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This thesis develops the literature on the role of human rights in the Cold War by
highlighting the impact of British human rights organisations in the response to Soviet dissent. It
argues that human rights groups played an essential role in compiling and distributing information
on Soviet dissenters to all levels of British society. These groups all held empiricism at the centre
of their campaigns, utilising an array of information to support their activism. This approach
entailed the development of relationships between groups, which led to a network of activists, all
working towards supporting Soviet dissenters.
The first chapter of this thesis assesses Amnesty International's output on Soviet
dissenters, focusing on the groups publications. Amnesty's translation of the samizdat journal The
Chronicle of Current Events and its own publication Prisoners of Conscience in the USSRwere
influential on journalists and other human rights groups. The high level of research produced by
Amnesty in this period was in deep contrast to its overstretched research department, who are
considered in depth.
The second chapter focuses on groups formed to respond to the Soviet political abuse of
psychiatry as a way to suppress political dissidents. It explores how groups such as the Working
Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals and the CampaignAgainst Psychiatric
Abuse campaigned on behalf of dissidents, and demonstrates the influence that they had on
official groups such asthe RoyalCollegeof Psychiatrists.
The final chapter examines the response to religious persecution in the Soviet Union,
focusing on the demonstrative campaigning of the Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry (the 35's)
and the more academic Keston College. This chapter demonstrates how despite the outward
differences between these two organisations, they held much in common such asa reliance on an
empirical method in their campaigns.
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Introduction
In the course of the ColdWar, human rights played an ever increasing role in the relations
between the Soviet Union and the wider world. Concern for prisoners of conscience persecuted
by the Soviet authorities grew in the West throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The Jackson-Vanik
amendment to the 1974 US Trade Act and the Helsinki Accords of 1975 are instances where
concerns for human rights directly impacted on the international conflict. Yet despite the
influence of the concept of human rights on international relations in this period, little is known of
the role played by groups formed in the West to campaign on behalf of Soviet political dissenters.
What role did these groups have, what was their purpose, and how influential were they on wider
political developments?
Dissidents in the Soviet Union were at the centre of public and political concern for
human rights in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, particularly from Western Europe and the United
States. The Soviet dissident movement was a loose collection of individuals who stood up against
the oppression of a totalitarian regime, notorious for the way in which it persecuted political
opponents. Their protests against the Soviet regime, which restricted their civil liberties to a
minimum, were regularly met with the harshest of punishments ranging from lengthy spells in
prison to personal intimidation by members of the KGB.
The resistance of these dissidents did not occur in a domestic vacuum, but relied on the
support of the international community. As the prominent dissident Yuri Orlov noted in his
memoirs Dangerous Thoughts, 'without pressure from abroad, any internal protest was virtually
useless'.' Charles Rheaume and Barbara Walker have both highlighted the important role that
Western opinion played on the Soviet dissident movement, and how dissidents utilised support
1Y. Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts: Memoirs 0/ a Russian Life (New York, 1991) p.170.
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from the West in their campaigns.' Details of the persecution of dissidents made their way to the
West through samizdat, exiled dissidents and the reports of [ournalists.'
Soviet dissenters were reliant on the attention they received from the West. Individuals
and organisations in the West who put pressure on the Soviet authorities were essential for
dissenters, without whom their campaigns would have undoubtedly been unsuccessful. These
dissidents needed the political leverage against the Soviet regime that an international campaign
on their behalf gave. On the whole, Western governments took the plight of the dissidents
increasingly seriously, and made official enquiries as to their position during meetings with Soviet
officials. At the centre of this pressure was a collection of human rights organisations, who
collated information on the dissidents, and campaigned fiercely on their behalf. Yet despite the
importance of these Western groups in shaping wider attitudes towards the Soviet dissidents,
their role has been largely overlooked to date. Indeed, the historiography of the role of human
rights organisations in the ColdWar is notably limited.
To date, discussion of human rights in the historiography of the Cold War has largely
focused on the impact that it had on high politics. In this literature, human rights are discussedin
direct reference to other issues, rather than as an important subject in its own right. For example,
John lewis Gaddis' The Cold Wa" only refers to human rights in direct relation to the SALTarms
treaty negotiations and other international dlscussions." likewise, RichardCrockatt only refers to
human rights in his work on the Cold War alongside foreign policy Issues," Robert English, noted
for his work on the impact of 'new thinking' on the Soviet regime after 1985, refers to the impact
that Margaret Thatcher had on Mikhail Gorbachev's developing humanitarian approach to foreign
2 C. Rheaume, 'Western Scientists' Reaction to Andrei Sakharov's Human Rights Struggle in the Soviet
Union, 1968-1989', Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 30, No.1, (February, 2008), pp. 1-20; and B. Walker,
'Moscow Human Rights Defenders Looks West, Attitudes towards U.S. Journalists in the 1960s and 1970s',
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Vol. 9, No.4 (Fall, 2008) pp. 905-927.
3 Samizdat was the underground form of publishing utilised by dissidents to avoid the state censor. It is a
play on the name of the major state publishing house, Gosizdat, and literally translates as 'self-published'.
This material was often typed on thin 'onion leaf paper to give several impressions, and then distributed
amongst dissident circles.
4 J. L.Gaddis, The Cold War (london, 2006) pp. 182-184, 188, and 201.
sR. Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991
(Abingdon, 1995) pp. 256-256, and 264,
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policy, which included discussion of human rights issues, but fails to directly address the impact
that human rights activists had on these figures," These scholars, whilst identifying that human
rights played an important role in differing aspects of the Cold War, fail to fully address the role
that human rights groups and activists played in promoting these concerns.
Whilst it is apparent that human rights activists have not been sufficiently covered by the
historiography on the Cold War to date, the impact of human rights has been discussed by a
variety of scholars in recent years. Daniel Thomas' article 'Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of
Communism, and the end of the Cold War' focuses on the changes in the Soviet Union at the end
of the Cold War. This piece challenges the traditional view of political developments in the Soviet
Union in the 1980s being dominated by the economic concerns of a conservative political ellte.'
Instead, Thomas highlights the effect that human rights ideas had on the Soviet General Secretary
Mikhail Gorbachev and the reforms that took place in the Soviet Union in the 1980s. He argues
that the influence of human rights ideals at the highest levels of the Soviet authorities played a
significant part in both the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in the ending of the Cold War.
Thomas' article was published in a special edition of the Journal of Cold War Studies that
focused on the role of ideas in the end of the Cold War. In an introductory piece to this special
edition, Nina Tannenwald and William Wohlfarth note that 'the debates of the end of the Cold
War provide fertile ground for investigating the role of ldeas'," Whilst this is true, it is also the
case that the entirety of the Cold War provides rich pickings for the study of ideas, none more so
than the concept of universal human rights. Tannenwald and Wohlfarth put it that the real issue
about the role played by ideas is not whether they 'mattered' in the ending of the Cold War, as
most observers would rightly agree that alongside material issues, institutions and individual
personalities, they had a clear impact. The important question to ask, they argue, is 'how to
6 R. D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War (New
York, 2000) pp. 218-221.
7 D. Thomas, 'Human Rights Ideas, The Demise of Communism and the End of the Cold War', Journal of Cold
War Studies, Vol. 7, No.2 (Spring, 2005) pp. 110-141.
8 N. Tannenwald and W. Wohlforth, 'Introduction: The Role of Ideas and the End of the Cold War', Journal
of Cold War Studies, Vol. 7, No.2 (Spring 2005) p. 4.
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discussproductively the role ideas played in this complex outcome'." This is particularly important
when considering the role of human rights in the Cold War. It is essential to consider how the
concept of human rights, and the work of human rights activists, impacted on the ideological
conflict, going beyond the repeated assertion that these concepts were important in this period."
Analysis of human rights groups, and how they responded to reports of Soviet human rights
violations, is a practical way to consider the impact that ideas had on the ColdWar.
Christian Peterson's recent PhD dissertation 'Wielding the Human Rights Weapon: The
United States, Soviet Union and Private Citizens, 1975-1989' takes the role of human rights
centrally, seeking to place the issue of human rights firmly into the international relations of the
late twentieth century." Specifically, Peterson looks to analyse how the concern of private
citizens towards human rights violation influenced the actions of the Carter and Reagan
administrations in the US, and how their actions, rhetoric and relationship with Non
Governmental Organisations (NGOs)helped to establish an international network that sought the
protection of human rights in the Soviet Union. Peterson uses the reaction to the Final Act of the
Helsinki Accords in an attempt to show how an international conception of human rights directly
affected the approach of USgovernments to Soviet dissidents, and the impact this had on US-
Soviet relations. Whilst Peterson effectively illustrates that human rights were a key concern of
these US administrations, his focus is primarily on the high politics of the US, rather than how
human rights activism is driven from below, something that is suggested by his title.
SarahSnyder's recent book Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War assesses
the role of human rights activists in the Cold War, building on Thomas' work by focusing on the
role of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.l2 Snyder argues that the signing of this act led to a
transnational network which pressured governments for adherence to the provisions for human
9 Tannenwald and Wohlforth, 'Introduction', p. 8.
10 For example, Crockatt, The Fifty Years War, p. 264, and Gaddis, The Cold War, p. 188.
11 C. Peterson, Wielding the Human Rights Weapon: The United States, Soviet Union, and Private Citizens,
1975-1989 (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, submitted to Ohio University, June 2009). See also C. Peterson,
Globalizing Human Rights: Private Citizens, the Soviet Union, and the West (New York, 2012).
12 S. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End oj the Cold War: A Transnational History of tne Helsinki
Network (Cambridge, 2011).
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rights set out in the Helsinki Final Act. This international network comprised of dissidents, activists
and politicians, is the focus of Snyder's work, in which she argues that this network, which
developed from the Helsinki process, helped to shape the end of the Cold War. Whilst Snyder's
argument is compelling, much like Peterson's thesis it lackssufficient assessmentof human rights
organisations which are rightly argued to have played an important role. Both of these pieces,
which challenge the traditional dominance of political figures in the historiography of the Cold
War, fail to fully highlight the role of human rights organisations, and the important role that they
played in political developments in the 1970sand 1980s.
There is a clear development in these scholars' work regarding the position of human
rights activism. Thomas highlights the essential role played by human rights, focusing on how it
influenced politicians. Peterson develops the importance of human rights by tentatively
suggesting the importance of the private citizen and NGOs in US policy towards human rights
violation. Snyder takes this one stage further by discussingthe role played by Helsinki Groups, but
they are portrayed as subtly influencing politicians, rather than dictating their direction. Whilst
this is a slight nuance in the role played by these organisations, it is an important distinction to
make with regards to both the relationship that they had with positions of power and their own
political influence.
The study of human rights in the context of the Cold War is essentially an analysisof what
the former USAssistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye has termed 'soft power'. Nye defines
this power as 'resting on the ability to shape the preferences of others', something that groups
from this period campaigned extensively for.13 Whilst Nye's work considers the high politics of
soft power, and how it has been utilised by governments and international organisations, smaller
organisations can clearly attempt to use this form of power. Human rights groups in the ColdWar
utilised the soft power they had to influence governments and other organisations in order to
assistSoviet dissidents.
13 J. S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York, 2004) p.S.
13
Alongside the developing literature on the role of human rights in the Cold War, scholars
have recently questioned the general approach to human rights. Robin Redhead and Nick
Turnbull's recent article, 'Towards a Study of Human Rights Practitioners', argues that the concept
of human rights is driven by activists and practitioners, rather than philosophical prlnclples." This
philosophical approach to date has focused largely on the development of the ideological basis of
human rights, rather than the explicit practice, campaigning for, and protection of these rights. is
In the context of research into the Cold War, shifting the focus from the theoretical development
of human rights towards an understanding of how these concepts were practically approached is
essential in fully understanding the political context of the Cold War.
This thesis will develop the work of Thomas, Peterson and Snyder by assessing the role
played by human rights activists in Britain, illustrating the key role they played in the British
response to Soviet dissidents. It will show how groups formed in Britain in the 1960s, 1970s and
1980s acted as a conduit for material on dissidents to reach the wider British society. In some
cases this was through the direct translation and reproduction of samizdat, and other dissident
material that had been smuggled to the West. Information on Soviet dissidents was also
presented to the wider British public through a variety of reports and news bulletins produced by
these groups, which often contained the most up-to-date information on dissidents. This was
used by journalists, academics and politicians alike, and regularly contributed to the public
discourse on dissidents. This is an important contribution to this literature as it illustrates how
14 R.Redheadand N.Turnbull, 'Towards a Study of Human Rights Practitioners', Human Rights Review, Vol.
12 (2011), pp. 173-189.
15 There is a vast amount of literature on the historiography of human rights, and its theoretical
development. SeeR.Afshari, 'On Historiography of Human Rights Reflections on PaulGordon lauren's The
Evolution of International Human Rights:Visions Seen', Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29, No.1 (2007), pp.
1-67; K.Cmiel, 'The Recent History of Human Rights', The American Historical Review, Vol. 109, No.1
(February, 2004), pp. 117-136; J. Donnelly, Universal Human Rights: In Theory & Practice (New York, 2003);
R.Dudai, 'The long View: Human RightsActivism, Pastand Present', Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 7, No.3
(2008), pp. 299-309; M. Freeman, Human Rights (Cambridge, 2002), especially pp. 32-75; S.Hertel, l.
Scruggsand C. Patrick Heidkamp, 'Human Rights and Public Opinion: From Attitudes to Action', Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 124, No.3 (2009), pp. 443-459; l.Hunt, Inventing Human Rights (New York, 2007); P.
Gordon lauren, 'History and Human Rights: People and Forces in Paradoxical Interaction', Journal of Human
Rights, Vol. 7, No.2 (2008), pp. 91-103; and M. Mutua, Human Rights: A Political & Cultural Critique
(Pennsylvania, 2002). Marle-Benedlcte Dembour, 'What are Human Rights?Four Schoolsof Thought',
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 32, No.1 (February, 2010), pp. 1-20, is a particularly useful article on the
theoretical background of the main strands of human rights scholarship.
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these groups used a variety of different means to collate information on Soviet human rights
violation, and repackaged it for the wider public, highlighting how influential they were in the
political developments of the ColdWar.
Whilst Britain was not the only nation to have developed movements that supported the
Soviet dissidents in the Cold War, the British response to Soviet dissent is unique compared to
other nations for a number of reasons." Arguably, the most prominent distinction that these
groups held in this period was a respect for the quality of research into the position of Soviet
dissenters. Britain became home to research specialisms with human rights groups commanding
international respect for their expertise, particularly on the Soviet abuse of psychiatry and the
persecution of religious believers. The reason for this expertise is largely due to several key
individuals that lived in Britain at this time, who formed organisations to research these areas and
played a large part in their activism. The work of these individuals will be discussed in the course
of this thesis, highlighting the key role that they played in the establishment, organisation, and
the impact of these groups. This research came at a time when the concept of human rights, and
perhaps more importantly the desire to campaign for the human rights of unknown others, came
to the fore in British culture.
One can point to the response to the formation of Amnesty International in london in
1961, and its campaigns for the so-called 'forgotten prisoners', as the start of this wider human
rights movement. To this day, Amnesty has established itself as the most important human rights
organisation in the world, becoming synonymous with the concept of human rights in both the
media and in wider British discourse. The first chapter of this thesis will consider how Amnesty
highlighted the level of Soviet human rights violation, and how they campaigned on behalf of
Soviet dissidents. This is a largely unexplored area as research to date on Amnesty's activism has
overlooked the organisation's campaigning and research on the Soviet Union. This chapter will
16 Human rights groups working for Soviet dissidents were particularly active in the United States, and
several European countries. For examples of these campaigns, see G. Beckerman, When They Come For Us
We'll Be Gone: The Epic Struggle to Save Soviet Jewry (New York, 2010); M. S. Christofferson, French
Intellectuals Against the Left: The Antitotalitarian Movement of the 1970s (Oxford, 2004); and J. Laber, The
Courage of Strangers: Coming of Age with the Human Rights Movement (New York, 2002).
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argue that Amnesty's output on the Soviet Union had significant influence across British society.
The translation and reproduction of the samizdat journal the Chronicle of Current Events,
alongside the two editions of its own report Prisoners of Conscience in the USSRin 1975 and 1980,
had a dramatic influence, offering detailed research and primary material to the media,
academics and the general public alike. The reception of this material was strengthened by
Amnesty's reputation for accuracy and reliability, something that it had seamlessly built up from
its foundation. This chapter on Amnesty's research on the Soviet dissident movement will also
highlight how productive and efficient its researchers were. Amnesty's Soviet researchers were
few and far between in the period covered by this thesis. Despite this, the level of research they
produced - including writing press releases, dealing with requests from Amnesty members,
preparing material for campaigns, and translating samizdat - was staggering. That such a level of
output was created by little more than two or three researchers is indicative of the commitment
of these researchers.
Alongside Amnesty's research and campaigns on behalf of Soviet dissenters, other human
rights groups were formed in Britain around a variety of different concerns. Two main issues - the
political abuse of psychiatric treatment as a tool to persecute dissidents, and the state endorsed
policy of atheism which directly persecuted religious believers - led to the formation of a variety
of organisations. The second chapter of this thesis will consider the British response to the
political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union, focusing on how the Royal College of
Psvchlatrlsts" was influenced by organisations such as the Medical and Scientific Committee for
Soviet Jewry (MSCSJ), the Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals
(Working Group), and the Campaign Against Psychiatric Abuse (CAPA). It will illustrate how the
policy of official bodies such as the Royal College were directly influenced by human rights
activists, who in some cases drove these organisations. It will assess the activities of the Special
Committee on the Political Abuse of Psychiatry (SCPAP), the Royal College of Psychiatrists'
committee formed in response to reports of the abuse of psychiatric treatment in the Soviet
17 The RoyalCollege of Psychiatrists will be referred to as the 'Royal College' throughout this piece.
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Union. It will show how individuals from human rights organisations held huge amounts of
influence over this committee, something that gave them much authority over the Royal College's
dealings with the Soviet All Union Society of Neuropathologists and Psychiatrists (AUSNP). Despite
claims that the SCPAPwould not develop links with human rights organisations, it is clear that by
the early 1980s these groups held much influence over the direction of this committee.
The final chapter of this thesis will assess the British response to the Soviet persecution of
religious believers, focusing on the efforts of two groups - Keston College and the Women's
Campaign for Soviet Jewry (also known as the 35's). Studying these two organisations alongside
each other enables analysis of how two different groups approached offering assistance to
dissidents in the Soviet Union. Keston College, led by the activist Michael Bourdeaux, developed
an internationally renowned research profile, and became a hub of information in the West about
the state of religious belief in communist nations, with a particular focus on the Soviet Union.
Keston collected a vast amount of material about the Soviet persecution of religious belief, and
published an array of materials based on their research. Amongst these, its journal Religion in
Communist Lands and its regular news circular the Keston News Service, both of whieh were used
by journalists, academies and politicians alike, gave Keston significant influence over the public
perception of religious belief in the Soviet Union. In direct contrast to Keston, the 35's were more
akin to a stereotypical protest group. They regularly engaged in public protests and the stage
invasions of cultural events with a particular flare. They became renowned for their elaborate
methods, whieh included an array of fancy dress and publicity hungry displays in order to gain
attention for their cause - attaining exit visas for refuseniks in the Soviet unlon." The 35's
outlandish appearance was underpinned by serious research, mostly conducted in the form of the
conversations Michael Sherbourne, one of the groups key supporters, engaged in with refuseniks.
18 Refuseniks were Soviet Jewswho applied for exit visas to emigrate to either Israel or another Western
country, and were subsequently refused by the Soviet authorities. These refuseniks were subjected to
persecution for their request to emigrate, including KGBsurveillance and pressure, and the loss of
employment. For more details on the refusenik movement seeM. Altshuler, Soviet Jewry Since the Second
World War (London, 1987); P. Buwalda, 7hey Did Not Dwell Alone': Jewish Emigration from the Soviet
Union 1967 -1990 (Washington D.C., 1997); E.Drachman, Challenging the Kremlin: The Jewish Movement
for Freedom, 1967 -1990 (New York, 1992); and L. P. Salitan, Politics and Nationality in Contemporary
Soviet-Jewish Emigration, 1968 - 89 (London, 1992).
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This chapter will illustrate how although these two organisations appear different on face value,
their activities were both underpinned research on collated primary source material.
Despite the differing outward approach that each of these human rights groups took in
their campaigns, this thesis will demonstrate that they all held the same central basis for their
activism. Eachof these campaignswas based on the collation and distribution of information. This
focus on empiricism was essential in the context of the Cold War, where propaganda from both
sides of the Iron Curtain was produced to manipulate public opinion. By using evidence at the
centre of their campaigns, these organisations attempted to step aside from this ideological
conflict, and focus solely on the facts regarding the treatment of prisoners of conscience. The
collation, and widespread distribution of information by these organisations gave them a
reputation of expertise in this field, which lead to them being taken seriously by journalists and
politicians alike.
The establishment of this reputation of expertise was particularly important on the
influence that these human rights groups had on British cultural attitudes towards prisoners of
conscience in the Soviet Union. Through their activism, these groups held a significant amount of
influence over the creation of the British discourse on Soviet dissenters. Public opinion on these
dissenting figures in Britain was shaped by the information produced and distributed by these
organisations. Not only did these groups reproduce samizdat materials produced by dissidents,
but their reports were also highly influential on prominent journalists such as Bernard Levin who
wrote regularly about Soviet dissidents in his column in The Times. This would have been
impossible without the reputation of reliability that these groups developed over the course of
the 1960s and 1970s, and it is clear that their campaigns would have been largely overlooked by
the media without this reliability. Indeed, the establishment and protection of their reputation
came to characterise the campaigns of many human rights organisations, something which
undoubtedly contributed to their successesin influencing the public agenda.
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Whilst this thesis is predominantly an analysisof the role of human rights groups, the role
played by individual activists should not be overlooked. Indeed, the key role played by prominent
individuals is telling of the function and direction of the organisations themselves, which were
often extensions of the leading figures interests and concerns. In most cases, the fervour with
which these groups functioned was dictated by the determination and vision of a single individual,
or small group of like-minded figures. Indeed, the successof these organisations can be attributed
to the hard work and willpower of these individuals and small groups. Even larger organisations,
such as Amnesty International, were influenced heavily by the input of prominent individuals,
who played a large part in shaping the group's output on the Soviet Union.
At first glance, the activities of the organisations formed in Britain in this period appear
disparate, and focused primarily on separate issues. Indeed, the literature to date on this area,
which will be examined more extensively in the course of this thesis, has tended to focus on the
activity of individual organisations. Monographs and extensive pieces could be devoted solely to
the actions of an individual organisation or activist discussed in the course of this thesis. However,
this focused analysis loses the subtle relationships that these organisations had with each other.
These organisations did not work in a vacuum; they shared information, and worked together on
campaign demonstrations. In some instances, individuals were prominently involved in the
organisation of more than one campaign. Taking this into account, the way in which these groups
operated is best understood when they are considered alongside each other, rather than
individually. Taking this approach highlights that these groups formed a wide network of activists,
all striving towards a similar aim in supporting Soviet dissenters.
Beneath the high politics of the Cold War, there was the establishment of a network of
concerned activists involved with human rights organisations, who responded to information they
had received from the Soviet Union, and packaged it for wider public consumption. These
organisations were at the forefront of establishing public consciousnessin Britain regarding these
human rights violations, spreading awareness of their plight at all levels of society. Indeed, human
rights, and the efforts of organisations in highlighting where these rights had been abused, clearly
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played a role in developing Anglo-Soviet relations in the 1970s and 1980s.19 Sir Curtis Keeble, the
British Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1978-1982, noted that,
The subsequent 'human rights' strand of British policy, pursued both on an overtly governmental
level and by private British organisations, was doubtless seen by the Soviet authorities as an
attempt to influence the development of Soviet society and over the years it was a not
insignificant element in the total relatlonshtp.i"
Whilst this thesis focuses explicitly on the response of British human rights groups to
Soviet dissenters, it also has implications for the literature to date on the Soviet dissident
movement itself. The historiography on Soviet dissenters to date can be divided into two major
areas, works that focus explicitly on an individual dissenter, predominantly in biographical form,
and pieces that consider wider themes and issues within the movement.
The bulk of the scholarship available on the Soviet dissident movement is in the form of
autobiographies of the dissidents themselves. These were translated and published widely in the
West from the 1970s onwards and give an interesting insight into individual dissidents."
Alongside these memoirs, Western scholars have also produced a variety of biographies of
dissidents. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, these included Michael Scammell's work on
Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Sir Martin Gilbert's biography of Anatoly Shcharanskv." Since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, an array of material has been made available to historians that
19 For more on the development of Anglo-Soviet relations in the twentieth century, seeM. Hughes, Inside
the Enigma: British Officials in Russia, 1900-1939 (london, 1997); F.S.Northedge, and A.Wells, Britain and
Soviet Communism: The Impact of a Revolution (london, 1982); A. Pravda, and P.J. S.Duncan, (ed.), Soviet-
British Relations Since the 1970s (Cambridge, 1990); and B.White, Britain, Detente and Changing East-West
Relations (london, 1992). For a wider historical discussion of Anglo-Russian relations, see M. 5 Anderson,
Britain's Discovery of Russia 1553-1815 (New York, 1958); J. H.Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in
Great Britain: A Study of the Interaction of Policy and Opinion (london, 1950); M. Hughes, 'Bernard Pares,
RussianStudies and the Promotion of Anglo-Russian Friendship, 1907 -14', The Slavonic and East European
Review, Vol. 78, No.3 (2000), pp. 510-535; M. Hughes, 'British Opinion and RussianTerrorism in the 1880s',
European History Quarterly, Vol. 41, No.2 (2011), pp. 255-277; M. Hughes, 'Searching for the Soul of Russia:
British Perceptions of Russianduring the First World War', Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 20, No.2
(2009), pp. 198-226; and M. Malia, Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin
Mausoleum (london, 1992).
20 C.Keeble, Britain and the Soviet Union, 1917-1989 (london, 1990) p. 323.
21 Examplesof these memoirs include P. Grigorenko, Memoirs (london, 1983); A. Marchenko, My Testimony
(london, 1969); V. Nekipelov, Institute of Fools (london, 1980); l. Plyushch,History's Carnival (london,
1979); A. Sakharov,Memoirs, (london, 1990); and A. Solzhenitsyn, The Oak and the Calf (london, 1980).
22 M. Gilbert, Shcharansky, Hero of Our Time (london, 1986) and M. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn - A Biography
(london, 1985). Anatoly Shcharanskychanged his name to Natan Sharanskyfollowing his emigration to
Israel in 1986. Given its focus, this thesis will use the pre-exile version of his name, in keeping with the
literature of the time.
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would have been impossible to access during the Cold War, including the ability to interview
dissidents in Russia and other former Soviet nations.
Jay Bergman and Richard Lourie's biographies of Andrei Sakharov and Emma Gilligan's
work on Sergei Kovalyov are examples of what can be considered as an emerging field of
literature regarding Soviet dissenters." Given the number of dissidents involved in political
opposition both in the Soviet Union and countries in the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, there is
clearly potential for many more such biographical pieces. That leading dissident figures such as
Elena Bonner, Vladimir Bukovsky, and Yury Orlov, amongst many others, have not had detailed
accounts of their lives produced by historians is something that will undoubtedly be addressed in
the coming years."
Alongside work focused directly on the life and work of individual dissenters, there have
been a variety of pieces written covering the wider scope of the dissident movement. Before the
collapse of the Soviet Union, works such as Joshua Rubenstein's Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle
for Human Rights were an attempt to understand the breadth of human rights groups in the
USSR.25This literature has been expanded upon since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with works
by scholars such as Philip Boobbyer and Robert Horvath that have focused on wider themes
regarding dissidents in the Soviet Union, such as spirituality, nationality and their political
thought." These pieces can be seen as attempts to understand the dissident movement in the
Soviet Union as a whole, seeking to identify common themes and influences that shaped them.
Given the disparate nature of the Soviet nonconformism, this scholarship is focused
23 J. Bergman, Meeting the Demands of Reason, The Life and Thought of Andrei Sakharov (New York, 2009),
R.Lourie, Sakharov, A Biography (Hanover, 2002), and E.Gilligan, Defending Human Rights in Russia: Sergei
Kovalyov, Dissident and Human Rights Commissioner 1969-2003 (Abingdon, 2004).
24 All three of these dissidents have produced lengthy memoirs of their activism, see E.Bonner, Alone
Together (London, 1986); V. Bukovsky, To Build a Castle (London, 1978); and Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts.
Philip Boobbyer has recently written an article on the political thought of Vladimir Bukovsky that goes some
way to address his life as a dissident. SeeP. Boobbyer, 'Vladimir Bukovsky and Soviet Communism', Slavonic
and East European Review. Vol. 87, No.3 (2009), pp. 452-487.
2S J. Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights (Boston, 1985).
26 P. Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia (Abingdon, 2005); R.Horvath, The Legacy of
Soviet Dissent: Dissidents, Democratisation and Radical Nationalism in Russia (Abingdon, 2005); and R.
Horvath, "'The Solzhenitsyn Effect": EastEuropean Dissidents and the Demiseof the Revolutionary
Privilege', Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29 (2007), pp. 879-907.
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predominantly on overarching themes linked to the dissidents, rather than the specific political
thought of individual figures.
This thesis is particularly important for the historiography of Soviet dissent as it placesthe
struggle of these individuals into a wider context, internationalising their position. It must be
made clear that this thesis is not an analysis of Soviet dissenters themselves; however, it does
contribute to scholarship on this area by reasserting the role played by British human rights
activists. In order to fully understand the Soviet dissident movement it is essential to recognise
that their plight did not occur in a domestic vacuum, but that it was directly connected to an
international community that was concerned about their plight.
The efforts of the dissidents in the Soviet Union were intertwined with the work of human
rights organisations and activists in the West. In certain cases, such as those of the prominent
human rights campaigner Vladimir Bukovsky, and the Soviet psychiatrists Marina Voikhanskaya
and Alexander Voloshanovich, some dissidents became actively involved with human rights
organisations in Britain after being exiled from the Soviet Union, further blurring the distinction
between activists in the two countries. It is therefore impossible to fully understand the dissident
movement in the Soviet Union without taking into account the human rights activism working on
its behalf that was developing in nations such as Britain at the same time. The analysis of British
human rights groups not only emphasises the important role that they played, but it also
internationalises the Soviet dissident movement, highlighting that it is essential to consider their
efforts in a global context.
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Note on Sources
Given its scope, this thesis will utilise a variety of differing types of primary material. The
bulk of this material is from the archival repositories of the individual organisations studied,
including Amnesty International, the Royal College of Psychiatrists, The Women's Campaign for
Soviet Jewry, and Keston College. In these instances, the archival material of these organisations
has been largely well preserved. This is due in part to sufficient finance and interest needed to
keep such large collections intact. Despite this, there are inevitable caseswhere archival materials
have been lost. The vast majority of the papers of the prominent Soviet Jewry activist Michael
Sherbourne, for example, were destroyed in the 1970s when they were being moved from
flooded offices in heavy rainfall. 27 These papers included transcripts of Sherbourne's many
conversations with refuseniks in the Soviet Union that provided much of the information used by
British Soviet Jewry organisations formed in this period, such as the 35's. A full list of archival
repositories used can be found in the appendices to this work.
The types of materials found in these collections and used in this research varies between
each archive. In most cases,internal correspondence and the minutes of meetings were the most
prominently used materials. These give an interesting insight in to the day to day operations of
these organisations, highlighting in some instances disagreements between members regarding
policy, which can be readily corroborated against other materials. These internal documents were
used alongside the external publications of each organisation which in some casesfar outweighed
the number of internal documents. Amnesty International, for example, produced a variety of
external publications such as news releases and calls for urgent action. Other organisations, such
as Keston College, produced regular journals and books which formed the bulk of their activism.
The external publication of these organisations was one of the key links between these groups
and their wider audience, and assuch have been considered in substantial depth.
27 Interviewwith MichaelSherbourne,9 May2011.
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Alongside archival repositories and the publications produced by human rights groups,
the research for this thesis also included a series of interviews conducted between September
2009 and October 2011 with individuals who were actively involved with these human rights
organisations. Interviews were basedaround two wide reaching questions put to interviewees:
• How were they involved with British groups campaigning for Soviet dissenters?
• How did they feel their efforts were received?
These questions allowed the interviewee to discusstheir involvement with British human
rights organisations, providing a narrative on the group and their own personal activism. It also
allowed them to reflect on how effective they felt their work was, and how it was received by
different aspects of society, which produced quite emotive responses from some interviewees.
Conducting interviews in this manner allowed a flexible approach that could be applied to
differing individuals involved with different organisations.
These interviews had two main purposes for this thesis. Firstly, they were used to
highlight the interviewee's perception of their activism, and allowed them to discuss their own
opinion of their efforts. This has added much colour to the subject of campaigning against human
rights violation which can, at times, be an impersonal and harrowing subject to research. It is
essential to remember that in some cases these activists were emotionally involved in their
efforts, campaigning on behalf of individuals with whom they built deep and lasting relationships
that in some cases put their safety at risk. Use of these interviews adds this extra dimension to
this research.
Secondly, and perhaps most usefully for this research, these interviews were used to
identify other areas of primary material that could be used in this study. Whilst this was not
always the case, the majority of these interviews opened avenues of enquiry that would have
been unconsidered without the personal suggestions of those interviewed. The personal expertise
of these individuals was clear from their suggestions for further work, which has undoubtedly
improved the quality of this thesis. This was in some cases accessto personal papers, in other
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casesthe identification of archival material. It is important to note that these interviews were not
the main source of information used in this thesis, and have been used primarily to supplement
other primary materials. Whilst this thesis has employed elements of oral history in developing
interview technique, this is not a oral history thesis." A list of those interviewed, and more details
of individual interviews, can be found at the end of this thesis.
28 There is a large, and growing, body of literature about the use of oral history. For example, see R. Perks




Amnesty International and Soviet Dissent
The basic idea of Amnesty International is to depoliticise the concepts of the civil and political
rights of the individual, the impermissibility of torture and other forms of inhuman treatment of
persons. Since time immemorial these concepts have been treated as in the political sphere.
Amnesty International has brought them in to the sphere of universal morality, the sphere of
spiritual culture. It is a paradox: how is it possible to depoliticise the concept of political rights?
Yet this is what Amnesty International does.
The Inertia of Fear, Valentin Turchin,"
It is with a feeling of disgust that one turns over the pages of Amnesty International's reports on
"prisoners of conscience" and other similar materials which can seem to be woven from a cobweb
of little lies interspersed with big lies.
The Anatomy of Lies, Samuil Zivs30
The concept of human rights in British society in the twentieth century has been largely
shaped by the activities and campaigns of Amnesty International. 31 Amnesty is undoubtedly the
world's most respected and renowned human rights organisation. It recently celebrated the so"
anniversary of its foundation, and it occupies a unique position amongst human rights
organisations for its large membership and esteemed history. Amnesty has developed an
unrivalled international reputation for its work, becoming synonymous with human rights
campaigning and the term 'prisoner of conscience' which was coined by the organisation.
Since its formation in May 1961 after the British lawyer Peter Benenson published an
appeal for amnesty entitled 'The Forgotten Prisoners' in The Observer, Amnesty has developed a
reputation that commands respect from national governments and international organisations
allke." As the Soviet dissenter Valentin Turchin notes in The Inertia of Fear, Amnesty attempted
to depoliticise the concept of human rights, something that had previously been considered as a
uniquely political concept. Its efforts alongside other organisations in this period shifted the
29 'Translation of an excerpt from 'The Inertia of Fear' by Valentin Turchin', Amnesty International Executive
Committee (IEC)document 152, [POL06/IEC 02/79], Internationaallnstituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis
(IISG),Amsterdam, Netherlands. Amnesty usea coding system for their archival material, giving a unique
number for individual documents. Details of this system are given in Appendix 1.
30 S.Zivs, The Anatomy of Lies, (Moscow, 1982) p. 35. This is a propaganda piece produced by the Soviet
authorities to attack Amnesty International. It will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.
31 This thesis will refer to Amnesty International as 'Amnesty' throughout.
32 P. Benenson, 'The Forgotten Prisoners', The Observer, 28 May 1961.
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concept of human rights firmly to, asTurchin puts it, the 'sphere of universal moralltv'." This is a
dramatic shift that has significantly shaped the contemporary Western world, and has given rise
to human rights legislation and guarantees in many countries internationally.
Given the universal respect for its work as a human rights organisation, and its
involvement in publicising cases of human rights violation in the Soviet Union, Amnesty is an
essential organisation to consider in the response to Soviet dissenters by British human rights
groups. In the 1970s and 1980s it published widely on Soviet human rights abuses. These
publications included the translation of the important samizdat journal the Chronicle of Current
Events and its own report Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR.This material shaped the British
perception of Soviet dissent, and was widely utilised by journalists, academies,and human rights
activists in their work on these dissidents.
Despite this important role, there has been no comment to date on Amnesty's efforts in
publicising and campaigning against the human rights violation in the Soviet Union. Given the
central role that Amnesty has played in the international development of human rights in the
twentieth century, it is important that its response to the Soviet Union - one of the most serious
abusers of universal human rights in the twentieth century - is fully understood.
It is telling that of the scholarship on Amnesty's response to Soviet human rights abuses,
the most informative pieces are two programs on the history of the organisation produced by the
BBC. 'The Future of Amnesty International' was a two part radio programme broadcast on the
BBCWorld Service in September 2011. 341t covered the development of the organisation from
Benenson's initial idea to form an organisation through to its current guise. The first edition of
this programme devoted substantial time to discussion of Amnesty's response to Soviet human
rights violations, whieh included an interview with the Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky.
'Amnestyl When They Are All Free' was broadcast on BBC4in May 2011, and similarly contains
33 Turchin,'TheInertiaof Fear'.
34 'TheFutureof AmnestyInternational',first broadcaston BBCWorldServiceon 13 September2011.
Availableat, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/pOOjf3yz[accessed24 October2011].
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interviews with Bukovsky on Amnesty's campaigns on the Soviet Union.35 These two programmes
were part of the wider media coverage given to Amnesty in 2011, to coincide with the so"
anniversary of the group's foundation. This included an array of newspaper comment on
Amnesty's first half century, and was largely positive about the groups work."
Despite the recent interest in Amnesty's history, and in the campaigns it has conducted,
there is no one work that can be considered as a good history of the organisation. No work has
considered Amnesty's history in extensive detail, something which is surprising given the
international reputation of the group. There are pieces that have considered aspects of Amnesty's
history, but none have sought to place Amnesty into the context of the international political
developments of the twentieth century. The reason for this gap in the literature is twofold. Firstly,
the sheer scope of Amnesty's work in campaigning against human rights abuses around the world
mean that a history of the organisation would require an author to have a working knowledge of
an enormous amount of primary source material. Amnesty's internal archives, housed at the
Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis37 (IISG) in Amsterdam are voluminous in both
paper and microfilm collections. The collection at the IISG needs to be considered alongside other
Amnesty archival collections, such as repositories at the Modern Records Centre, University of
Warwick and the large microfiche anthology produced by the Dutch publishers 10C, both of which
are extensive in their own rights. A project on the 'complete' history of Amnesty would be an
enormous one which would undoubtedly be the life's work of a keen scholar. The scale of such a
project is likely to have deterred historians from approaching Amnesty's work in its entirety, going
some way to suggest why such a history has not been produced to date. Secondly, given the
emotive nature of Amnesty's ongoing work, it is likely that those interested in the history of the
35 'Amnestyl When they are All Free', first broadcast on BBC4on 31 May 2011, programme information
available at http://www.bbc.co.ukLprogrammesLb011m9cx, video available at
http://www.youtube.comLwatch?v=Bn04cBOYz7g [accessed9 July 2012].
36 For example see The New Review, The Observer, 3 April 2011, which contained a 12 page special on
Amnesty's half century; T. McVeigh, 'Front: Amnesty marks 50 year of fighting to free world's prisoners of
conscience: An article in the Observer in 1961 led to the setting up of the group that has become a
champion of human rights', The Observer, 29 May 2011, p. 3; and P. Bignell, 'Amnesty SO years of fighting
for human rights', The Independent on Sunday, 29 May 2011, p. 28.
37 International Institute of SocialHistory.
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organisation are also concerned with its current campaigns. Those who might be interested in
researching the history of this group may become more concerned with the contemporary
concerns of the organisation and devote their attention there.
Whilst these two reasons may have dissuaded scholars from approaching a general
history of Amnesty, this is not to suggest that Amnesty has been ignored entirely by historians in
recent years. Of the recent scholarship of the organisation, the works of three authors stand out.
Tom Buchanan's article ''The Truth Will Set You Free': The Making of Amnesty International'
discussesthe founding years of Amnesty, stressing the importance of the international context of
the ColdWar in the groups forrnatlon." This article outlines the early years of Amnesty, exploring
how it developed from Benenson's original vision into an established human rights organisation
by the end of the 1960s. Buchanan's article neatly shows how Amnesty was not born solely out of
the work of one man, as has sometimes been suggested, but by a plethora of concerned
individuals. He argues that Benenson was assisted and inspired by individuals such as Sean
McBride, louis Blom Cooper, Eric Baker and Frank Buchman, and that Amnesty was born out of
the ideas of these men.39 Buchanan has also written a second article on the early years of
Amnesty, detailing a tense period in the development of the organisation. 'Amnesty International
in Crisis, 1966-7' discussesthe events of the mid 1960s, where it was alleged that Amnesty had
been infiltrated by British intelligence, and that it was being used to channel secret funds in
Rhodesia." This piece can easily be read alongside 'The Truth Will Set You Free', and neatly shows
how Amnesty's initial enthusiasm was dampened by these accusations. It is also a revealing piece
about the personalities that surrounded Amnesty in its early years, casting Benenson asextremely
paranoid and out of control of the organisation that he had founded. Whilst these two pieces by
Buchanan are articles from specialist academic journals, read together they arguably provide one
38 T. Buchanan, ''The Truth Will Set You Free': The Making of Amnesty International', Journal of
Contemporary History, Vol. 37, No.4 (Oct. 2002) pp. 577, 579, 584, and 595.
39 Buchanan, 'The Truth Will Set You Free', pp. 581-2, 584-6, 589, and 595.
40 T. Buchanan, 'Amnesty International in Crisis, 1966-7', Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 15, No.3
(2004), pp. 267-289.
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of the best accounts of Amnesty's early years. This is revealing both of their quality and the lack of
extended scholarship on Amnesty's history.
Stephen Hopgood's Keepers of the Flame, although focusing on contemporary debates
about the direction of Amnesty's work in the early 2000s, contains substantial analysis of its
development. Hopgood places these debates about Amnesty's work into an historical context,
clearly illustrating the impact that its composition in earlier years has had on its current
researchers resistance to changing practice." Hopgood's piece extensively analyses the basis of
justification for Amnesty's work, seeking essentially to identify why those who work for Amnesty
do what they do. He notes that the complex structures and working methods of Amnesty are best
understood as a secular religion, with primary concern on relations between human beings rather
than with a divine being." This is a neat way of describing the impact that Amnesty's ethos hason
its membership and the direction of the organisation.
Firstly, the description of Amnesty as a secular religion alludes to the influence that its
central body had over its membership in the West, something that it has arguably maintained to
this day with a significant proportion of the British public. Secondly, inferring that an organisation
operates as a religion suggests that it has a set of devoted followers, something that can clearly
be seen in the dedication of Amnesty's membership. Finally, association with religion implies a
sense of self-declared moral purity, a reputation that Amnesty have sought to maintain
throughout its existence despite several high-profile scandals, which despite having short term
ramifications for the organisation have not had lasting effects. Each of these areas can be
considered as key components of Amnesty's successin its campaigns, using its massmembership
to support campaigns that are widely held as being conducted in a moral way.
As will be seen throughout this thesis, the success of human rights organisations that
campaigned against the persecution of dissenters in the Soviet Union relied on developing a
relationship with the public which ensured that their publications and output were trusted.
41 S.Hopgood,Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty international (Ithaca,2006).
42 Hopgood,Keepers of the Flame p. 71.
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Indeed, the maintenance of a reputation of reliability was often more important for these groups
than finance or personnel. Amnesty's position as the first major international human rights
organisation contributed significantly to its reputation, being the first prominent group to identify
and support political prisoners around the world. On the issue of Soviet dissenters, Amnesty
developed this reputation through publishing an array of material on human rights violations
which was empirically grounded. This was a particularly impressive feat given the difficulties in
not only attaining information from behind the Iron Curtain, but also in assessingits reliability,
especially so given the level of propaganda that emanated from the Soviet Union in this period.
This reputation was particularly important for the reception of Amnesty's reports on the Soviet
Union by the press,who used this material extensively in their reporting. Aswill be discussed later
in this chapter, some journalists were very complementary about Amnesty's publications on the
Soviet Union, something that in turn enhanced the groups reputation further.
Keepers of the Flame deftly illustrates the background in which Amnesty developed, and
how the group responded to the array of political developments at the end of the Cold War.
Despite this, it offers little in the way of historical analysis of the group. With a subtitle alluding to
its most useful purpose, Hopgood's work is a good piece for developing an understanding of
Amnesty, especially in its contemporary guise. Although of much use in assessingthe history of
the organisation it is not, and does not claim to be, a history of Amnesty International.
Jonathon Powers Like Water on Stone is the most informative piece on the historical
development of Amnesty as a human rights organisation to date." This, however, does not mean
that it is flawless. Power has structured this work around a series of personal recollections of the
influence of Amnesty in casesof human rights abuse, and has interjected it with more sustained
analysis of the role of the organisation. Power usescase studies of Amnesty's response to human
rights abuses in different countries to illustrate their role, and how they have conducted their
work since the group's formation. Whilst this piece clearly illustrates the compassion that Power
felt for Amnesty and the importance of its work, it feels disjointed in the extreme. Discussionof
43 J. Power, Like Water on Stone: The Story of Amnesty International (London, 2002).
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the first forty years of the organisation starts in the forth chapter, over a hundred pages into the
book. This occurs after three chapters and a prologue on Amnesty's work in Nigeria, Guatemala,
the Central African Republic and Chile, all of which appear to be based heavily on Power's
personal interests and involvement. Whilst this lengthy analysis of Amnesty's foundation and the
struggle in its early years is interesting and thorough, it feels as if it has been parachuted into a
book of case studies and personal recollections. Power's claim that this piece is 'the story of
Amnesty International' is also very ambitious and a great exaggeration. Whilst coverage of
Amnesty's work in countries such as China, the United States and Northern Ireland appears to be
thorough, the distinct lack of reference to either the Soviet Union or Russia is remarkable.
Amnesty's response to Soviet prisoners of conscience was - as this chapter will show - extensive,
yet Power scarcely mentions the Soviet Union in this work. There are only nine references to the
Soviet Union in Like Water on Stone, most of which are in reference to other issues such as human
rights abuses in the United States. This is a staggering omission. Given the international concern
for human rights in the course of the Cold War, the context that Amnesty was born into and
developed in, a lack of a chapter on the Soviet Union is inexcusable in a piece that claims to
outline the story of Amnesty.
Power's approach to Amnesty's history was criticised by reviewers on its release in 2001.
Joan Smith's review of the book for The Independent recognises that whilst it is a very readable
book, it is more often a history of human rights in the twentieth century than a history of
Amnesty. Smith notes that the task set by Power's title was a 'near impossible brief, and that
instead of matching this he has produced something resembling a long magazine article." Like
Water on Stone, as Smith rightly points out, is a very readable piece that falls well short of what it
claims to be. Criticism of Power's work should be measured alongside the scope and difficulty in
writing Amnesty's history. A piece that claims to cover the bulk of Amnesty's history is hugely
44 J. Smith, 'Review: LikeWater on Stone: the story of Amnesty International by Jonathon Power', The
Independent, 25 May 2001. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/books/reviews/like-water-on-stone-the-story-of-amnesty-international-by-jonathan-power-
685995.html [accessed18 April 2011].
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ambitious, given the scope of the organisations work and the scale of archival material relating to
its activities.
It is perhaps inevitable that there will be much more scholarship on the history of
Amnesty in the future. Its work for prisoners of consciencearound the world drew, and continues
to draw international attention and a substantial membership of over 3 million people."
Amnesty's importance in international relations shows little signs of fading SOyears after its
formation. When this international interest in Amnesty is timed with the extensive amount of
empirical material produced by the group in the form of publications and news releases, it
becomes clear that it is a human rights organisation rife for historical analysis.
There is a clear gap in the literature on Amnesty's history, with much scope for an
extended piece on the general history of the organisation. This would undoubtedly be a
demanding piece given the scope of Amnesty's activities, but one that undoubtedly needswriting.
Whilst it is far beyond the scope of this thesis to do this, this piece does develop the
historiography of the organisation by discussing its Soviet campaigns. This is important, as it
highlights the influential work of this organisation, and the impact that it had on wide perceptions
on the Soviet Union by journalists and activists alike - something that has been ignored by the
literature to date. This is most explicit in Power's work, which claims to be a history of the
organisation but ignores the important work that Amnesty conducted on human rights abuses in
the Soviet Union.
This chapter will utilise an array of source material in order to analyse Amnesty's
response to human rights violation in the USSR,focusing particularly on its publications and news
releases. Amnesty produced a vast amount of documentation on Soviet prisoners of conscience
from the early 1970s onwards. This is due in part to manner in which Amnesty operated,
researching human rights abuse and publishing their findings en masse. As a result and perhaps
unusually for an organisation of this size, there is not a singular archival collection that can be
45 AmnestyInternational,'Who we are', availableat http://www.amnesty.org!en!who-we-are[accessed18
April 2011].
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used to assess Amnesty's work on the Soviet Union. Instead material from a variety of archives
and publications must be consulted and interwoven to create a narrative of Amnesty's efforts.
This chapter will use material from three main repositories - the Modern Records Centre at the
University of Warwick; a microfiche collection produced by the Dutch Publishers IDC held at
Marylebone library, tendon:" and the Amnesty collections at the IISG, Amsterdam. The Modern
Records Centre and the IDC microfiche collection predominantly contain external reports
produced by Amnesty, including press releases and campaign material on prisoners of conscience
from the mid 1970s to 2009. The Amnesty archive at the IISG contains internal Amnesty
documents, including correspondence between leading members, minutes of policy meetings,
and internal reports from the late 1960s onwards. Aside from yearly reports, archival material on
Amnesty's activity in the 1960s is scarce. This is probably due to the manner of the organisation,
which worked in cramped conditions with few staff in the early 1960s. As the first Soviet prisoner
of conscience that caught attention in Britian in this period was Yevgeny Belov in 1965, this
omission of materials does not hinder research of Amnesty's approach to the Soviet Union. 47
This chapter will begin by offering a general outline of the functions of Amnesty, briefly
discussing the early years of the organisation and the formation of its powerful ethos. This ethos
is important to take into account when considering Amnesty's work. This underlying moral force
has come to dominate the direction that this organisation has taken since the 1970s, even at the
expense of its founding figure who was forced to leave the organisation in embarrassing
circumstances." Understanding how this ethos developed will offer a sense of context with which
to place analysis of its efforts regarding the Soviet Union against. This chapter shall then focus
directly on Amnesty's approach to the human rights violations in the Soviet Union, focusing
predominantly on the publications of the organisation. Amnesty's publications on the Soviet
46 For finding aids for the IDCcollection see IDCPublishers,Amnesty International's Country Dossiers and
publications, 1962-2008 Finding Aid (2010), available at http://www.idc.nl./ead/127.xml [accessed17
March 2011). Details of Amnesty's output on the Soviet Union is detailed at
http://www.idc.nl/ead!/ead.php?faid=127-03.xml [accessed17 March 2011).
47 For more on Belov's case seeS.Bloch and P. Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals (London, 1971) pp. 68-
70.
48 Buchanan, 'Amnesty International in Crisis'.
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Union played a key part in its campaigns, and had wide reaching impacts on the British response
to the human rights violations behind the Iron Curtain. This chapter will thoroughly assessthe
impact and importance of two of its main publications - the translation of the samizdat journal
the Chronicle of Current Events, and the report Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR: Their
Treatment and Conditions. The final section of this chapter will consider Amnesty's Soviet
researchers, showing how their role developed as Amnesty's wider research department grew
and became more professional. It will show the personal sacrifices that these researchers made,
and show the increasingly difficult circumstances in which they were working.
EarlyVears
In order to understand Amnesty's approach to the Soviet Union, it is essential to fully
understand the group's foundation and early years, a period that had significant impact on the
direction of the organisation. Amnesty was formed by the British barrister Peter Benenson in
response to a report of two Portuguese students who had been imprisoned in Lisbon by the
Salazar dictatorship for making a public toast to freedom." Benenson wrote a short article
entitled 'The Forgotten Prisoners' for The Observer, which started what was initially anticipated to
be a year-long campaign to draw attention to prisoners of conscience around the world." 1961
was considered to be a particularly apt year for this appeal, coming a century after the
emancipation of the serfs in Russiaand the freeing of slaves in the United States, two events that
greatly developed the concept of inviolable human rights around the world.51 Benenson's article
also set out several principles that were to guide the development of Amnesty's ethos. Perhaps
the most important principle set out in 'The Forgotten Prisoners' was the centrality of freedom of
conscience to Amnesty's ethos. Benenson used Voltaire's famous utterance '1 detest your views,
but am prepared to die for your right to express them' to describe the conviction that brought
49 Power,Like Water on Stone, pp. 119-120.
so Power,Like Water on Stone, p. 120, andP.Benenson,'TheForgottenPrisoners',The Observer, 28 May
1961.
Sl Power,Like Water on Stone, p. 120.
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Amnesty's founding members together." Taking this into account, it is of no surprise that
Amnesty described people imprisoned for their political stance as 'prisoners of conscience' - an
evocative term that has become entrenched in British discourse through the activities of Amnesty
and other human rights organisations in this period.
Image 1.1- Peter Benenson. 'The Forgotten Prisoners'. The Observer. 28 May 1961
'The Forgotten Prisoners' was received with much acclaim in Britain and internationally. It
was reprinted simultaneously in Le Mande, and a variety of newspapers from around the world
reported the appeal in subsequent editions. A Spanish newspaper even mentioned the appeal
despite the risk of repercussions from the Franco regime." The initial successand public interest
in this year long campaign in both Britain and around the world led to its extension into a
permanent movement which expanded internationally and still thrives to this day. 'The Forgotten
Prisoners' is essentially Amnesty's founding document, and has come to represent the early ethos
of the organisation. The evocative cartoon of a prisoner behind bars, alongside portraits of the
initial six prisoners of conscience, as shown in Image 1.1, is deeply symbolic of Benenson's initial
call for Amnesty.
52 Benenson, 'The Forgotten Prisoners'.
53 Power, Like Water on Stone p. 121.
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'The Forgotten Prisoners' also identifies the prisoners of conscience that Benenson
wanted Amnesty to support, defining them as:
Any person who is physically restrained (by imprisonment or otherwise) from expressing (in any
form of words or symbols) any opinion which he honestly holds and which does not advocate or
condone personal violence."
This definition clearly excluded any individual that either used, or promoted the use of
violence. This was an approach based on Benenson's moral philosophy, and may have been
influenced by his faith and interactions with the prominent Quaker Eric Baker,who played a large
role in the formation of Arnnestv," This provision, which excluded Amnesty's support from those
who endorsed violence, came to the fore in 1964 when one of its adopted prisoners of
conscience, the South African activist Nelson Mandela, advocated the use of violence as a part of
his activism. Amnesty decided that his use of violence meant they were unable to support him,
and whilst they continued a campaign for his release, this was not as one of their prisoners of
conscience - a decision endorsed by a poll of its membership after a long, and far-reaching
internal debate." This position of non-violence became one of the driving forces of Amnesty's
work, only tarnished by its involvement in its support for members of the Baader-Meinhoff group
in the 1970s. Amnesty's support for members of this group can be seen as one of the most
challenging issues in the organisation's history, something that greatly effected its public image in
the West at the tlme."
Prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union provided an interesting test to Amnesty's
commitment of only supporting prisoners of consciencewho did not endorse the use of violence.
This became problematic for supporting prisoners of conscience who were, or had been members
of the communist party or had a communist political leaning. It was argued that any political
endorsement of communism was in fact a notion of support for the use of violence. This was due
54 Benenson,'TheForgottenPrisoners'.
55 Hopgood,Keepers of the Flame, p. 56; Power,Like Water on Stone p. 120.
56 Power,Like Water on Stone, p. 125.
57 FormoreonAmnesty'sinvolvementin supportingmembersof the Baader-MeinhoffgroupseePower,
Like Water on Stone, pp.182-190.
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to the Marxist doctrine that oppressive bourgeois governments should be overthrown by force
including, if necessary, the use of violent measures. This created a problem for supporting
dissidents such as General Petro Grigorenko, who had been both a high ranking member of the
RedArmy and the Communist party. The position of the Communist party in the Soviet Union also
further complicated this issue, with many people joining the party simply to further their career
and reap the benefits of being part of the nomenklatura. The same can be seen in contemporary
China, where young people often join the Communist party as a right of passageto a better life
rather than for any ideological conviction. 58 A discussion paper from the University of
Nottingham's China Policy Institute suggeststhat membership of the communist party is directly
linked to an increased wage premium, something that would have undoubtedly been similar in
the Soviet Union.59
Peter Benenson responded directly to this issue in a circular to national sections in May
1964, in which he noted that over a century had passed since the publication of the Communist
Manifesto and that conditions had changed dramatically from the early days of Marxist ideology.
He urged local groups to use their initiative, judging caseson their individual merits and not to
abandon a prisoner of conscience because 'he happens to be called a communist'. Indeed,
Benenson noted in this circular that in many cases, Government officials had libelled political
opponents by calling them communists, further highlighting the need for each case involving a
communist to be individually assessed." This circular is important for Amnesty's response to
Soviet dissent for two reasons. Firstly, given that it was circulated in May 1964 meant that the
issue of Communist party membership was effectively dealt with before the plight of Soviet
dissenters had become a serious issue in international relations. This allowed Amnesty to work on
58 Some commentators have described this as shocking the well-educated into compliance with the regime
in return for career and business opportunities. See J. lee, 'How China bought its graduates' loyalty', The
Guardian,8 December 2008, Comment is Free (online), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/dec/08/china-graduates-credit-crunch [accessed 24
October 2011].
59 See S. Appleton, J. Knight, L. Song and Q. Xia, 'The economics of Communist Party membership - the
curious case of rising numbers and wage premium during China's transition' November 2005, available at
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/discussion-papers/discussion-paper-2-economics-of-
communist-party-membership.pdf [accessed 24 October 2011].
60 P. Benenson, 'Communist "Prisoners of Conscience"', May 1964, Amnesty Indexed Documents no. 427,
IISG [POL 30/64].
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behalf of prisoners of conscience who had been, or were, members of communist groups without
hindrance. Secondly, Benenson's circular outlined the case by case approach to prisoners of
conscience that was to continue throughout the ideological battlefield of the Cold War. This
allowed Amnesty to continue their work for prisoners of conscience without directly becoming
involved in the political conflict itself. Political impartiality was particularly important for Amnesty,
which regularly highlighted that it stood aside from ideological conflicts, and showed concern only
for the human rights of persecuted individuals. This was important in the group's dealings with
the Soviet Union, as it heightened the group's reputation, and that of the material it produced -
something that set this group apart from other political organisations in this period. This impartial
approach allowed politicians and journalists to utilise Amnesty material without accusation of
political bias.
The decision not to support those who endorsed violence was notable in Amnesty's
campaigns in the Soviet Union. This stance led Amnesty to refuse to support the refuseniks
involved in the so-called 'leningrad plot' in June 1970, despite the worldwide attention that their
treatment gained.61 Two of those involved, Mark Dymshits and Eduard Kuznetsov were sentenced
to death with five others sentenced to long terms in prison. The case received international
publicity, and protests from the West led to the death sentences being reduced to terms of
imprisonment. Amnesty refused to become involved in these protests due to the use of violence
by these refuseniks who had attempted to hijack an aeroplane to escape from the Soviet Union.
This, however, was an unusual approach from dissenting groups in the Soviet Union in this period
and the Dymshits-Kuznetsov affair was one of very few instances where the use of violence
prevented Amnesty from supporting Soviet dissenters. The leningrad plot was undoubtedly a
unique case in the history of the refusenik movement and in wider Soviet dissenting circles, in its
61 The leningrad plot was the attempt by a small group of refuseniks to hijack a small aeroplane, and fly it to
Sweden in an attempt to leave the Soviet Union. They were caught by the Soviet authorities, and tried in
December 1970 for a variety of crimes, including treason, which was punishable by death. For further
details of the leningrad plot, also referred to as the Dymshits-Kuznetsov affair, seeAmnesty International,
Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR,Their Treatment and Conditions, (london, 1980) p. 87; M. Gilbert,
Shcharansky (london, 1986) pp. 18-20; M. Azbel, Refusenik: Trapped in the Soviet Union (london, 1982) pp.
234-238; and G. Beckerman, When They Come For Us We'll Be Gone: The Epic Struggle to Save Soviet Jewry
(New York, 2010) pp. 172-207.
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avocation and attempted use of violence. Andrei Sakharov discusses the affair in detail in his
memoirs, in which he noted that there was doubt as to whether it was a human rights issue as
such. In a telegram he sent to Brezhnev asking for a commutation of the death penalties passed
on Dymshits and Kuznetsov, Sakharov clearly notes his condemnation of their plan.62 It was clear
in this instance that Amnesty's stand against the use of violence was shared by several high
profile dissidents in the Soviet Union, one of many similarities the organisation was to share with
human rights circles behind the Iron Curtain.
Amnesty's development from humble beginnings in Benenson's cramped barristers office
in the basement of Mitre Court, london, to the respected position that it now holds occurred with
apparent ease over a short period of time.63 This is not to suggest that this occurred without any
controversies. The most damaging period for the organisation itself were the events of 1966-67
which Tom Buchanan has analysed in detall." In this period accusations that British intelligence
had funded Amnesty using secret government funds shook the composition of the group's
leadership.65 Given the lengths that Amnesty went to in order to establish political impartiality,
these accusations could have potentially destroyed the group's reputation. Direct financial links to
the British government would have significantly weakened Amnesty campaigns against Soviet
human rights violations, as the organisation could be dismissed as being a stooge of the British
government. Benenson became increasingly paranoid of those around him, and was eventually
forced to leave his position as President. Perhaps the most damaging aspect of Benenson's
actions in this period was that they occurred publicly, which allowed Amnesty's reputation to be
questioned. Amnesty members who worked at the International Secretariat were notified in a
memo from Sean MacBride and Eric Baker, two prominent members of Amnesty's hierarchy, that
if Benenson came to Amnesty's office, staff were to inform him that 'he ha[d] no authority to act,
62 Sakharov,Memoirs, p. 323.
63 Amnesty produced a short video covering their history which was uploaded to their YouTube account in
March 2008. It contains an array of interesting footage of the early days of the organisation, including its
offices at Mitre Court, London. Available at http://www.youtube.com!watch?v=JKftcnkoY-o [Accessed14
October 2011].
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speak or issue any instructions on behalf of Amnesty International', something that was
undoubtedly a dramatic fall from grace and a personal embarrassment." These accusations of
political manipulation and funding continued to be attached to Amnesty by those critical of its
efforts, especially from the Soviet bloc and its supporters. In October 1979 TASS,the Soviet news
agency, criticised Amnesty of being an anti-Soviet organisation, and with spreading
misinformation, playing on the events of 1966-67 and its reported links with British intelllgence."
Despite the publicity attained by the suspicion of secret government funding, Amnesty
came out of this scandal relatively unscathed having little impact on the group's authority in the
period that immediately followed this controversy. This is somewhat remarkable when it is
considered that organisations such as the Congressfor Cultural Freedom were effectively ended
once funding from the American intelligence agencies was revealed.6'1"he probable reasons for
this are twofold. Firstly, the international response to Benenson's call for Amnesty in 'The
Forgotten Prisoners' suggests that Amnesty's ethos and raison d'etre were far stronger than the
fallout from this internal scandal. The desire to support prisoners of conscience from its
membership far outweighed the problems created by such internal controversies. Once the initial
shock of Benenson's remarks had blown over, it was easy for the organisation to return to its
previous work based on and inspired by the strong ethos the organisation had created and
instilled amongst its supporters. Secondly, by the mid-1960s Amnesty had become more than just
Benenson's pet project. It is perhaps a testament to how quickly the organisation developed that
just five years after its foundation it no longer needed its founder. The sheer strength of the
organisations raison d'etre, developed by Benenson, ironically meant that he was no longer
essential for the organisation. The reasoning for Amnesty's survival in the face of this scandal sets
it apart from other organisations formed in this period of the Cold War in that the strength of its
ethos outweighed the position of its leading members. By the early 1970s, the idea behind
66 S. MacBride, 'To All Staff', 27 February 1967, IECdoc. 39, IISG. [No Ref].
67 For a translated copy ofthis TASS report see 'USSR Campaign Update No.2: Text ofTASS Comment on AI's
Open Letter', November 1979, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick (hereafter MRC), MSS
34/4/1/USSR/66.
68 For more on the Congress for Cultural Freedom see F. S. Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?: The CIA and the
Cultural Cold War, (London, 1999).
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Amnesty's work had become more important than the composition of the organisation itself. This
is particularly important to note in the context of Amnesty's work on the Soviet Union as it
highlights that the organisation was driven by a strong ethos and principle, rather than the whim
of a leading figure - something that gave the group much political credence.
Although initially founded in a small barristers office, Amnesty rapidly grew from its
humble beginnings into an international organisation which encompassed members from around
the world. These london based offices became the heart of Amnesty's work - a central point
where day-to-day research and running of the organisation occurred. Alongside this development
was the regular meetings of the International Executive Committee (IEC)and the International
Council (ICM), which brought together members from the national Amnesty sections to discuss
central policy and decisions. As a result, Amnesty developed into quite a complex group with a
vast spread of influence and interest at differing levels of the organisation. Despite this
complexity, Amnesty is essentially comprised of two main components; its london based central
body known asthe International Secretariat and the more localised national organisations.
The International Secretariat was the central hub of Amnesty, which controlled the
direction and official output of the group throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Based in london, it
acted as the information source of the organisation comprising its research departments and
management. It was essentially born out of Benenson's barrister offices, which expanded and
moved into new premises when needed. Its location in london led to the organisation being
described as 'British', when in reality it was an international organisation that had been based in
Britain since its foundation. Amnesty's base in the West is something that some human rights
theorists were undoubtedly critical of, arguing that organisations such as Amnesty sought to
impose Western human rights traditions on the rest of the world in a form of cultural
imperialism.69 The location of the International Secretariat in london was supported by a report
to the IECin November 1975. This report noted that as an outstanding English-speakingworld
metropolis, london was an obvious place to locate an organisation that had an English working
69 Forexample of this see M. Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (Philadelphia, 2002).
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language, in the same manner that Paris would be an obvious choice for an organisation with a
French working language." This report also noted the benefit of Amnesty being located in 'a
classical center[sic] of liberal traditions', stating that drawing on the democratic traditions of the
United Kingdom was of much use for the organtsatlon." Whilst being based in the UK limited the
nationalities that worked in the International Secretariat, it meant that the organisation
developed a European flavour that has remained with Amnesty to the present.
Running in tandem with the International Secretariat were national groups, which carried
out the campaigning efforts of the organisation. These national groups were comprised of local
Amnesty groups, where the bulk of Amnesty's membership reside. These local groups were
effectively tasked with responding to the information provided by the International Secretariat,
adopting prisoners of conscience and campaigning on their behalf." Jonathon Power refers to
these local organisations in Like Water on Stone as the 'central cog in the machinery Amnesty
used in its struggle on behalf of political prtsoners.:" This is particularly true in two senses. The
local groups contained the vast grassroot membership of the organisation that carried out the
bulk of its activism and also from which the organisation's finances were raised from. Without
either of these components, Amnesty would simply not have functioned in this period.
Amnesty has become recognisable for the efforts of its local organisations. In particular,
the letter writing campaigns that these groups conducted have become one of the main features
of Amnesty's work that it is most publicly identified with. Local Amnesty groups were encouraged
to write letters to both the prisoner in question, offering their support, and to the authorities that
had imprisoned them." These groups were nicknamed the 'Three's Network' by Benenson, due to
the three prisoners of conscience allocated to each group - one each from the West, the Soviet
bloc, and the developing world. That prisoners of conscience from the Soviet bloc made up a third
70 'london - Positive and Negative', November 1975, IECdoc. 97, IISG[ORG06/IEC 75).
71lbid.
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of all casestaken on by local groups highlights how wide spread Amnesty efforts were for Soviet
dissenters. It also reinforces how surprising it is that writers such as Power have omitted
discussionof this area of Amnesty's history in their work.
The technique of sustained pressure on the authorities through letter writing by local
activists was remarkably effective in improving the position of prisoners of conscience, and is
something that has become synonymous with Amnesty's campaigns. Power cites the example of
Julio de Pefia Valdez, a prisoner of conscience in the Dominican Republic who was released from
imprisonment in January 1976 after Amnesty had launched a letter campaign on his behalf.7sThis
letter writing technique was widely used in supporting Soviet prisoners of conscience, and is
described by some dissidents in their memoirs of time in prison. The Ukrainian dissident leonid
Plyushch, for example, refers explicitly to the impact of Amnesty letters in his memoir History's
Cornival.76 This letter writing technique may have been particularly effective in the case of Soviet
prisoners of conscience due the way in which the Soviet state functioned. The highly
bureaucratised manner in which the Soviet state operated was often exploited by dissidents, who
wrote large amounts of correspondence to bureaucrats to complain about legal abuses."
Amnesty's numerous letters would have added much pressure to the work of these bureaucrats,
and undoubtedly had an impact on the way in which these dissidents were treated.
Amnesty's composition as a centralised research body with many local groups had many
benefits for the organisation. It allowed its work to be governed by a central international body
who controlled the direction of the organisation and its public output, whilst allowing national
and local bodies to maintain an element of independence, and the fervent activism that went
along with this autonomy. This approach maintained the passion for activism from the average
grassroots member whilst allowing the leadership to enter into negotiations with national
governments and international organisations on a more established basis.As such it is clear that
75 Ibid,p. 134.
76 Plyushch,History's Carnival, p. xvii andp.324.
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Amnesty was an organisation with two very different personas: the international organisation and
the local activist group.
Whilst the role of local groups was key to the way in which Amnesty operated, it is clear
that the overarching direction of the organisations campaigns was largely dictated by its central
organisation. This chapter will focus on this central organisation, allowing sustained analysis of
the long term campaigns for Soviet dissidents, rather than the more personalised campaigns for
individuals dissidents conducted by local Amnesty groups. Focusing on the central organisation
also centres analysis on Amnesty's publications and reports on the Soviet Union, which were
deeply influential on both British society and politics. Amnesty's ResearchDepartment was the
heartbeat of the groups work of the Soviet Union, and in order to fully understand the
organisations approach, one needs to understand the work ofthis body.
Amnesty's Involvement with the USSR
From its beginnings, the hierarchy of Amnesty were concerned about the position of
human rights in the Soviet Union and other communist states. At its second international
conference held in September 1962 in Sijsele, Belgium, Sean MacBride, the Chairman of
Amnesty's International Executive from 1961 to 1975, gave a lecture entitled 'Persecution in the
Marxist-leninist States'. That this was delivered alongside other lectures that covered broad
themes such as 'Persecution of Religion', 'Persecution of Minorities' and 'Racial Persecution',
highlights the importance to which the topic of MacBride's lecture was placed."
The need to keep abreast of the latest developments in the position of human rights in
the Soviet Union was noted at Amnesty ICMs in the 1960s. At a meeting in 1966, two resolutions
were brought to the Council regarding the Soviet Union. The first of these was a direct pledge for
Amnesty to make 'vigorous' representations to the Soviet authorities about the imprisoned
dissident writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, calling for their release. This resolution' also
78 'Reliefof the Persecuted1962' conferenceoutline,September1962 and'Persecutionin the Marxist-
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noted that Amnesty should do more to publicise this caseamongst both its own members and the
wider public."
The second resolution on the Soviet Union noted the need for the organisation to engage
in research into the position of political prisoners in the USSRand other communist states. This
resolution stated that this was to ensure that Amnesty was not 'worse informed about it [the
Soviet Union] than we are about that of political prisoners in other countries with which we are
concerned'." This suggests that there was a concern in the leadership of Amnesty that it lacked
knowledge on the Soviet Union in comparison to its own work on other nations, something that it
wanted to redress. It is also revealing of how central research and quality of information was to
Amnesty's campaigns. Given the centrality of this research to Amnesty's work, this resolution can
be seen as a direct call to action to improve the quality of research into the Soviet Union. It also
illustrates the concern that the group had for the region, effectively calling for more activism in
this area.
In hindsight, these two early resolutions discussed at Amnesty's International Council
Meetings neatly illustrate the approach that Amnesty took to the Soviet Union for the duration of
the ColdWar, and the problems that it had doing this. Repeated petitions to the Soviet authorities
for specific persecuted dissidents, timed with widespread publicity campaigns in the West on their
behalf, alongside the constant struggle to maintain and develop the highest levels of research into
violations in the Soviet Union.
Amnesty's public output on the Soviet Union in this period was remarkably forthright on
human rights abuses.Whilst the distribution of information on prisoners of consciencewas at the
centre of its activism, this was closely followed by a clear emphasis on Amnesty's position and
their demands. Its news releases on the Soviet Union were replete with the organisation's
position on reports of abuses, which regularly called for immediate action from the authorities.
Amnesty's press release on the deportation of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in February 1974 is a good
79 'CommitteeII,Resolution3, September1966, ICMno.7. IISG[No Ref).
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example of its bold approach towards the Soviet authorities. This press release deplored the
actions of the Soviet authorities, calling for them to act in order to restore the rule of law and the
inviolable rights of its own cltlzens." Considering that Amnesty had attempted to build relations
with the Soviet authorities at the highest levels in this period, this request, which challenged the
way in which the Soviet government operated, was not going to win the organisation friends in
Moscow. Another example of this forthright approach can be seen in a press release dated 21
March 1976 in which Amnesty demanded that the details of the trial of Andrei Tverdokhlebov, a
prominent dissident with links to Amnesty, be released to the public and that it be allowed to
send a lawyer to observe the trial itself.82 This approach can also be seen in a news release dated
20 September 1985, which called for an immediate Soviet official report to be compiled on the
deaths of prisoners held at a special labour camp for political prisoners."
The consistent demanding approach from Amnesty towards the Soviet government is in
stark contrast to the fluctuating output from Western governments. In this period the US
administration's position towards the Soviet Union changed from one of detente under Richard
Nixon, insistence on human rights under Jimmy Carter, and finally to a renewal of the Cold War
against an 'evil empire' under Ronald Reagan. British governments also fluctuated in their
response to Soviet human rights abuse in this period, although perhaps not as dramatically as
their US counterparts. In contrast, Amnesty's position towards the Soviet abuses in this period
remained unchanged. Other organisations, such as the British trade union movement, lacked this
forthright approach. The Trades Union Congress (TUC) had a particularly 'soft' approach when it
petitioned the Soviet authorities about the plight of dissidents, preferring to engage in off-the-
record comments and discussions rather than public press releases." Trade Unionists that directly
ai'Amnesty SaysUSSRhasviolated its own undertakings in deporting Solzhenitsyn and continuing its policy
of detaining dissidents', Amnesty Pressreleases no. 948, 20 February 1974, IISG.[NoRef]
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criticised the Soviet record on human rights, such as the General Secretary of the Electrical,
Electricians, Telecommunications and Plumbers Union (EETPU) Frank Chapple became vocal
exceptions to an otherwise quiet group." That Amnesty's forthright approach to Soviet human
rights violation remained consistent throughout the later twentieth century is perhaps most
telling of its reliance on the ethos and conviction of the organisation above other political
influence. The stable position that Amnesty occupied in shifting international ideological conflict
undoubtedly strengthened the organisation's reputation. This was especially important in dealing
with reports of abuse from the Soviet Union, where a firm conviction basedon evidence was likely
to hold more weight with the wider public than the politically charged propaganda of the time.
Alongside the petitions to the Soviet authorities, Amnesty's research department
flourished, creating a multitude of reports on the Soviet abuse of human rights. There are several
reasons as to why Amnesty produced such a vast amount of material on the Soviet Union. Firstly,
Amnesty's hybrid composition as both an international and local organisation means that a flow
of information from the centre to its grassroot components was essential for the group to
effectively function. Today, Amnesty utilises the internet to fulfil this service, publishing an array
of materials regarding prisoners of conscience on the website of the International Secretariat.
Indeed, given the amount of press releasesand reports of human rights abuse, and the frequency
with which it is updated, the website of the International Secretariat closely resembles that of a
news crganlsatlon." Prior to the widespread useof the internet, Amnesty relied on print material
to maintain this connection between the centre and the periphery of the organisation. This can be
seen not only in the frequent supply of press releases and reports on abuses on a regular basis,
but also in the type of reports that were published. Material published by Amnesty in this period
can rarely be seen as stand alone pieces. Reports regularly refer to previous information released,
and in some casesare incoherent without referencing a previous report. For example, 'Continuing
Psychiatric Abuses in the Soviet Union', an Amnesty report released on 22 January 1979 makes
explicit references to three previous reports in a section on the general background of the
85 Formoreon FrankChapple'sactivism,seeF.Chapple,Sparks Fly!: A Trade Union Life (london, 1984).
86 Seehttp://www.amnesty.org/ [accessed25 March2011]
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abuses." This report is clearly a list of developments since previous reports had been published,
and as a result cannot be read in isolation. This form of report is common of Amnesty's
publications on the Soviet Union in this period, with reports adding new information to previously
published material. This illustrates not only the cumulative effect of Amnesty's research reports,
but also the desire of the organisation to disseminate the most up-to-date information it had on
human rights violation as frequently as possible.
The flow of information from the Soviet Union in this period should also be taken into
account when assessing Amnesty's output on the matter. Despite the attempts of the Soviet
authorities, underground material on human rights abuses flowed from behind the Iron Curtain to
the West with much ease. Samizdat reports from dissidents were regularly smuggled out by
human rights activists and other concerned individuals. Professor Peter Reddaway, an academic
keenly involved in reporting on the dissident movement managed to attain an array of material
from the Soviet Union in this period through journalists, tourists and students who came to
london after having left the Soviet Union.88 This irregular and rapidly changing courier service
carried the vast majority of empirical evidence on Soviet dissenters from the USSR to the UK.
Materials that emanated from the Soviet Union in the form of samizdat offered a plethora of
examples of human rights abuse. Much of this material made its way to human rights
organisations such as Amnesty, who used this information in their news bulletins and sometimes
reprinted verbatim extracts of samizdat materlal." Of these reports translated and published by
87 Amnesty International, 'Continuing Psychiatric Abuses in the Soviet Union', 22 January 1979, MRC, MSS.
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88 Interview with Peter Reddaway, 5 July 2010. Peter Reddaway was a very important figure who was
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an academic in the School of Government at the london School of Economics and Political Science, and
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Reddaway, Uncensored Russia: The Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union (london, 1972); S. Bloch
and P. Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospital's (london, 1977); A.H. Brown, P. Reddaway, and T.H. Rigby (ed.)
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Amnesty, the most prominent was the underground journal of the dissident movement, the
Chronicle of Current Events, which will discussedextensively later in this chapter.
Alongside the reproduction of underground material, Amnesty ran a regular campaign for
so-called 'Prisoners of the Month' throughout the 1970s and 1980s. This campaign identified a
selection of prisoners of conscience from around the world, and requested that Amnesty
members send correspondence to governments, politicians and other influential individuals on
their behalf. This can be seen as an attempt to both target individual prisoners that hoped to
attain a significant boost in support for their plight and to place pressure on the regimes that had
them imprisoned. Amnesty was clear to highlight the way in which it wanted those who were
concerned with these individuals to respond. In a header to its Prisonersof the Month campaign it
clearly stated that:
In the interest of prisoners, letters to the authorities should be worded carefully and courteously.
You should stress that your concern for human rights is not in any way politically partisan. In no
circumstances should communications be sent to the prisoner."
This tactic of requesting letters to not be sent to the prisoner in question is very different
to Amnesty's usual request. Indeed, part of the public image of the organisation is in the letter
writing to prisoners that its local groups conducted. This request reveals two of Amnesty's
concerns with this prompt campaign on behalf of a prisoner. Firstly, they appear to be keen to
avoid their efforts to put the prisoner in question in a more threatened position, as this
correspondence could be used to accuse prisoners of being foreign spies. Dissidents were
routinely accused of conducting espionage due to their links with Westerners. Anatoly
Shcharansky, for example, was accused of being an American spy, despite the fact that Jimmy
Carter, the USPresident, broke protocol by discussingUSintelligence and denied that this was the
case," Secondly, it highlights Amnesty's insistence on being a politically neutral organisation,
something it clearly wished to uphold in the context of the Cold War. As this campaign
90 Foranexampleof this, seeAnatolyMarchenko(Campaignfor Prisonersof the Month)Amnesty
International Newsletter, November1982,Vol. 12,No.11,IDC,ficheno. 112[NoRef].
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encouraged people to act on Amnesty's behalf, it was essential for them to insist on courtesy to
prevent any backlash against either the organisation itself or the prisoner.
Somewhat unsurprisingly, a host of Soviet dissidents found themselves among these
campaigns. Among those highlighted were Andrei Sakharov, Anatoly Marchenko and Sergei
Kovalyov, three prominent figures in the dissident movement." What is notable about the
individuals from the Soviet Union that Amnesty decided to focus their attention on in this
campaign is the frequency little known prisoners were chosen. With the exception of a few high
profile individuals, Amnesty appears to have focused its attention on those who were not being
recognised in the international press. This is even more striking in hindsight, when it is noted that
Amnesty campaigned for individuals such as Henrikas Jashkunas, Yuri Shukhevych and Mart Niklus
who are not considered as major figures of Soviet dissent."
This publicising of cases involving those less well known prisoners of conscience in the
Soviet Union appears to run through Amnesty's press releases from the 1970s and 1980s.
Consultation of the IDC microfiche collection of Amnesty's output and the IISG collection of
Amnesty news releases shows that the organisation's output on the Soviet Union was not
dominated by names of well known dissenters, something that could be suggested of other
human rights organisations and campaigns for individual dissidents active in this period. This can
be most clearly seen in the so-called Urgent Action reports released by Amnesty on Soviet
prisoners of conscience. Urgent Actions were the most pressing releases from Amnesty on
prisoners of conscience, used when a prisoner's life was in grave danger and immediate action on
their behalf was required. Whilst these Urgent Action reports do include information on the more
prominent dissidents, they include calls for action for 'forgotten prisoners'. These included less
92 SergeiAdamovich Kovalyov (Campaign for Prisoners of the Month), Amnesty International Newsletter,
December 1977, Vol. 7, No. 12, IDC,fiche no. 038 [No Ref); Anatoly Marchenko (Campaign for Prisoners of
the Month) Amnesty International Newsletter, November 1982, Vol. 12, No. 11, IDC,fiche no. 112 [No Ref);
and Andrei Sakharov (Campaign for Prisoners of the Month), Amnesty International Newsletter, September
1985, Vol. 15, No.9, IDC,fiche no. 0135 [No Ref).
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Shukhevych (Campaign for Prisoners of the Month), Amnesty International Newsletter, February 1982, Vol.
12, No.2, IDC,fiche no. 0105 [No Ref); and Mart Niklus (Campaign for Prisoners of the Month), Amnesty
International Newsletter, January 1983, Vol. 14, No.1, IDC,fiche no. 0115 [No Ref).
51
prominent dissidents such as Mikhail Leviev, Yakov Suslensky, and Ivan Svitlychny amongst many
others." The Urgent Action reports on behalf of these individuals occurred alongside similar
reports for some of the well known dissenters such as Sakharov and Alexander Podrabinek." This
suggests that Amnesty were keen to report all cases of human rights violation in the Soviet Union,
and that they did not focus solely on the well known dissidents such as Sakharov, Shcharansky
and Solzhenitsyn. From Amnesty's publications, it does not appear that any such focus on
particular dissidents took place. This suggests that Amnesty researchers considered all the
information that they received from the Soviet Union, and published reports on all worthy cases
without drawing particular attention to certain individuals. The Urgent Action reports are of
particular use in showing this approach, as they highlight the most urgent information that
Amnesty disseminated on Soviet prisoners of conscience. That these reports are not dominated
by the more well known dissidents, such as Sakharov and Shcharansky, is indicative of how
Amnesty's output was not driven by geopolitical concerns in the context of the Cold War, but by a
concern for the human lives of individuals in the Soviet Union. That Amnesty did not appear to
consolidate their efforts around certain individuals, and reported on dissenters who have
subsequently faded from British discourse suggests that their efforts were impartial focusing on a
broad spectrum of victims rather than well known dissenters.
In an article entitled 'The "Forgotten Prisoners", ...16 years later', Peter Benenson
highlighted Amnesty's desire not to focus on the 'celebrity' dissident. He recalled the approach by
a television producer who wanted to create a programme about Amnesty, and hoped to film a
local adoption group working for 'some prisoner as near the like to Vladimir sukovskv'."
Benenson's response to this approach aptly shows his position:
To ring a bell with her audience she was determined to have a Soviet dissident, preferably young
and good looking. If that programme was to give a true reflection of the work of "Amnesty
94 See'Urgent Action Campaign - Death Penalty', 7 February 1975, UA doc. 929, IISG[No Ref); 'Urgent
Action: Prisoner in BadHealth Condition', 5 August 1976, UA doc. 930, IISG,[UA 71/76]; and 'USSR:Ivan
Svitlyehny', 8 January 1982, UA doc. 937, IISG[EUR46/02/82].
95 'USSR:Andrei Sakharov', 15 June 1983, UA doc. 938, IISG,[EUR46/19/83]; and 'USSR:Alexander
Podrabinek', 25 November 1982, UA doc. 937, IISG,[EUR46/34/82].
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1977, Amnesty Pressdoc. 952, IISG[No Ref).
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International", it should have shown a group working for the release of some ugly old man in a
country most people have never heard of.97
Benenson's illustration of Amnesty members working for the 'ugly old man' rather than
the clean cut young dissident neatly illustrates the universal approach of Amnesty with regards
not only to Soviet dissenters, but to all prisoners of conscience that it worked for. In this instance,
Benenson is clear to highlight that the organisation worked for individuals due to a moral position
on protecting freedom of speech and other human rights, rather than in defence of 'poster boys'
of the dissident movement. The strength of this ethos dominated Amnesty's output on the Soviet
Union, and undoubtedly played a part in the fervent campaigning of its members.
The insistence of this producer to focus on a Soviet dissenter illustrates how the problem
of Soviet human rights violation had become popular in the mainstream, something that would
'ring a bell' with her audience. This is quite ironic, due in part to the efforts of human rights
groups which publicised the cases of individuals such as Bukovsky who can be seen as the
archetypal 'celebrity' Soviet dissident." Bukovsky's reputation was established in British public
discourse by human rights organisations such as Amnesty, who campaigned extensively for his
release and included him in their postcards for prisoners campaign.99Amnesty's reputation, and
the regard in which its publications were held with journalists and the wider public arguably
popularised these dissidents, which made them celebrities of sorts. This created the problem of
over-exposure for prisoners of conscience from some countries. This was arguably a welcome
problem, as increased publicity for an individual dissident such as Bukovsky may have publicised
Amnesty's work to a wider audience. In doing so, other prisoners of conscience that it also
worked for also gained this much welcomed publicity.
By the early-1970s, Amnesty had a clearly defined international profile, something that
sets it apart from the other human rights organisations assessed by this thesis. This international
97Benenson, 'The "Forgotten Prisoners"...16 years later'.
98 'Celebrity' in this instance refers to being well known in the public domain, rather than the negative
prima donna association that contemporary celebrity contains.
99 For example see 'Amnesty welcomes release of Vladimir Bukovsky and LuisCorvalan', 21 December 1976,
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presence, which included many national bodies operating as affiliated but distinct entities from
the International Secretariat in London, was most strongly present in the West. Amnesty
International USA and Amnesty International UK were perhaps the two most prominent of these
national bodies, and continue to maintain a strong presence today.
Unlike other human rights organisations in this period, Amnesty is perhaps most notable
because it had its own branch within the Soviet Union. The first signs of an Amnesty group
forming in Russia occurred in September 1973 when four Soviet dissidents, who called themselves
Group 73 contacted Amnesty's International Secretariat in London.loo Their message to the
International Secretariat was released in a statement to the press, which coincided with the sixth
ICM that was in session in Vienna at the time. Their astonishment at Amnesty's ideological
position in contrast to their own experiences is clear to see from this message:
As for words like 'conscience', 'dignity', 'convictions' - we have been accustomed to apply them
exclusively to the exertions and strivings of individual human beings ...[We] could not at first grasp
the fact that it is possible to speak to total strangers about these things, even though they live in
totally different conditions and other cultures. It is this above all that we prize in your example
and your activity, insofar as we are in a position to judge it. Please accept our best wishes.lOl
Group 73 were clearly deeply enamoured with Amnesty and its ethos of supporting the
forgotten prisoner of conscience. The chance to interact with others who held similar beliefs was
a strong appeal for the group, who in October 1973 became the Moscow branch of Amnesty. This
was part of a wider plan by a group of dissidents to create non-state organisations to engage in
peaceful human rights activism.102 Yury Orlov, one of the early members of the group, noted that
there were 25 to 30 original members of this group, comprised mainly of writers and scientists
from the major cities in the West of the Soviet Union.103They were led by Andrei Tverdokhlebov
and Valentin Turchin, who dealt with the formalities of founding the group and its relationship
with Amnesty in London. The group were officially accepted by Amnesty's International
100 The four members of Group 73 were Vladimir Albrecht, Vladimir Archangelsky, lIya Korneyev and Andrei
Tverdokhlebov, seeSoviet Human RightsCommittee SendsMessage to Amnesty International, September
1973, Amnesty ICM no. 13, IISG.[No Ref).
101 'Soviet Human RightsCommittee SendsMessage to Amnesty International, September 1973, Amnesty
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102 Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts, p. 168.
103 Ibid, p. 168.
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Secretariat as a national section in September 1974, and were assigned prisoners of conscience in
Spain, Sri lanka, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.104
Whilst the Moscow group were active in supporting prisoners of conscience around the
world they did not (in Amnesty's name at least) engage in supporting Soviet dissidents. lOS
Amnesty regulations prevented members from taking up prisoners of conscience from their own
country, a policy known as the Work On Own Country (WOOe) rule, which caused much
controversy among Amnesty members in the 1990s.106 This policy was essential in the course of
the Cold War, and was a way in which Amnesty members attempted to separate their work in
supporting prisoners of conscience from engagement in the wider ideological conflict of the time.
In short, it was an attempt to show impartiality in a partial world.
Yury Orlov's account of the foundation of the Moscow group in his memoirs Dangerous
Thoughts gives a sense of the danger that members of this group faced due the position of
Amnesty in the Soviet Union. Orlov noted that:
It would have been natural for the Soviet authorities to arrest us immediately. After all, they
hated peaceful pluralism even more than they hated any hostile ideology, and had long since
proclaimed to everyone in the USSRthat Amnesty International was an agency of the American
elA107
The foundation of a group that was seen to be subversive in this period clearly brought
many risks for the individuals involved, many of whom had been active dissidents in other
organisations such as Sakharov's Moscow Committee for Human Rights.108Indeed, Orlov notes
that the only reasons their immediate arrest did not happen was due to a forthcoming visit of
Sean MacBride to a Congress of Peace-Loving Forces to be held in Moscow shortly after the
groups formation. MacBride was deeply respected by the Soviet authorities for his activism
104 D. Kowalewski, 'The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' in J. Donnelly and R.Howard, International
Handbook of Human Rights (Connecticut, 1987) p. 416; and 'Amnesty International asksSoviet Authorities
to investigate harassment complaint from Moscow group member', 18 October 1976, IDCfiche no. C4 [No
Ref).
lOS 'Amnesty International AsksSoviet Authorities to Investigate Harassment Complaint from Moscow
Group Member', Amnesty International News Release, 18 October 1976, IDC,fiche no. C4 [No Ref).
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against British rule in Ireland, and was an individual the Soviets did not want to alienate.109 The
Soviet authorities were clearly attempting to utilise their relationship with Amnesty, and figures
such asMacBride, for their own political aims.
The Moscow branch kept infrequent contact with the International Secretariat in the mid
1970s, due to harassment by the Soviet authorities. In the minutes of the ninth International
Council Meeting held in September 1976, there was a messagefrom Andrei Amalrik, which noted
the activity of the Moscow group in supporting prisoners of conscience. Amalrik's message
describes how important their concern was for prisoners of conscience 'since many of our fellow
citizens including members of our own group have been sentenced to long terms of imprisonment
and exile for expressing their opinions,.l1oThis message can be read as both an update on the
group's efforts for prisoners of conscience, and also a call for assistance.
Delegates from the Moscow group were invited to attend Amnesty's eleventh ICM, held
in Cambridge in September 1978. Andrei Tverdokhlebov and George Vladimov are both listed as
delegates from USSRwho, it had been noted in the report of the meeting, had been unable to
attend the meeting due to a failure to receive permission to travel abroad from the Soviet
authorities.i" This was clearly an attempt to limit the links that the Moscow group had with
Amnesty's International Secretariat, and a direct punishment of those involved with Amnesty in
the Soviet Union. This was part of a wider array of attacks on Amnesty by the Soviet authorities,
which occurred on both a personal level against its members and on an institutional level against
the organisation itself.
In the early 1970s, attacks on Amnesty by the Soviet authorities were relatively trivial.
Articles in the Soviet press described Amnesty of spreading 'falsified materials in capitalist
countries which are expected to convince the public that that believers are persecuted in the
l09lbid.
110 AmnestyInternational,'ReportandDecisionsof the 9th InternationalCouncilMeeting',p. 101, ICMdoc.
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USSR... In addition, the philanthropists resort to crude slander.'1l2These attacks came in a period
when Amnesty attempted to engage with the Soviet government, meeting with a group of high
profile Soviet Lawyersat a meeting of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers in April
1975, something which is likely to have contributed to this relatively tame approach.t'" This was
arguably in an attempt to enter into a dialogue with the Soviet authorities regarding prisoners of
conscience, hoping to attain an improvement in their treatment.i" This is a relationship that the
Soviet authorities may also have wanted to develop, potentially so that they could have some
influence on Amnesty's leadership and its subsequent output on Soviet prisoners of conscience.
TASSdid not openly call Amnesty 'anti-Soviet' in this period, despite Stephanie Grant, Amnesty's
Head of Research,noting that it was plain they regarded them as such.115This ambivalent position
shifted throughout the 1970s,with Soviet attacks on Amnesty becoming more severe later in the
decade. Unlike other human rights organisation in the West that came under attack by the Soviet
authorities, the presence of an Amnesty group in Moscow meant that these attacks took on a
more personal level with explicit pressure placed on Amnesty members. In some cases this
included lengthy spells in hard labour camps and flagrant abuse of the Soviet legal system as in
the casesof SergeiKovalyov and Vladimir Turchin.
Sergei Kovalyov, a prominent member of the Moscow Amnesty group and later human
rights advisor to the RussianPresident Boris Yeltsin after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was
sentenced to seven years hard labour in December 1975 for 'anti-Soviet agitation and
propaganda', ostensibly for his involvement with Amnesty.116Andrei Tverdokhlebov, another
important member of the Moscow group, was arrested in April 1975, accused of anti-Soviet
slander. He was held without trial for over a year, longer than the nine month period allowed in
112 'Wrong Address, Gentlemen', Pravda Ukrainy, 1 November 1970, quoted in Amnesty International In
Quotes (london, 1973) p.1S.
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Soviet law, suggesting that there was political intervention in his case, something that led
Amnesty to report that his trial would be 'one of the few overtly political trials in Moscow in
recent years,.117Ten prominent Soviet Jews protested against his arrest, an unusual instance in
itself due the relative isolation of Soviet Jewry from human rights activism. This protest was the
subject of a letter written to The New York Review of Books by Peter Reddaway, who noted that
such an appeal by Soviet Jewry had previously been reserved to 'world-famous' figures such as
Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, illustrating the compassion felt for Tverdokhlebov by these
individuals. They noted in their appeal that due to Tverdokhlebov's close association with
Amnesty, an organisation they noted that enjoyed international respect, 'his arrest can be
interpreted only as a slap in the face to world public opinion,.118
Vladimir Turchin, the chairman of Amnesty's Moscow group, and Vladimir Albrecht, the
secretary, were invited to the attend Amnesty's 1976 ICM but were refused permission to leave
by the Soviet authorities. After this request, Turchin and Albrecht were subjected to harassment
from KGBagents, who followed both individuals, warning them that they would be thrown onto
the tracks of the Metro, and that if ordered to, they would kill them.119These caseswere clearly
attempts by the KGBand other parts of the Soviet authorities to intimidate these individuals, and
to coerce them to ceasetheir activities.
The attacks on members of the Moscow Amnesty group came to a head in January 1977
when Albrecht was questioned by the KGB regarding an explosion on the Moscow Metro. By
making Albrecht a suspect in this case, the Soviet authorities clearly attempted to label him a
terrorist. Several dissidents had come out in the wake of the Metro explosion with a statement
that they were in no way associated with this event, and that they rejected the use of violence.12o
This attack was part of a larger KGB clampdown on dissidents that Sakharov described as 'a
117 'Amnesty International asks Soviet to reveal details of trial of one of its Moscow members', 21 March
1976, IDC fiche no. C2 [No Refl.
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slander aimed at discrediting dissidents in the eyesof trusting and uninformed people in the USSR
and the West.121 Attempts to designate those involved with the Moscow Amnesty group as
terrorists was a clear attempt by the Soviet authorities to discredit Amnesty's reputation in the
Soviet Union. Given Amnesty's clear stance on not supporting those who used, or advocate the
use of violence, Amnesty came out in full support of Albrecht. A news release dated 20 January
1977 outlined Amnesty's concern at the reports that Albrecht was being linked to the Metro
explosion, and noted that as a member of its Moscow group, he subscribed to the organisation's
statute, which prohibited members from supporting prisoners of conscience with links to
violence.122Whiist this was perhaps not the strongest defence of one of the organisations leading
figures in the Soviet Union, it does fall in line with Amnesty's empirical nature, which relied on the
reputation of the organisation to be enough to persuade people of Albrecht's innocence.
Attacks on Amnesty extended beyond the Moscow group, often in attempts to disrupt the
activities of the organisation. This was most obvious in seemingly trivial matters such as the
granting of visas to countries in the Soviet bloc, which were either refused or granted at such a
late date that made travel impossible. Martin Ennals,Amnesty's Secretary General, was refused a
Soviet visa to attend a meeting of the World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA)
conference in Moscow in October 1975. This was seen as a politically motivated refusal which
coincided with a low point in relations between Amnesty and the Soviet authorities.mlt was
arguably an attempt to affect the relationship between Amnesty and the United Nations, which
had become increasingly close due to Amnesty's Campaign for the Abolition of Torture. Amnesty
had reported on several incidents of torture in the Soviet Union in relationship to this campaign,
particularly the political abuse of psychiatry. A June 1972 report on torture noted the names of
several leading Soviet psychiatrists, including Oaniil Lunts, Alexander Lifshits and Andrei
Snezhnevsky, and directly labelled them as 'known torturers,.124Given the reputation of these
121 Sakharov, Alarm and Hope p. 61.
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individuals in the Soviet hierarchy, this claim would have undoubtedly made the relationship
between Amnesty and the Soviet authorities more strained. Visa restrictions were a common
tactic used by the Soviet authorities to deal with human rights activists and specialists in the West
who had become an irritant. Many of the activists discussed in the course of this thesis
experienced difficulties in travelling within the Soviet bloc, in extreme cases being refused entry
and blacklisted for many years, something that could be immensely challenging for an area
specialist.
The attacks on Amnesty from the Soviet authorities continued into the 1980s. The Times
reported a Sovetskaya Rossiya report in September 1982 that accused Amnesty of being a
'subversive centre dedicated to battling against communism', and that three senior members
worked for the CIA.12SWhilst this can now be considered as a politically motivated accusation
designed to slur Amnesty's work in the Soviet media, this was something that played upon the
difficulties experienced by Amnesty leadership in 1966-67.
Of all the Soviet propaganda attacks on Amnesty in this period, Samuil Zivs' The Anatomy
of Lies is perhaps the most full-blooded. Zivs' work is a transparent piece of Soviet propaganda,
published in 1984 and written with the clear intention of discrediting Amnesty's work as being
nothing more than ideologically driven attacks on the Soviet Union. This is a particularly important
piece to consider when assessing the impact that Amnesty had on the wider British public's
perception of Soviet dissent as it is one of the major Soviet attempts to attack the groups
reputation. Amnesty's ability to persuade the public was effective largely because of its strong
reputation for reliability, something that Zivsattempted to dislodge.
Zivs accusedAmnesty of having instigated a 'campaign intended to picture the USSRas a
sort of regular human rights violations ...in keeping with the strategy of stirring up tensions in
international relations,.126The Soviet criticism of Western organisations and governments 'stirring
up international tensions' after the period of detente was a common way in which criticism of its
125 'Russia accuses Amnesty of link with CIA', The Times, 6 September 1982, p. 4.
126 Zivs,The Anatomy of Lies, p. 15.
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domestic agenda was dismissed. Accusing Amnesty of essentially taking sides in the Cold War was
a misguided slur from Zivs, given Amnesty's work on human rights violation in Western countries
such as the United States and the United Kingdom.m
Zivs charged that Amnesty had falsified the information that it published about Soviet
human rights abuses, and accused the organisation of being 'born of lies,.128This is an interesting
turn of phrase used by Zivs, and is indicative of the approach that this work took. Throughout The
Anatomy of Lies, Zivs attacked the very foundations of Amnesty - the ethos of the organisation
which had seen it survive previous controversies and had driven its membership throughout its
existence. By suggesting in the strongest terms that this ethos was born out of lies, Zivs attempted
to dismantle Amnesty's foundations. This was unlikely to ever be a successful approach for two
main reasons Firstly, in the context of the Cold War, this work would have been seen by the
majority in the West as an obvious attempt by Soviet propagandists to attack Amnesty. This was
part of the wider cultural war that took place in this period and was an attack that would have
undoubtedly fallen on deaf ears. Secondly, Amnesty's ethos, described by Hopgood as being a
secular religion remained intact from previous attacks which were much more threatening to the
organisation such as Benenson's forced departure from the organisation in 1967. Such was the
reverence to Amnesty's ethos from its membership and supporters that any criticism of its
position would have been easily deflected. By the 1970s, Amnesty had become firmly entrenched
in British culture and society, something that acted as a defence mechanism against partial
attacks on its position such as The Anatomy of Lies. It was this reputation which meant that the
majority of the British public and media sided with Amnesty's assessment of human rights in the
Soviet Union over its critics - indicative of its strong influence over British discourse.
127 For examples of this see: Amnesty International, Proposal for a commission of inquiry into the effect of
domestic intelligence activities on criminal trials in the United States of America [AMR 51/05/81] (London,
1981); Amnesty International, The Death Penolty. Amnesty International Report [ACT50/003/1979]
(London, 1979); and Amnesty International, Report of an enquiry into allegations of ill-treatment in
Northern Ireland [EUR45/001/1976] (London, 1975).
128 Zivs, The Anatomy of Lies, p. 6.
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The tone throughout The Anatomy of Lies is one of accusation and spite. There are
lengthy sections which refer directly to individual dissidents, including Bukovsky, Sakharov and
Plyushch which are bitter in style. An example of this can be seen in reference to a list of
dissidents whom Zivs accuses Amnesty of recruiting as actors for their guest tour agency.
Amongst those listed is Andrei Amalrik, who died in a car accident in November 1980. The manner
in which his death is described by Zivs is curt and degrading, stating that Victor Fainberg and
Vladimir Borisov, two dissidents who were also involved in the car crash that killed Amalrik, 'got
away with just a fright' and that 'these two would be sent on more [Amnesty] tours' .129 Zivs work
continued in this vain, and accused Amnesty of picking up dissidents to use them for their own
ends. He particularly focused on Fainberg, whom he claims was easy for Amnesty to transport,
implicating that he was nothing more than a puppet of the organlsatlon.i" The attack on Fainberg
continues on personal lines, noting the author's opinion that he still suffered from psychiatric
illness as Zivs claims to have seen him at a Soviet cultural delegation in Copenhagen running
about the hall shouting 'you are murderers', and had to be calmed down by his accompanying
psychiatrist.131In this respect, The Anatomy of Lies is a clear propaganda piece designed both to
denigrate and attack those affiliated to Amnesty International and critical of the Soviet Union.
Zivs' attack on dissidents working for Amnesty extended to other activists. Peter
Reddaway is mentioned on several occasions in this piece as working for, and being an official of
Amnesty.m Given that Reddaway kept his involvement with organisations such as Amnesty as
quiet as possible, with his name not appearing in Amnesty's published versions of the Chronicle
that he edited, and he was not an official of Amnesty as is suggested'", one can presume that
some of Zivs' pronouncements were based on information fed to him, potentially by the Soviet
129 Zivs, The Anatomy of Lies p. 33. Amalrik, Borisov, Fainberg and Amalrik's wife Gyuzel were travelling to
Franceto Spain to attend a conference on the Helsinki accords. This was done illegally via car as having
been stripped of Soviet citizenship they were stateless, and the SpanishGovernment had refused them
entry to avoid a confrontation with the Soviet Union. SeeR.Van Voren, On Dissidents and Madness: From
the Soviet Union of Leonid Brezhnev to the "Soviet Union" of Vladimir Putin (New York, 2009), p. 76.
130Zivs, The Anatomy of Lies, p. 33.
131 Ibid, p. 146.
m Ibid, p.34, 155-156
133 Interview with Peter Reddaway, 5 September 2011.
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authorities. The Anatomy of Lies, and other propaganda attacks on Amnesty produced in this
period were doubtless due to the organisations reproduction of samizdat material
Chronicle of Current Events
The Chronicle is historically a very important publication for Amnesty International. For years it
was the only major Amnesty International publication on a Communist country. It has been and
remains a key element in our real support for Soviet prisoners of conscience, for whom it is
difficult to work effectively on an individual prisoner basis. Amnesty International has also relied
heavily on out publication of the Chronicle to "prove" our balance.
Clayton Yeol34
At the forefront of Amnesty's campaign for Soviet dissidents was the translation and
distribution of samizdat material in the West. The richest piece of samizdat material readily
available to Western Scholarson the Soviet persecution of dissidents was undoubtedly the journal
the Chronicle of Current Events. Described by Peter Reddaway as 'one of the most important
documents ever to come out of the Soviet Union', the Chronicle documented human rights abuses
in the Soviet Union in a remarkably objective manner, a trait that it became renowned for.m This
samizdat publication sought to report the facts of abuse as they were, and allowed the reader to
formulate their own opinions on the matter, offering a unique insight into the dissenting
movements within the Soviet Union.
The Chronicle was first published via samizdat in the Soviet Union in April 1968 and
continued to produce regular copies until its final edition in December 1982.136This was a
remarkable achievement for the dissidents involved with the Chronicle when the obstacles they
faced are taken into account. The lack of private printing presses in the Soviet Union meant that
the mass publication of material was driven through state controlled publishing houses. This had
the inevitable complication of being governed by internal censors, who took strict control over
134'Amnesty International's publishing of A Chronicle of Current Events', July 1975, lEe doc. 94, IISG [No
Ref).
135 Reddaway, Uncensored Russia, p. 15.
136 For a complete run of the Chronicle of Current Events see MeMopuall: 'XpoHuKa meKYUlux c06blmuu
apxue' (Memorial: Chronicle of Current Events Archive) available at
http://www.memo.ru/history/diss/chr/index.htm [Russian] [Accessed 8 March 2011]. For an English
translation of the Chronicle, see Reddaway, Uncensored Russia, and Amnesty International Publications, A
Chronicle of Current Events: A Journal of the Soviet Civil Rights Movement - Numbers 17 to 64 (London,
1971 to 1984).
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the content of all material produced. As a result, anything remotely anti-Soviet in tone would not
have been published, sometimes with severe repercussions for the author in question. This forced
dissidents to publish material underground, either via laborious retyping of samizdat papers,
often on so-called 'onion paper' which although very thin allowed several pagesto be reproduced
on one typewriter at once, or through the formation of their own illegal printing presses. The
term samizdat is a play on the acronym of the Soviet state publishing house Gosizdat, and literally
means 'self-publishing house,.m The current use of the term samizdat in the English language to
refer to all forms of clandestine publication goes some way to highlight both the impact that this
form of publication had on the Western perception of Soviet dissenters, and also the amount of
material produced. This, alongside terms such as refusenik, is an instance where Western
interaction with Soviet dissenters literally developed British discourse, undoubtedly with the
assistanceof concerned human rights activists and scholars.
Samizdat literature has come to dominate how historians understand dissenters in the
Soviet Union. It was arguably the main way in which dissidents managed to discuss their political
ideas with a wider public, both domestically and internationally, and was used extensively by
British human rights groups as a way to collate uncensored information from behind the Iron
Curtain. Given the influence that it had on British human rights groups in the 1970s and 1980s, it
is essential to consider the importance of samizdat, and why it developed in the Soviet Union.
Samizdat was a method of publishing in which authors could distribute their work to a
wide audience without being censored by the Soviet authorities. This format of publishing allowed
works such as Mikhail Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita and Boris Pasternak's Doctor
Zhivago, which were critical of the Soviet regime, to be disseminated throughout the Soviet
Union, both of which are now regarded as literary classlcs.l"
Engaging in the production of samizdat was a particularly important challenge for
religious dissenters, who attempted to circumvent the state dominance of publication in order to
137 M. Shatz,Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective (Cambridge,1980) pp. 128 -130.
138 M. Bulgakov,The Master and Margarita (london, 2008), B.Pasternak,Doctor Zhivago (london, 1958).
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reproduce religious materials such as the bible and other liturgical books. Unsurprisingly, the
Soviet authorities significantly restricted the production of religious materials as part of state-
driven atheism which forced covert religious organisations to build underground printing
presses.i"
The punishments for those found to have been involved with these printing presseswere
severe, with the KGBactively seeking to close them. In an article for The Times, the journalist
Leopold Labedz discussed the background to the Chronicle in depth, and noted the risks that
involvement with its publication entailed. This included a 'loss of livelihood, exile or
imprisonment', or, as he chillingly put it 'such mild routine measures as forcible confinement in
mental lnstttutions."? This is something that the second chapter of this thesis on the response to
psychiatric abuse illustrates was a common way in which the Soviet authorities dealt with
dissenters, something that was recognised and actively campaigned against in the West. The
dangers in producing and disseminating this material were very real, and being found with
samizdat material was often enough to send a dissident to the Gulag on trumped up charges.One
need only read the memoirs of Soviet dissidents to find many examples of this occurrlng.r"
The restrictions put in place by the Soviet authorities, although making the mass
publication of material difficult, did not completely prevent samizdat from being reproduced.
Indeed, there were cases when extensive amounts of samizdat were produced without the
knowledge of the Soviet authorities. For example, Chronicle No. 34 reports a KGBraid on a Latvian
farmhouse in October 1974 which uncovered a working printing press being used by a group of
Baptists, along with nine tons of paper and 15,000 copies of the Gospels.142
Whilst the KGBwere clearly intent on suppressing underground literature of this sort in
this period, their record of success is very mixed. The arrest and detainment of Peter Yakir and
139 Formoreon the publicationof religiousmaterial in the SovietUnionsee.J. Ellis,The Russian Orthodox
Church: A Contemporary History (London,1986) pp. 149-171; andM. Bourdeaux,The Gospels Triumph over
Communism (Minneapolis,1991) p. 115-118.
140 L. Labedz,'TheStrainsof IntellectualLifein Russia;WhySovietwritersmaythink of leaving',The Times, 1
August1969, p. 6.
141 ForexampleseeSolzhenitsyn,The Oak and the Calf, pp. 103-159.
142 AmnestyInternational,Chronicle of Current Events, No.34, 3S and36 p. 53.
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Victor Krasin in 1972, both of whom were keenly involved in the production of the Chronicle,
suspended its samizdat publication. It only returned in the Spring of 1974 when other dissidents
restarted its publlcatlon."" The suspension of the Chronicle in this period can be directly
attributed to the success of the KGB,who found and imprisoned its editors and many of its
contributors. However, the fact that it returned in samizdat in 1974, continued in publication for
another decade, and was regularly smuggled out to the West highlights both the KGB's
shortcomings in preventing this type of dissent and the determination of those behind the
Chronicle in disseminating this material. Essentially,samizdat was a largely uncontrollable way in
which dissidents could spread information without interference from state censors.
Samizdat material was extensively used by British human rights group who researched
Soviet dissent. This material offered an uncensored view of the Soviet authorities, and exposed
some of the abusesof power that they conducted. Much of the evidence that these groups based
their campaigns on was from samizdat smuggled to the West. In several cases, human rights
groups translated and reproduced samizdat verbatim, illustrating that they felt its content was
persuasive enough without any additional commentary.
The content of the Chronicle itself has been utilised by historians and contemporary
scholars alike as a reliable insight into the workings of the dissident movement in Russia in the
1960s and 1970s. Its frank style of reporting events of human rights abuse was arguably its
greatest strength, in which it presented evidence on the events without allowing ideology or
politically driven rhetoric to take over. This was vastly different from the bulk of samizdat, which
is full of political argument and the opinion of writers. One need only consider the samizdat works
of dissident authors such as Amalrik, Sakharov, and Solzhenitsyn to see how forthright these
opinions were.l44 Joshua Rubenstein has highlighted how clear this emotionally detached
approach was in the first edition of the Chronicle, which focused on the aftermath of the 1968
143 Shatz, Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective p. 132.
144 For example see A. Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (London, 1970); A. Sakharov,
Reflections on Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom (New York, 1968); andA. Solzhenitsyn, A
Letter to Soviet Leaders (London, 1974).
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trial of Galanskov and Ginzburg and could easily have been more accusatory in its reportlng.l"
This approach became a key trait of the Chronicle, and one that undoubtedly boosted its
reputation amongst Western commentators who sometimes gave the impression in their articles
that it was a news bulletin rather than a dissident journal.146 This frank style of reporting had
direct parallels with the way in which Amnesty operated, focusing on evidence and impartiality
over ideologically tainted reporting. This may go some way to suggest why the Chronicle was so
readily received by Amnesty, and why it was used extensively by the organisation in its reporting.
Another great benefit of the Chronicle over other samizdat journals produced in this
period is the national scope that it had. Some samizdat pieces had a clear regional focus, such as
the Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church which unsurprisingly focused on issues regarding
the Catholic faith in Lithuania. On the other hand, the Chronicle of Current Events covered events
from all over the Soviet Union. Marshall Shatznotes that the Chronicle was able to cover events in
both small towns and major cities, and formed a nationwide information network across the
Soviet Union.147 This national scope is important when considering the information that the
Chronicle contained, and how it was utilised in the West. Rather than focusing on events from the
major cities such as Moscow and leningrad, the nationwide scope of the Chronicle further
illustrated the objective approach that it took, suggesting that it reported on matters regarding
their importance, rather than their proximity to major cities in the Soviet Union. When the sheer
size of the Soviet Union is taken into account, alongside the spread of the so-called Gulag
Archipelago across the breadth of the country, this is an essential point to make in order to
reinforce the journals impartiality.
The desire for objectivity in the Chronicle was arguably driven by an aspiration from its
editors to achieve and maintain the standards set out in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR),rather than adopt a political attack on the Soviet system itself. The importance of
the UDHRfor the editors of the Chronicle is clear, and each edition of the journal contained a
145 Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents, p. 100.
146 Forexample, see B.levin, 'Russia's Political Asylums', The Times, 12June 1973,p. 16.
147 Shatz, Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective, p. 132.
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quotation of Article 19 on its front page. That Article 19 refers explicitly to freedoms of opinion
and expression is revealing about the direction that these dissidents wished to take, aiming for a
glasnost (openness) which, somewhat ironically, would later playa large part in the collapse of
the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev.148This insistence on freedom of speech had much in
common with Amnesty's main objectives for prisoners of conscience and can be related directly
to the principles Benenson set out in 'The Forgotten Prisoners'. Amnesty clearly recognised the
Chronicle's explicit support for freedom of conscience, and noted in its June 1979 International
Newsletter that the journal was 'a dispassionate, uncensored source of information' and 'remains
the most important source of information on violations of human rights in the Soviet Union
today'.149
The output and material that the Chronicle produced had no precedent in the history of
Russian intellectual nonconformism. literature produced by Soviet dissidents in the 1960s and
1970s has many similarities to other literary works from Russian history. For example, Martin
Malia described Solzhenitsyn as an author who resurrected the dissenting traditions of the
Russianliterary greats such as Fyodor Dostoevsky and LevTolstoy.15oMarshall Shatz has spoken at
length about the historical precedent that Soviet dissidents found themselves in, becoming part of
a longstanding tradition of dissent in Russianhistory.m Even the internal debates among Soviet
dissidents have been compared to the division of intellectuals in pre-revolutionary Imperial Russia
between Westernisers and Slavophiles.152Whilst the Chronicle fits into the convention of
intellectual nonconformity that is ever-present in Russianhistory, it can be seen to have broken
with this tradition and formed a new path. Philip Boobbyer notes that there are some similarities
between the Chronicle and Liberation, a journal produced by Petr Struve in early twentieth
148 Article 19 of the UDHRstates that, 'Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information
through any media and regardless of frontiers.' For a full text of the UDHRsee 'The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights', at http:lLwww.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml [accessed28 March 2011].
149Amnesty International, '50th issue of 'A chronicle' published', Amnesty International Newsletter, Vol. 9,
No.6 (June 1979), IDC,fiche no. 065 [No Ref).
150 Malia, Russia Under Western Eyes, p. 394.
151Shatz,Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective, especially pp. 12 - 63.
152For more on this comparison, see D. Kelley, The Solzhenitsyn-Sakharov Dialogue: Politics, Society and the
Future (Connecticut, 1982).
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century, but does not suggest that it was born out of this tradition. Instead, Boobbyer points
towards the unifying force of both of these journals and is right to suggest that the importance of
the Chronicle was that for a period it that brought elements of the highly divided Soviet dissident
movement together.1S3 Whilst it would be erroneous to suggest that the Chronicle was the journal
of the dissident movement, its reportage on dissenting figures in the Soviet Union in this period
was unrivalled. Despite the variety of differing ideological positions present amongst Soviet
dissenters, the Chronicle's objective approach meant that it reported on all aspects of this often
fragmented movement.
Translated extracts of the Chronicle were first published English in 1972 in Uncensored
Russia, a volume edited by Peter Reddaway,who compiled and translated the first eleven editions
of the Chronicle of Current Events.l54 Instead of reproducing the first eleven editions in a verbatim
fashion, Reddaway approached the content thematically. This allowed for the development of
events reported over several editions of the Chronicle to be easily portrayed without the need for
extensive commentary from the editor. Uncensored Russia was broken into seven main sections,
and used the analogy of a river to describe each section. Thesewere the mirror of the movement;
the main stream; the movement in captivity; individual streams; mainstream publications;
tributaries and dams. This division allowed detailed analysis of national movements alongside
individual dissident cases, specific dissident works, and the response of the Soviet authorities
neatly bringing together the multifaceted dimensions of the dissident movement. The subtitles of
these divisions also suggest that Reddaway saw the Chronicle as a vehicle with which information
on dissenters could flow from the tributaries of the Russianprovinces, through individual national
streams into the mainstream of dissident activity in Moscow, and, to extend the metaphor
further, on to the West if it could avoid the dams of the Soviet censors. This identification may
also suggest the role that Reddaway felt he played in this flow of information, providing an
avenue for it to be spread out further in the West.
153 Boobbyer,Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia, p. 85.
154 Reddaway,Uncensored Russia.
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Somewhat unusually for such a collection of primary material, Reddaway interspersed
Uncensored Russia with frequent annotations. These notations are short on the whole, and do not
detract from the material presented. If anything, they are used primarily to thread the extracts
together into a more fluid narrative. These annotations make the material presented more
accessibleto the reader and offered a senseof context to extracts that can at times feel disjointed
due to the thematic approach. Making this material accessible for a wide audience was
particularly important, and it was undoubtedly influential on an array of activists. Whilst
Reddaway'swork is commendable for its ability to compile eleven editions of densely informative
material into a workable and fluid narrative, the real value of the Chronicle for human rights
activists in the West lay in its individual editions, and the up-to-date information they provided on
Soviet human rights abuses.
Reddaway oversaw translations of editions of the Chronicle for his own research,
translating material himself or enlisting the assistance of others who were interested in their
contents. For example Xenia Dennen, who was later to become heavily involved in publicising the
persecution of religious believers in the Soviet Union through her work with Keston College, was
one of those who assisted him, translating edition No.7.1SS Reddaway had originally circulated
these translations to his friends and colleagues whom he thought would be interested, using the
mailing system at the London School of Economics and Political Sciencewhere he was a Lecturer
in Government. This was initially done without charge to Reddaway's close friends and colleagues,
something that he recalled developed in a very spontaneous and ad hoc manner.l" The
distribution of these early translations of the Chronicle illustrate how information on Soviet
dissenters spread from Reddaway through to a wider network of concerned individuals. This is
indicative of the early network of activists that was developing in Britain in the 1970s, of which
Reddaway played a central role.
155 Interviewwith PeterReddawaydated5 July2010.
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The popularity of these translations of the Chronicle quickly grew, especially with the
public successof Uncensored Russia. Reddaway recalled that unlike conventional academic books,
he earned 'a bit of money' from the publication of Uncensored Russia.1S7The relative successof
this work may be attributed to the interest in the position of dissenters in the Soviet Union, who
became more regularly reported in the Western media in the early 1970s. This popularity
undoubtedly proved that there was a public interest in the content of the Chronicle. Reddaway
approached Amnesty about publishing regular translations of the Chronicle, a decision that he
recalled being a simple one for him to make. Amnesty was the only human rights organisation in
this period that had an established reputation of impartiality, the ability to produce the Chronicle,
and one that Reddawayhad personal links with.ls8
Amnesty had a clear interest in the content of the Chronicle, noting in its annual report
from 1971 that it was the organisation's main source of information regarding the latest position
of Soviet prisoners of consclence.!" Amnesty agreed to publish an Englishversion of the Chronicle
from early 1971 onwards, going on to publish complete translations of the journal from numbers
17 through to 64 in 1984.160This was notably new territory for Amnesty, who admitted in their
1970-1971 annual report that it was the first time it had 'published material of this kind - i.e.
material which is distributed outside the organisation, and which has not been compiled by
Amnesty observers as a result of their own enquiries.'161This was a bold step for Amnesty, as it
meant that the organisation was effectively endorsing material that it had not produced itself.
Given the material contained within the Chronicle there was a real risk that Amnesty's campaigns
could be accused of being politically motivated. That this material had come from samizdat and
had to be smuggled out of the Soviet Union illustrates the potential for it to be slanderous or
politically biased. The decision to publish this translation, and to support its production for over a
1571bid.
1581bid.
159 Amnesty International Annual Report 1970-1971, p. 58.
160.pdf versions of each edition of the Chronicle produced by Amnesty are available on the library section
ofthe International Secretariat's website. Seehttp://www.amnesty.org/en/library (accessed22 May 2012).
161 Amnesty International Annual Report 1970-1971, p. 70.
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decade, illustrates not only how important Amnesty felt this publication was, but also that it felt it
was a reliable source of information.
Image 1.2 Cover of Amnesty's Translation of A Chronicle of Current Events. No. 17. April 1971.
Amnesty's support for the Chronicle was clearly long term, with its support for the
translation and publication of the journal lasting for over a decade. The longevity of this support
was confirmed in 1974 when Amnesty invested heavily in its publishing capabilities, and expanded
the potential output of the organisation in order to deal explicitly with the demands of publishing
the Chronicle.162 Despite attempts in the later years to transfer the complete publishing of
Chronicle to Writers and Scholars International (WSI), the group behind the free speech
162 Amnesty International Annual Report 1974-1975, p, 34.
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publication Index on Censorship, Amnesty maintained an element of control over the Chronicle.
From no.32 onwards, WSI dealt with the publication of the Chronicle in Amnesty's name, and
provided copies for Amnesty to sell on.163WSl's involvement with the Chronicle became much
firmer from number 39 onwards, when the journal effectively became a WSI publication produced
for Amnesty. This shift in publisher, however, is impossible to discern from the copies of the
Chronicle itself, which was still produced as an Amnesty publication.
WSI would have been unable to effectively disseminate the Chronicle on their own merit,
and needed Amnesty's name to be attached to the Chronicle in order to secure public trust in the
contents of the publication. Philip Spender, writing on behalf of WSI, noted the importance of
Amnesty's endorsement of the Chronicle in a letter to Mark Grantham of Amnesty's publication
department in June 1976. He noted that:
The endorsement of the Chronicle by Amnesty seems to us very important because of the general
esteem in which Amnesty is held ...We think removal of all connection with Amnesty is bound to
raise questions in the minds (and perhaps the mouths too) of the public at large. We are aware
that the editors in Moscow have made it known that they attach great importance to Amnesty's
endorsement. One supposes that the KGB etc. are similarly inhibited from attacking too carelessly
a journal explicitly or unambiguously connected with Amnesty, whom they know to be capable of
effective protest.l64
This neatly illustrates not only Amnesty's own position in Britain in this period, but also
how much its own reputation was needed to secure the success of the Chronicle. Even though
Amnesty was no longer producing this translation, had this endorsement not been provided the
reputation of the journal would have plummeted. That this could have impacted both on
Amnesty's work for prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, and on the physical safety of
those involved with the Chronicle in the Soviet Union may have forced its hand. The success of the
Chronicle was directly related to its relationship with Amnesty. This is an area where Amnesty's
influence on the British discourse on Soviet dissent can be easily noted. The translated editions of
the Chronicle were the main source of information regarding Soviet human rights violations
163 'Resolution for Council - A Chronicle of Current Events', June 1976, IECdoc. no. 107 IISG[ACT81/IEC76].
164letter from Philip Spender to Mark Grantham, 'THECHRONICLENo. 39 and following', 18 June 1976, IEC
doc. 107, IISG[No Ref].
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readily available to Western commentators. Had it not been supported by Amnesty, this
publication would not have been as readily used by journalists and academics.
Reddaway maintained his involvement in the Chronicle throughout the time that it was
published by Amnesty, editing and translating the journal, initially without requesting a fee. When
the editions of the journal grew, Amnesty were able to supply finance with which Reddaway was
able to pay for translators to assist him and to claim a small amount for his own editorial work.165
This highlights the role that Reddaway played for Amnesty, who utilised his experience and
expertise in this area rather than bringing the editorship of the journal into its research
department. This can be linked to the changes in Amnesty's research department in the early
1970s, which will be discussed later in this chapter, which sought to increase its academic repute.
Keeping Reddaway involved with its production of the Chronicle was an undoubted advantage to
Amnesty's academic credentials.
Despite reproducing translations of the Chronicle and other samizdat documents from the
Soviet Union, Amnesty attempted to distance themselves from a full affirmation of their contents.
For example, in the introduction to a reproduction of an open letter from a victim of Soviet
psychiatric abuse dated September 1984, it is clearly noted that Amnesty could not verify all
evidence presented in the letter, and that it was only being reproduced as 'it gives interesting
background information'.166 This can be seen as a 'get out' clause in case some of the evidence
presented in this samizdat material proved to be false, something that protected Amnesty from
any errors in the material which could have been discovered at a later date. The same sort of
claim exists in Amnesty's production of the Chronicle, which contained a reoccurring paragraph in
its preface to the translation stating that:
Since Amnesty International has no control over the writing of A Chronicle of Current Events, we
cannot guarantee the veracity of all its contents. Nor do we take responsibility for any opinions or
judgements which may appear or be implied in its contents. Yet Amnesty International continues
to regard A Chronicle of Current Events as an authentic and reliable source of information on
165Interview with Peter Reddaway, 5 July 2010.
166'Translation of an open letter from a former victim of Soviet psychiatric abuse', September 1984, MRC,
MSS.34/4/1/USSR/9S, [No Ref].
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matters of direct concern to our own work for the worldwide observance of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.167
This reference first appeared in Amnesty's preface to Chronicles No. 28, 29, 30 and 31
which were published jointly in a collected edition in April 1975. This multiple publication of
Chronicle numbers in one edition was due to the attacks on the journals writers and editors by the
KGBwhich had prevented its samizdat publication in the Soviet Union from October 1972 to
September 1974.168 These numbers appeared simultaneously in samizdat, showing that the
Chronicle's contributors had continued writing throughout this period, and had only released
material after the KGBattacks had eased, covering the period of non-publication. This multiple
edition was the first time that Amnesty's reproduction of the Chronicle had included a signed
preface, something that continued through to its final edition in 1984. Whilst the text of the
preface changed slightly for each edition, updating its content slightly to adjust for new
developments, it remained consistent in tone and content throughout Amnesty's publication of
the Chronicle. The last paragraph of each preface, quoted above, notably remains identical
throughout. The consistency with which this section was reproduced and its place within the
preface itself suggest that it was a conscious and calculated decision by the authors to be
replicated in this manner. This extract puts Amnesty's unusual relationship with the Chronicle
clearly and concisely; highlighting the importance and authenticity of the information that it
presented, whilst at the same time distancing itself from direct responsibility for its content. It is
also revealing of the difficulties in using samizdat material as the basis for wide campaigns, and
that in the context of the Cold War, all material obtained from behind the Iron Curtain had to be
treated with caution.
Despite these safety clauses inserted into these publications, the sheer effort that
Amnesty went through to publish the Chronicle show the support that it was giving to its
contents. By publishing a translation of the Chronicle under its own name, Amnesty clearly put its
own reputation on the reliability of the claims that it presented. This was a bold approach to take
167 Amnesty International, Chronicle o/Current Events, No. 28, 29, 30 and 31, April 1975. p. S.
168 'A Chronicle of Current Events', September 1974, Amnesty ICM no. 15, IISG [No Ref).
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in the context of the Cold War, where information received from behind the Iron Curtain was
often met with scepticism due to the difficulties in proving its reliability. Despite this, Amnesty
clearly stood behind the reliability and importance of the journal, and noted in a press release
dated 23 May 1978 that the decision to publish the Chronicle 'reflected the high respect the
journal has earned through its meticulous attention to accuracy and its strict restriction to cases
of violation of the human rights proclaimed in the UDHR.169 The decision of the Chronicle's editors
to base their actions on the UDHR aligned their action with Amnesty's philosophy. It could be
argued that the Chronicle was in this sense a perfect fit for Amnesty, and a journal that it could
support with ease due to a common moral ground.
Amnesty's publication of the Chronicle also had potential financial benefits for the
organisation. Journalists, libraries and universities were likely to have been keen to utilise the
material presented in these translations. Indeed, it is clear from the current catalogues of several
British universities that many institutions held long term subscriptions to this publtcatlon.i" The
demand for copies of the Chronicle in English from these individuals and organisations would have
likely been enough to generate a steady income for Amnesty. The success of Uncensored Russia
generated a steady income for its author, and the reception of Reddaway's early translations of
the Chronicle which circulated via the LSEmailing system also suggested a captive market for this
material. This is something that the organisation clearly recognised, noting in their 1970-71
annual report that the transfer of funds to a Publications Department Account was to finance the
publication of the Chronicle, aiming to make this publication a source of profit for the
organisatlon.i" This financial implication for publishing a translation of the Chronicle must be kept
in mind when assessing Amnesty's support for the journal.
169 Amnesty International, 'Amnesty International Publishes Further Numbers of Chronicle of Current
Events', 23 May 1978, IDC,fiche no. Cll, [No Ref].
170 For example, the Libraries at Durham University, the london School of Economicsand Political Sciences,
the University of Kent, the University of Manchester and the University of Sheffield all contain sets of
Amnesty's translation of the Chronicle of Current Events.
171 Amnesty International Annual Report 1970-71, p. 20.
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Whilst reproduction of the Chronicle appears to have been in keeping with the groups
wider aims, financial incentives had a significant influence on its decision to publish it. By the
1970s, Amnesty had become increasingly concerned with its financial situation. In particular, the
British section of Amnesty was saved from a 'disastrous cash crisis' in September 1975 by large
donations from several individuals.172 That the British Section was arguably amongst the most
supported national Amnesty section suggests that other national groups would have doubtless
been in a more difficult financial position. Amnesty's International Council Minutes from
September 1973 include a document written by Dirk Borner entitled 'Development of Amnesty
International Including National Sections and Fundraising,.173 This document discusses the way in
which Amnesty could develop its fundraising strategies, including Christmas card campaigns, the
development of a fundraising manual to be sent to local groups and taking steps to 'obtain tax-
privileges'. Whilst these are perhaps obvious developments for an organisation such as Amnesty
to have taken, the language used in this document is particularly jarring when it is remembered
that it is a human rights organisation. Alongside suggestions for developments in this document,
Borner asks several questions that appear very out of place for members of a human rights
organisation. These include:
'What do we sell?,174
'What is our product?,175
'Who is our customer?'!"
'What is our sale force"?,177
These business concepts do not sit easily in discussion of the development of a human
rights organisation committed to the release of prisoners of conscience from around the world.
172 Amnesty International British Section, 'Director's report for Executive Committee Meeting on n"
November 1975' British Section Documents no. 1278, IISG[No Ref).
173 'Development of Amnesty International Including National Sections and Fundraising', September 1983,






This is something that Borner himself recognises, apologising in the conclusion of this report for
using such terminology and 'business thinking,.17s This document highlights the financial
considerations that Amnesty's leadership had addressed at this time, something that undoubtedly
impacted on the way it approached the request to reproduce the Chronicle. It is also indicative of
the wider changes Amnesty made to the way it thought about its work in the early 1970s in the
process of becoming a more professional and efficient organisation.
The potential financial benefits to Amnesty of publishing the Chronicle was likely to have
made the decision to publish it a much easier one to make. The minutes of IECmeetings from the
early 1970s breaks down the mathematics behind making such a decision. Minutes from the July
1973 meeting state that if Amnesty were to continue to publish the Chronicle, the US section of
Amnesty would guaranteed to purchase 500 copies and that the American publisher Kronika Press
was also willing to take 2,000 coples.!" Earlier minutes from the March 1971 meeting of the IEC
note that a print run of 2,500 copies of No. 16 of the Chronicle would need to selll,OOO copies for
Amnesty to breakeven on their investment.1SO A cursory look at these numbers imply that
Amnesty would have made a profit on the Chronicle by selling it to its American section and
Kronika press alone without taking into account the clear market for this publication in English
speaking nations.
Given the clear importance of the Chronicle for Amnesty's campaigns on the Soviet Union,
and the clear ideological risks that the group took in undertaking this publication, it would be a
crude slight to claim that the main reasons for its publication was to make a profit for the group.
Yet it is apparent that had this publication not been financially viable, Amnesty's support for the
publication would have diminished. The potential to produce a journal that would have assisted
Amnesty's work whilst generating a profit was clearly of much benefit to the organisation. The
finances of Amnesty's publication of the Chronicle is particularly revealing about the wider public
178 Ibid, p. 11
179'A Chronicle of Current Events', September 1974, ICM no. 15, IISG[No Refl.
180 'Matters arising from the minutes of the previous meeting', March 1971, IECno. 51, IISG[No Ref],
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impact that this journal had. That Amnesty was able to make a profit on the Chronicle illustrates
that it was well received, and suggests that it was widely held as an important journal.
Although Amnesty's publication of the Chronicle appears to have been seamless on the
outside, the decision to support its publication was met with resistance internally. Leading
Amnesty members such as Sean MacBride opposed the publication of this material, and
attempted to attain support within Amnesty to stop its publication. Indeed, the publication of the
early editions of the Chronicle from 1971 to 1973 was noted to have aroused 'mild controversy'
from sections of the hierarchy of Amnesty.181 Despite this opposition, Amnesty pressed forward
with the publication, with Peter Reddaway highlighting the efforts of Zbynek Zeman, the head of
the research department, in persuading them to do SO.182
There was a clear concern about publishing the Chronicle from members of the
International Council. An ICM document from September 1974 notes International Council
members felt that by publishing the Chronicle, there was a risk that Amnesty would be linked
directly with the Soviet dissident movement.183It was feared that this direct link would impact on
Amnesty's efforts in assisting prisoners of conscience both in the Soviet Union and in other
nations. This concern is directly linked to Amnesty's attempts to maintain impartiality in an
international political climate that favoured partiality. From its inception, Amnesty's leading
members showed a deep concern for maintaining impartiality. Indeed, in the first document ever
released by the organisation, it is noted that Amnesty's purpose was to 'concentrate upon
drawing attention impartially to prisoners of conscience in countries around the world,.l84 At the
September 1972 ICM, the International Council noted how publishing the Chronicle might violate
181 'The Chronicle of Current Events, Note from Herbart Ruitenberg and George Siemensma, September
1974, ICM no. 15, IISG[No Ref).
182 Interview with Peter Reddaway, 5 July 2010.
183 'A Chronicle of Current Events', September 1974, ICM no. 15, IISG[No Ref).
184 Amnesty, 'Action to free political prisoners, international movement formed, secretariat in London', ICM
doc. no. 1, IISG[No Ref). Dated unknown, approximately mid-1961.
79
its impartial status, and suggested that each edition contain a reference that the contents should
not be considered as official Amnesty material.185
It was suggested at this September 1974 meeting of the ICM that Amnesty should 'try to
find a similar document published regularly by an underground civil rights movement in another
country, and reprint it as a "balance" to the Chronicle'. The response to this suggestion was simple
- 'there is, in fact,.!lQ other regular publication like the Chronicle: it is unique,.186In fact, it could
be argued that publication of the Chronicle was in itself a political balancing act, showing that
Amnesty reacted to human rights violation in left-wing regimes as their actions prior to this had
been predominantly against right-wing governments - something that the International Council
also recognised at this meeting.187 The IEC also discussed how the publication of the Chronicle
would affect the Amnesty's political balance, and unanimously agreed that it should support
publication 'at as reasonable a cost as possible,.188If anything, the debates about the Chronicle
and Amnesty's impartiality at this meeting of the ICM shows how importantly the concern for
balance was taken by the organisation's leadership, and how difficult it was far the group to
maintain a sense of neutrality.
Amnesty's concern for impartiality can be seen most explicitly in the appointment of
Derek Roebuck as the Head of Research in 1979. Given Roebuck's political background as a former
member of the Communist Party of Australia and his clear left-wing leanings, this can be seen as
an appointment to illustrate Amnesty's impartiality in the context of the Cold War. This
appointment was met with much criticism from high ranking figures within Amnesty, especially
given his background in partisan attacks on the US and articles he had published in the North
Korean press.189Roebuck's appointment was also the trigger for the prominent American human
rights activist Edward Kline to leave his position as the director of AI-USA. In a letter to AI-USA,
185'Report and Decisionsof the s" International Council Meeting', 8-10 September 1972, ICM doc. no. 26,
IISG[No Ref], p. 11-see point 41 in particular.
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Kline noted that his resignation was due to Roebuck's appointment, stating that 'I believe that
dedication to the ideology of human rights and not a partisan political approach is the proper
qualification for the post of Head of Research of A[mnesty] I[nternational]' .190Kline went on to
develop strong links with Andrei Sakharov, one of the most prominent Soviet dissidents, and
would have undoubtedly been a great asset to Amnesty's Soviet campaigns.
Not all national sections were against Roebuck's appointment, with the board of the
Finnish section strongly supporting his appointment in a letter to Martin Ennals. They noted that
'it is of tremendous importance, trying to make people in this country realize that A[mnesty]
I[nternational] is politically independent, to be able to say that the Head of Research is a
communist,.191 The differing perspectives of Roebuck's appointment show how Amnesty desire to
stay politically impartial had to be tactfully navigated in order to please all of its members -
something that was often an impossible task in the context of the Cold War.
Amnesty's publication of the Chronicle had a substantial effect on the organisation's
image in the Soviet Union itself. It put Amnesty 'on the map' with Soviet human rights circles,
something that arguably assisted the good reputation that Amnesty built among Soviet
dissidents.192In a report to the IEC in July 1975, Amnesty's Soviet researcher Clayton Yeo noted
that if Amnesty were to stop publication of the Chronicle there would be a 'severe drop in
A[mnesty] I[nternational]'s prestige within the human rights movement in the USSR' and that any
decision to stop publication would probably be irreversible.193Yeo's statement clearly shows the
options Amnesty had regarding the Chronicle once it had begun publishing its English translation-
continue publication of the journal and maintain the support from Soviet human rights activists or
cease publication and attempt to develop stronger links with the Soviet authorities. Given
190Letter from Edward Kline to David Hinkley, AI-USA,30 January 1979, IECno. 144, IISG[No Ref].
191Letter to Martin Ennalsfrom the Board of the Finnish section of Amnesty, 16December 1978, IECno.
144, IISG[No Ref].
192'The Chronicle of Current Events, Note from Herbart Ruitenberg and George Siemensma, September
1974, ICM no. 15, IISG[No Ref).
193C. Yeo, 'Amnesty International's publishing of A Chronicle of Current Events', July 1975, IECno. 94, IISG
[No Ref).
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Amnesty's ethos in supporting 'the forgotten prisoner', the support of its membership would have
undoubtedly been for the former option.
Amnesty's relationship with the Soviet authorities was severely affected by its publication
of the Chronicle, something which might have been of use in petitioning for prisoners of
conscience. In reports of early Amnesty meetings with representatives of the Soviet Government
it is apparent that efforts were made to persuade Amnesty to stop its support for the Cnrontcte?"
The impact that good relations between Amnesty and the Soviet authorities could have had
would have been minimal. Given Amnesty's clear position of support for prisoners of conscience
who had actively campaigned against the Soviet authorities, this was a relationship that was
unlikely to have been successful. Even in countries where Amnesty has a relatively good
relationship with the authorities, such as the US and Britain, the organisation's opinions could
easily be dismissed or lgnored.!" Some of the Amnesty hierarchy noted in September 1974 that
discussions with Soviet officials 'do not appear likely to become fruitful,.196 The publication of the
Chronicle was arguably the main step that put Amnesty in direct conflict with the Soviet
authorities, falling into active support of dissidents. This was also a point of no return for the
organisation, despite the potential ties that it had with the Soviet authorities through figures such
as Derek Roebuck and Sean MacBride. It is also perhaps unsurprising that propaganda attacks by
the Soviet authorities, which culminated in the more literal attacks on members of its Moscow
group, occurred after Amnesty's commitment to publish the Chronicle.
Amnesty's decision to publish the Chronicle appears initially to have been simple -
reproduction of material on human rights abuse in the Soviet Union was something in line with
the ethos and aims of the organisation. However, it is clear that a range of political, financial and
personal factors meant that the decision to support this publication was by no means a
194'Amnesty International's Relations with Governments - CaseStudy: The Soviet Union', July 1975, IECno.
92, IISG[No Ref].
195 For examples of this see Power, Like Water on Stone pp. 165-181, 252-280 and Amnestyl When They Are
All Freel
196'The Chronicle of Current Events, Note from Herbart Ruitenberg and George Siemensma, September
1974, ICM no. 15, IISG[No Ref].
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straightforward one. By supporting the Chronicle and publicising it extensively, Amnesty arguably
became an extension of the Soviet dissident movement, despite all attempts to distance itself
from the journal's content. Given the significance that was attributed to the spread of information
for the dissidents, this support was of the utmost importance, publicising their plight in the
English speaking world. This support, however, arguably came at the cost of unbalancing
Amnesty's political impartiality. This was, in short, anything but a simple decision.
On its publication, the Chronicle was used extensively by journalists as a reliable source on
Soviet human rights violation and the position of the dissident movement. From the early 1970s
onwards, there were an array of newspaper articles which utilised the Chronicle as their main
source of primary material for their assertions. For example, Bernard Levin utilised material from
the Chronicle in several of his articles in The Times on human rights violation in the Soviet Union.
In an article on the reports of the Soviet political abuse of psychiatry, Levin quotes the Chronicle
on the case of Nikolai Samsonov as if it were an official publication, with no questions regarding
its reliability.197 Levin was full of praise for the efforts of the Chronicle, and showed particular
admiration for the systematic nature of their work in face of the Soviet authorttles.?" Indeed, the
manner in which this publication is referred to would leave an uninformed reader unaware of the
fact that this publication was an underground dissident journal that was being smuggled to the
West by activists. Many other commentators used the material presented in the Chronicle in their
reports. In an article on a series of death threats against Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Frank Crepeau of
the Associated Press references the Chronicle as a respected publication in much the same way as
Levin did.l99 Michael Scammel also went as far as to call the Chronicle a 'news journal',
highlighting the manner in which the information it contained was received by British
commentators.f"
197 B. levin, 'Russia's Political Asylums', The Times, 12 June 1973, p. 16.
198 B. levin, 'This is-second indictment of Soviet tyranny', The Times, 16 November 1977, p. 18.
199 F.Crepeau, 'Solzhenitsyn speaksof threats against his life', The Times, 29 August 1973, p. 1.
200 M. Scammell, 'The Soviet opposition: part one of a series by Michael Scammell', The Times, 10 August
1981, p. 5; and M. Scammell, 'The Soviet opposition, part two: the liberal democrats', The Times, 11 August
1981 p. S.
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Peter Reddaway also utilised evidence from the Chronicle to base a series of articles that
reported the latest information on the position of Soviet dissidents in The Times. These reports
appeared on a regular basis from 1969 to 1978, each containing direct reference to the latest
material on Soviet human rights violation noted in the Chronic/e. 201 The frequency of these
reports in the early 1970s suggests that Reddaway was keen to show the sort of information that
was presented in the Chronicle in the national press. As Reddaway was one of the first to receive
copies of the Chronicle in the West, and was the editor of Amnesty's English translations, it is
unsurprising that he published these stories before other journalists.
Whilst the Chronicle was often referred to in the British press as an 'underground' and
'clandestine' journal, its reliability and accuracy were rarely questloned.i" The fact that it was
widely accepted as a reliable source of information about the position of dissidents in the Soviet
Union can be directly attributed to that fact that it was published in the West by Amnesty. Had
the Chronicle been produced by an organisation without this reputation, it is very unlikely that it
would have been referred to in this manner by these journalists. As these journalists were one of
the main ways in which this information was distributed to the wider public, Amnesty's reputation
was of the utmost importance for the success of the Chronicle.
Amnesty's publication of English translations of the Chronicle affected the British
discourse on Soviet dissent on two main levels. Firstly, it acted as a key piece of primary material
for contemporary commentators on the dissident movement, who as noted above used it
extensively in their reports. Whilst the Chronicle would have been available to those who spoke
Russian and had appropriate connections, this translation opened up a wider audience to this
material in the West. Information drawn from the Chronicle is likely to have played a large role in
informing smaller, active human rights organisations, such as local Amnesty groups and
201 For good examples of this use of the Chronicle in his articles, see P. Reddaway, 'Notes from
'underground', Russia'sprodigal fugitives', The Times, 9 August 1969, p. 6; P.Reddaway, 'Soviet exiles under
threat of new trial', The Times, 23 August 1969, p. 6; P.Reddaway, 'Dissident's trust in Russia'sfuture', The
Times, 27 April 1970, p. 4; P. Reddaway, 'Moscow group joins international human rights body', The Times,
9 July 1971, p. 6.; and P. Reddaway, 'A good excusefor another purge', The Times, 29 July 1980.
202 For examples of this see '51 Russianliberals call for amnesty and end to executions', The Times, 20
November 1972, p. 8; 'Wilson dilemma over Russiandissidents', The Times, 13 February 1975, p. 7; and
'Leningrad pupils scattered illegal leaflets', The Times, 9 June 1976, p. 7.
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campaigns on behalf of individuals dissidents. The Chronicle also continues to affect the way in
which historians formulate opinion on Soviet dissenters and the Soviet authorities treatment of
them. It can now be considered as an important historical archive, which with the benefit of
hindsight appears to have been both thoroughly researched and more importantly an accurate
portrayal of events in the Soviet Union. Amnesty's translations mean that this material is readily
available in many University libraries in Britain, and is likely to playa substantial part in future
analysis of the dissidents. Thus the Chronicle, and particularly Amnesty translation, shaped both
the contemporary discourse in Britain regarding the dissidents, and is likely to inform future
historical analysis of the dissident movement, and its international reception, by Western
scholars.
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Alongside the Chronicle and the array of press releases, Amnesty's other notable
publication on the USSRwas the report Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR_2°3First produced in
1975, and reprinted with a substantial revision in 1980, this work can be considered to be
Amnesty's textbook on the abuse of human rights in the Soviet Union. These publications cover a
vast amount of detail about the position of dissenters in the Soviet Union, ranging from Soviet law
and how it applied to political opponents, the trials of these dissidents, and their treatment once
imprisoned. The scope and detail to which both editions of this work go into are a testament to
the amount of information that Amnesty had compiled on the Soviet Union in this period.
Amnesty, like many other human rights organisations active in reporting on Soviet
persecution of dissenters, relied on factual information for their claims. As discussed above, this
came mostly from samizdat publications such as the Chronicle. The 1980 edition of Prisoners of
Conscience in the USSRcontained a brief but significant discussion of the source material used in
the creation of this publication in its introductory comments. It divided the primary material used
into two main categories: 'officially published materials' and 'accounts by prisoners themselves,
their relatives and friends.'204The study of dissent in the Soviet Union has necessitated this
division in primary material between 'official' and 'unofficial', with both having very different
uses.Amnesty's recognition of this shows its political nous in the context of the Cold War. This is
not something exemplary of Amnesty in particular in this period, but certainly illustrates that the
organisation grappled with the reliability of information that it was presented with on the Soviet
Union. An admission that it was consulting samizdat alongside official Soviet publications may
have been an attempt to placate critics of the organisation who may have considered the reliance
on clandestine literature as a weak and suspicious basis for the organisation to campaign on.
What is most significant about this discussion of source material is that it happened in a
prominent position in one of its major publications on the Soviet Union. This was a way in which
Amnesty informed those who read its material that it used both of these forms of information,
203 Amnesty International, Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR:Their Treatment and Conditions (First Edition
london, 1975, SecondEdition london, 1980).
204 Amnesty, Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR(1980) p. 2.
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and that it had actively considered the reliability of material that it was being presented with. Not
only did this make the use of samizdat material as a major source of information for its reports
transparent, but it also justified the reasons for doing so. This frank discussion of its publications'
source material illustrates the importance that Amnesty placed on the accuracy and use of
primary material, and its full endorsement of the empirical method.
Reference to the primary material used for this report includes brief analysis of how
'official' and 'unofficial' materials were utilised in the writing of this publication. Official materials
were noted to have provided Amnesty with 'essential information regarding official norms in
prosecuting dissenters', allowing the organisation to build up a picture of the legal framework
governing the treatment of prisoners of conscience.2os However, these materials were arguably
considered to contain little reliable information on the actual treatment of dissidents, something
which in many cases differed substantially from legal provisions. Information on the actual
treatment of dissenters was gathered by Amnesty's researchers from their own accounts, either
from personal recollections or their memoirs. In this sense, it can be suggested that Amnesty used
samizdat materials to add accuracy and colour to the carefully constructed monotone Soviet
official material, highlighting its use for the organisation.206
In the brief discussion of the use of 'unofficial' materials in Prisoners of Conscience in the
USSR, it is notable that the Chronicle is not mentioned. This is somewhat surprising given the
effort that Amnesty had gone to in publishing regular translations of the latest editions in English.
Given that on several occasions,Amnesty reports and press releaseshad stated that the Chronicle
was one of the most important sources that it used in its publications on prisoners of conscience
in the USSR,this omission is striking. The frequency with which the Chronicle is quoted
throughout Prisoners of Conscience also highlights its lmportance.f"
205 Amnesty,Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR(1980) p. 2.
206 Ibid,p. 2.
207 In the 1980 editionof Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR,the Chronicle isdirectly referencedover 15
timesasasourceof information. It isalsomentionedon severaloccasionsasanareafor further
information,andhasclearlyinformedmuchof the information presented.
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One reason behind this omission may be the distance that Amnesty had tried to create
between these two publications. Both Prisoners of Conscience in the USSRand the Chronicle were
at the forefront of Amnesty's work on the Soviet Union. Whilst they were both of much
importance to Amnesty's public output on Soviet human rights violations, they could not be more
different in their outlook or the way in which they presented the dissident movement in the USSR.
Considering how important Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR was for Amnesty's
campaigns on the Soviet Union, it is useful to directly compare it to the group's other major
publication - the Chronicle. Whilst the Chronicle was a translation of an unofficial Soviet human
rights journal, Prisoners of Conscience in the USSRwas both Amnesty's account of the human
rights violations and also in some ways an official commentary, outlining the organisation's
position on the Soviet Union at the time. Unlike the translation of the Chronicle, in which Amnesty
made clear that it was simply repeating information from a samizdat source, the organisation
stood fully behind the accuracy of information that it produced in Prisoners of Conscience in the
USSR.This material was published under its own authorship, and as such there were no hiding
places for Amnesty if any claim was subsequently to be proved to be inaccurate.
Given Amnesty's composition, Prisoners of Conscience would have been utilised by
national organisations and the local 'threes groups' to provide information on the position of
human rights, and individual prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union. Local groups, who were
in no sense specialists on the political context of the prisoners of conscience they supported had
to rely entirely on reports such as these in their course of their activism, relying on Amnesty's
name to provide enough reassurance that its contents were factually accurate. Prisoners of
Conscience was one report of many from Amnesty on the Soviet Union, and the manner in which
it would have been utilised at the local level demonstrates how much influence Amnesty's central
researchers had over British discourse. These researchers were the central hub from which much
information on Soviet human rights violation was spread throughout Britain, and it was through
reports such asthese that they had a significant influence on public opinion.
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The publication of Prisoners of Conscience also affected Amnesty's reliance on publishing
the Chronicle as a political balance. This is something that the Clayton Yeo noted in a report to the
IECin June 1976, stating:
Now that A[mnesty] I[nternational) has published its own report on the Soviet Union - Prisoners
of Conscience in the USSR: Their Treatment and Conditions - the need to have the Chronicles to
'balance' our publications list is of far less political importance to the organisation than it was in
the past.208
Yeo's comments to the IEC highlight how Prisoners of Conscience acted as stronger
political balance of Amnesty's overall output than the Chronicle could. This is perhaps due to the
fact that Prisoners of Conscience was authored by Amnesty researchers, and therefore the
organisation had to stand fully behind the conclusions and comments made in this publication.
Yeo's report to the IEC in June 1976 notes the burden that producing the Chronicle placed on
Amnesty's Soviet researchers, particularly due to the fact that Peter Reddaway had informed the
organisation that he could no longer devote time to editing the translations. Yeo became the
editor of the Chronicle for numbers 34 and 35, something which given his other research
commitments and position in the research department as Head of Europe, which will be discussed
later in this chapter, had put him under much pressure.f" When placed in this context, the desire
to shift Amnesty's reliance on the Chronicle to Prisoners of Conscience as a political balance for its
output may have been down to pragmatic reasons. This shift allowed a focus on Amnesty reports
on the Soviet Union, rather than a reproduction of samizdat material.
The second edition of Prisoners of Conscience in the USSRwas released in 1980, the same
year as the Moscow Olympic games which had drawn international criticism and a variety of
boycotts. Comparisons to the Olympics held in Nazi Germany in 1936 were made as the games
became a clear part of the Soviet Cold War propaganda machine. The Moscow Olympics became
208 M. Grantham and Clayton Yeo 'Resolution for Council- A Chronicle of Current Events', June 1976, IEC
doc. 107, IISG[ACT81/IEC76].Mark Grantham was involved with Amnesty's publication department.
209 M. Grantham and Clayton Yeo 'Resolution for Council- A Chronicle of Current Events', June 1976, IEC
doc. 107, IISG[ACT81/IEC76].
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a focus for human rights groups in the West, calling for athletes and nations to boycott the games
due to the Soviet human rights vlolattons.i"
Amnesty's publication of the second edition of Prisoners of Conscience was clearly
designed to tap into the public awareness of the Olympic games. As a report sent to the IECby
Amnesty's campaign unit in July 1979 notes, 'because the USSRwill host the Olympic Games in
1980, A[mnesty] I[nternational] will use the opportunity to educate the general public about
specific human rights abuses in the Soviet Union and to press for the release of less well known
prisoners,.211This report set out Amnesty's proposed campaign on the USSRin 1980, of which the
second edition of Prisoners of Conscience played an integral role. This was for two main reasons.
Firstly, the report was anticipated to received a great deal of publicity amongst the international
media, regardless of any promotional work on Amnesty's behalf. It is clear that in an Olympic
year, a report that criticised the human rights record of the host nation would attain much
publlcltv, This is a tactic that Amnesty recently emulated in 2008, when it released a report on
Chinesehuman rights violation to coincide with the Beijing Olympics.212
Secondly, Prisoners of Conscience was seen as the bedrock of the 1980 campaign on
Soviet human rights violation. The July 1979 campaign unit report notes the lessonsthat Amnesty
had learnt from its difficult campaign in Argentina in 1978, which coincided with the Football
World Cup. One of the major difficulties faced during this campaign was that national groups
were not sufficiently aware of Amnesty's specific position on Argentina. Thomas Hammarberg,
Amnesty General-Secretary from 1980 to 1986, wrote in a March 1979 letter to Martin Ennals,his
predecessor asGeneral-Secretary, that Amnesty must learn from the experiences of the Argentina
1978 campaign. He insisted that the most effective part of the Argentina campaign was the early
210 The Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry were particularly active in these campaigns. For further details,
see D. Gerlis, Those Wonderful Women in Black (London, 1996) pp. 59-64, 104.
211 Memo from Amnesty Campaign Unit to the IEC entitled 'Draft letter to national sections on the USSR
campaign', 6 July 1979, IECdoc. no. 149, IISG [EUR 46/1EC 01/79].
212 See BBC News 'Olympics 'worsening China rights', 2 April 2008, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi17325754.stm[accessed2November2011]andAmnestylnternational'China:
Olympics countdown' July 2008, [ASA 18/089/2009] available at
http://www .am nesty.org/ en/I ibra rv/asset/ ASA17/089 /20081 en/8249b304-5 724-11dd-90eb-
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factual information which greatly assisted the media. He also noted in this letter that Amnesty
could be more effective in their USSRcampaign in the year preceding the Olympics rather than at
the events thernselves.i"
Taking Hammarberg's letter into account, it is more appropriate to see the 1980 edition
of Prisoners of Conscience as the culmination of the USSRcampaign to coincide with the Olympics,
rather than a component of it, even though it was published some five months before the games
themselves. In this sense, Prisoners of Conscience can be seen as a sort of manifesto, which
outlined Amnesty's position on Soviet human rights violations. This allowed Amnesty to tap into
the public interest in the Soviet Union brought about by the Olympic games without the
organisation making direct moral judgements on the games themselves, something that had
confused its previous campaign in Argentina. This report gave national sections the information
they needed to deal with requests for information from the media without confusing Amnesty's
overall position on the matter.2l4
The 1980 edition of Prisoners of Conscience in the USSRnotes the displeasure with which
the Soviet authorities reacted to the report's 1975 edition. Unsurprisingly, Amnesty's claims of
human rights abuse in this work were attributed by the Soviet authorities to the organisations
'anti-Soviet' underpinnings as an organisatlon.i" Interestingly, the Soviet criticisms of the first
edition of Prisoners of Conscience do not refer to any individual cases, raising suspicions that the
Soviet authorities wanted to attack Amnesty as an organisation rather than respond to the
accusations laid upon it - somewhat unsurprisingly in the context of the Cold War.
Like the Chronicle, Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR was utilised by a variety of
journalists in their reports on the Soviet Union. In an article on Russian labour camps in November
1975, Bernard levin was extremely complementary about the quality of Prisoners of Conscience in
the USSR,and devoted a substantial amount of his column to discuss its merits. levin recognised
m Letter from Thomas Hammarberg to Martin Ennals, 10 March 1979, IECdoc. 147, IISG[POL51/IEC
02/79}.
214 Memo from Amnesty Campaign Unit to the IECentitled 'Draft letter to national sections on the USSR
campaign', 6 July 1979, IECdoc. no. 149, IISG[EUR46/IEC 01/79}.
215 Amnesty, Prisonersof Consciencein the USSR (1980) p. 1.
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the attention to detail and insistence on empiricism in this report, noting that 'the work of
compiling, checking and presenting the details of the appalling persecution of those in the Soviet
Union who wish to criticize its rulers or institutions, or who simply wish to leave the place, has
been done to an exceptionally high standard.'216This is something that Amnesty's research
department were likely to have been glad to hear given the emphasis they give on their source
material at the beginning of the report asdiscussedabove.
The impression of this report on Levin is clear, as he also dedicated his column the
following day to discussion of the reports contents. In this second account, his overwhelming
support for this report is clear, noting that:
The Amnesty report Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR,of which I gave an account yesterday, is
the kind of document that almost defies quotation, becausethe journalist who wants to give his
readers some idea of its contents stands before it like Buridan's assbefore the bundles of hay,
unable to select a suitable excerpt from the vast number of equally telling passagesthat jostle for
inclusion. I recommend purchase and perusal of the whole book.217
This strong endorsement of Amnesty's report in a national newspaper with the reputation
of The Times would have had a huge effect on British discourse on Soviet abuses and on
Amnesty's reputation for research in this area. Not only was Levin wholeheartedly recommending
that his readers obtained a copy of this report, something that a proportion would have done, he
also lent his own reputation to the reliability and quality of this report. For a journalist with
Levin's reputation to claim that a report is of such a quality that it 'defies quotation' is praise in
the highest form. This support from Levin was also timed with very good coverage for this
Amnesty report in a prominent national newspaper. These two articles by Levin are essentially
devoted to the merits of this report, and how well it had been produced, rather than the material
that it covers. Indeed, these pieces can be considered as two very good adverts for Prisoners of
Conscience in the USSRwhich doubtless increased its public profile significantly.
It is clear that the bulk of Amnesty's campaigns on the Soviet Union came from its
publications, which informed both the media of the plight of the dissidents, but also gave its
216 B. levin, 'In detail, Amnesty's guide to the vileness of Russia's camps', The Times, 18 November 1975, p.
14.
217 B. levin, 'Soviet resistance: A harsh catalogue of suffering', The Times, 19 November 1975, p. 16.
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groups information on the position of the prisoners of conscience that they supported. Given the
centrality of these publications, it is important to analyse the conditions in which they were
produced, and the researcherswho wrote these reports.
Research Department
The Research Department of Amnesty International was, and remains to this day, the
centre of the organisation's work. This department processed a vast amount of information
regarding international human rights violation, using this to create an array of reports, press
releases and publications that informed the work of the International Secretariat and local
organisations. From the outside the ResearchDepartment's work on the Soviet Union appeared
seamless, with a seemingly continuous supply of reports on the Soviet Union and individual
dissenters. This efficient exterior does not betray the level of chaos and stress that Amnesty's
Soviet researchers were faced with. Indeed, one gets a sense from reading ResearchDepartment
documents and IECminutes regarding the Soviet Union that there was a constant struggle within
Amnesty to keep on top of this research, something that was managed by a group of hard
working and dedicated researchers.
Personnel were key to Amnesty's work, especially so in the early days of its Research
Department, initially known as the Investigation Department, with the study of individual nations
often being delegated to one individual, regardless of the size of the nation. In the 1960s, this was
a role predominantly filled by unpaid volunteers alongside researchers, most of whom were paid
very basic wages or in luncheon vouchers.i" The amount these individuals were paid fluctuated
dramatically, suggesting that some members of staff donated much of their time for little financial
reward. For example, Alex Hawson, Egypt researcher, was unpaid for one day a week; Therese
Raymond, Syria researcher, was paid just over £20 per year in luncheon vouchers for two days a
week; and Colin Leyland-Naylor was paid £52 and £52 in luncheon vouchers per year for his full
time job as press cutter, compared to Bruce Laird, the highest paid member of the Investigation
Department, who was paid £1000 per year, with £52 of luncheon vouchers and £104 National
218 'StaffSalariesasat April 1967', lEe doc.40, IISG [No Ref].
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Health Insurance ccntrlbutlcns.i" Despite having to work in poor conditions and with minimal
resources, Amnesty's research on the Soviet Union in this period was described by a 1966 report
as being 'adequate', alongside other states such as Portugal, Chile and South Africa.22o This
adequate level of research is clearly contextual and as the reputation and membership of
Amnesty expanded, so too did the size and quality of its ResearchDepartment and, therefore, its
subsequent output.
By the end of the 1960s, there was a clear need for Amnesty to develop its research
department. In the early 1970s, this department went through a development process,
strengthening various aspects of its research capabilities. A core of full time paid researchers were
appointed under the leadership of Zbynek Zeman, who become the newly created Head of
Researchin July 1970.221 These researchers were recruited 'on the strength of their academic and
linguistic qualifications and of their ability to be flexible and deal with new situations as they arise
in their particular regions,.m The requirements for these new researchers suggestsa desire for a
compromise between flexibility and expertise, something that was much needed given the style
of Amnesty's work. It is also revealing of where Amnesty placed its priorities regarding its
research. The desire to recruit academics rather than media or marketing experts, shows that
Amnesty held high regard for the quality of its research, rather than its ability to work with the
media. This academic approach was essential in Amnesty's development of a reputation of
expertise on human rights violation in the Soviet Union, a reputation that came to dominate how
its work in this area was received by the wider public, as can be seen in the response to its
publication of the Chronicle
The procedure for developing the ResearchDepartment in the 1970s was clearly set out
in an lEe report from November 1970. This document noted a desire to have a minimum
permanent core of eight researchers, each with a secretary, who were to be supplemented with
219 'StaffSalariesasat April 1967', IECdoc.40, IISG[NoRef].





additional researchers in the following years.223This 'minimum core' was described as being
central to the organisation and 'without which it would be impossible to carry out the work of the
department.f" This minimum core included researchers on Europe, Latin America, Asia, the
Middle East, Africa and three administrative positions comprising a librarian, a special projects
researcher and a director of research. This report to the IEC also described the proposed
development of the ResearchDepartment in four main stages over five years. Stage one of this
development included a proposal for an assistant researcher on Eastern Europe, suggesting both
the need for Amnesty to have a more dedicated researcher on this area. Given that these
proposed developments were noted to give 'the present organisation a better service' rather than
expand the organisation as a whole, the desire to have a specific position on Eastern Europe gives
a senseofthe importance Amnesty placed upon research into this area.22S
The November 1970 report to the IEC reiterates the type of person the Research
Department sought to recruit, and is indicative of the personal traits that were essential to
Amnesty researchers in this period. Good linguists and persons with high academic qualifications
were noted as being essential to the organisation, as was flexibility, which given the state of
Amnesty in the early 1970s was perhaps the most important trait a researcher could possess.f"
This desire for flexibility is important to note, as it appears in hindsight to have been essential to
those working on the Soviet Union for Amnesty, and in some sense dominated the way in which
the organisation's research on this area was conducted.
Despite the size and scale of human rights violation in the USSR,there were only two or
three individuals working on the Soviet Union at anyone time in the 1970s and early 1980s. Of
these, only one was a dedicated researcher, supported by executive assistants or secretaries.
However, given the nature of Amnesty at this time, this 'dedicated' researcher often held other
responsibilities, either for research on other nations or for the running of the organisation.
223 'The Present State and Future Development of the Research Department', 28-29 November, 1970, lEe
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Amnesty's research on the Soviet Union can be divided into two periods based on the
leading Soviet researcher. From its inception to the mid 1980s, Amnesty had two chief
researchers on the Soviet Union, Bruce Laird and Clayton Yeo.
Bruce Laird was the key researcher on the USSR in Amnesty's early years, although it is
unclear from archival material when he began this work. This is perhaps due in part to the
undeveloped and amateur nature of Amnesty's research department in the 1960s before the
professionalisation under Zeman. Laird's work with Amnesty appears to illustrate the group's
professed need for flexible individuals within the organisation. A staff salary list from 1967 shows
that together with his work on the Soviet Union, Laird also had responsibility for Amnesty's
research on East and West Germany, Poland, Hungary, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Austria and
Switzerland.227 Although he was assisted by Hilary Sternberg, a part-time paid worker who worked
on Russia who had translated several important pieces of samizdat literature, and Christel Marsh,
who assisted him on Eastern Europe, the diversity of Laird's research areas illustrate how thinly
spread research on some of these nations was.228 It would have been impossible for any
individual, no matter how talented, to keep fully up to date with human rights violations that
occurred under such a breadth of languages, cultures and regimes.
Laird held an important role in the wider Investigation Department before its
professionalisation under Zeman. Not only did he have responsibilities for research in an array of
European nations, but he was also involved in a variety of differing areas of Amnesty's hierarchy,
including its European working party. 229 The importance of his work in these areas was clearly
recognised, given that his salary was the highest in the Investigation Department, and the same as
227 'Staff Salariesasat April 1967', IECdoc. 40, IISG[No Ref].
228 'The Present State and Future Development of the ResearchDepartment, Appendix A The Present
Establishment', 28-29 November, 1970, IECno. SO, IISG[No Ref]; 'An outline of the staffing and work of the
London Office', April 1971, IECno. 52, IISG[NoRef]. Hilary Sternberg was also involved in the translation of
several prominent dissident works into English, including P. litvinov, The Trial of the Four: The Case of
Galanskov, Ginzburg, Dobrovolsky and Lashkova (New York, 1972), Z.Medvedev, Ten Years After Ivan
Denisovich (London, 1973), and A. Solzhenitsyn, Letter to Soviet Leaders (London, 1974). Sternberg's
involvement in the publication of Letters to Soviet Leaders is discussed in M. Scammell, 'The LongView',
Index on Censorship, Vol. 2, No.4 (1973), pp. 26-27.
229 'International Council and Assembly Meeting 1971, Working Parties', September 1971, ICM doc. 11, IISG
[No Ref].
96
that of Stella Joyce,who was then Headof Department.23o Despite its importance, Laird's position
illustrates neatly the manner in which Amnesty's Investigation Department operated before the
professionalisation under Zeman. The wide ranging requirements of Laird's position suggeststhat
Amnesty's research was still very much in an amateurish position, with researchers thinly spread
across nations. This is perhaps further indicative of Amnesty itself in this period - an newly
formed organisation reliant on the work of key individuals. That Laird covered such an array of
nations might go some way to suggest why Amnesty's output on the Soviet Union in the 1960s
was limited. Although there were clear cases of human rights violation which had caught the
attention of the international media, such as the case of Yevgeny Belov in 1965, Amnesty did not
have sufficient personnel or resources in this period to translate these cases into wide campaigns
as they did in later years.m
Laird left the Research Department during the early 1970s, at a date unspecified in
Amnesty archival material. It is clear, however, that there was a period of nearly two years from
January 1973 to September 1974 where there was no dedicated Amnesty researcher for the
Soviet Union.232Considering that Amnesty was keenly involved in supporting Soviet dissenters in
this period, including the reproduction of dissident materials such as the Chronicle, the lack of a
designated Soviet researcher is a surprising omission. Especially so given not only the scale of
human rights violation in the Soviet Union, but also the amount of information that was getting to
Amnesty about these abuses.During this period, JaneWard appears to have continued Amnesty's
research on the Soviet Union, and was supported by Hilary Sternberg and George Steiner, both of
whom were part time researchers, and Julia Kemp, the Eastern Europe secretary.m Despite the
amount of researchersgiven to this area, personnel was clearly spread thinly with Ward having to
focus on the Soviet Union alongside her work on Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.234 Only in
230 'Staff Salaries as at April 1967', lEe doc. 40, IISG [No Ref].
231 For details of Belov's case see Bloch and Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals, p. 353.
m 'Staff list as at i" January 1973', lEe doc. 62, IISG [ORG 61/IEe 73]; 'International Secretariat - Staff at
21.6.73', lEe doc. 68, IISG [No Ref); 'Research Department staff list', August 1973, lEe doc. 70, IISG
[FIN03/IEe73].
233 'Staff list as at 1st January 1973', uc doc. 62, IISG [ORG 61/IEe 73].
234letter from Zbynek Zeman to Eric Baker, 19 January 1973, lEe doc. 62, IISG [No Ref).
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September 1973 was it noted in IEC minutes that a new researcher on Eastern Europe was a
priority, and that Jane Ward should be allowed to focus solely on the Soviet Union. Amnesty's
decision not to have a designated Soviet researcher in this period is even more surprising given
the missions and actions that it was approving at the time regarding the Soviet Union.m
Not having a specific Soviet researcher in this post was of clear concern to the research
department, with a report on this vacancy being discussed at the September meeting of the IEC.
This report noted the strain this vacancy was having, stating that whilst 'every other area in the
Research Department has expanded, the East European research staff has decreased, without any
corresponding decrease in the work load,.m This report noted that the one full time researcher in
the East European section had to cover the USSR,Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia
and Albania.m Alongside two part time researchers, one of whom was a volunteer, an executive
assistant and a secretary, this department dealt with information regarding 350 cases. Somewhat
inevitably, this report noted that the standard of work on these reports was 'inadequate' and that
the appointment of an additional researcher for this area was a 'matter of great urgency,.238
This position was filled when Clayton Yeo was appointed as Amnesty's USSRresearcher in
September 1974, initially on a part time basis until January 1975 when he became a full time
researcher. like Laird, Yeo's research on the Soviet Union coincided with other positions he held
within the Research Department. He eventually held positions as the Head of Europe and the
Deputy Head of Research, alongside which he played a leading role in Amnesty's policy decisions,
representing the International Secretariat at an array of international events.239 Yeo's involvement
in these areas, much like Laird's earlier involvement in many different European countries,
arguably restricted his ability to commit to his research on the USSR. In Yeo's case, this was
235 'Research Department Priorities', September 1973, lEe doc. 71. IISG[No Ref] For examples of Amnesty's
actions regarding the Soviet Union in this period see 'lEe meeting minutes - European Missions', January
1973, uc doc. 62, IISG[No Ref]; 'lEe Draft Agenda', 23 August 1973; isc doc. 71, IISG[No Ref]; and 'Mission
Status', June 1973, uc doc. 68, IISG[No Ref).
236 'East European ResearchPost', September 1973, lEe doc. 71, IISG[ORG63/IEe73].
237lbid.
2381bid.
239 For an example of this, see 'Minutes of the Medical Advisory Board Meeting, 26-27 January 1980,
London', Amnesty lEe no. 159, IISG[ORG44/IEe01/80].
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something that contributed to his later decision to step down as Head of Europe in May 1977 to
focus on his work on the Soviet Union.24o
By the early 1980s, Yeo once again had to step down from an administrative position, and
informed the International Secretariat in July 1980 that he could not conduct research on the
USSRalongside his position as Deputy Head of Research, instead this time choosing to focus his
efforts on the later. This decision left Amnesty with only a part time USSR researcher, Bohdan
Nahaylo, alongside an executive assistant Marjorie Farquharson and a secretary Karin Owen.241
When the scale of human rights violation occurring in the Soviet Union in this period, and
Amnesty's previous high level of research into this area is taken into account, this lack of staff is
very surprising and something that undoubtedly restricted further activism in this area.
The day to day working of Amnesty's USSR researchers in the 1970s was clearly busy. A
report by Yeo to the IEC subcommittee on research planning and priorities from August 1979
outlines the vast amount of work that he, the USSR researcher, his Secretary and an Executive
Assistant had to complete. This included:
• Writing about 100 case sheets a year
• Servicing about 600 adoption groups or more and about 20 coordination groups
• Producing very many external papers (probably about 75 in the past three years)
• Preparing second edition USSRreport
• Preparing material for USSRcampaign (forthcoming)
• Producing an average of five new releases per year
• Producing Urgent Actions (about 20 so far in 1979)
• Preparing "special actions" for membership in a scheme developed in USSRresearch
department (nine so far in 1979)
• Supplying articles for most issues of AI newsletter
• Initiating and preparing action materials which are not on the Action Calendar and which
may not involve National Section participation
• Preparing material (in Death Penalty report) and guidelines for USSRDeath penalty
campaign
• Writing USSRAnnual Report entries242
240 'lEe private session report to Headsof Region', 1 May 1977, lEe doc. 117, IISG[ORG61/IEe77).
241 'Planning and Priorities - Europe 1981', July 1980 Amnesty lEe no. 163, IISG[EUR01/IEe01/80).
242 'Report to lEe subcommittee on ResearchPlanning and Priorities', August 1979, Amnesty lEe no. 151,
IISG[EUR01/IEe02/79).
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This list of activities was noted to 'only cover highlights', and omitted the 'routine work' of
these researchers which included responding to numerous letters, telephone calls, and internal
matters that dealt with the USSR.243 Alongside this clerical activity these researchers were also
involved in the translation of thousands of pages of samizdat a year, an extremely time
consuming activity.244 Yeo's report to the IEC stated that these commitments took up the vast
majority of his time, and left only 15%of his working time to 'actually doing researcb'.i" Indeed,
Yeo's report clearly illustrates the pressure and frustration that he and his colleagues experienced
due to the sheer scale of work involved in their research. He noted that:
everything we do (every adoption, campaign, external paper etc.,) creates additional work
subsequently (queries, follow-up action, servicing the action potential engendered} ...Even for an
experienced researcher who wrote the first edition of the USSRReport to write the second
edition requires about four months of full-time and over-tlme.i"
The overworked USSRresearchers depicted in Yeo's report to the IEC sit in stark contrast
to Amnesty's output on the USSR, which was well researched and of the highest quality. The
second edition of the Prisoners of Conscience in the USSRreport that Yeo referred to was one of
the main documents that Amnesty created on the USSR.As discussed above, this report played a
major part both in Amnesty's efforts in publicising the human rights violation in the USSRand in
its wider campaigns. It was arguably one of the most important reports produced by any
organisation or individual in this period on Soviet human rights abuse. However, it could be
suggested that given the pressure that Amnesty's USSRresearchers were under, it is a report that
might not have been produced. That it exists is perhaps a testament to the efforts of these
individuals, who appear to have worked extremely long hours in order to produce their research.
That such an important and influential document was produced in the context of such pressure
and over work goes some way to illustrate the commitment of Amnesty's researchers on the
243'Report to lEe subcommittee on ResearchPlanning and Priorities', August 1979, Yeo notes that they
received 20 to 30 letters a day regarding the USSR.
244lbid.
2451bid.
246Ibid. This is probably a self reference as although anonymous, Yeo is likely to have been the author of the
majority of these reports. Interview with Peter Reddaway, 5 September 2011.
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Soviet Union in this period, showing how important these individuals were for the organisation's
output.
The concluding paragraph of Yeo's report to the lEe on the state of the USSR research
clearly shows the frustration that he experienced in this period and is worth quoting in full.
[T]he USSRResearch Department team is so burdened with current work ("routine") that it is very
difficult to develop work better or do work as thoroughly as we should. Thus, research is the poor
sister and gets done largely in overtime. We have never had any possibility to develop an
aggressive system of research, for example by undertaking research missions and trying to
penetrate into areas not covered by existing samizdat sources. Even the press cuttings we read
cursorily unless they feed directly into action. Similarly, in servicing the groups, the researcher and
E[xecutive] A[ssistant] scarcely have time to develop new techniques or go beyond established
advice to groups and methods with them, although there is much we could do here. We feel that
we are in a position of having to do too much of our work in half measures. This, rather than the
workload, creates considerable emotional drain in the team of staff. 247
As Yeo states in this extract, Amnesty's Soviet researchers were so burdened with their
workload that they simply could not develop into new areas - something that should have
arguably been their main priority. At the time this report was written, Amnesty was in the middle
of a campaign on the Soviet abuses to coincide with the 1980 Moscow Olympics. There was
clearly a desire to expand Amnesty's work on the Soviet Union at this time, something that was
evidently restrained by the amount of pressure its Soviet researchers were under. Time spent on
consolidation rather than development or conventional research harks back to the position the
Research Department was in before its professionalisation under Zeman. In this sense, it can be
noted that in some respects the development of Amnesty's Research Department could not keep
up with its required and desired output. Just as before its professionalisation, the Research
Department relied heavily on key individuals such as Yeo.
Yeo's final remark in this report is perhaps the most telling about the frustration he and
his colleagues experienced. It highlights that working in 'half measures' was more emotionally
draining than the long hours required. This highlights the personal involvement that these
researchers had invested in their work, something that affected them emotionally when they
could not develop their work further. This is perhaps tied to the subject matter of their research,
247 'Report to lEe subcommittee on ResearchPlanning and Priorities', August 1979. All emphasis from
original document, except final sentence highlighted by this author.
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being held back from fully assisting dissidents and victims of Soviet abuses by clerical and
logistical demands. This frustration in operating in 'half measures' is also telling of Amnesty's
researchers on the Soviet Union, and especially of Yeo himself. Working long hours for an
organisation such as Amnesty would suggest a personal and moral obligation to the prisoners of
consciencethese researcherswere involved with. Whilst it perhaps seems a little obvious to note,
it is clear that these researchers were not working at Amnesty primarily for the high wages or
benefits such an organisation could offer. Amnesty's ethos of assisting the forgotten prisoners
would clearly have affected those involved with its ResearchDepartment. Hopgood's discussion
of Amnesty as a secular religion is particularly apt in this context, with this 'faith' arguably driving
these researchersto work in adverse circumstances.
There were clear attempts to alleviate the pressure on Amnesty's Soviet researchers, with
the IEC regularly discussing the need to appoint another researcher on the USSRor Eastern
Europe. Indeed, research on the USSRand Eastern Europe was often considered the highest
priority by members of the IEC.However, that these discussions occurred so regularly suggest
that these researchers could not be appointed at a rate sufficient to keep on top of demand.
Attempts to recruit an Eastern European researcher were particularly difficult, with an Eastern
European researcher position advertised for over a year in 1973.248 Given the amount of expertise
on the Soviet bloc in London, where the Research Department was based in this period, at
arguably the height of the Cold War, it is particularly surprising that Amnesty could not secure a
researcher in this field.
In assessing the efforts of both Laird and Yeo, one gets a sense of highly capable
researchers struggling against the position they found themselves in. Yeo's reports to the IECin
particular paint a picture of a department that struggled in vain to maintain its output, let alone
develop into new areas and campaigns. This struggle is in stark contrast to the output of Amnesty
on the Soviet Union, such as the Chronicle and Prisoners of Conscience in the USSRwhich were of
248 'East European Research Post', September 1973, lEe doc.71, IISG [ORG63/IEC73].
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the highest quality and often the most up-to-date reports available on the Soviet dissident
movement.
The impact that Amnesty had on the British discourse on Soviet dissent cannot be
underestimated. Its research department, although at times vastly overstretched, produced an
array of publications on Soviet human rights violation that was unmatched by any other
organisation in the West. Its translation of the Chronicle of Current Events provided the English
speaking world with the most important primary material on position of dissenters in the Soviet
Union. These documents not only formed the bulk of information utilised by journalists and
commentators at the time, but have become a significant collection of documents for scholars to
utilise to this day. The two editions of Prisoners of Conscience in the USSRoffered local Amnesty
groups the central position on individual prisoners of conscience, and would have been utilised by
these activists in their work for dissidents. These reports are a neat way of illustrating how
information from the research department spread out to the wider world, and how it was able to
influence a vast number of individuals. Amnesty relied on its reputation for its work on the Soviet
Union. Given the level of political intrigue and manipulation in the period of the Cold War, that
Amnesty stood out and offered a moral position to a political problem is perhaps one of the many
reasons that journalists and academics alike came to trust its output. Claims that the group was
partial, including accusations that it was funded by the British intelligence services, the CIA and
the KGBmay have actually worked in the groups favour.?" It clearly made every attempt in this
period to illustrate its impartiality, something that perhaps put the group in unique territory in the
Cold War. When this work is placed into the context of threats against its members, including the
callous attacks on the members of its Moscow group, and the high workload of its stretched
research department, both the quality and quantity of Amnesty's work on the Soviet Union




Psychiatric Abuse in the Soviet Union
Especially zealous is the notorious "Amnesty International", whose unscrupulous methods we
have already related to you in the pages of Izvestia ...One of the reports of the British Section of
this organization states that representatives of the intelligentsia in the Soviet Union are sent off to
psychiatric hospitals "without any trial". Tales of "psychiatric isolation cells for healthy persons"
are unfailingly accompanied by a hypocritical refrain from "martyrs", condemned, apparently, to
spend the rest of their days behind impenetrable walls. In reality, we are dealing with persons
who have committed socially dangerous actions while of unsound mind, or who have, during the
course of the investigation, the trial, or after the sentence has been passed, become mentally ill,
thus making it impossible for themselves to take account of their own actions or control them ...
The Western ideological saboteurs who babble all kinds of rubbish about mentally ill persons do
not even notice what a ridiculous position they are putting themselves in ...
K. Bryantsev, Zealots of Falsehood in the Slough of Slande?5o
Arise ye starvelings from your slumbers,
Arise ye psychic slaves of woe,
For reason in revolt now thunders
Against the psychiatric foe ...
Valery Tarsis, Ward 751
Alongside the general expertise of Amnesty regarding the position of Soviet prisoners of
conscience, a collection of British groups became noted for their expertise on the Soviet
authorities abuse of psychiatry. From the mid-1960s, the Soviet authorities used psychiatric
treatment as a way to deal with political dissenters. By declaring that a dissident suffered from a
psychiatric condition, the Soviet authorities could denounce any public statement previously
made by that person as the work of a lunatic on the fringe of mental health. This was particularly
useful for the Soviet authorities as not only did it offer the opportunity to denigrate dissidents
who were gaining support, but it also allowed them to deflect attention away from their own
problems which were being exposed by dissidents. In an article written for the British Journal of
250 K. Bryantsev, 'Zealots of Falsehood in the Slough of Slander', Izvestia, 24 October 1971, quoted in
Amnesty International, AI in Quotes (London, 1976) p. 20.
251 V. Tarsis, Ward 7: An Autobiographical Novel (London, 1965) p. 25. Sung to the tune of the
Internationale.
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Psychiatry, Nanci Adler and Semyon Gluzman highlight how the Soviet authorities used this to
their advantage, stating that:
By claiming to 'treat' political adversaries in either 'special' or 'ordinary' psychiatric institutions,
the failures of the political system were relocated from the institutions of State to the psyche of
the individual so that the Soviet system could deny its own structural failings.m
In order to get around the legal formalities prescribed by the Soviet system, many
dissidents were sent for psychiatric evaluation and declared unfit to stand trial due to diagnosis of
mental illnesses and psychotic disorders. This allowed the Soviet authorities to imprison
dissenters in psychiatric hospitals without the need for court cases or public legal proceedings.
This was especially convenient for the KGB and other branches of the internal state security forces
as it prevented the dissidents from using public legal proceedings for propaganda purposes. The
rigidly bureaucratic nature of the Soviet Union meant that all dissidents had to be subjected to a
series of legal procedures, including several court appearances. Dissidents in this period
frequently utilised court appearances as a public rostrum with which to talk about their political
beliefs to an audience and to criticise the actions of the Soviet government. For example, at his
September 1967 court appearance, Vladimir Bukovsky used his final statement to criticise the
legality of his trial, and to openly question the actions of the KGB in his arrest - something that
would have been impossible to suggest publicly outside of the courtroom, and which greatly
angered the presiding judge.m
These trials also served as an instance for dissidents to gather together, often in a public
display of support for their imprisoned comrades. Although these trials were declared as 'public',
the reality was that they were closed to all but members of the KGB and keen supporters of the
state. Friends of dissidents on trial repeatedly tried to gain access to the courtroom for these
hearings, but were regularly turned away by guards.254 This in turn led to the public gathering of
dissidents outside the courtrooms whilst cases that involved dissenters were in session. Bukovsky
m N. Adler and S.Gluzman, 'Soviet Special Psychiatric Hospitals: Where the Systemwas Criminal and the
Inmates were Sane', British Journal a/Psychiatry Vol. 163 (1993) p. 713.
253 For details of this court appearance see P. Litvinov, The Demonstration in Pushkin Square (London, 1969)
pp.87-95.
2S4 For an example ofthis seeSakharov,Memoirs, pp. 315-318.
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neatly notes that these protestors were 'standing outside the closed doors of an open trial'.25S
Those dissidents who did manage to attend these 'open' trials were on the whole keen to spread
information about the casesthemselves which sometimes ended up with the publications of court
transcripts in samizdat.256 Public trials of dissidents gave the wider dissident community the
chance to engage in a substantial propaganda exercise - something which was undoubtedly
considered as a great threat to the Soviet authorities.
Instead of these public hearings, political opponents were declared mentally insane, and
subjected to forced psychiatric assessment in a psikhushka, the slang term used by prisoners to
describe a psychiatric hospital where these dissidents were imprisoned. Dissidentswere regularly
diagnosed as suffering from the dubious psychiatric condition sluggish schizophrenia, or other
forms of persecution mania, and subsequently sectioned. The scientific validity of these diagnoses
predominantly emanated from a group of psychiatrists based at the infamous Serbsky Institute in
Moscow. The Serbsky Institute gained a reputation similar to that of lefortovo Prison, an
infamous KGB prison renowned for its use of torture against political dissidents. Soviet
psychiatrists attached to the Serbsky, including Daniil lunts, Georgiy Morozov and Andrey
Snezhnevsky,were frequently accused of following KGBorders in their diagnosis of dissidents.
Indeed it could be argued that the so-called 'Snezhnevsky school' of psychiatry based at the
Serbsky Institute, which first described the symptoms of sluggish schizophrenia, invented the
disorder to facilitate the incarceration of dissidents in psychiatric institutes. The vague nature of
this disorder, with recognised symptoms that included 'extreme emotional instability', 'boundless
belief in one's abilities' and 'apathy' suggest that patients could be made to fit the condition
rather than the other way around - an argument that would fit the accusations of using
psychiatric diagnosis for political means.257In an article published in the British Journal of
Psychiatry in 1986, Professor Harold Merskey and Bronislava Shafran noted that the concept of
255 Bukovsky, To Build A Castle, p. 241.
256 These samizdat court transcripts sometimes made their way to the West and were translated by activists
before being put into publication. For an example of this see litvinov, The Trial of the Four.
257 H. Merskey and B. Shafran, 'Political Hazards in the Diagnosis of 'Sluggish Schizophrenia', British Journal
of Psychiatry, Vol.148 (1986), pp. 249-251.
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sluggish schizophrenia was 'virtually limited to the Soviet Union' and raised issues about the
reliability of the empirical grounding of the illness.2S8Merskey and Shafran stated that if the
Russian articles they had considered regarding sluggish schizophrenia 'had been submitted in
English to a Western journal, most of them would probably have been returned for radical
revision,' thus placing extreme doubt on the empirical basis of this condition, and subsequently
the reputation of the psychiatrists who had diagnosed patients with it.2s9
By the mid-1980s, it was heavily suspected in the West that the KGB was involved in the
psychiatric evaluations of dissidents, and that it was utilised as another form of punishment. In an
article published in 1980s, the American magazine Time clearly saw the convenience that a
diagnosis of sluggish schizophrenia gave the KGB another way to deal with dissidents. It noted
that one of the key signs for spotting sluggish schizophrenia was an illustration of 'stubborn
"reformist tendencies"', something that any political dissident would show undoubtedly in
abundance, regardless of their state of mental health.260 It is important to note that the Western
concerns about the category of sluggish schizophrenia stemmed predominantly from the
psychiatric community's concern at the medical validity of this condition. The fact that this
condition was virtually limited to the Soviet Union suggests either that Soviet psychiatry had
identified an illness that Western psychiatrists had failed to recognize, or that this condition had
been invented to suit the demands of state security bureaus. The convenient nature of the
symptoms of sluggish schizophrenia, and the concern at the empirical method of Soviet
psychiatrists conducting research into this area suggests that the latter was true.
Whilst they underwent psychiatric assessment, dissidents were subjected to horrendous
conditions and treatment. Repeated questioning of their mental state and their political position
was carried out by psychiatrists, nurses and other non-medical staff, which led some dissidents to
258 Merskey and Shafran, 'Political Hazards in the Diagnosisof 'Sluggish Schizophrenia', p. 247 and 251.
259 Merskey and Shafran, 'Political Hazards in the Diagnosisof 'SluggishSchizophrenia', p. 251.
260 'Behaviour: The Children of Pavlov', Time, 23 June 1980, available at
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0.8816.922041.00.html# (Accessed7 September 2010).
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query whether they were being treated by medical professionals or KGB lnvestigators.i'" The
dissident General Petro Grigorenko noted that he regularly saw Professor Oaniil Lunts - a leading
Soviet psychiatrist - 'coming to work in the uniform of a KGBgeneral', and that other psychiatrists
also wore this distinctive uniform.262 Grigorenko's assertions, timed with the wider international
concerns about the medical basis of sluggish schizophrenia suggest that the line between an
investigator of the KGB and a psychiatrist was extremely blurred in the Soviet context.
Psychiatric evaluations were accompanied by forced treatment, often through a course of
injections of the anti-psychotic drugs Sulfazin and Atropine, and periods of Insulin shock
therapy263, each of which had horrific effects on the patient. Nand Adler and Semyon Gluzman
have explained the detailed effects of each of these drugs in turn, noting that they caused intense
muscle pain, exhaustion, toxic psychosis and permanent brain damage.264The effects of these
chemical 'treatments' are also described in detail by those dissidents who had been incarcerated
in psikhushki. Interestingly, the haunting descriptions of the 'treatments' tend to focus on the
effect that psychiatric drugs had on others in the psikhushka, rather than their own experiences,
suggesting that they were perhaps too vulgar to recollect. leonid Plyushch, vividly described the
effects that these drugs had on those around him:
I could see the effects of the potent sedative haloperidol26s on my fellow inmates and wondered
why drugs were administered in quarantine. The patients' illnesses had not been diagnosed yet,
and contra indications had not been established. One inmate was writhing in convulsions, head
twisted to the side and eyes bulging. Another patient was gasping for breath, and his tongue was
lolling. A third was screaming for the nurse and begging for a corrective to alleviate the physical
effects of haloperidol. The drug was given in such large doses in order to reveal the malingerers
and to break any reslstance.i"
261 Plyushch,History's Carnival, pp. 275-297.
262 Grigorenko, Memoirs, p. 294.
263 Insulin shock therapy was pioneered by Manfred Sakel in the 1930s, and effectively involves bringing
patients in and out of hypoglycaemic comas. The historical background of this treatment, and the disturbing
side effects are neatly described in K.Jones, 'Insulin ComaTherapy in Schizophrenia', Journal of the Royal
Society of Medicine, Vol. 93 (March, 2000), pp. 147-149.
264 Adler and Gluzman, 'Soviet Special Psychiatric Hospitals: Where the System was Criminal and the
Inmates were Sane', p, 715.
265 Haloperidol is more commonly known in the West as Haldol, and is used in the treatment of
schizophrenia, psychosisand delirium. For more information on the use of these treatments in Britain, see
RoyalCollegeof Psychiatrists article on antipsychotics, available at
http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/mentalhealthinfo/treatments/antipsychoticmedication.aspx (accessed8 August
2012)
266 Plyushch,History's Carnival, p. 305.
108
Plyushch's assertion that these 'treatments' were given both to those who had been
consulted by psychiatrists and those who had yet to undergo diagnosis offers the strong
suggestion that haloperidol, in this instance, was used to punish and suppress those in psikhushki,
rather than to treat them. Bukovsky's claim that everyone's treatment in the psikhushka started
with 'the agonising haloperidol in doses large enough to fell a horse' further shows the barbarity
of the use of psychiatric drugs.267 These powerful psychiatric drugs appear to have been
administered as a matter of course to those interned in Soviet psychiatric institutions, suggesting
that the Soviet authorities wanted dissidents to be 'treated' regardless of whether they needed
treatment or how painful these treatments were.
What is perhaps most haunting about the use of anti-psychotic drugs was that in many
cases their horrific side effects were both preventable and reversible. It must be noted that many
of the psychiatric drugs used in Soviet psychiatric institutions were used by psychiatrists in the
West, and are still used in British hospitals today. In conventional use of psychiatric tranquilizers-
such as Trifluoperazine, Aminazin and Chlorpromazine - an array of anti-Parkinsonian drugs are
used to combat the side effects experienced by those on tranquilizers which resemble those with
Parkinson's disease. The painful side effects of these tranquilizers can also be reversed by
stopping treatment for periods of time and simply allowing the side effects to wear off.2G8Failure
to use either of these methods demonstrates that Soviet psychiatrists in this period were in one
of two predicaments. Either Soviet psychiatry lagged so dramatically behind the position of
psychiatric treatment in the West that they were unaware of the conventional way of treating the
side effects of these drugs; or they knew about the preventable side effects of their 'treatments',
and were using them as a deliberate political tool to torture and repress enemies of the state.
2G7Bukovsky, ToBuild A Castle, p. 283.
268 Bloch and Reddaway,Russia's Political Hospitals, pp. 202-209. For current British NHSguidelines on the
use of psychiatric drugs in the treatment of Schizophrenia see National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence(NICE)clinical guideline 82 (March 2009) available at
http://www.nice.org.uk/nicemedia/liveI11786/43608/43608.pdf (Accessed1 November 2010). These
guidelines note the possible side effects of using anti-psychotic drugs, including akathisia (uncontrollable
muscular movement or restlessness),weight gain, and 'unpleasant subjective experiences'.
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In an article published in 1976, Professor Harold Merskey discussed the differences
between what he termed 'bad psychiatry' and the political use and abuse of this medical
treatment. Merskey noted three categories of psychiatric abuse. The first category described 'bad
psychiatry', which was well-intentioned but importantly technically erroneous. In this context
Merskey argued that psychiatrists should be absolved from any moral blame as it was their
genuine intention to treat their patient, despite lacking technical ability. The second category
involved neglect of psychiatric treatment, either through provision or lack of care. This category is
not limited to psychiatrists, and includes politicians and aspects of the bureaucracy who might
have prevented psychiatric treatment through their negligence. The final category is the most
aggressiveof the three and described the political use or compliance in the abuse of psychiatric
treatment, either randomly or systematically.269That Plyushch refers to a patient who begged for
a corrective suggeststhat the nurses and psychiatrists in the particular psikhushka knew what was
occurring, and chose to either comply with the abusesfrom the psychiatrists or turn a blind eye to
the demands of this patient. This suggests that the treatment of dissidents in psychiatric
institutions was not a caseof 'bad psychiatry', but something more sinister.
There were a vast array of psychiatrists in the Soviet Union who were neither among the
'Snezhnevskyschool' or in the dissenting ranks.Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway,who wrote two
detailed pieceson the abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union, identify 'average' psychiatrists asa
group who, in their opinion, were either relatively ignorant towards the political abuse of
psychiatry, or completely passivetowards it. This group, they argue, regularly evaded involvement
in cases that involved dissidents, and preferred to pass them on to others so as not to take
personal risk for their case.270Furthermore, Bloch and Reddaway also contend that discussion of
cases involving dissidents was virtually non-existent between psychiatrists through fear of being
reported to the authorities for their opinions - risking not only their professional reputation but
also their employment status."! Thus, even if Soviet psychiatrists knew of cases of abuse, it is
269 H. Merskey, 'Abuses of Psychiatry in the USSR', Soviet Jewish Affairs, Vol. 6., No.1, (1976) p. 45.
270 Bloch and Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals, pp.230-234.
271 Bloch and Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals, p. 232.
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likely that many would have kept quiet in order to preserve their own position and standard of
living. In this context, it is impossible to draw the conclusion that Soviet psychiatry as a whole was
engaged in the abuseof dissidents. However, it is clear that a significantly powerful section of the
profession was engaged actively in these abuses which meant that other psychiatrists had to
follow their lead or risk their careers. The argument about the role of the average Soviet
psychiatrist was to playa key role both in the international conflicts over psychiatric abuse, and in
the response to psychiatric treatment in post-Soviet countries.272
It must be noted that psikhushki were fully functioning psychiatric institutions. Within
these institutions were patients with genuine mental health conditions who were being treated
by psychiatrists. There was no separation in wards between genuinely ill patients and dissenters
held there against their will. Indeed, dissident memoirs of time spent in psikhushki often include
references to sharing wards with patients whom the dissident in question felt was genuinely ill.
For example, the dissident Zhores Medvedev noted that on his first night in the KalugaPsychiatric
Hospital he was placed in a ward with patients who suffered from depressive psychosis,
psychopathy, and alcoholism.273 Vladimir Bukovsky recalled two patients he met in psikhushki;
one, who maintained virulent anti-American opinions who believed he had killed President
Kennedy by pressing a bell which summoned the guards, and another man who held extremely
paranoiac views that he would be eaten by another patient. In both of these cases, Bukovsky
notes the insistent teasing and hostility towards these genuinely ill patients by sane dissenters in
order to outline both their superiority and their sanity.274The fact that dissidents were kept
alongside genuine patients inside psikhushki can be argued to have been in an attempt to drive
the dissidents closer towards insanity. Even if this did not occur, the haunting and oppressive
atmosphere created by being forced to share a ward with potentially violent patients with clear
mental health problems can only have increased the pressure on dissidents to recant their views
in exchange for release, and to break their mental strength.
272 Fordetailsof the responseto psychiatryin the post-Sovietnations,seeVanVoren,On Dissidents and
Madness, pp. 135-264.
273 Z. MedvedevandR. Medvedev,A Question of Madness (NewYork,1971)p. 89-90.
274 Bukovsky,ToBuild a Castle, p. 165-168.
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The barbaric treatment of political prisoners led some to comment on the similarity of
psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union to the abuse of medical ethics in Nazi Germany. Anatoly
Koryagin, a Soviet psychiatrist who became a dissident, stated in a lecture to the British Royal
College of Psychiatrists Autumn quarterly meeting on 29 October 1987, after his exile from the
Soviet Union, that 'there are doctors like [Joseph] Mengele in the Soviet Gulag today'.m Such an
evocative comparison illustrates the barbarity of conducting 'treatment' in this manner, and
suggests that like medical experimentation in Nazi Germany, the Soviet practice was
unnecessarily cruel.
The use of madness to oppress political opposition has a precedent in Russianhistory. In
1836, Tsar Nicholas I declared the Russian philosopher Pyotr Chaadayev a 'lunatic' after he
criticised the Tsar in a philosophical letter written to the Moscow journal Telescope. Chaadayev
was detained in his home and his views were widely discredited by the Imperial court as those of
a madrnan.i" There have also been suggestions that contemporary Russian leaders have used
psychiatry to suppress opposition. In The New Cold War, Edward Lucas has suggested that the
psychiatric incarceration of political dissenters continues in contemporary Russiain a remarkably
similar fashion to Soviet practlces."? Although he recognises that these new accusations of abuse
are 'not a carefully calibrated means of repression' as in the Soviet Union; it is still alarming that,
in principle, 'everything is in place for a return to Soviet style punitive psychiatry,.278Reports in
the British press of the detention of the journalist Larisa Arap in a psychiatric institution near
Murmansk in 2007 show concern that this was linked to her articles that criticised of the quality of
275 A. Koryagin, 'The Involvement of Soviet Psychiatry in the Persecution of Dissenters', British Journal of
Psychiatry, Vol. 154, (1989) p. 339. Joseph Mengele was a Nazi doctor infamous for his medical experiments
on concentration camp prisoners.
276 See Bloch and Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals, pp. 48-49; D. Shaw, S. Bloch and A. Vickers,
'Psychiatry and the State', New Scientist, 2 November, 1972, p. 258; G. Hosking, Russian and the Russians,
From Earliest Times to 2001 (London, 2001) pp. 274-275; and Shatz, Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective,
p.l.
277 See E. Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces both Russia and the West (London, 2008) pp.
74-77.
278 Lucas, The New Cold War, p. 77.
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mental healthcare for children in the region.279 Whilst this case does not show that the current
Russianadministration is politically abusing psychiatric treatment, it does raise fears that Soviet-
style practices are still continuing.
This systematic political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union was met with much
protest from Western observers. The outrage at these abuses led to the complete alienation of
Soviet psychiatrists from international psychiatry by the mid 1980s. Given the reputation of
scientific excellence that had been built up by the Soviet Union in the course of the twentieth
century, something that was a key part of the ideological conflict of the Cold War, this
international isolation was extremely embarrassing. The All Union Society of Neuropathologists
and Psychiatrists (AUSNP)were forced to resign from the World Psychiatric Association (WPA)on
31 January 1983, months before their expected expulsion at the organisation's World Congressin
Vienna, after a period of pressure on them to explain their treatment of dissidents. The pressure
placed on the AUSNP came mainly from national psychiatric organisations such as the Royal
College of Psychiatrists and the American Psychiatric Association. However, it is clear that the
efforts and rhetoric of these organisations were driven by human rights groups, who not only
informed the response of more renowned and prestigious bodies, but in some cases scripted it.
The role of these human rights groups in this pressure has been largely underestimated to date,
and is where the attention of this chapter will be directed.
There is a limited historiography regarding the political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet
Union. Memoirs from dissidents who were incarcerated in psikhushki such asVladimir Bukovsky,
General Petro Grigorenko, leonid Plyushch and Viktor Nekipelov form a substantial part of the
literature regarding Soviet psychiatric abuses. 280 These memoir accounts offer personal
viewpoints to the abuses that occurred in psikhushki, and give the historian an insight into how
dissidents subjected to this torture dealt with the punishments. These accounts fall into the wider
279 SeeA.Gee,'Russiandissident'forcibly detainedin mentalhospital", The Independent, 30July2007,
availableat http://www.independent.co.uk!news!world!europe!russian-dissident-forcibly-detained-in-
mental-hospital-459539.html(Accessed1 February2011).
280 Bukovsky,ToBuild a Castle; Nekipelov,Institute of Fools; Plyushch,History's Carnival; andGrigorenko,
Memoirs.
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historiographical source of dissident literature which has done so much to inform historians about
the plight and position of Soviet dissenters.
The other major source for this area is the work produced by Western scholars and
human rights activists, much of which was published whilst the psychiatric abuse in psikhushki
was a contemporary problem. The most prominent of these pieces were the two monographs
produced by Peter Reddaway, and Sidney Bloch, two activists heavily involved in British human
rights groups campaigning against the Soviet psychiatric abuses.. Both Russia's Political Hospitals
and Soviet Psychiatric Abuse: The Shadow Over World Psychiatry were ground breaking pieces,
offering documentation on the scale of the abuse of psychiatric treatment in the Soviet Union.281
The accounts of psychiatric abuse compiled by these two authors are arguably the most
important pieces produced in the West, both due to their thoroughness and their impact. The
detail with which both these works went into about the specific nature of psychiatric abuse in the
Soviet Union was extraordinary and is testament to the knowledge and authority of both authors.
These pieces still form the basisof the academic historiography of this form of abuse in the Soviet
Union. Also, these pieces document some of the efforts of British based individuals who
publicised the psychiatric abuses that occurred in the Soviet Union. It is interesting to note that
not only are these two pieces the most important in the historiography on Soviet psychiatric
abuse, but they also played a substantial role in influencing and informing human rights activists
in the late 1970s and 1980s about the abuses that were taking place. The information presented
in these two monographs was utilised by human rights groups as sources of information about
the abuses in their own right. This means that these works are in the interesting position of being
both primary and secondary material in the context of this piece, and therefore should be
considered both for their historiographical importance and for the role the had on informing
those who were active in human rights groups in this period.
281 Bloch and Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals [simultaneously published in the US under the title
Psychiatric Terror: How Soviet Psychiatry is Used to Suppress Dissent (New York, 1917)]; and Bloch and
Reddaway, Soviet Psychiatric Abuse.
114
David Cohen's Soviet Psychiatry was published in 1989 to accompany the Channel 4 short
film Dispatches; Gorbachev's Asylums.282 This piece carries similarities with the works produced by
Bloch and Reddaway in the sense that it is an overview of psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union.
Although noticeably a much smaller piece than the two works by Bloch and Reddaway, the detail
and ground covered by Soviet Psychiatry is impressive, and it must be noted that although it was
written to accompany the Dispatches programme, this is not - as Cohen puts it - the 'book of the
film,.283 Cohen's work should be rightly considered as a key text in the historiography of Soviet
psychiatric abuse, not only as a piece that revises some of the points made by Bloch and
Reddaway, but as a work in its own right. It is an interesting piece to consider alongside Bloch and
Reddaway's work mainly due to the international context in which Cohen places the Soviet
abuses. Cohen's research prior to writing Soviet Psychiatry concerned psychiatric treatment in
Japan, America, Egypt and India - something which allowed him to place Soviet practices into an
international context.284 This has the effect of noting that psychiatric abuse occurred elsewhere in
the world, particularly the abuses in Japan, and that the Soviet example was an extreme version
of abuses that are potentially epidemic to general psychiatric treatment. 285
Alongside these contemporary accounts, the two recent accounts by Robert Van Voren, a
human rights activist, into the Western responses to the psychiatric abuses in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe show the current direction of the scholarship in this area looking at the
international response to these abuses.286 Van Voren's accounts are effectively autobiographical
recollections of his personal involvement with the dissident movement, and his work with the
International Association on the Political Use of Psychiatry (IAPUP) (now known as the Global
282 D.Cohen,Soviet Psychiatry: Politics and Mental Health in the USSRToday (London, 1989).
283 Cohen,Soviet Psychiatry, p. 8.
284 Cohen,Soviet Psychiatry, p. 7. Seealso D.Cohen, Forgotten Millions: The Treatment of the Mentally /11-
A Global Perspective (London, 1988). One of the interesting criticisms of Forgotten Millions is that whilst
claiming to be 'the first major study to evaluate mental health care comparatively on a global scale', it does
not contain any analysis of psychiatric treatment in the Soviet Union. In the context of the 1980s, and the
controversy surrounding the 'expulsion' of the All Union Society of Neuropathologists and Psychiatrists
(AUSNP)from the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) this omission is particularly striking, especially so
given the bold claim to be international in scope. This issue was raised in D. Gould, 'People we'd rather not
think about - Reviewof D. Cohen, Forgotten Millions', New Scientist, 23 June, 1988, p. 69.
285 SeeCohen,Soviet Psychiatry, p. 52-54.
286 Van Voren, On Dissidents and Madness; and R.Van Voren, Cald War In Psychiatry: Human Factors, Secret
Actors (New York, 2010).
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Initiative on Psychiatry (GIP)) in responding to claims of abuse. In stark contrast to the works of
Cohen, Bloch and Reddaway, these pieces deal heavily with the diplomatic developments and the
international response to the Soviet psychiatric abuses.These accounts detail the work conducted
with the WPA in responding to these claims of abuse, and how they were dealt with in the wider
context of the Cold War. The two most recent works by Van Voren are notably different from the
pieces by Cohen and Bloch and Reddaway due to the context in which they were written. Both of
these pieceswere written in the late 2000s, a significant amount of time after the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the end of the ColdWar. This naturally entails that these pieces are much more
reflective in their approach, seeking to explore the reasons behind changes in an historical
context rather then simply outlining the events as previous works had done. Whilst the benefit of
hindsight might detract such an author into producing a piece that suggests the fight against
psychiatric abusewas one that would be inevitably won, this does not occur in Van Voren's works.
Indeed, approaching the Soviet political abuse of psychiatry with a senseof hindsight allows these
abuses to be placed into an international context. Van Voren's approach is one that is most
welcome, allowing historians to build up a picture not only of how a key human rights activist in
the West perceived his response to these abuses, but that also outlines the activity of Western
organisations in the context of the ColdWar.
The works of Van Voren are developing an area of historiography that has been largely
ignored to date. It is clear that there is much scope for scholarship on the Soviet political abuse of
psychiatry, especially from scholars in the West. The scale of abuse in psikhushki deserves serious
attention from scholars, and is an area ripe for original and detailed work. This research would not
only prove to offer an interesting insight into the Soviet suppression of internal dissent, but would
hopefully expose their barbarity and cast light on contemporary reports of similar abuses in
Russia.
In the context of the Cold War, it is clear that the political abuse of psychiatry did not
occur in a vacuum. The Soviet authorities were heavily influenced by reactions from the West, and
the role of human rights activists around the world was clear in putting pressure on governments
116
and official bodies. The literature to date does not explicitly consider the role of these human
rights groups, and the role they played in the Western response to these abuses.
Britain became the central point for groups and individuals protesting against the political
abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union. This was for a variety of reasons. Several prominent
dissidents who had been incarcerated in psikhushki had settled in Britain after their emigration
from the Soviet Union - most notably Vladimir Bukovsky,Viktor Fainberg and Zhores Medvedev.
Alongside these dissidents were several psychiatrists who emigrated to Britain in this period,
including Marina Voikhanskaya and Alexander Voloshanovich, both of whom went on to play roles
in the British campaignsagainst the Soviet abuses.
The pressure from the RoyalCollege of Psychiatrists was integral to the World Psychiatric
Association's response to the Soviet abuses.This was not only becauseof the prominent position
of the Royal College within the WPA and international psychiatry, but also because of the hard
line stance that it took on the matter, something that will be discussed in much depth later in this
chapter. It must be remembered that the Royal College of Psychiatrists is one of the most
prestigious psychiatric bodies in the world, and that its position was very important for
influencing other national psychiatric organisations. It is also important to note that a number of
important figures who campaigned against the political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union
were based in Britain in this period. Bloch and Reddaway wrote their two works on Soviet
psychiatric abuseswhilst in Britain, something which kept the academic focus of Soviet psychiatric
abuse on British shores.m As noted above, the work of these two academics was very important
for offering academically credible information about the Soviet psychiatric abuses to the British
public, and it is likely that these two individuals were influential in the formation and sustenance
of some British groups formed in this period. Professor Harold Merskey and Dr Gery Low-Beer,
two influential psychiatrists in the campaigns against psychiatric abuse, were also based in Britain
in this period.
287 Interview with Peter Reddaway. 5 July 2010.
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A combination of these factors meant that Britain developed a strong academic and
institutional position with regards to the psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union, gaining an
international reputation for expertise in this area. This chapter will analyse the role of human
rights groups in informing the British response to the Soviet abuse of psychiatry. In order to offer
a senseof context, three casesof psychiatric abuse that were particularly noted in Britain will be
discussed. The cases of General Petro Grigorenko, Zhores Medvedev and Vladimir Bukovsky
illustrate the development of public awareness of the abuses from ephemeral interest in the late
1960s to a wider human rights concern in the 1980s. This chapter will then consider the British
cultural exposure to Soviet psychiatric abuses, centring on the works of Tom Stoppard and Valery
Tarsis, and the impact they had on wider society. Once this context has been established, the role
of human rights groups will be analysed in detail. The campaigns of the Medical and Scientific
Committee for Soviet Jewry, the Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental
Hospitals, and the CampaignAgainst Psychiatric Abuse will be assessedin detail. Finally, the role
played by the Royal College in campaigning against psychiatric abuses will be considered,
particularly the efforts of its SpecialCommittee on the Political Abuse of Psychiatry. The influence
that human rights groups had on this committee, and subsequently the direction of the Royal
College, will be highlighted, illustrating the impact that human rights groups had on the policy of
official bodies.
Three Cases that caught the West's Eye
From the mid 1960s to the early 1980s there were three main cases of the psychiatric
abuse of dissidents in the Soviet Union which caught the eye of Western organisations,
individuals, and perhaps most importantly the media. In order to give a sense of context it is
worth considering the cases of General Petro Grigorenko, Zhores Medvedev and Vladimir
Bukovsky, and how the West responded to their particular plights. The cases of each of these
dissidents had particular resonance in Britain, and are good illustrations of the impact that the
response from British groups and individuals could have on the internal policy of the Soviet Union
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towards dissidents. A comparison of these cases is also revealing of the developing awareness and
concern about the abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union from the British public.
Petro Grigorenko
The psychiatric incarceration of General Petro Grigorenko is one of the most high profile
cases in which the Soviet authorities clamped down on a dissenting figure within their own ranks.
Grigorenko was a high-ranking General in the Red Army, who served with great distinction in the
Great Patriotic War.288Grigorenko's memoirs clearly document the dramatic rise in stature that
he experienced in the course of his life time. Born into a working class family in Ukraine, he spent
most of his life fanatically working towards communist ideals.289Grigorenko can be described as a
devout communist, who found answers for the many questions that arose in his lifetime in the
works of lenin.290 Despite this conviction, his public concern at the inability to question the
direction of the Soviet authorities, and the fear of a new personality cult being formed under
Nikita Khrushchev, led him to become an enemy of the Soviet authorities.i" Grigorenko was
incarcerated in a psychiatric hospital in August 1964, after being declared insane at a trial in which
neither he, nor his wife could attend. He was represented by a lawyer, whom he described as
being 'a KGB lackey,.292Grigorenko's case is a good example of how psychiatric incarceration
avoided the complications of a public trial, and how it was used in order to imprison dissidents
without any chance of retaliation. Given Grigorenko's previous public denunciations of the
direction of the Soviet government, it is likely that he would have used the opportunity of a public
trial to attack the corruption of the Soviet nomenklatura, rather than be submissive in the face of
288The Great Patriotic War was the Soviet, and later Russian,name for the SecondWorld War. For an
account of Grigorenko's activities in the Great Patriotic War see Grigorenko, Memoirs, pp. 122-200.
289Grigorenko, Memoirs, p. x.
290Ibid, p. 265.
291Bloch and Reddaway,Russia'sPolitical Hospitals, p. 106. For an account of the speech in which
Grigorenko publicly voiced his concerns about the direction of the Soviet government under Khrushchev see
Grigorenko, Memoirs, pp. 237-261.
292Grigorenko, Memoirs, p. 293.
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the court.293 By denouncing Grigorenko as being medically unfit to stand trial - a decision which
he had no say in - the Soviet authorities prevented this from occurring. After a period in
psychiatric institutions and prisons, Grigorenko was released on 27 June, 1974, as a concession by
the Soviet authorities before the visit of the US President Richard Nixon.294Grigorenko was
eventually exiled by the Soviet authorities when, during a sanctioned visit to New York for medical
treatment in November 1977, he was stripped of his Soviet citizenship.295
Grigorenko's case is important to consider for several reasons. Firstly, the high-profile
nature of Grigorenko, and his esteemed background in the Soviet military clearly show the extent
to which the Soviet authorities were prepared to use psychiatric incarceration to punish and
control dissidents. It could be argued that the most effective way for the Soviet authorities to deal
with Grigorenko was to declare him mentally insane. This is due not only to the strength of his
position, but also to his background as an exemplary communist. Declaring his shift in viewpoint
as being due to his insanity was an attempt to remove all credibility that he had, and to destroy
his reputation among the Soviet public. Secondly, Grigorenko's case was one of the first examples
of psychiatric abuse being used to persecute dissent that was publicised prominently in the West.
His plight was first mentioned in a front page article in The Times on 10 January 1968. Although
this report mentions nothing about his incarceration in a psychiatric institution, it does elude to
his ideological dissent, noting that he had previously made an anti-Soviet speech in 1964.296An
article in the same paper the following day mentions his psychiatric treatment, noting that he was
refused attendance at a court case due to his time in hospital - despite having been issued a
discharge certlflcate.?" Although lacking distinct clarity, taken together these two articles suggest
that Grigorenko's psychiatric treatment was linked to his dissenting opinions.
293Nomenklatura - the name given to the elite of the Soviet hierarchy who enjoyed an array of privileges
dependant on their position. Heavily criticised by many dissidents, most famously by Milovan Djilas. SeeM.
Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (london, 1957).
294Grigorenko, Memoirs, p. 429. For a good account of Grigorenko's imprisonment see Bloch and
Reddaway,Russia's Political Hospitals, pp. 105-127.
295Grigorenko, Memoirs, pp. 449-451.
296K.Tidmarsh, 'Ex-general in Moscow trial protest', The Times, 10 January, 1968 p. 1.
297K.Tidmarsh, 'Soviet court bars lawyer', The Times, 11 January, 1968 p. 5.
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Whilst in prison and in psychiatric institutions, Grigorenko made detailed notes about his
treatment. These accounts were smuggled out of prison and sent to the West by his wife.298 They
were subsequently made into the short documentary film, 'Grigorenko: The Man Who Wouldn't
Keep Quiet', for Granada Television, which was produced and directed by Leslie Woodhouse.299
This film was first shown on British television on 24 October 1970, and was a very important
moment for the cultural recognition of Soviet psychiatric abuse in Britain. This documentary was
based intently on Grigorenko's prison diaries, something which is keenly pointed out in the film
itself. This was the first in a series of projects that Woodhouse engaged in, in which he tried to
create documentaries on areas that issues of access made difficult. This entailed a reliance on
factual evidence such as transcripts, tape recordings, witness accounts and, in the case of this
documentary, diaries. 300 Woodhouse's documentary clearly depicts the barbarity of the
incarceration of a sane man in a psikhushka. One scene showed an aggressive patient attacking
visiting relatives and Grigorenko being awoken in the night by piercing screams. This documentary
also visually recreates the psychiatric diagnosis of Grigorenko, with actors playing the role of
Morozov and Lunts - two key psychiatrists accused of psychiatric abuse - giving a clear visual
prompt to not only the conditions endured by those in psikhushki, but also the unfairness of the
psychiatric diagnosis. This allowed viewers to visualise what the conditions were like in the Soviet
psychiatric institutions, arguably an image more powerful and accessible than written accounts.
Aside from Woodhouse's documentary, the initial Western reception to the psychiatric
incarceration of Grigorenko was negligible. It could be argued that his case was met with minimal
support or interest from the West, aside from a cursory interest shown by people like Woodhouse
in producing a documentary without the traditional access available. It took several years for the
Grigorenko's plight to be fully recognised in the West, something that arguably occurred due to
the later public knowledge of other dissidents who were punished in the same fashion.
298 Grigorenko, Memoirs, p. 391.
2991. Woodhouse, 'Grigorenko: The Man Who Wouldn't KeepQuiet', Granada Television, 1970. See
programme details from the British Film Institute at http://ftvdb.bfLorg.uk/sift/title/224877 (Accessed25
October 2010). Bloch and Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals, p. 120, footnote 31 detail on p. 471.
300 Email to author from l.Woodhouse, 26 October, 2010.
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Zhores Medvedev
In the first days following my return home I learned about the widespread reaction to my illegal
hospitalisation. Thanks to the many protests by scientists both in the USSRand abroad, the use of
psychiatry as a means of persecution had attracted the attention of foreign commentators and
journalists. Newspapers and weeklies in England, the United States, France and other countries
not only published the numerous protests about this violation of medical ethics in the USSR,but
also described the actual events in Obninsk and Kaluga.
Zhores Medvedev, A Question of Madness.301
The incarceration of Zhores Medvedev in a psychiatric institution from May to June 1970
is unique for two reasons. Firstly, Medvedev was not placed into a typical psikhushka, but into an
ordinary psychiatric hospital, one that resembled a hospital rather than a prison. This is important
as it showed intent from the Soviet authorities to prove that Medvedev suffered from mental
illness, rather than using a psikhushka as a form of prison. This was perhaps due to the public
stature that he had among dissidents in the Soviet Union, who came out in force in his support.
Secondly, Medvedev was quickly released from the psychiatric institution after protests on his
behalf from prominent figures, both from within the USSRand abroad.302 This international
response is in stark contrast to the response to Grigorenko's case both in its scope and in its
outcome. Medvedev's case is also of extreme use for historians due to the way in which it has
been documented. In the period surrounding his forced psychiatric diagnosis, and in the
immediate period after his release, Medvedev and his twin brother Roy compiled a set of their
personal observations of the confinement. A Question of Madness is a detailed, and deeply
personal account of the experience of how a dissident dealt with psychiatric abuse in the Soviet
Union, including details of the efforts of the wider dissident community in the Soviet Union
working for Medvedev's release.?" It is clear from the very beginning of this work the role that
international support had in the Zhores' release. In an introductory note to the piece, Zhores
neatly offered his
most profound gratitude to all those friends, acquaintances and strangers, at home and abroad,
who by protesting in various ways against the inhumane use of medicine for political purposes,
301 MedvedevandMedvedev,A Question of Madness.
302 Merskey,'Abusesof Psychiatryin the USSR',p. 46.
303 MedvedevandMedvedev,A Question of Madness.
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created a climate of opinion which meant freedom for him and hope for others illegally confined
in psychiatric hospitals.304
Medvedev was placed in a psychiatric hospital in direct response for the samizdat that he
had produced, which included a book attacking the Soviet genetic policies under Stalin,
particularly the geneticist Trofim Lysenko.305 The interest in Medvedev's publications from
psychiatrists during his diagnosis, as recollected in A Question of Madness, echoed Grigorenko's
confusion as to whether those who diagnosed him were psychiatrists or KGB tnvestlgators.f"
Whilst incarcerated, there were a plethora of calls for Medvedev's release from an array of figures
in the Soviet Union, including Andrei Sakharov, the novelist Veniamin Kaverin, and Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn.307 At an international symposium at the Institute of Genetics on 30 May 1970,
Sakharov boldly asked for signatories for an appeal on behalf of Medvedev, something that was
criticised by the head of the Institute Nikolai Dubinin.308 Solzhenitsyn's appeal for Medvedev's
release was also notably powerful, linking his case to that of Pyotr Chaadayev and claiming his
treatment as being a 'variation on the gas chambers' - a clear reference to the Holocaust and the
Nazi genocide.309 This reference is particularly evocative due to its historical references, subtly
arguing that the Soviet regime was no better than the Tsarist regime it had replaced or the Fascist
system it had destroyed at the end of the SecondWorld War.
The support that Medvedev received from dissidents within the Soviet Union is in stark
contrast to Grigorenko's case. Medvedev's initial diagnosis was met with public statements by
dissenters, compared to the seeming apathy towards Grigorenko's case. This is perhaps in part
due to the awakening of the dissident movement in the Soviet Union, which became notably
more active in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The public support from dissidents for Medvedev
was also perhaps in part due to his position as a dissenting scientist. His denunciation of Lysenko
was largely supported by Soviet scientists, something that may have impacted on support for him
304 Ibid,p. ix.
305 See Z. Medvedev, The Rise and Fall ofT. D. Lysenko (Columbia, 1969).
306 Medvedev and Medvedev, A Question of Madness, pp. 96-97.
307 Medvedev and Medvedev, A Question of Madness, pp.115-117, 130, 134-137.
308 Sakharov, Memoirs, pp. 310-312.
309 For the text of Solzhenitsyn's appeal see Medvedev and Medvedev, A Question of Madness, pp. 135-137.
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from scientists such asSakharov.Also, in comparison to Grigorenko it is clear that Medvedev held
many more links and relationships with fellow dissenters in the Soviet Union. The work of his
brother Roy in galvanising this support should also not be forgotten. It could be suggested that
this array of support from dissenters also expedited the publication of material in the West on this
abuse of psychiatry. This dissident support was notably missing from Grigorenko's case, and goes
someway to explain why Medvedev's plight was more widely reported in the West. Whilst leslie
Woodhouse noted that his documentary on Grigorenko was challenging to produce due to a lack
of accessto material, there was a vast amount of material available on Medvedev's plight, due in
part to the production and distribution of material by dissidents.
Despite not covering the initial stages of his psychiatric evaluations, the British media
regularly reported on Medvedev's case.310 Zhores recalled that after his release, his friends had
compiled a sizeable collection of newspaper clippings from around the world that reported his
case.?" The international response for Medvedev's release was much more restrained in
comparison to later campaigns for other dissidents, and consisted mainly of reports of this case.
This was perhaps due to the sheer timescale involved - Medvedev was released comparatively
quickly, perhaps too quickly for an international campaign to gather momentum. However, in
comparison to the case of Grigorenko, the response to Medvedev's incarceration clearly shows
that international opinion had become increasingly aware of these abuses.
Medvedev's case is important in the British context as it publicly suggested that
psychiatry was used in the Soviet Union to control political dissenters. The fact that Medvedev
was released so quickly after pressure was placed on the Soviet authorities is also of much
significance. This casedemonstrated to the West that sustained pressure on behalf of a particular
dissident could have a dramatic impact on the Soviet internal policy towards them. This is
something that arguably shaped the later work of human rights activists who operated on the
310 ForexamplesseeJ. F.Clarity,'New Inquisitionon SovietBiologist',The Times, 5 June1970,p. 7; 'No
releasefor Sovietgeneticist',The Times, 6June1970,p. 4; and 'DetainedSovietbiologistfreed', The Times,
18June1970,p. 7.
311 MedvedevandMedvedev,A Question of Madness, pp. 169-171.
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basis that international pressure could change the domestic policy of the Soviet Union.
Medvedev's case shaped the way in which human rights groups targeted the Soviet authorities
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and gave them the knowledge that their pressure could
eventually force the Soviet authorities into loosening their grip on particular dissenters.
A Question of Madness, the Medvedev brothers account of Zhores' incarceration gave a
very useful source on the personal reactions to the forced psychiatric evaluations, and provided
emotive material for contemporaries concerned with human rights abuses in the Soviet Union.
This piece may have encouraged some to involve themselves in groups who campaigned against
psychiatric, and wider human rights abuses in the Soviet Union, and may have informed their
campaigns to an extent. Importantly, it was first published in 1971, five years before the Soviet
Union publicly admitted to holding political prisoners with the exchange of Vladimir Bukovsky. In
this light, this piece can be seen as playing another important step in building public
consciousnessregarding Soviet human rights abuses, and perhaps laid the ground for the work of
later human rights organisations. Perhaps most importantly, the response to Medvedev's case
shows a clear shift in both the way in which the Soviet authorities dealt with dissidents, but also in
the Western knowledge of the abuses, and how they could influence them.
Vladimir Bukovsky
There was one last resort - Western psychiatrists. This seemed to offer little hope. What chance
was there of breaking through all those ideological encrustations, prejudices and doctrines? I had
little faith in its success,but none the less I sent the documentations to Western psychiatrists...At
all events it was worth a try. Perhapsthere were more honest people in the world than I thought?
Vladimir Bukovsky, To Build a Castle.3l2
Vladimir Bukovsky is a man of firsts with regards to the British response to the Soviet
dissident movement. His high-profile exchange for the imprisoned Chilean Communist luis
Corvalan in December 1976 was a deeply symbolic event in the course of the Cold War. This well
documented exchange, which resembled the swapping of covert agents between the two sides of
the Iron Curtain, was the first admission by the Soviet authorities that it held political prisoners,
312 Bukovsky, To Build a Castle, p. 289.
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something that it had strenuously denied before this event, and made the front pages of British
newspapers.m This was a key event in the construction of the Soviet dissenter in British
discourse, and gave a public face to what had previously been abstract names and references.
Bukovsky's exile to the West was not only an admission that the Soviet authorities held political
prisoners, but also a sign that it was willing to utilise them for their own political motives, using
them astokens to trade for their comrades abroad.
Bukovsky's life and activism has been wide and varied, and an attempt to cover the scope
of his life is simply beyond the remit of this piece. He has been involved in fighting human rights
causes along a multitude of different lines, and has continued unabated in his activism since he
settled in the Britain in the late 1970s. His unsuccessful attempt to run for President of the
RussianFederation in 2008, an appearance on the Russiantelevision documentary 'OHI'! Bbl6palll'!
cB060Ay'(They chose freedom), protests against the British Television License, and his political
affiliation to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) have kept Bukovsky in the public
light in both Britain and Russia.314Bukovsky's political campaigning has meant that there are a
plethora of interviews, videos and articles that refer to his work and life available on the internet
and in academic pieces. Philip Boobbyer's recent article 'Vladimir Bukovskii and Soviet
Communism' discussesBukovsky's life, offers an insight into aspects of his political thought, and is
the first to analyse the intellectual basis for his actions and activities.315Bukovsky's memoir To
Build A Castle also lays out his dissident work whilst in the Soviet Union and should rightly be
considered as a key historiographical piece in researching the Soviet dissident movement, and as
a literary piece in its own right.316
313 D.Watts, 'Bukovsky exchange for Chilean Communist', The Times, 18 November 1976, p. 1.
314 For example, seeM. Franchetti, 'Russia is returning to Soviet-era repression, saysdissident Bukovsky',
The Times, 7 October 2007, available online at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/toJ!news/world/europe/articJe2604593.ece [Accessed2 November 2010];
M. Hall, 'Anti-BBC political activist fined over TV license', Get Surrey, 8 June 2010, available online at
http://www.getsurrey.co.uk/news/s!2072348 antibbc political activist fined over tv licence [Accessed2
November 2010]; 'TV LicenseRefuseniks', online at http://www.bbcrefuseniks.co.uk/index.html[Accessed
2 November 2010) and OHI1Bbl6palll1cBo6oAY(They Chose Freedom), available online at
http://www.newsru.com/russia/01dec2005/film.html[Accessed 30 October 2010).
315 Boobbyer, 'Vladimir Bukovskii and Soviet Communism'.
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In short, Bukovsky can be best described as a life long non-conformist. He first showed
dissenting feelings as a child, when he resigned from the Pioneers and refused to join the Soviet
youth organisation the Komsomol. From these early foundations, Bukovsky went on to become
involved with the Mayakovsky Square poetry readings in the late 1950s, and was eventually
incarcerated in a psikhushka in May 1963 for possession of a copy of Milovan Djilas's The New
Class.317 Bukovsky was subsequently released in 1965, and maintained his dissident activity. He
was arrested and sentenced to jail terms for his actions in 1967 and 1972, and used the occasion
of his public trial as a rostrum with which to criticise the Soviet actions.318Bukovsky's activism did
not stop during his incarceration. In 1974, with the imprisoned psychiatrist Semyon Gluzman, he
co-authored the samizdat piece 'A Manual on Psychiatry for Dissenters', a guide to surviving
incarceration in a psikhushka without being mentally broken by the officers of the KGBwhich was
based largely on his own experlences.l"
In early 1971, Bukovskysent a collection of medical documents he had acquired regarding
the political abuse of psychiatry to the West, which became the most comprehensive information
regarding Soviet psychiatric abuse available at the time. Among these 150 pages of documents
were medical files, and pieces that outlined the psychiatric diagnosis of six dtssldents."? In a letter
attached to these documents, Bukovsky appealed to psychiatrists in the West to study these
documents and express their opinions on them; asking specifically if these documents contained
enough scientifically-based material to diagnose mental illness and, on this basis, whether these
people needed to be isolated from society.m Bukovsky also asked psychiatrists to place the issue
of the Soviet abuses, and the outcome of these documents, on the agenda of the next
International Congressof Psychiatrists. Reflecting on these documents, Bukovsky claims that he
317 Boobbyer, 'Vladimir Bukovskii and Soviet Communism', pp. 453-456.
318 See litvinov, The Demonstration in Pushkin Square, pp.47-102 for an account of Bukovsky's 1967 trial.
319 Available in an English translation in Bloch and Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals, Appendix VI, pp.
419-440.
320 These were the cases of Vladimir Borisov, Viktor Fainberg, Natalya Gorbanevskaya, General Petro
Grigorenko, Viktor Kuznetsov, and Ivan Yakhimovich. For an interesting discussion of the Bukovsky papers
see S. Shafar, 'The disease of dissent', New Psychiatry, 17 July 1975, pp. 12-13.
321 For a copy of Bukovsky's letter see Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals,
The Internment of Soviet Dissenters in Mental Hospitals (London, 1971) Appendix I.
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held little hope of there being a response to these materials. He notes that these documents were
sent abroad as a final attempt to publicise these cases of abuse, claiming there was little else he
could do.m
The so-called Bukovsky papers have been described as the most persuasive body of
evidence regarding the Soviet psychiatric abuses in the early 1970s.323 Although the authenticity
of these documents was originally questioned, Peter Reddaway later stated that Bukovsky was an
'impeccable source' and that his integrity was beyond reproach. This claim was built on
Reddaway's experiences of dealing with an array of samizdat material from the Soviet Union; but
it also worth noting that no psychiatrist mentioned in the Bukovsky papers refuted their claims,
suggesting that they were accurate.!" This led to these materials gaining a reputation of
reliability, something that was of utmost importance in the context of the Cold War.
The Bukovsky papers were first released to the Western press in March 1971 by The
International Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, a small French human rights
organisation.m These documents were translated into English by the newly formed Working
Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals, an important British organisation of
whom more will be said later in this piece. This group translated Bukovsky's appeal to the West,
and had it reprinted in The Times, The British Journal of Psychiatry, and in its own pamphlet
entitled 'The Internment of Soviet Dissenters in Mental Hospitals,.m On 16 September 1971, a
group of psychiatrists wrote a letter to The Times in response to this appeal, noting Bukovsky's
courage in sending these documents abroad, and called for their international colleagues to
consider these documents and to discuss the matter with their Soviet colleagues.?" The timing of
Bukovsky's appeal proved to be excellent in this respect, as the world congress of the WPA was
322 Interview with Vladimir Bukovsky, 18 January 2011.
323 Bloch and Reddaway,Russia's Political Hospitals, p. 79.
324 Ibid, pp. 79-80.
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held in Mexico City in November 1971. Bloch and Reddaway note that due to the dissemination of
materials at and before this meeting, including translations of the Bukovsky papers and the
recently published A Question of Madness by the Medvedev brothers, the 'stage was set' for
discussion of the political abuse of psychiatry at this congress.f" Indeed, one gets the impression
that action from the WPA against the abuses was expected by many at this congress. This,
however, did not occur. The WPA failed to take up the issueof the political abuse of psychiatry in
the way expected by human rights activists. Although Dr Ramosde la Fuente, the President of the
congress, noted in his inaugural speech that to keep silent about these abuses would 'weigh
heavily on our consciences', no specific mention was made of individual cases or countries.329
Bloch and Reddaway's account of this event in Russia's Political Hospitals analyses the WPA's
approach in detail in the context of its institutional purpose. This account conveys a sense of
frustration at the WPA's inaction, pointing to the somewhat unwieldy composition of the
organisatlon.l" The approach of the WPA to this issue was conceivably due to the desire to
maintain cordial relations with psychiatrists in the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc nations.
The WPA may have preferred at this stage to bring together the international psychiatric
community, rather than dividing it through allegations of abuse. It must also be noted that little
information emanated from the Soviet Union regarding psychiatric abuse other than these
documents and dissident material. One can sympathise with the WPA taking a cautious approach
to dealing with these allegations. Had these documents later been proven to have been forgeries
created by an anti-Soviet group, the world psychiatric community would have divided, and the
position of the WPA would have been significantly undermined. Indeed, the stern response from
the WPA to these abuses in later years occurred after more evidence had been collated, and
several victims of psychiatric abuse had emigrated to the West. As with all organisations that
dealt with the dissidents in the Soviet Union, a reliance on factual information was a safe way to
deal with reports of abusewithout placing an institution's reputation on the line.




Bukovsky's efforts in sending these documents to the West was met with much support
by British psychiatrists. In response to his sentence of 12 years in the Soviet penal system, an
array of psychiatrists wrote to The Times in March 1972 offering their full support, noting it was
'both wrong and unnecessary to lock up such a person'.!" Interestingly, among those who signed
this letter of support were Sidney Bloch and Peter Sainsbury, two psychiatrists who were to playa
large part in the British campaign against the Soviet psychiatric abuses in the 1970sand 1980s.
The receipt of the Bukovsky papers in Britain led to the formation of the Working Group,
who went on to play an important role in the campaigns against the Soviet abuses. It could
therefore be argued that the Bukovsky papers not only triggered a response from the British
psychiatric community towards the Soviet abuses, but that it also started the organisation of
groups and individuals that were to later playa prominent role. These papers gave a coherent
empirical base with which to argue against the Soviet abuses, and their influence can be felt on
two different levels: the short term interest in the plight of dissenters, and the long term
organisation of concerned individuals. This can be clearly seen in the response of the WPA. In
1971, the WPA congress failed to take action based on these papers. However, at the following
WPA congress in Honolulu in 1977, more active steps to place pressure on the All Union Society of
Neuropathologists and Psychiatrists (AUSNP) occurred.f" Two resolutions were passed at this
conference, one that censured the Soviets for their actions and the second which established a
WPA review committee to assessaccusations of psychiatric abuses. Both of these resolutions
clearly targeted the reports of abuses from the Soviet Union.333 This shift arguably occurred due
to the efforts of human rights organisations who responded to, and publicised the Bukovsky
papers. Whilst it would be erroneous to describe these documents as the start of the public
engagement with this form of human rights abuse, they certainly acted as a catalyst with which
331 S.Blochet. al., 'VladimirBukovsky',The Times, 30 March1972, p. 17.
332 TheAUSNPwerethe Sovietcentralorganisationof psychiatrists,akinto the RoyalCollegeof Psychiatrists
in Britain.
333 'SovietsLeftWPAUnderExpulsionThreat',Psychiatric News, Vol.45, No.22 (November2010) p. 11. See
VanVoren,Cold War in Psychiatry, pp. 189-223.
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individuals in the West began to take action. The impact that these documents had on the British
response to Soviet dissent must not be underestimated.
What is clear in analysis of the casesof Grigorenko, Medvedev and Bukovsky is how the
British perception towards victims of Soviet psychiatric abuse developed from the mid 1960s to
the 1970s. From the minimal public interest in Grigorenko's incarceration, through rising concern
at Medvedev's plight to the beginnings of a coordinated international response to the Bukovsky
papers, these three cases illustrate a development in the public discourse on Soviet dissenters in
Britain. This development occurred through the increased dissemination of material regarding
dissenters, such as memoirs and the Bukovsky papers, and increased attention on the abuses
from the media. These developments occur in a cumulative manner, in some respects akin to
opening Pandora's box on information regarding each dissident - once it is in the public domain it
cannot be removed. If one takes the difference in public response from the first showing of 'The
Man Who Wouldn't KeepQuiet' through to the release of the Bukovsky papers, the difference in
public response over two years is remarkable. The influence of Bukovsky in this field was to
continue increasing. By 1977, Dr Allan Wynn of the Working Group noted that Bukovsky 'had
achieved a recognition that made it impossible for his appeal to be dismissed as just another
attack on psychiatry by a disaffected person,.334The fact that the WPA dealt with his appeal to the
1977 congress seriously shows not only how their respect for his position had increased since
1971, but also how much the public discourse on Soviet psychiatric abuse had developed over this
period in Britain.
British Cultural Exposure to Psychiatric abuse
Alexander: I have no symptoms, I have opinions.
Doctor: Your opinions are your symptoms. Your disease is dissent.m
The British public was first exposed to the potential of widespread abuse of psychiatric
treatment in the Soviet Union with the publication of Valery Tarsis's Ward 7 in 1965.336Tarsiswas
334 A. Wynn, Notes of A Non Conspirator: Working with Russian Dissidents (London, 1987) pp. 101-102.
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(London, 2009) p. 28.
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an author in the Soviet Union who had on several occasions failed to have his work published via
official channels. In frustration and desperation, he sent a manuscript copy of an earlier novel The
Bluebottle to the West for publication, something that he did not keep secret from the Soviet
authorltles.!" Before its publication, and as an apparent punishment, Tarsis was confined to a
psikushka in Moscow. Ward 7, as its subtitle An Autobiographical Novel would suggest, is Tarsis'
account of his time in a psikhushka. Ward 7's main character Valentine Almazov is clearly a direct
representation of Tarsis himself, and like Solzhenitsyn's characters Ivan Denisovich Shukov and
Gleb Vikentich Nerzhin, is used as a vehicle through which to describe the personal recollections
of events through a literary medium.338 It is also worth noting that the title of Tarsis' work is
drawn from the Chekhov short story Ward No.6 in which a Russian doctor's interaction with a
mentally ill patient lead to his own incarceration within a mental asylum.339 The link to Chekhov's
work of the late nineteenth century can be considered as an inference that psychiatric abuse of
this kind has long been possible, and that Tarsis' work - and subsequently the Soviet abuse - is
simply the next chapter in a wider story of the misuse of psychiatry. It could also perhaps be an
attempt to raise the credibility of Tarsis' assertions, trying to establish his piece in the wider
context of Russian literature - something which lending Chekov's reputation may have done. The
reference to Chekhov could be also noted as an example of the wider, perhaps unconscious,
attempt of dissident authors to place their work into the wider tradition of Russian literature.
The publication of Ward 7 in Britain by the Collins & Harvill Press in 1965 was the first
moment when the widespread abuse of psychiatric treatment in the Soviet Union was noted in
the West.340 Time described the work as 'a searing indictment of the Communist system' and the
336 Tarsis,Ward 7.
337 V. Tarsis, The Bluebottle (london, 1962)
338 Ivan Denisovich Shukov is the main character in A. Solzhenitsyn, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich
(london, 1962), Gleb Vikentich Nerzhin is one of the lead characters in A. Solzhenitsyn, The First Circle
(london, 1969). Both are considered to be autobiographical characters depicting sections from
Solzhenitsyn's life.
mA. Chekhov, Ward No.6 (1892) available at http://www.ibiblio.org/eldritch/ac/w6-01.html(Accessed 11
October 2010).
340 Collins & Harvill Press,and their predecessor the Harvill Press,translated and published an array of
dissident material in Englishfrom the early 1960s onwards. Their translations include Tarsis, Ward 7;
Solzhenitsyn, The First Circle; Plyushch, History's Carnival; A. Sakharov,My Country and the World (london,
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first to detail the process of psychiatric incarceration of 'enemies' of the state.341 It should be
noted that the publication of Ward 7 occurred in the aftermath of the thaw in culture and
literature during Nikita Khrushchev's time as General Secretary, which had seen the publication of
Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich in both the Soviet Union and the West. This
was an ever changing period in the discursive representation and popular perception of the Soviet
Union in the West, which had seemed to some areas of British society as an infallible and utopian
system that the West should aspire to. This position had been challenged by the Soviet response
to the Hungarian Uprising in 1956, shaking the beliefs of many on the British left. In this context,
Ward 7 was another bombshell for communism in the West, challenging an already shaken faith
in the Marxist-leninist model. like One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, however, it is difficult to
really assess the impact that this book had on wider British society's perception of the Soviet
Union. There is little commentary on the publication of the book itself in the British press in 1965,
although it was serialised in The Observer on 2, 9, and 16 May 1965 and was claimed to have had
a wide aUdience.342Newspaper articles on Tarsis in this period focus primarily on his emigration
from the Soviet Union, and his comments about the Soviet system made whilst in the West.343
This perhaps says more about the author rather than his work. Tarsis was an outspoken individual
upon his arrival in the West, something that may have distracted the media attention away from
his work. When this is compared to Solzhenitsyn, who was renowned for his reclusive behaviour
after his exile from the Soviet Union, it could be argued that the media attention on Tarsis was
diverted to the character rather than his work.344
The importance of Ward 7 is distinctively different to the success of One Day in the Life of
Ivan Denisovich. Both books broke public silence in the West on different aspects of the
1974); and Grigorenko, Memoirs. More on the early years of this publisher can be found in the memoirs of
one of its founders and translators, Manya Harari. SeeM. Harari, Memoirs 1906-1969 (London, 1972).
341'Russia:The Inconvenient Citizens', Time, 21 May, 1965, available at
http://www.time.com!time!magazine!article!0.9171.901695.00.html{Accessed 11 October 2010).
342Bloch and Reddaway,Russia'sPolitical Hospitals, p. 65, footnote 13.
343SeeF.Wells, 'I am No Traitor, SaysRebel From Russia',Daily Mirror, 11 February 1966, p. 2; 'Tarsis: Let
Me SeeDaughter', Daily Mirror, 18 March 1966, p. 7; and 'Mr. TarsisAttacks Regime', TheTimes, 11 May
1966, p. 8.
344 For an example of Solzhenitsyn's reclusive nature whilst in the West see 'Solzhenitsyn in W Germany',
lTV Late EveningNews, News At Ten, 14 February 1974, broadcast at 22:00:00.
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authoritarian regime in the Soviet Union - the Gulag and the psikhushka. Solzhenitsyn's work
opened the floodgates for the wider recognition in the West of human rights violation in the
Soviet Union, particularly the extent of abuse present in the Gulag under Stalin. Ward 7, on the
other hand was revealing of a new form of abuse uses by the Soviet authorities. Peter Reddaway
recalled that Ward 7 had a large impact on him, noting how influential it was on his activism for
Soviet dissidents.345 Given that Ward 7 was the first piece to discussSoviet psychiatric abuse, it is
likely that others were also influenced in a similar manner. Indeed, it could be argued that since
this was the first piece that uncovered the abuses, all subsequent work that protested against
psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union from the West stemmed in some form from its taboo
breaking publication.
As a work of literature, Ward 7 is engrossing and evocative. It is clear from the emotions
raised in the narrative, and the disturbing details of the psychiatric incarceration of a sane man
that Tarsis either had a terrifically vivid and warped imagination or that the details of his story
were based on his experiences. In hindsight, the details that came out of the Soviet Union via
samizdat and with the emigration of psychiatrists and former psychiatric patients heavily suggest
that Tarsis' work was based on the reality of his experiences. In fact, when this work is taken into
the context of later pieceswritten about the psychiatric abuse that occurred in the Soviet Union,
the amount of detail that Tarsis goes into is particularly impressive; drawing the conclusion that
perhaps this work is more a non-fiction recollection of events than a novel; something that is
suggested by the author. Bloch and Reddaway even assert that Ward 7 should be considered as a
primary source regarding the internment of sane dissidents in mental hospitals.346 Ward 7
effectively opened up the possibility of discussingpsychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union without it
being dismissed as a complete fiction or figment of the imagination.
Another key cultural moment for the public recognition of Soviet psychiatric abuse in
Britain came over a decade after the publication of Ward 7. Every Good Boy Deserves Favour
345 Interview with Peter Reddaway, 5 July 2010.
346 Bloch and Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals, p. 66.
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(EGBDF)was written in 1978 by Tom Stoppard, the noted British playwright, with a musical score
produce by Andre Previn.347 Stoppard was a renowned supporter of human rights and dissidents
in the Soviet Union, and was involved in campaigns that supported refuseniks and condemned the
abuse of psychiatry. EGBDFis set predominantly within a psychiatric hospital and explores the
position of a sane dissident writer known only as Alexander, alongside a mentally insane patient
Ivanov, with whom he shares a cell. Ivanov suffers from what can only be described as extreme
delusions; notably that he is constantly surrounded by an orchestra that he is conducting. The
play itself does contain a full orchestra within it, showing the audience Ivanov's delusions, and
using music to heighten the emotions raised throughout the play. EGBDFexplores Soviet
psychiatric abuse in a dark manner, infusing humour and typical Stoppardian word play to
illustrate the barbarity of the psychiatric incarceration of a sane man, and his interactions with
genuinely ill patients. EGBDFalso illustrates the wider social stigma for the family of dissidents
who were sectioned, showing Alexander's son Sasha, and how he dealt not only with being
separated from his father, but also with the humiliations he endured from his teacher.
Interestingly, these humiliations also include references to the role that Western organisations
played in supporting this fictional dissident, perhaps subtly noting that support for these
dissenters was needed from the audience. In one scene, Sasha'steacher notes sarcastically that
he should have special treatment due to his fathers position, stating:
Yes,your name goes around the world. By telegram. It is printed in the newspapers. It is spoken
on the radio. With such a famous name why should you bother with different colours? We will
change the music for you. It will look like a field of buttercups, and sound like dinnertime.348
EGBDFwas dedicated to Vladimir Bukovskyand Victor Fainberg. Stoppard met Fainberg in
April 1976 whilst writing a play about a millionaire triangle-player. During this meeting, Fainberg
expressed his concerns about the plight of Bukovsky to Stoppard, who swiftly rewrote this play
into EGDBF,undoubtedly due to the experiences of meeting this dissident.349 Stoppard notes that
347 See T. Stoppard, Every Good Boy Deserves Favour and Professional Foul (London, 2009). First published in
1978.
348 Stoppard, Every Good Boy Deserves Favour and Professional Foul, p. 13.
349 Ibid, p. v-vi.
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both Fainberg and Bukovsky make appearances in the play itself; Bukovsky as the unknown 'friend
C' and Fainberg as one of the group of dissidents referred to only as a letter between M and S in
the dialogue.35o Bukovsky was even invited to the rehearsals of the play before it had been shown
to the public, although Stoppard notes that he found it embarrassing, and Ian McKellen, who
played the role of Alexander, 'seized up in the middle of a speech touching on the experiences of
[the] visitor, and found it impossible to continue'."? McKellen later noted in a letter to Stoppard
that 'the rehearsal when C [Bukovsky] walked into Floral Street was overwhelming + I don't think I
recovered the objective composure which your play demanded. Such a !lig hall, such a !lig
orchestra, such !lig themes,.352 This clearly shows the light in which Stoppard and the actor in
question held Bukovsky, as a character whom they felt they could never do justice to the
storyline, having never experienced a similar period of incarceration. It also suggests that
Stoppard was a deep admirer of Bukovsky and other dissidents, something which goes some way
to explain why he choose to write a play on this particular topic. It is also interesting to note the
admiration that Bukovsky has for Stoppard's ability as a playwright, and especially the way he
weaves an array of themes and events into his plays. Bukovsky is full of praise for EGBDF,
especially its recent production at the National Theatre, and Travesties, another of Stoppard's
works that he greatly enjoyed.m
Given the logistics of having a full orchestra, EGBDF has only been shown on several
occasions. The first performances at the Royal Festival Hall, London, in July 1977 contained a cast
of incredible talent, many of whom were to become household names. Ian McKeJlen, John Wood,
Philip Locke and Patrick Stewart were amongst the cast, along with accompaniment from the
350 Ibid, p. vi.
3511bid, p. vii.
352 Letter from Ian McKellen to Tom Stoppard, dated 2 August 1977, 10.4 Every Good Boy DeservesFavour
Correspondence and Production file, 1976-1979, Tom Stoppard Papers,Harry RansomCenter University of
Austin at Texas.Emphasisfrom original letter. McKellen also notes on a page of his website referring to
EGBDFthat 'When Bukovsky slipped into our rehearsals one afternoon in London, the juxtaposition of
dramatic fiction and actual fact, rendered me speechlessand we abandoned rehearsals for tea.' 'Words
From Ian McKellen' (April 2008), available at http://www.mckellen.com/stageI00071.htm (accessed6 June
2012).
353 Interview with Vladimir Bukovsky, 18 January 2011. Bukovsky was so impressed with Stoppard that he
insisted his protege go and see EGBDF,suggesting not only how much he enjoyed the play, but also how
useful it is. Seealso T. Stoppard, Travesties (London, 1974).
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London Symphony Orchestra.354 These first performances included the highlight of being the last
performance at the Mermaid Theatre, London, in 1978 before it was renovated. This performance
was reviewed by Ned Chaillet in The Times, who noted that the play 'works as entertainment and
as a salutary reminder of grim, political truths'. Despite this positive recognition of the wider
political message of the play, Chaillet also noted that not everyone in the audience would
remember that the piece was about a sane dissident and an insane man, both of whom were
lncarcerated.f" Others criticised Stoppard's play for its ambiguous end, in which Alexander is
mistakenly released by a KGB guard who confuses him for a different patient. Martin Huckerby,
who reviewed the play for The Times, noted that 'plenty of critics came to the wrong conclusion
that the dissident was responsible for the confusion and was duping the KGB', rather than the
ironic twist that Stoppard intended.3s6
EGBDFwas also produced for television, and was shown on BBCl in July 1978, allowing a
wider audience who might not have had access to the theatre to see it.m However, critics were
not impressed by the television production, noting that the three distinctive 'stages' that the play
was set in did not translate well onto the screen.3S8 Despite these concerns about the aesthetics
of the production itself, the fact that a drama about the incarceration of sane dissenters in the
psikhushka appeared on mainstream British television suggests that a wide audience would have
been exposed to the issues of Soviet psychiatric abuse. This would have had a dramatic effect on
the creation of the public discourse on these abuses. On the other hand it is difficult, if not
impossible, to assess not only the number of people who saw and understood the wider ethical
and moral messages throughout EGBDF, but also how many separated fiction from reality.
Stoppard's play, although based on the accounts and experiences of Soviet dissidents, may have
been misunderstood as a completely fictional work of a playwright. This is something that
Stoppard's notably dry and dark style might not have assisted. However, regardless of the
354 Stoppard, Every Good Boy Deserves Favour, p. 3.
mN. Chaillet, 'Every Good Boy DeservesFavour, Mermaid', The Times, 15 June 1978, p. 15.
356 M. Huckerby, 'KGBto blame in the end', The Times, 17 August 1978, p. 12.
3S7 'Shakespearian plays start programme', The Times, 19 July 1978, p. 19.
358 M. Church, 'Every Good Boy DeservesFavour: BBC2',The Times, 15 November 1979.
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audience's assumption of fiction or reality, EGBDF was one of the most important cultural
introductions to the concept of Soviet psychiatric abuse - something that informed many of the
potential for, and implications of psychiatric abuse.
What is clear about EGBDF is that it drew discussion. Although critics were unsure that its
political motives left a clear and lasting impression on the audience, the sheer virtue of its
discussion further developed the public awareness of Soviet psychiatric abuse. Discussion of this
piece in broadsheet newspapers necessitated a brief description of the plays plot - something
which in itself inevitably led to discussion of psychiatric abuse. Stoppard's keen intention to keep
the issue of Soviet dissent, and the persecution of dissidents in the public consciousness would
have been carried out not only in the showing of EGBDF itself, but also in all reviews of the play,
regardless of how they assessed its quality. If anything, a critical review may well have drawn
more attention to the psychiatric abuses than an entirely positive one.
EGBDF is now considered by many as a classic with a brief sell out run at the National
Theatre in 2009, that led to an extension of dates into 2010 which received an array of positive
reviews from critics.m The fact that this play attracted sell out audiences in 2010 suggests not
only that Stoppard and Previn have created a fantastic play, but also that its plot is interesting and
emotive enough to draw a crowd. Even if those who have seen the play do not fully comprehend
the reality of the abuses that are being portrayed, the fact that they are being made aware of
them is enough to have an effect on the way in which they perceive, and therefore discuss Soviet
dissent.
Both Ward 7 and EGBDF were key cultural events that raised the issue of Soviet
psychiatric abuse with the British public. They were also accompanied by other events that
discussed psychiatric treatment at the time, and the forced incarceration of mentally ill people in
a more general setting. Most important of these was the 1975 film One Flew Over the Cuckoo's
359 Seehttp:Uwww.nationaltheatre.org.uk/47002/productions/every-good-boy-deserves-favour.html
(Accessed11 October 2010) and http:Uwww.nationaltheatre.org.ukl?lid=47002&dspl=reviews (Accessed
11October 2010).
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Nest.36O Starring Jack Nicholson, this film's plot covers one man's attempt to remain in an
American psychiatric hospital instead of returning to prison by proving to the staff that he is
insane. It is only when he is permanently sectioned that he realises the barbarity of his situation,
and tries in desperation to escape. Although the film itself does not overtly cover issues of
psychiatric abuse, the domineering figure of Nurse Ratched appears to revel in her position of
power over the patients, and perhaps alludes to the potential of the abuse of this form of
treatment. Issues of forced incarceration are also raised throughout the film, becoming a
prominent aspect of the storyline itself. A dark scene that shows Nicholson's character being
subjected to Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT)361against his will perhaps shows the haunting
nature of conventional psychiatric treatments, let alone unconventional uses. This scene might
have highlighted the potential abuses in countries where medical treatment was perceived to be
less modern than the United States. Activists, such as Dr Allan Wynn, noted the potential
influence of this film in depicting the potential for the abuse of psychiatry to a wide aUdience.362
One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest can be rightly considered as a cinematic classic,
something which was clearly seen in both the US and Britain, receiving five Academy Awards and
six BAFTA's. Such was its acclaim that it was the first film in over four decades to win all five major
Academy Awards in one year. 3631t is also interesting to note that in 1977 Professional Foul - a
television production written by Stoppard for the BBC in which a Cambridge Professor travels to
Prague for an academic conference and meets with a former student who had become a dissident
360 M. Forman, One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest (Warner Brothers, 1975).
361 Electro Convulsive Therapy is a treatment, initially developed in the 1930s in which an electric current is
passedthrough the brain in order to produce an epileptic fit. There are a variety of hypothesise asto why
this reduce symptoms of severe mental illnesses. For more information on this treatment seeThe Royal
College of Psychiatrists online information about ECTat
http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/mentalhealthinfoforall/treatments/ect.aspx [accessed17 November 2010].
362 Wynn, Notes of a Non Conspirator, p. 30.
363 Academy Awards are often referred to by the nickname the 'Oscars'. BAFTAstands for the British
Academy of Film and Television Arts SeeOne Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest entry on the Internet Movie
Database (IMOB) at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0073486/awards (Accessed5 November 2010]; BAFTA
award listings for 1976, available at http://www.bafta.org/awards/film/nominations[?year=1976 [Accessed
5 November 2010].
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- was awarded the Best Actor BAFTA for Peter Barkworth who played the lead role.364Stoppard
also won The Writers Award at 1977 BAFTAs, which highlights not only the recognition of his
writing talent, but perhaps also the acclaim to which his politically motivated pieces had been
received by the critics.365His high profile, undoubtedly boosted by these awards, would also have
likely attracted crowds to his plays, something that would have further enabled discussion of
Soviet dissent.
The success of One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest in Britain exposed the public to the
potential abuse of psychiatric treatment and the horrific side-effects that it could have for those
involved. Whilst this film did not directly discuss Soviet abuses, there are clear parallels to this
treatment, and the reception of this film in popular culture undoubtedly impacted upon public
awareness of the potential of these abuses.
The cases of Grigorenko, Medvedev and Bukovsky, timed with the cultural discussion of
psychiatric abuse, led to a clear response from sections of British society to these horrific abuses.
A variety of human rights groups formed in Britain in the 1970s, specifically to campaign on behalf
of dissenters who had been subjected to psychiatric abuse. These groups played a substantial role
in informing the British public about the abuses, distributing information to politicians, journalists
and concerned individuals alike. Whilst these groups all had the same aim - to stop the abuse of
psychiatry in the Soviet Union - they all had distinctive approaches to this issue.
Medical and Scientific Committee for Soviet Jewry
The Medical and Scientific Committee for Soviet Jewry(MSCSJ) was formed in February
1972 at the invitation of a leading Jewish MP, Greville Janner.366Janner's work in supporting
Soviet Jewry groups is well documented in his memoirs To Life!; in which he describes his efforts
364BAFTAaward listings for 1977, available at
http://www.bafta.org/awards!television!nominations!?year=1977 [Accessed5 November 2010]. SeeT.
Stoppard, Every Good Boy Deserves Favour.
365BAFTAaward listings for 1977, available at
http://www.bafta.org!awards!television!nominations!?year=1977 [Accessed5 November 2010].
366Greville Janner Q.C.,MP is now Lord Janner of Braunstone after stepping down from the House of
Commons in 1997.
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and those of his wife Myra, in forming and sustaining groups that campaigned on behalf of
refuseniks.367 Janner's involvement in these groups often included no more than offering his name
in support of a campaign, raising the plight of refuseniks in Parliament, or utilising his prominent
position to invite concerned individuals to form groups.368 The MSCSJ was born out of an
invitation from Janner to an array of Jewish and non-Jewish doctors, scientists and medical
practitioners to form a committee to campaign on behalf of the refuseniks. This committee was
chaired by the psychiatrist, Professor Harold Merskey, who had already been allocated the role at
his late arrival to the initial meeting of the cornmlttee.t" Merskey attributes this to being due to
his prestigious position at the Maudsley hospital, London, which specialises in psychiatric research
and treatment of mental health conditions. Merskey contends that the Soviet authorities held
positions such as his in high regard, and it was thought that by making him the chairman, the
committee's protests would carry more weight with the Soviet hlerarchv."? Campaigns conducted
by individuals in respected scientific and medical positions should not be underestimated. Allan
Wynn, noted that:
Every Soviet bureaucrat lives in dread of committing an offence which can be brought home to
him. Paper is dangerous in the Soviet Union but it is also immensely important ...Letters which
come from scientific or official bodies have an even greater impact - they may never be answered
but they are rarely ignored. The effect is subtle and cumulative. The Soviet government craves
respectability - it knows how damaging its image of brutality and inhumanity is.371
The impact that these prominent individuals could have on the Soviet treatment of
dissidents was vast. Letters from official medical or scientific organisations were unlikely to have
gone unopened by the Soviet authorities, something that set them apart from human rights
organisations whose letters were doubtless completely ignored. The Soviet desire to maintain
367G.Janner, To Life! The Memoirs of Greville Janner (Stroud, 2006), pp. 231-246.
368For an example of Janner's parliamentary speeches regarding Soviet Jewry, seeJanner's speech in the
House of Commons, Foreign Affairs (East-West Relations)24 February 1976, Hansard, available at
http://hansard,millbanksystems,com/commons/1976/feb/24/foreign-affairs-east-west-
relations#SSCV0906PO19760224 HOC 323. For more on Janner's involvement in Anglo-Soviet Jewry
groups seeJanner, ToUfe], pp. 231-246.
369Telephone interview with Harold Merskey, 22 October 2010.
370Telephone interview with Harold Merskey, 22 October 2010.
371Wynn, Notes 0/ a Non Conspirator, p. 101
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links with scientific organisations gave these activists a clear advantage, something they sought to
exploit.
The initial aims of the committee are clearly set out in a document entitled 'First Report
of the Medical and Scientific Committee for Soviet Jewry'. This report highlights the individuals
that were involved from the formation of the group and outlines the methods of the committee.
It notes that the committee was concerned primarily with organising publicity for individual
scientists or doctors in the Soviet Union who were 'suffering at the hands of the Russians,.m This
involved sending letters to both the mainstream press and the more specialist scientific media
outlining the abuses and calling for support. This included letters published in The Lancet and The
British Journal of Psychiatry, two internationally respected medical publications; and references to
the work of the committee in The Times.m This would have undoubtedly improved the credibility
of the group, and spread their message across a wide professional audience of scientists,
psychiatrists and other medical practitioners alike. These letters were supplemented by articles
written for journals and newspapers on the abuses by members of the committee. Harold
Merskey was at the forefront of these publications, having articles published in The British Journal
of Psychiatry and The Journal of Medical Ethics on the political influence in the diagnosis of
sluggish schizophrenia and the need for political neutrality in dealing with issues regarding
medical ethics, particularly in the Soviet Union.374 The MSCSJalso aided publicity for the plight of
Soviet Jewry by assisting other campaigns, most notably those of the Women's Campaign for
Soviet Jewry (the 35's) who will be considered in depth in the final chapter of this thesis. These
372 'First Report of the Medical and Scientific Committee for Soviet Jewry', date of production unknown,
probably mid 1970s.Copy of report sent to author by Harold Merskey.
373 H. Merskey, 'Diagnosis of Schizophrenia', The Lancet, 9 December 1972, p. 1246; H. Merskey, 'Political
Dissenters in Mental Hospitals', The British Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 122 (1973) pp. 237-238; 'The Times
Diary, The Slow Shuffle of Democracy', The Times, 3 May 1974, p. 18; and 'Dr Shtern is given eight-year
sentence', The Times, 2 January 1975, p. 1.
374 Merskey and Shafran, 'Political Hazards in the Diagnosisof 'SluggishSchizophrenia", pp. 247-256; and H.
Merskey, 'Political neutrality and international cooperation in medicine', Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 4
(1978) pp. 74-77.
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efforts at developing publicity for the plight of Soviet dissenters was mainly through obtaining
signatures for prominent advertisements and petitions.m
This report also notes the support that the committee had from the 35's and other British
Jewish organisations from its formation, suggesting a link with the wider community supporting
Soviet-Jewry that was forming in Britain in the 1970s. Despite this common link, there were
disagreements between the MSCSJ and the 35's. In a letter to Doreen Gainsford, a leading
member of the 35's, Merskey criticised the fact that 35ers had taken Mrs Nashpits and Mrs
Tsitlionok, the wives of two refuseniks, to a demonstration outside the Home Office in London.
Members of the MSCSJhad requested that the 35's not protest on certain issues until the British
Dental Association had approached the Soviet Embassy in London at the behest of the MSCSJ.
Merskey felt that using these guests in this way was deeply damaging, and noted that the 35's
were good enough at demonstrating themselves to not need to use them in this manner.f" This
highlights the seemingly reflective nature of the MSCSJcompared to the 35's in this period. The
MSCSJappear to have had much more professional output than the 35's, and focused on building
up public information and the support of more established groups rather than the protesting and
more direct action of the Women's Campaign. This is perhaps due to the background of MSCSJ
members, and the professional connections that they were able to exploit. Whilst offering
support for the efforts of the 35's, it appears that they did not see eye-ta-eye on some aspects of
the 35's public demonstrations.
Although the MSCSJconcerned itself mainly with increasing publicity for the plight of the
refuseniks, it did also have a humanitarian element to its efforts.m The MSCSJwas involved in the
acquisition of specialist medical supplies which were unavailable in the Soviet Union for refuseniks
who needed treatment. In one case, Professor Alexander Lerner, a cybernetician based in
Moscow, received a small plastic net from the committee, which was needed in an operation on
375 'First Report of the Medical and Scientific Committee for Soviet Jewry'.
376 Letter from Harold Merskey to Doreen Gainsford, 19 March 1975,Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry
Archive, University of Southampton, Hartley Library SpecialCollections, (hereafter UofS) MS 254/1/3/4, 35's
administration file.
377 'First Report of the Medical and Scientific Committee for Soviet Jewry', p. 1.
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his gall bladder, but was not produced in a sufficient quality in the Soviet Union.378 This example
of the supply of medical equipment to Soviet Jewry perhaps suggests that the MSCSJ were in
some respects a humanitarian organisation, based around the foundations of a more traditional
human rights pressure group.
Whilst the MSCSJwas founded to campaign for refuseniks, it soon became an important
group in the campaign against Soviet psychiatric abuse. Through its interaction with refuseniks,
the issue of the political abuse of psychiatry came to the fore, something which was of much
interest to many of the committee's supporters given their scientific and medical backgrounds.
Merskey himself notes that he came into the field of Soviet psychiatric abuse indirectly,
something that is perhaps unusual given his professional background as a renowned
psychiatrist.m In telephone conversations with the famed Soviet Academician Veniamin Levich,
Merskey came across the case of Van Krylsky, a refusenik who had been threatened with
detention in a psikhushka by men in white coats. At the request of Krylsky, Merskey conducted a
short psychiatric diagnosis over the phone. This is something that he admits, on reflection, was a
very bold and somewhat careless move as it is very unusual to conduct a diagnosis without seeing
the patient in the flesh. Merskey recalls that he gave the impression that this was not a formal
diagnosis, but a statement that, given the evidence he had heard, Krylsky appeared not to suffer
from any mental deficiency.38o Interestingly, Merskey notes that this admission gave Krylsky a
sense of protection from the threat of forced psychiatric detention.381 This is perhaps due to
Krylsky attributing Merskey's comments that he appeared to be without psychiatric disorder as a
professional affirmation of his sanity. Whilst this is not to suggest that Krylsky either suffered or
did not suffer from a mental disorder, it does appear as if he felt this verbal confirmation from a
Western psychiatrist was enough to protect him from the Soviet psychiatric abuses. This can be
378 'Professor Lerner Receiveshis "Spare Part"', Pressrelease from Greville Janner (Undated), UofS,MS
254/1/2/53, Janner Papers.
379 Letter from Harold Merskey to Marie Girard, 9 January 2008, p. 1. Marie Girard is a French student based
in Pariswho had inquired about Merskey's work on Soviet psychiatric abuse. Copy of letter sent to author.
380 Letter from Harold Merskey to Marie Girard, 9 January 2008. p. 2; and telephone interview with Harold
Merskey, 22 October 2010.
381 Letter from Harold Merskey to Marie Girard, 9 January 2008. p. 2.
144
seen to be like the protection that Andrei Sakharov received from the Western knowledge of his
plight, meaning that the Soviet authorities could not use the full extent of their might against him
without flaring the attention of the West. Despite this feeling of protection, Krylsky did spend
time in a psychiatric institution against his will and was 'treated' with pyrexia-inducing
injections.382 Krylsky was later released, and allowed to emigrate to Israel in January 1974.383 The
MSCSJclaimed the improvement of Krylsky's position and the conditions of his treatment as one
of their main and definable achievements, further highlighting the humanitarian aspect of their
efforts.384
Krylsky's case is important in analysis of the work of the MSCSJ not only because it was
the first of several that the group became involved in, but because it highlighted the abuse of
psychiatry in the Soviet Union, and encouraged some MSCSJmembers to campaign against it. This
was to be of extreme importance, as some of these members, most notably Harold Merskey,
petitioned the Royal College to take a stand against the Soviet abuses. Merskey seconded an
important resolution of the Royal College in 1973 which condemned the Soviet abuses of
psychiatry, an action which was no doubt influenced by his earlier interaction with Krylsky's
case.38S Had he not taken such an interest in this case, he might not have leant his support to the
later Royal College resolution.
Whilst the MSCSJcannot be considered to have been a widespread campaign against the
political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union, it did engage key figures, such as Merskey, in
these areas. Indeed, the articles produced by Merskey are undoubtedly the most influential
activism conducted by the MSCSJ. This had a significant effect on the later campaigns against
psychiatric abuse from bodies such as the Royal College.
382 Pyrexia is the medical term for controlled hypothermia or fever. SeeE.N. Marieb, Human Anatomy and
Physiology, Sixth Edition (SanFrancisco,2004) p. 989; Letter from Harold Merskey to Marie Girard, 9
January 2008. p. 2; and 'First Report of the Medical and Scientific Committee for Soviet Jewry', p. 3.
383 For details on the caseof Jan Krylsky see Bloch and Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals, p. 369
384 'First Report of the Medical and Scientific Committee for Soviet Jewry', p. 3.
385 SeeB. Levin, 'Soviet Repression:Western Scientists are now at a crossroads of conscience', The Times, 7
May 1974, p. 14.
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Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals
The Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals386 was founded
in February 1971, and described by Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway as a 'small ad hoc research
group, composed mainly of psychiatrists, human rights experts and specialists in Soviet
affairs,.387It was initially founded in response to the Bukovsky Papers which had arrived in Britain
via France in late February 1971. Members of the Working Group translated these materials, and
distributed them to the wider press. The Working Group was formed primarily to spread
information about the political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union, and to use their influence
to change institutional policy from groups such as the Royal College and the WPA.
Prior to the Autumn of 1973, the vast majority of campaigns against the Soviet abuses
came from the Working Group, who concerned themselves with making the public aware of these
human rights violations. They did this through an array of articles that were published in the
medical and general press, and through the mobilisation of psychiatrists.388 Members of the
Working Group were also involved in the media, in which they discussed the position of Soviet
psychiatry. Professor Jenner, a member of the Working Group, appeared on the BBC Radio
programme 'Protest or Madness?' which discussed the available evidence regarding the
abuses.389
The early years of the Working Group are unclear, due perhaps in part to the ad hoc
nature in which the group operated, a phrase that is regularly used to describe this body. Indeed,
the manner in which the group operated goes some way to suggest why there are limited archival
materials from this organisation compared to some of its counterparts in this period. Peter
Reddaway certainly played a leading role in the group, with Dr Allan Wynn, the group's later
386 Referred to from here on as the 'Working Group', not to be confused with the 'Working Commission to
Investigate the Useof Psychiatry for Political Purposes', a Moscow based group of dissidents campaigning
against psychiatric abuse.
387 Bloch and Reddaway,Russia's Political Hospitals, p. 17.
388 Bloch and Reddaway,Russia's Political Hospitals p. 295. For an extensive list of these articles see Bloch
and Reddaway,Russia's Political Hospitals, p. 484 endnote 47.
389 Broadcast on BBCRadio 3 on 17 January 1973. Bloch and Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals p. 295.
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Chairman, noting that he had kept the group active 'at the cost of sacrificing much of his time and
energy,.390The Working Group was comprised of an array of psychiatrists and other concerned
individuals, notably Gery low-Beer, Sidney Bloch and Christine Shawwho were particularly active
in the groups work.391
In June 1982,Wynn took over the position of Chairman from Reddaway, who became its
Vice-Chairman.392Wynn's autobiographical account, Notes of a Non Conspirator: Working with
Russian Dissidents documents the period 1978 to 1983, and includes details of the activities of the
Working Group and its relationship with the Royal College. In this period the Working Group
pressured the Soviet authorities to conform to the 1977 WPA resolution condemning the political
abuse of psychiatry; an impossible task as this was something that it did not want to do. He notes
that the Working Group devoted most of its time in this period 'accumulating, assessing and
correlating 'objective' evidence on the abuse', a notably empirical approach.!" This renewed
need to collate information on the psychiatric abuses in the Soviet Union was probably brought
about by the formation of the WPA review committee at the congress in Honolulu in 1977. This
committee was formed to investigate reports of psychiatric abuse, and as such the sharing of
information on abusesbecame an integral part of the operation of the Working Group. Given the
manner in which the Working Group collected information, it is perhaps of little surprise that it
built up strong links with RoyalCollege, particularly its SpecialCommittee on the Political Abuse of
Psychiatry (SCPAP),which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
The main output of the Working Group was an irregular news bulletin which it produced
from 1977 onwards. These news bulletins contained an impressive amount of information on the
abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union, and were produced with 'extraordinary care and
attention' by their principal editors, Peter Reddaway and Christine Shaw.394They extensively
390Wynn, Notes of a Non Conspirator, p. 99.
391 Ibid,p.99.
392 International Association on the Political Use of Psychiatry Information Bulletin, No.4 (Englishedition),
June 1982, p.7.
393 Wynn, Notes of a Non Conspirator, p. 105.
394 Wynn, Notes of a Non Conspirator, p. 116.
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outline casesof psychiatric abuse, discussingtheir background and offering reasonsfor the Soviet
authorities action against them. For example, in the Working Group's News Bulletin No.3, 44
casesof those interned in psychiatric institutions are listed, including details of their professions,
background and addresses of their either their guardians, partners, or parents in the Soviet
Union.395 These publications also list the addresses of national psychiatric bodies and anti-
psychiatric abuse organisations in length. These are broken down by country and include details
for groups such as Amnesty International, the WPA, and the Royal College. Interestingly, this
breakdown by country also includes a section on the Soviet Union, giving details for leading
psychiatrists such as Snezhnevsky, lunts and Morozov, and the addresses of prison hospitals in
leningrad, Kazanand Smolensk.396 The intention of the Working Group supplying these details is
clear: to allow others to write letters of protest and support. The effectiveness of appeals to
organisations in both the Soviet Union and the West on behalf of an individual dissident is made
explicit in Working Group news bulletins. Earlier in the June 1977 news bulletin, letters to
Aleksandr Podrabinek from 'colleagues in medicine and public health' were requested as a matter
of urgency.m The Working Group were clearly noting that letters from medical organisations or
individual doctors in the West sent directly to Soviet psychiatrists had much effect. The inclusion
of these details was clearly in an attempt to spur individuals who had received this bulletin to put
pen to paper and write to these organisations and individuals.
This list of addresses and contact details for organisations provided in these bulletins.
would have proved invaluable for organisations such as Amnesty International, who could
forward this information onto its local bodies to use in their campaigns. The list of victims of
psychiatric abuse also contained references to casesthat had been submitted to the WPA review
committee, suggesting that the Working Group had good links with the WPA and its member
395 WorkingGroupon the Internmentof Dissentersin Mental Hospitals,News Bulletin onPsychiatric Abuse
in the Soviet Union, No.3, October1980,pp.4-14.
396 WorkingGroupon the Internmentof Dissentersin Mental Hospitals,News Bulletin on Psychiatric Abuse
in the Soviet Union, No.1, June1977,pp. 16-19.
397 WorkingGroupon the Internmentof Dissentersin Mental Hospitals,News Bulletin on Psychiatric Abuse
in the Soviet Union, No.1, June1977,p. 11.
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organisatlons.l'" This was important to include in this publication as it showed that these cases
were receiving attention from international psychiatric organisations who were concerned about
these abuses.
Alongside these details of victims of psychiatric abuse were lengthy commentaries on the
international protests against psychiatric abuses. For example, News Bulletin No.1 devoted seven
pages to reporting the WPA Congress in Honolulu, a substantial amount given the length of this
publication.399This report outlined how the Soviet authorities had tried to manipulate the WPA
for their own ends, and what its attitude towards this congress was. It also outlined the procedure
of the WPA General Assembly, detailing how the WPA operated for those who were unaware of
its practices. This can be seen to be in an attempt to educate people in the workings of the WPA
so that attempts to influence its output could be efficiently targeted.
An interesting feature of the Working Group news bulletins is the prominence of their
medical panel on the front page. Each news bulletin lists, in full, the psychiatrists who comprised
the group's medical panel, with earlier issues detailing the full medical qualifications of each
member. The list of the group's medical panel also appears on the front of some of its other
publications, including the 1980 report Soviet Opponents of Political Psychiatry in the USSR.400 This
impressive list of medical acronyms and capital letters takes up a sizeable section of the front
page of these publications, and nods towards the medical expertise and academic qualification of
the group. This is arguably in an attempt to reinforce that the material presented in the Working
Group publications was reliable due to the reputation and expertise of those associated with it. It
could also be argued that this was to present the Working Group as a concerned scientific
organisation rather than a typical human rights group. This is supported by the distinct lack of
398 Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals, News Bulletin on Psychiatric Abuse
in the Soviet Union, No.3, (October 1980), pp. 4-14.
399 Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals, News Bulletin on Psychiatric Abuse
in the Soviet Union, No.1, June 1977, pp. 3-9.
400 SeeWorking Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals, News Bulletin on Psychiatric
Abuse in the Soviet Union, No.1, June 1977; Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental
Hospitals, News Bulletin on Psychiatric Abuse in the Soviet Union, No.3, October 1980; Working Group on
the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals, The Political Abuse 0/ Psychiatry in the Soviet Union
(London, 1977); and Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals, Soviet Opponents
0/ Political psychiatry in the USSR (London, 1980).
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reference to Peter Reddaway, someone who played a key role in the workings of the Working
Group, perhaps because he was not a psychiatrist and primarily recognised for his human rights
work.
Alongside these bulletins, the Working Group also published special reports on psychiatric
abuse in the Soviet Union. The first of these special reports was a pamphlet entitled, The
Internment of Soviet Dissenters in Mental Hospitals. This was released in 1971 shortly after the
Bukovsky papers had been received and translated by the Working Group. This pamphlet
contained remarkably detailed reports on individual casesof psychiatric abuse, including General
pyotr Grigorenko, Natalya Gorbanevskaya and Olga lofe. It also contained the text of Bukovsky's
appeal to Western psychiatrists as a set of appendices.401 The level of detail given in this
publication is remarkable given that it was published in 1971, some five years before significant
action from either the Royal College or the WPA on the matter. This demonstrates the quality of
information that this group had access to, most likely through the personal connections of
prominent members such as Reddaway. This illustrates both the expertise that the Working
Group had amongst its membership and the links it held with the Soviet Union to attain this
information. Another example of the Working Group's special publications is The Political Abuse
of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union, published to coincide with the WPA congress in Honolulu in
1977. This report also demonstrates the expertise present in the Working Group, with this
publication more closely resembling an academic paper rather than a press release from a human
rights group.402This academic influence can be clearly seen in both the terminology and linguistic
style used and the extended use of references throughout.
Alongside the publication of news bulletins and other materials, the Working Group was
also involved in organising public meetings of psychiatrists and concerned individuals. At the WPA
congress in Honolulu, the Working Group, in collaboration with a French organisation, arranged a
401Mee,The Internment of Soviet Dissenters in Mental Hospitals.
402WorkingGroupon the Internmentof Dissentersin MentalHospitals,The Political Abuse of Psychiatry in
the Soviet Union (London,1977).
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'Special Extra-Congress Meeting on Psychiatric Abuse of Political Purposes' .403 This was organised
to coincide with the international gathering of psychiatrists at the WPA congress, attempting to
gain as large an audience as possible. This event sought to 'inform both congress participants and
the press about the issues' regarding the Soviet abuse of psvcblatrv.'?' This can be seen as an
effort by the Working Group to not only influence the direction of the WPA and its participants,





Image 2.1- 'The Fight Against Psychiatric Abuse in the USSR'. Poster advertising the joint public
event held by the Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals and the
Campaign Against Psychiatric Abuse (CAPA) in London on 15 May 1980,
403 Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals, News Bulletin on Psychiatric Abuse
in the Soviet Union, No.1, June 1977, p. 8. The name of this French Committee is not given in this bulletin,
although is noted as being headed by Dr J.-P.Descombey, and being organised by the group's secretary
Martine LeGuay.
404 Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals, News Bulletin on Psychiatric Abuse
in the Soviet Union, No.1, June 1977, p. 8.
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Another example of a public event orchestrated by the Working Group occurred in
london on 15 May 1980. This was a series of three events held at the Central Hall, Westminster.
The first of these was a public hearing on the cases of Vyacheslav Bakhmin, leonard Ternovsky
and Viktor Nekipelov. This was effectively a kind of public trial of these dissidents, at which
translations of letters of support from concerned Soviet citizens were read.40sAlongside these
statements, evidence was given at this 'trial' by General Petro Grigorenko, Vladimir Bukovsky and
Aleksandr Voloshanovich, three influential figures regarding the Soviet abuse of psychiatry.406 The
event was chaired by louis Blom-Cooper, a.c., a reputable barrister who was keenly involved in
supporting victims of human rights abuses in the Soviet Union. The second event was a public
meeting at which several renowned figures spoke on the Soviet abuses, including Grigorenko,
Voloshanovich, the Swedish psychiatrist Dr Harold Blomberg, and the former labour MP Eric
Moonman. Thirdly, this day concluded with the signing of three open letters to prominent figures
in the Soviet Union, registering concern at the plight of Bakhmin, Ternovsky and Nekipelov, and
calling for their release.?" A publicity poster for this event produced by the Working Group can be
seen in Image 2.1.
This event, and the array of renowned figures that attended drew the attention of the
media, with The Times reporting particularly on the involvement of Grigorenko.408 The prominent
scientific journal Nature also ran a short report on the mock trial, noting that the Soviet
40S Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals, 'Report on London Meetings on
Soviet Psychiatric Abuse, lS May 1980', RoyalCollege of Psychiatrists, Special Committee on the Unethical
Practice of Psychiatry: Soviet Union Papers (hereafter RCPsych,SCOUPP:Soviet Union) The SCPAPwas later
renamed SCOUPP,and archival material for this committee is held under its later name. Translated
statements by Irina Grivnina, Yury Yarym-Agayev, Lyudmila Ternovskyaya, FelixSerebrov and 23 other
citizens, and Serebrov, Sofia Kalistratova and Maria Petrenko-Podyapolskaya Uointly) were read at this
public hearing and are listed in full in RCPsych,SCOUPP:Soviet Union.
406 'The Fight against Psychiatric Abuse in the USSR',RCPsych,SCOUPP:Soviet Union. Voloshanovich was a
Soviet psychiatrist who had emigrated from the Soviet Union and had been heavily involved with the
Moscow 'Working Commission', who reported incidence of psychiatric abuse.
407 Working Group on the Internment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals, 'Report on london Meetings on
Soviet Psychiatric Abuse, lS May 1980', RCPsych,SCOUPP:Soviet Union. These open letters were sent to 1)
the Moscow City Procurator, 2) the head of the Vladimir Region KGB,and 3) FelixSerebrov of the Moscow
Working Commission, notifying him of the meeting and the two previous letters. Eachletter received over
100 signatures.
408 'General Grigorenko tells of Soviet wave of arrests', The Times, 16May 1980, p. 7.
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authorities appeared to be sensitive towards allegations of psychiatric abuse.409 However,
developments in the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the boycott of the West German athletics
team from the 1980 Moscow Olympics dominated the news on the day following this event,
perhaps diluting the media's reporting of it.410
This all day event brought together several different groups and individuals concerned
with the political abuse of psychiatry, along with those who had first hand experience of these
abuses. The aims of such an event are difficult to define, but it could be argued that it sought to
form both a media spectacle so that reports on the psychiatric abuse were made in the national
press, and to galvanise those in Britain who worked to put pressure on the Soviet authorities.
Whilst this event did not produce the media spectacle that it originally sought to produce, owing
in part to other international events, it brought activists together. In the context of the Cold War
this was increasingly important, and this event may have reignited a sense of passion in this work
in those who attended. Whilst the Working Group did not manage to gain the attention of the
media in the same manner as other organisations working in this period, such as the 35's, there
was little else that it could do to gain public attention given its remit and reputation. By working
with other concerned organisations in this manner, the group was able to gain public attention
about psychiatric abuse, and to present its information to a wider audience. This approach only
worked due to the wider network of human rights activists that had developed in the course of
the 1970s, and allowed the Working Group to participate in public protests whilst maintaining
their academic credibility.
Campaign Against Psychiatric Abuse
The events of May 1980 were organised by the Working Group in conjunction with the
Campaign Against Psychiatric Abuse (CAPA). CAPA was an off-shoot of the Working Group that
409 V. Rich, 'Soviet Psychiatry: Mock Trial In london', Nature, Vol. 28S, 22 May 1980, p. 185.
410 SeeN. Davies, 'Germans to stay away from games', Daily Mirror, 16 May 1980, p. 2; D. Howell, 'The real
heart of Britain', Daily Mirror, 16 May 1980, p. 31; M. Hornsby, 'Mr Muskie dismissesAfghan offer on Soviet
Withdrawal', The Times, 16 May 1980, p.1; and P.Clough, 'West Germans decide to boycott Olympics', The
Times, 16 May 1980, p.l.
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formed in September 1975 to take a more direct approach to the campaign against Soviet abuses.
Chaired by Dr Henry Dicks, it became actively involved in public events and demonstrations. CAPA
was largely driven by Victor Fainberg, a dissident who had been incarcerated in a psikhushka prior
to his exile to Britain in October 1974.411 Fainberg took an active role in the British movement
campaigning against the psychiatric abuses, and went on later to marry Marina Voikhanskaya, a
former Soviet psychiatrist who had emigrated to Britian. Voikhanskaya and Fainberg's marriage
was widely reported in the British press due to their background, described by some as being like
a tragic Russian novel. Malcolm Stuart wrote a lengthy piece on their story in The Daily Mail,
which referred to them as 'the couple that beat Russia'smind-benders'.412New Psychiatry also
wrote at length about the background of Voikhanskaya and Fainberg, taking a more scientific
approach to their story.413
Voikhanskaya worked in the Leningrad Ordinary Psychiatric Hospital (OPH) when she
became aware of the political abuse of psychiatry, seeing that the internment of the artist Vury
Ivanov was unjust as she felt he did not suffer from mental illness.414 She personally intervened in
the casesof Ivanov and Fainberg, offered her personal support to them, and actively prevented
the harshest of psychiatric treatments.i" She was ostracised by other psychiatrists at the
Leningrad OPHfor her involvement with these dissenters, and for her wider activity in the human
rights movement, and in April 1975 she emigrated to the United Kingdom. This emigration was
not as smooth as she expected, with her nine year old son Misha being refused permission to join
her abroad, something that she felt was a punishment directly related to her comments on Soviet
psychiatry made after her emigration.416
411 Bloch and Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals, p. 328.
412 M. Stuart, 'Reunited - the couple that beat Russia's mind-benders', The Daily Mail, 14 April 1975, p. 19.
413 S. Shafar, 'The Disease of Dissent', New Psychiatry, 17 July 1975 pp. 12-13.
414 Bloch and Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals, p. 231. For more on Voikhanskaya's experiences in the
Soviet Union see M. Voikhanskaya, 'Psychiatry betrayed', New Psychiatry, 21 July 1975, pp. 10-11.
415 Bloch and Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals, p. 289.
416 P. Nobile, 'From lonely Exile, Soviet Dissident Marina Voikhanskaya Begs, 'Please Give Me Back My Son",
People, Vol. 9, No.17, 1 May, 1978, available at:
http://www.people.com!people!archive!article!0 ..20070731.00.html(Accessed 8 October 2010),
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Image 2.2 CAPA Misha Voikhanskaya campaign leaflet, Date approximately early 1976.
CAPAcampaigned explicitly for Misha to be reunited with his mother, gaining the support
of a number of notable figures including the playwright Tom Stoppard and the musician Yehudi
Menuhin. Misha was eventually allowed to emigrate from the Soviet Union in April 1979, along
with his grandmother leah Friedlender, and join his mother in Britain.417 Misha's emigration was
widely reported in the British press. Interestingly, his case was used by Michael Cummings, a
cartoonist for the Daily Express, to attack James Callaghan as being controlled by communists.
Image 2.3 satirises Misha's arrival in Britain, being highly critical of Callaghan's links to
communists. That Misha's case is being used in such a manner illustrates that it would have been
well known amongst Daify Express readers in order for this cartoon to make sense.
417 For details of this, see CAPAnewsletter May 1979,CAPA Collection, IISG.
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Image 2.3 "Welcome I But you must be very sure of a victory for Mrs Thatcherl", Michael
Cummings, Daily Express, 27 April 1979
CAPA's aims were much like most human rights groups working for Soviet dissidents in
Britian in the 1970s, essentially to do all they could to put an end to the Soviet abuses. In their
campaign material they set themselves the following four main aims:
1. To investigate the abuse of psychiatry for the purposes of State wherever it may
occur
2. To publicise the use of psychiatric methods for political repression
3. To bring about the release of sane persons interned in mental hospitals because
of their political, ethical or religious beliefs.
4. To eradicate these evil practices completely and forever.?"
CAPA collated information on the political abuse of psychiatry, and publicised this
material through a variety of media outlets and at public events. Publicity was essential to their
campaign, noting in a campaign leaflet that 'CAPA members assist in the vitally important task of
making the public aware of the political abuse of psychiatry and the plight of individual prisoners
of conscience in psychiatric hospltals'i'" This publicity leaflet also illustrated the role that CAPA
members felt they occupied. At the top of this leaflet, as shown in Image 2.4 is a picture of
418 Membership leaflet enclosed in CAPANews, No.2, Spring 1977, CAPA collection, IISG
419 'CAPA NEEDSYOU!!' Campaign Against Psychiatric Abuse publicity leaflet, date unknown. CAPA
collection IISG.
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workers assisting people out of a prison. This image clearly illustrates the active role that CAPA
members felt they played, in literally dragging dissidents out of prison and comforting them. This
extremely proactive approach to their campaigns can also be seen in the strikingly bold aims
noted by the organisation, which are clearly highly ambitious. These two examples are indicative
of the more publicly demonstrative approach that CAPA took to its campaigning compared to the
Working Group.
THREE OU - BUT LOTS MORE TO GO!
. .....
CAPA NEEDS YOU II
CAMPAIGN AGAINST PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE
Image 2.4 CAPA NEEDSYOUI! Campaign Against Psychiatric Abuse publicity leaflet.
Other public events conducted by CAPA included a 48 hour vigil of fasting and prayer on
14 July 1978, sponsored walks, and more conventional demonstrations at Soviet exhtblttons."?
CAPA also ran a flying squad of activists in London who were ready to demonstrate at very short
notice.42l The flying squad were involved in protests outside Wembley Stadium during a display by
Soviet gymnasts, and at an performance by a Soviet singer at Wigmore Hall, where Victor
Fainberg took to the stage before the encore began and gave a speech on Soviet psychiatric
abuses.?" The Working Group would have been unable to conduct such events given the
academic and scientific nature of its working and its reliance on the reputation of these
420 For details of these events see CAPA newsletter, June/July 1978,CAPA Collection, IISG; CAPA newsletter
April/May 1978; and CAPA Newsletter, May 1979, CAPA Collection, IISG.
421 CAPA newsletter, September 1978, CAPA Collection, IISG.
422 CAPA newsletter, February 1979, CAPA Collection, IISG.
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individuals. CAPA therefore made the most of these opportunities to highlight the psychiatric
abuses in the Soviet Union, using more traditional demonstration techniques.
On 20 December 1980, the Working Group joined with activists from France, Germany,
Switzerland and the Netherlands to form the International Association on the Political Abuse of
Psychiatry (IAPUP).423CAPA later joined IAPUP in the summer of 1982, reuniting with the Working
Group.424 Allan Wynn attributes the formation of this organisation to the efforts of Peter
Reddaway in taking the initiative bringing together European groups working on the issue of
Soviet psychiatric abuse so that they could speak with a more united voice.425 IAPUP still exists
today as an organisation promoting the ethical practice of psychiatry, and is now known as GIP.426
IAPUP was not an international organisation in the traditional sense. Instead, it was simply a
confederation of concerned bodies; something which had a significant effect on the workings of
the group. IAPUP meetings were notably lengthy for several reasons. Firstly, the array of different
languages meant that communication between parts of the organisation was often slower than it
would have been within a national body. Secondly, because there was no need to reach
consensus amongst all affiliate members of IAPUP, meetings essentially revolved around the need
to persuade others, which led to lengthy and sometimes heated dlscusslons.f"
The news bulletins started by the Working Group in 1977 were replaced with IAPUP
bulletins, with the group producing a more regular publication from May 1981 onwards. The
decision to combine the Working Group's news bulletin with IAPUP was communicated to its
supporters in a letter dated June 1981. As well as notifying this merger, this letter is also full of
thanks for the financial support given to the Working Group from its members.428 The IAPUP
423 Van Voren, On Dissidents and Madness, p. 44; and IAPUPInformation Bulletin No.1 (May 1981). The
founding organisations that merged to form IAPUPwere the SwissAssociation against Abuse of Psychiatry
for Political Purposes, the Working Group, the Committee of French Psychiatrists against the Useof
psychiatry for Political Purposes, the German Association against Political Abuse of Psychiatry, and the
International Podrabinek fund (Netherlands).
424 L. Jacob, 'Letter to CAPAmembers and friends' August 1982, CAPACollection, IISG.
425 Wynn, Notes 0/ a Non Conspirator, p. 114.
426For more information on GIP,see http://www.gip-global.org/ (Accessed30 December 2010).
427Van Voren, On Dissidents and Madness, p. 63.
428Letter to Supporters of the Working Group from Peter Reddaway and Ian Forster, a member of the
Working Group, dated June 1981, RCPsych,SCOUPP:Soviet Union.
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bulletins contained more in the way of up to date information than the Working Group bulletins,
producing a piece that was more akin to traditional reports from human rights organisations.
However, apart from direct reference to the activity of human rights groups in continental
Europe, and reports on the activities of the constituent bodies of IAPUP, there is little difference
between the Working Group bulletins and the first set of IAPUP bulletins. This is perhaps due to
the fact that Reddaway and Christine Shaw continued their work on the Working Group bulletins
into the IAPUP bulletins.429 The bulletins continued to outline the latest information received on
cases of psychiatric abuse within the Soviet Union, and the response of international
organisations such as the WPA to the abuses. The most notable difference about these bulletins
compared to those of the Working Group is the reporting of these issues from a pan-European
position rather than solely from a British perspective. This illustrates the shifted base of support
from these two organisations. By the 1980s, IAPUP was better positioned to place pressure on
international organisations such as the WPA than national organisations could ever be.
After the formation of IAPUP in 1980, the efforts of the Working Group did not cease. The
efforts of the Working Group were regularly reported in a dedicated section of the IAPUP bulletin
which discussed the activity of its regional members. From 1980 to 1983, these bulletins stress
that the role of the Working Group was mainly to increase publicity of the abuses in the Soviet
Union through articles in the mainstream and scientific press, and appearances on television
documentaries.430 The Working Group also became particularly involved in highlighting the abuse
of two Soviet miners Alexei Nikitin and Vladimir Klebanov, and urged the National Union of
Miners (NUM) to become involved in supporting this case.?' Given the power that the NUM held
in the 1980s, culminating in the nationwide miners strike from 1984-85, this was perhaps a
429 The editorship of both Working Group and IAPUPbulletins are not mentioned in the publications
themselves, although Allan Wynn suggeststhat the reason for the high quality of IAPUPbulletins from their
origin is due to the 'extraordinary care and attention devoted to them by the principal editors, Peter
Reddaway, and later, Dr Christine Shaw'. (Wynn, Notes of a Non Conspirator, p. 116.) Given the similarity in
style between the Working Group and IAPUPbulletins, and the involvement of both Shaw and Reddaway in
the Working Group, one can assume that they were involved in both publications.
430 SeeIAPUPInformation Bulletin, No.3 (English edition), March 1982; IAPUPInformation Bulletin, No.4
(Englishedition), June 1982, p.7; and IAPUPInformation Bulletin, No.5 (English edition), October 1982, p. 9.
431 IAPUPInformation Bulletin, No.2 (English edition), October 1981, p. 11.
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shrewd move by the Working Group, hoping to gain a widespread audience for these abuses
through the trade union movement.
From 1983 to 1985, reporting of the work of constituent members of IAPUPceases to
appear in its bulletins. Arguably, this was initially due to the AUSNP'swithdrawal from the WPA in
1983, which prompted IAPUPto focus their attentions on the implications of this event rather
than the work of their constituent members. The Working Group responded to the AUSNP's
withdrawal from the WPAwith the following statement given by Allan Wynn,
TheWorking Group seesthe move asa tacit admission that political psychiatry has been practiced
in the USSRand asa sign that the new Kremlin leadership may have taken the first steps to
abolish this perversion of medicine. The Group believes that the process of abolition will take
place gradually and unobtrusively and will take some time asstructural and personnel changes
will be necessary.It hopes that when the process is complete, the AUSNPwill be re-admitted to
the WPA.432
This statement clearly signifies that the Working Group considered the AUSNP's
withdrawal as a sign that the political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union was coming to an
end. The change of political leadership after the death of Brezhnev in 1982 was seen to have
prompted this change. Much like the exchange of Bukovsky in 1976, this withdrawal was also
taken as a sign that psychiatric abuses had occurred. Importantly, the Working Group statement
recognises that there were an array of bureaucratic changes needed in the Soviet Union to fully
eradicate this form of abuse, and that the AUSNPshould be welcomed back into the WPA once
these changes had taken place. This illustrates that the Working Group wanted Soviet psychiatry
to be represented and involved in international movements, arguably hoping that this withdrawal
would be the start of a new period of Soviet psychiatry.
After 1983, the activity of the Working Group clearly receded. It appears to have
maintained its relationship with the SCPAP,sending information to the committee on 10 January
and 26 February 1984, but other than this its activism ceases.433This decline in activism was
432 Wynn, Notes of a Non Conspirator, p. 121.
433 See Letter to Peter Sainsbury from Fiona Anderson dated 26 January 1984, RCPsych, SCOUPP: Soviet
Union; and Letter to Peter Sainsbury from Fiona Anderson dated 10 February 1984, RCPsych, SCOUPP:
Soviet Union.
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arguably due to the fact that other organisations, such as the Royal College and the WPA had
recognised the abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union and were now working to combat it. After
the AUSNPwithdrew from the WPA in 1983, there was little that organisations such as the
Working Group could do to speed this process up other than maintaining links with organisations
and sharing information. Indeed, after the WPA congress in Vienna in 1983, the purpose of the
Working Group had ceased to exist. Reddaway's emigration to the United States in 1985
effectively brought an end to the Group. His efforts had kept the organisation alive in the mid-
1970s, and although he was very rarely mentioned in the Working Group publications, it is clear
that he was the major driving force behind the group's work.
Campaigns for individual dissidents
IMIR BUKOVSKY MUST or DIE
Image 2.5 - Committee for the Release of Vladimir Bukovsky. 'Vladimir Bukovsky Must Not Die
- Campaign Leaflet'
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One interesting aspect of the British response to Soviet psychiatric abuse are the sporadic
groups formed to gather support for one particular dissident. The Committee for the Release of
Vladimir Bukovsky is a good example of this. This committee formed in 1971 after Bukovsky's
appeal about psychiatric abuse was sent to the West. This committee, which had links to Amnesty
International, essentially formed to raise public awareness about Bukovsky's plight in the Soviet
Union, and was a vehicle with which to unite those who protested on his behalf. The campaign
itself was led by David Markham, the English actor, who also played an active role in CAPA.434 The
Committee for the Release of Bukovsky managed to draw a number of prominent cultural figures
from British society, including Dame Peggy Ashcroft, Eva Figes, Iris Murdoch and 22 members of
the Royal Shakespeare Company as supporting petitioners to the campaign.435 The support of
these cultural figures in these campaigns was significant, as it not only lended their personal
reputations to the campaign itself but it greatly raised the profile of the dissident in question. A
similar tactic was carried out by the Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry (the 35's) and other
Jewish groups in their campaign on behalf of Anatoly Shcharansky. In 1977, these Jewish groups
took out a full page advertisement on the 6 October copy of The Times, in which nearly two
thousand prominent citizens had signed their public support to a campaign for his release.436
Another interesting aspect about campaigns for individual dissidents that were subjected
to psychiatric abuse is how they could bring together all different aspects of the human rights
movement in Britain. The campaign for Dr Semyon Gluzman, for example, brought together a
variety of different British human rights groups and activists. Gluzman was a Soviet psychiatrist
who was sentenced to seven years of hard labour and three years of exile for his stand against
psychiatric abuse.?' He wrote a highly critical report on the psychiatric diagnosis of General Petro
Grigorenko and Leonid Plyushch, and co-authored 'A Manual on Psychiatry for Dissenters' with
434 Committee for the Releaseof Vladimir Bukovsky, 'Vladimir Bukovsky Must Not Die', MRC,
MSS.34/4/1/USSR/17.
435 Committee for the Releaseof Vladimir Bukovsky, 'Vladimir Bukovsky Must Not Die', MRC,
MSS.34/4/1/USSR/17. Date of publication unknown, presumed sometime between February and December
1975.
436 See.Gerlis, Those Wonderful Women in Black, p. 100.
437 For details on Gluzman's activities see Bloch and Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals, pp. 234-238.
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Vladimir Bukovsky. This manual on psychiatry circulated widely in samizdat and gave explicit
information on how dissidents could defend themselves against accusations of insanity whilst in a
psikhushka.438
Amnesty International, CAPA,the 35's and the Working Group sponsored a meeting at
Conway Hall, Holborn, london in November 1979 that called for freedom for all victims of Soviet
psychiatric abuse under the banner of 'Freedom for Gluzman' as shown in Image 2.6. The
coordinated involvement of these groups is perhaps unsurprising; Amnesty, CAPA and the
Working Group all had clear concerns about the psychiatric abuses. The involvement of the 35's
is, on face value, more unclear. This can be attributed to two factors. Firstly, the fact that Gluzman
is Jewish meant that the 35's felt a connection for religious reasons. Secondly, there was a good
working relationship between Bukovsky, one of the speakers at this event, and the 35's. Bukovsky
became involved with the 35's campaign that called for athletes to boycott the 1980 Olympic
games in Moscow and may have subsequently become involved in their other campaigns.439 It is
also interesting to note the involvement of prominent individuals from human rights groups, such
as Sidney Bloch and Marina Voikhanskaya from the Working Group and David Markham from
CAPAtook such a prominent, and shared role in speaking at this event. This meeting, and others
like it, brought these people into a working relationship with other groups, such as the 35's and
Amnesty. The way in which these groups operated together on the Bukovsky and Gluzman
campaigns is indicative of the wider network of Soviet human rights activism present in Britain in
this period.
438 Wynn, Notes of a Non Conspirator, p. 31-32, 88. A copy of the Manual on Psychiatry for Dissenters is
available [in Russian] at http://antology.igrunov.ru/authors/bukovsky/psychiatr.html(Accessed 8 October
2010), and in an English translation as Appendix I in H. Fireside, Soviet Psychoprisons (Toronto, 1979) pp. 92-
118.






Image 2.6 -Freedom for Gluzman: Freedom for all victims of the abuse of psychiatry in the USSR
- public meeting leaflet (Date of publication unknown. probably October 1979).
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PUBL1C MEETING
Centrdl Hall, W tIt'llnstElr
20 pm SAturd,av. 27th NOYtMW
AdmlWQn 15p
Rb R. Ollirman. NfU*') 1ftlfrnal"irQlOt urn
Image 2.7 - Freedom for Bukovsky and Gluzman. Freedom for all victims of politico-psychiatric
repression (Date of publication unknown. probably November 1976).
Another example of this networking of groups can be seen in an earlier gathering, which
called for freedom for both Gluzman and Bukovsky as shown in Image 2.7. This meeting was
primarily organised by Amnesty International in collaboration with a variety of other smaller
groups. These groups are vastly different in size, scope and aims. They range from Amnesty
International to the Committee for the Releaseof Vladimir Bukovsky, a much smaller single issue
group. Also included in this list are several overtly politically motivated groups {London Liberal
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Party, Young liberals, and an array of localised london labour Parties} and a religious
organisation (Christian Prisoners Release International). This assortment of groups appears to be
deeply unwieldy, given different political and institutional motives. This array of different
thoughts, ideologies and directions can also be seen in the impressive list of prominent individuals
that supported this meeting, coming from diverse religious and cultural backgrounds. These
ranged from the comedian Spike Milligan, the Bishop of Southwark, Mervyn Stockwood and
several MPs from differing parties. Although there were an array of individuals, it is clear that if
one could attribute an overall ideology to those involved with these events it would be left of
centre. The involvement of figures such as the renowned Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm and
the Marxist political scientist Ralph Miliband alongside an array of liberal and labour groups
highlight the left-wing heart of these campaigns. However, the diverse background of these
supporters suggeststhat the unifying concern of these individuals and groups was human rights,
and an anxiety about the life of a particular individual. Although this is perhaps an obvious point
to raise, it is important to note given the context of the Cold War. Human rights groups in this
period were open to accusations of ideological and anti-Soviet bias, and in some cases even
accusedof inventing dissidents in order to attack the Soviet Union. For example, Peter Reddaway
was accused by the journalist D. A. N. Jones of inventing the dissident Andrei Amalrik, claiming
that there was no proof of his existence. This is something that Reddaway 'took him to task' over,
proving Amalrik's existence through personal correspondence, and was later confirmed by
Amalrik's emigration in 1976.440 These predominantly left-wing campaigns show the discontent
with Soviet Socialismthat was present in Britain in the 1970s, and the concern about the abuse of
human rights.
When the cooperation evident in these public events is taken into context with the
correspondence and personal links between these groups and individuals, it is clear that there
was a set of entrenched links between these human rights activists. Whilst this thesis has set out
the activities of each organisation as distinct and separate from other organisations in order to
440 See D.A.N. Jones 'Siberian Trip', The Spectator, 26 November 1970, p.843. and Interview with Peter
Reddaway, 5 July 2010.
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create a narrative that is easy to follow, this is a simplistic approach that does not fully account
for the overlapping between these organisations. The approach taken by this chapter has sought
to introduce the main framework of the British response to the political abuse of psychiatry in the
Soviet Union, within which these interrelations can be seen. Indeed, it would be impossible to
introduce the multifaceted relationship of these British groups without covering them separately.
The one-off events for Bukovsky and Gluzman noted above are among the most explicit
demonstration of these links. However, there are more subtle areas where the activities of
different organisations overlap. The activism of individuals such as Peter Reddaway, Gery Low-
Beer, Sidney Bloch, Harold Merskey and Vladimir Bukovsky, as discussed above, created explicit
links between human rights organisations. The work of these individuals, and the overlapping
influences of British human rights groups means that contrary to the segmented approach that
this piece might have suggested, the reality is that there was a clear network of human rights
activists that worked to highlight the political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union. The
differences on paper between these groups appear to have meant very little to the individuals
involved with these organisations.
Royal College of Psychiatrists
One of the major purposes of the human rights groups discussed above was to publicise
the Soviet abuse of psychiatry to a wide audience, and to get official bodies to react to the
information that they distributed. In the 1970s, the most body petitioned by these groups was the
Royal College of Psychiatrists, who played a prominent role in the campaign against the Soviet
abuses. The Royal College is the central professional body for psychiatry in Britain, that actively
monitors and promotes a high standard of psychiatric treatment in both Britain and throughout
the world. As a Royal College, it enjoys an influential reputation amongst both psychiatrists and
governments internationally.
The Royal College first dealt with the reports of the political abuse of psychiatry in 1973
when Dr Gery Low-Beer and Professor Harold Merskey moved a motion at a Quarterly Meeting of
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the Royal College calling for a condemnation of the reported abuse. This motion was first put
forward in the Spring of 1973 receiving only a quarter of available votes in support. However, due
to the mass publicity given to the accusations of Soviet abuses in the Summer of 1973, including
an array of articles in The Times, the same motion was passed with a healthy majority at the
Autumn meeting of the Royal College.441
The change of heart in the membership of the Royal College was also arguably due to the
public criticism of the delegates it sent to WPA meetings in Yerevan, Armenia; and Tbilisi, Georgia.
David Carver, the General Secretary of International PEN, was particularly scathing of the Royal
College in a letter to The Times in August 1973, which noted the hypocrisy of their membership in
officially denouncing the abusive practice of Soviet psychiatrists whilst at the same time meeting
with them at professional conferences. Carver makes particular reference to the WPA co-
sponsored symposium on schizophrenia which was held at the Serbsky Institute in October 1973
at which a number of British psychiatrists were to deliver papers. 442Given the role that
psychiatrists from the Serbsky played in the abuse of psychiatry, the apparent political
manipulation of the diagnosis of schizophrenia, and the notoriety that this psikhushka gained,
attending symposia here was particularly insensitive. In response to Carver's accusations, the
Royal College registrar, Morris Markowe, responded that 'it is not for this Royal College to decide
whether individual psychiatrists should present papers at this or any other symposium' and
reiterated that the Royal College was greatly concerned at the political abuse of psychiatry.443
The official condemnation of Soviet abuses by the membership of the Royal College led Sir
Martin Roth, President of the Royal College, to write a telegram to the leaders of the American
Psychiatric Association (APA) and the AUSNP on 9 November 1973. This telegram, which is
included in full in Appendix 2, noted the Royal College's concern at the reports of the political
441Letter from Harold Merskey to Marie Girard, 9 January 2008, p. 1. Telephone interview with Harold
Merskey, 22 October 2010. For examples of these articles and letters see B. Levin, 'Cries for help that go
unheeded', The Times, 14 June 1973, p.16; K. Coates and C. Farley, D.Green, A. C.Woodmansley, M. Own,
'Incarceration of RussianWriters', The Times, 1 September 1973, p. 13; 'Ten Jews held after Moscow
protest', The Times, 3 October 1973; and 'Western psychiatrists pay visit to Gen Grigorenko', The Times, 16
October 1973, p. 11.
442 D. Carver, 'Soviet Writers in Mental Hospitals', The Times, 27 August 1973, p. 7.
443 M. Markowe, 'Soviet Writers in Mental Hospitals', The Times, 30 August 1973, p. 15.
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abuse of psychiatric treatment in 'various countries', noting an appreciation that 'reports on such
matters are liable to some distortion'. This telegram called for an impartial commission, made up
of psychiatrists of high repute from a number of countries to investigate these claims.444 This
telegram is particularly important as it illustrates the Royal College's explicit concern about the
abuse of psychiatric treatment, and the urgency needed to protect the 'good name of psychiatry
the world over'. The need to protect their subject is something that clearly drove many
psychiatrists involved with campaigns against the Soviet abuses.
What is notable about this telegram, and the letter to The Times by Markowe is the lack
of direct reference to the reports of Soviet abuses. In particular, if one were to read the telegram
to the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and the AUSNPwithout contextual knowledge, it
would be difficult to draw the conclusion that this document was part of an attempt to place
pressure on the Soviet authorities. Indeed in the early 1970s, references to the political abuse of
psychiatry from the RoyalCollegeare often made in these couched terms, despite the accusations
against the Soviet Union being public knowledge. This was perhaps due to the same reasons that
the WPA were initially reluctant to publicly criticise the Soviet Union on the basis of allegations
without sufficient evidence. The RoyalCollegemay have wanted to maintain the links that it held
with Soviet psychiatrists, something that might explain its approach to WPA conferences in Tbilisi
and Yerevan.
The Royal College's efforts to put pressure on those engaged in the unethical use of
psychiatry were greatly increased and became more explicit five years after this original
condemnation of Soviet abuseswhen it formed the SCPAPin June 1978. The SCPAPwas a small
committee, comprising no more than eight individuals at anyone time, who met on a regular
basis to discuss information the Royal College had received about the political abuse of
psychiatry. This committee played a large role in deciding the response of the Royal College
towards the Soviet abuses, and the President of the Royal College Professor Kenneth Rawnsley
444 Copyof Telegramsentto DrA. Freedmanof the APAandProf.A.Snezhnevskyof the AUNSP,9
November1973, RCPsych,SCOUPPSovietUnion.
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regularly attended the SCPAPmeetings.445 The SCPAPwas particularly influential on the Royal
College's response to the Soviet authorities, and in its interactions with the AUSNP. In some
instances, SCPAPmembers drafted letters to be sent on behalf of either the President or the
RoyalCollegewhich appear in most casesto have been sent unaltered. An example of this can be
seen in the minutes of the first SCPAPmeeting on 26 July 1978 in which the draft of a letter to
Snezhnevskyis quoted in full. SCPAPmembers drafted and approved this letter which was to be
sent to the AUSNPon behalf of the RoyalCollege, suggesting the element of control that they had
over issues of psychiatric abuse from their foundatlon.t" The SCPAPwas chaired from its
inception to 1987 by Dr Peter Sainsbury, an esteemed psychiatrist with a reputation for his
rigorous use of empiricism in psvchlatrv.?" The SCPAPreported directly to the Councilor the
Executive and FinanceCommittee of the Royal College, illustrating the importance of its role and
its link with the central body which ran the RoyalCollege.
The foundation of the SCPAPin 1978 is perhaps of little surprise. The previous year can be
seen as a watershed moment in Western understanding of, and concern about the political abuse
of psychiatry in the Soviet Union. 1977 held an array of key events for the development of British
discourse on these abuses, including the fall out and response to Bukovsky'sexile in late 1976; the
exile of Petro Grigorenko in December 1977; and the WPA congress in Honolulu at which the
subject of Soviet abuses dominated. Indeed, the fallout from the WPA congress alone meant that
the Royal College needed to formulate their approach to this issue, and other unethical practices
of psychiatry. The SCPAPwas a formal way of doing this, and its formation dealt with the concerns
of members of the RoyalCollege. Sidney Levine, a member of the SCPAP,even suggests that the
committee was formed at the request of various 'informed organisations' such as Amnesty
International and the Working Group. Levine notes that these organisations approached the Royal
College, requesting that it respond to the ever growing number of casesof abuse that were being
44S See SCPAPattendance records 1978-1985, RCPsych, SCOUPP minutes 1978-93.
446 Minutes of SCPAPmeeting dated 26 July 1978, RCPsych, SCOUPP minutes 1978-93.
447 J. Jenkins, 'Obituary: Peter Sainsbury', The Guardian, 24 February 2004, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news12004/feb124!guardianobituarieS.obituaries (Accessed 10 January 2011);
and R. Rathod, 'Peter Sainsbury', British Medical Journal, No.328, (2004) p. 1442, available at
http://www.bmj.com/content/suppI/2004/06/l0/328.7453.1442-e.DC1 (Accessed 10 January 2011).
170
reported in the West.448That these human rights organisations had an influence on the creation
of this committee is telling of the later relationship that they were to have with the SCPAP,and of
the role that these groups were to play in how the committee operated.
The remit of SCPAPwas clearly set out in the minutes of its first meeting on 26 July 1978,
which noted that the 'Special Committee should consider all reports of the political abuse of
psychiatry wherever it might OCCUr'.449Itis important to note this international focus, as a cursory
glance at the SCPAP papers might give the impression that this group was formed solely to
consider the reports of abuse in the Soviet Union given the frequency of discussion in this area. In
the context of the Cold War, this international focus was particularly important, as it would have
been easy for the Soviet authorities to accuse the SCPAP of being an ideologically biased group.
Taking this into account, it is perhaps a little surprising that the SCPAPwas not publicly dismissed
as an anti-Soviet organlsatlon.P? Although the SCPAP was arguably formed primarily to
investigate the Soviet abuses of psychiatry, it does not appear to have been formed with a
particular anti-Soviet position. Although the meetings of SCPAP from 1978 to 1983 were
dominated by discussion of the Soviet Union, this is due predominantly due to the type, scale and
inimitable character of the Soviet abuse of psychiatry. The Soviet abuses were unique in this
period due to their political nature compared to other countries where abuses were not as
centrally driven. Although the work of SCPAP in this period was dominated by a focus on the
Soviet Union, abuses in other countries were discussed by this committee. For example, reports of
Japanese psychiatric abuses were discussed at the SCPAPmeeting on 2 October 1985; concerns at
South African psychiatrists colluding with apartheid were discussed in October 1984; and reports
of abuse in Argentina and Chile were discussed at a 1981 meeting.4S1
448 S. levine, 'The Special Committee on the Political Abuse of Psychiatry', Psychiatric Bul/etin, Vol. 5 (1981)
p.94.
449Minutes of SCPAPmeeting dated 26 July 1978, RCPsych, SCOUPPminutes 1978-93.
450 For an example of this see letter to Peter Sainsbury from 1. Pollert, dated 29 April 1982, RCPsych,
SCOUPPSoviet Union.
451 Minutes of SCPAPmeeting dated 2 October 1985, RCPsych, SCOUPPminutes; Minutes of SCPAPmeeting
dated 25 October 1984, RCPsych, SCOUPPminutes; and Minutes of SCPAPmeeting dated lS July 1981.
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David Cohen was particularly critical of Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway for referring to
the Soviet abuses as the 'shadow over world psychiatry', noting that similar abuses occurred
elsewhere in the world but were comparably underreported. Cohen contends that there were
many other 'shadows' in world psychiatry, noting the example of 221 psychiatric patients who
had died in the Utsonomiya Hospital in Japan under suspicious circumstances that suggested
there had been psychiatric abuse.452 He argued that it was convenient for Western commentators
to treat the Soviet abuses as being unique, and by highlighting the political aspect of this abuse it
served as a vehicle to challenge the 'particular evil' of the Soviet situation.453 Given the political
nature of the Soviet abuses compared to other international abuses, it is doubtless that the Soviet
case was unique. This is illustrated by the SCPAP's predominant focus on the Soviet abuses in the
late 1970s and early 1980s.
The SCPAPwas not a body that was biased against the Soviet Union in this period, the fact
is that an apparent bias only existed because of the unique and extreme system of abuse that
existed in the Soviet Union. This is supported by comments made in the October 1980 News
Bulletin of the Working Group. This bulletin noted that 'apart from in Rumania, and to some
extent in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, political abuse of psychiatry does not seem
as yet to be a widespread phenomenon outside the USSR',454 This bulletin also referred to the
reports of abuse in Argentina and South Africa, concluding that after investigation they did not
produce 'clear-cut cases of psychiatry being used to suppress dissent'.4S5 The SCPAP's focus on the
political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union was due to circumstance, not ideological bias.
One of the main activities of the SCPAP was its interaction with the WPA review
committee. This committee was created by the WPA at the 1977 congress in Honolulu in response
to reports of Soviet psychiatric abuse. This committee was designed to examine all complaints
regarding psychiatric abuse that were sent to the WPA, and to forward their recommendations to
452 For details of these JapanesePsychiatric abuses see Cohen, Forgotten Millions, pp. 57-85.
453 Cohen,Soviet Psychiatry, p. 52-53.
454 Working Group on the Interment of Dissenters in Mental Hospitals, News Bulletin on Psychiatric Abuse in
the Soviet Union, No.3, October 1980, p. 2.
455 Ibid, p. 2.
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the WPA executive committee.456The review committee was to become the key point of contact
between national psychiatric organisations and the WPA regarding psychiatric abuse. It was
effectively a passagewayfor which evidence of abuses could be sent to the WPA via concerned
psychiatric bodies. Details of the casesreceived by the Review Committee are documented in the
WPA publication The Issue of Abuse, which was published in January 1983. This document outlines
in detail the role of the Review Committee, and extensively lists cases that were brought to its
attention by national psychiatric organlsatlons."? The formation of the SCPAPwas an effective
way for the college to gather concerned members together to compile this information to be sent
to the WPA.
The SCPAPpapers suggest that there was a regular flow of information from the
committee to the WPA review committee, with an array of materials and correspondence being
sent between the two groups.458The formation of the Review Committee meant that the main
interaction that the SCPAPwas to have directly with the WPA was in the supply of information
about cases of abuse. Like most campaigns on behalf of Soviet dissidents in this period, this
distribution of information was at the centre of both the SCPAPand the WPA discussions about
abuses. This was to have a dramatic effect on the role of human rights groups who supplied
information to the SCPAP,as it meant that this evidence was not only to be consulted by
members of the RoyalCollegebut potentially also by the WPA.
The minutes of the first meeting of the SCPAPclearly note the relationship that the
committee was to have with other organisations concerned with the political abuse of psychiatry
in this period, with members agreeing that it should hold no formal links with other
4S6 For details on the WPA review committee see A. Wynn, 'The Soviet Union and the World Psychiatric
Association' The Lancet, 19 February, 1983 pp. 406-408; and Extract from the Minutes of the Meeting of the
Executive Committee of the WPA held in Marrakesh, Morocco on 31 October 1983, RCPsych, SCOUPP:
Soviet Union.
4S7 WPA, The Issue of Abuse: 1970-1983 (1983).
458 For examples of this correspondence see letter from Professor Berner (WPA Review Committee) to Royal
College of Psychiatrists, dated 15 February 1983, RCPsych, SCOUPP: Soviet Union; letter from Professor
Rawnsley to Professor Berner dated 13 December 1982, RCPsych, SCOUPP: Soviet Union; letter to Royal
College of Psychiatrists from WPA Review Committee (author unknown) dated October 1981, RCPsych,
SCOUPP: Soviet Union; and letter from Professor Gosselin (WPA Review Committee) to Professor Pond
dated 30 January 1981, RCPsych, SCOUPP: Soviet Union.
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organisations.459The initial desire to not engage in formal links with human rights organisations
was perhaps in an attempt to avoid tarnishing the reputation of the Royal College, which it must
be noted was an organisation with an international membership keen on promoting scientific
links with a variety of nations, including those in the Soviet bloc. However, in reality the links
between the SCPAPand human rights organisations became clear - particularly in the cases of
Amnesty International and the Working Group.
The SCPAPregularly asked for details on particular victims of psychiatric abuse from
Amnesty International, and notably used personal relations with human rights organisations to
attain the latest information from the Soviet Union. A good example of this is the letter from
Peter Sainsbury to Marjorie Farquharson, a member of Amnesty's International Section, dated 5
May 1982. This letter not only asked for the latest information that Amnesty had on three Soviet
dissidents, but it also suggestedthat a member of Amnesty's staff act as a LiaisonOfficer between
the SCPAPand Amnesty.46OThis letter reveals several things about the relationship between the
SCPAPand Amnesty. Firstly, the fact that the SCPAPmade a request for regular information from
Amnesty illustrates that its reports were trusted by the RoyalCollege. Had there been elements of
doubt about the reliability of this information, it is unlikely that these requests would have been
made. Secondly, the fact that a request was made for the establishment of a coordinating officer
between the two organisations clearly shows the frequency with which they dealt with each
other. Attempts to make this link more efficient suggest not only the importance with which
SCPAPmembers placed on Amnesty reports, but also that they wished for this relationship to be
maintained in the long term. This was perhaps due to the desire to maintain the flow of reliable,
and up to date information that the Royal College could not provide in the same manner as
Amnesty. The establishment of an official link between the SCPAPand Amnesty is a clear
indication of how important the wider network of activists that had developed in the 1970s was,
459 Minutes of SCPAPmeeting dated 26 July 1978, RCPsych, SCOUPPminutes.
460 Letter to Marjorie Farquharson from Peter Sainsbury, dated 5 May 1982, RCPsych, SCOUPP: Soviet
Union.
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and how an official body such as the Royal College was keen to utilise this network in their own
work.
The SCPAPwere also regularly asked by human rights campaigners to use their position to
petition the AUSNPon behalf of specific victims of abuse. The most frequent example of this in
the SCPAPpapers is from the Amnesty member, Enid Nussbaum. Nussbaum, a member of the
Keele and North Staffs Amnesty Group, was in regular contact with the SCPAPabout the plight of
Nikolai Baranov from 1980 onwards. Her letters to the SCPAPare a mixture of requests for
information, translated documents from Baranov or his close family and friends, and appeals for
action from the Royal College.461These letters can be seen to have had two main purposes.
Firstly, to ensure that the SCPAPand the Royal College paid attention to the plight of Baranov, a
prisoner of conscience adopted by Nussbaum's local Amnesty group. Secondly, this was another
example of the flow of information, with the SCPAPrecognised by some as being a reputable
source of information on the Soviet abuses, and a group that could act on information given to
them.
The SCPAPalso held very close links with the Working Group, most notably with
individuals holding positions in both organisations. Both Sidney Bloch and Gery Low-Beer were
prominent members of both bodies. Perhaps more importantly, both were very active members
of the SCPAP,with high attendance at meetings and apparent keen involvement in the actions of
the group. low-Beer in particular appears to have been one of the most active members of the
SCPAP,who regularly wrote draft letters on behalf of the committee and acted as the
committee's expert on Soviet affairs.462 For example, Low-Beer drafted a letter to the Soviet
authorities on behalf of the SCPAP,protesting against the treatment of members of the Moscow
461 For an example of these letters see letter from Enid Nussbaum to Peter Sainsbury, dated 9 January
1981,; letter from Enid Nussbaum to Peter Sainsbury, dated 12 October 1981; letter from Peter Sainsbury
to Enid Nussbaum, dated 8 March 1982; Letter from Enid Nussbaum to Peter Sainsbury, dated 17 March
1982,; Letter from Enid Nussbaum to Peter Sainsbury, dated 4 February 1983; and letter from Enid
Nussbaum to the SCPAP, dated 24 October 1983, all from RCPsych, SCOUPP Soviet Union.
462 For examples of Low-Beer's activity see Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR:
An Amnesty International Briefing (Date Unknown - probably early 1980s), RCPsych, SCOUPP: Soviet Union;
Letter to Gery Low-Beer from Peter Sainsbury, dated 8 March 1982, RCPsych, SCOUPP: Soviet Union; and
Letter to Professor Desmond Pond (President of Royal College of Psychiatrists) from Gery low-Beer, dated 5
November 1980, RCPsych, SCOUPP: Soviet Union.
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Working Commission who were documenting and reporting of Soviet abuses. This draft was sent
to Professor Desmond Pond, the president of the Royal College, asking him to sign this petition,
which had been printed on College paper, and send it to the Soviet authortnes.?" This is a direct
instance where the words of a leading member of a human rights organisation became the official
output of the Royal College, clearly illustrating the influence that this group held. The efforts of
these two individuals in the SCPAP timed with their direct involvement with the Working Group
inevitably meant that the relationship between these two organisations was heightened.
Another member of the Working Group who had influence on the SCPAP was Peter
Reddaway. Alongside his work for Amnesty as the editor of the Chronicle of Current Events,
Reddaway's influence both as an academic and with his association with the Working Group were
felt on the SCPAP due to the regular correspondence that he held with the committee's chair,
Peter Sainsbury. Reddaway was in regular contact with the SCPAP and the Royal College, and
provided them with the most up-to-date information that he had on abuses in the Soviet
Union.464 This was something that was gratefully received by members of the SCPAP, and Peter
Sainsbury regularly thanked Reddaway for sharing information on Soviet dissenters with the Royal
College.46s
The supply of information to the SCPAP put Reddaway in an interesting position. Given
that the response of the Royal College to reports of psychiatric abuse was driven by information,
Reddaway's correspondence and materials had a substantial impact on the direction of the
committee. When this is placed in the context of the personal relationships he held with SCPAP
members such as Sidney Bloch and Gery Low-Beer, it becomes apparent that his influence was
felt on the committee itself. For example, on 20 August 1979, Reddaway sent a letter to Peter
Sainsbury noting that 'it is growingly important to maintain steady and strong pressure on the
463 Seeletter to Professor Desmond Pond from Peter Sainsbury dated 31 October 1980, RCPsych,SCOUPP:
Soviet Union.
464 For examples of this correspondence see Letter to Peter Reddaway from JaneManley (Royal College
Secretary) dated 15 May 1980, RCPsych,SCOUPP:Soviet Union; Letter from Peter Reddaway to Jane
Manley dated 20 March 1980, RCPsych,SCOUPP:Soviet Union; Letter from Peter Reddaway to Peter
Sainsbury dated 19 February 1980, RCPsych,SCOUPP:Soviet Union; and Letter from Peter Sainsbury to
Peter Reddaway dated 6 September 1979, RCPsych,SCOUPP:Soviet Union.
465 Letter to Peter Reddaway from Peter Sainsbury dated 8 April 1980, RCPsych,SCOUPP:Soviet Union.
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Soviets and to encourage the WPA to take the same line,.466Although this was the approach of
the SCPAPand the RoyalCollege at the time, Reddaway's recommendations are indicative of the
input on the direction of the SCPAPthat he had.
Another example of this occurred in March 1979 when he asked Peter Sainsbury to
forward copies of the original Russianinformation bulletins produced by the Working Commission
to the WPA. Whilst this in itself was not an unusual request, especially not in the context of
shared information in which these groups operated, the detail with which Reddaway goes into on
how to send these materials is impressive, outlining the exact procedure for submitting these
materials to the WPA.467This can be seen as Reddaway utilising the reputation of the Royal
College in order to send information to the WPA. A request from the Royal College would
inevitably carry more weight than a personal request from Reddaway. By asking Sainsbury to
forward these materials to the WPA for him demonstrates how Reddaway used his relationship
with members of the committee to ensure that the WPA paid full attention to this information. In
this case, the relationship between Reddaway and the SCPAPwas a mutually exclusive one, with
both sides gaining favourably - the SCPAPwith the most up-to-date information and expertise,
and Reddaway with an extra avenue with which to put pressure on the Soviet authorities. What
this relationship does reveal is that links developed between human rights activists and the SCPAP
despite the insistence at its foundation that this was not to be the case. Relationships with human
rights organisations were too useful for the SCPAPnot to make advantage of them.
The influence of human rights activists on the SCPAPand the Royal College came to the
fore in the run up to the 1983 WPA congress at Vienna. Shortly before this event, the AUSNP
withdrew from the WPA in response to allegations of the widespread political abuse of psychiatry
in the Soviet Union. This withdrawal can be understood to have been the Soviet attempt to save
face, by leaving the WPA rather than being expelled by it. After the resolutions passedat the 1977
WPA congress in Honolulu, and the unanimous adoption of the so-called 'Declaration of Hawaii'
466 Letter to Peter Sainsbury from Peter Reddaway dated 20 August 1979, RCPsych, SCOUPP: Soviet Union.
467 Letter to Peter Sainsbury from Peter Reddaway dated 26 March 1979, RCPsych, SCOUPP: Soviet Union.
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which codified international ethical guidelines for the psychiatrists to abide by, it was increasingly
likely that the AUSNP would have been expelled from the WPA at the 1983 congress.46B
Withdrawing from the committee before this seemingly inevitable expulsion was a way in which
the AUSNP were seeking to save face.
Before the AUSNP's withdrawal from the WPA, the Royal College had written to Andrey
Snezhnevsky in 1978 asking him to explain the reports of psychiatric abuse that had reached the
West from the Soviet Union.469 Snezhnevsky's response to the Royal College was considered
unacceptable, and the President of the College, Professor Desmond Pond wanted to take firm
action on the matter and asked the SCPAP for their advice.470 SCPAP members appear to have
agreed with Pond's concern as legal action was taken to start the process to remove Snezhnevsky
from his position as a Corresponding Fellow of the College. The fact that Pond consulted the
SCPAP before this process started illustrates the key position that they held within the college on
issues regarding the Soviet Union. The process to remove Snezhnevsky from his honorary position
at the Royal College was in an attempt to place pressure on the Soviet authorities by exerting
political leverage against the AUSNP, humiliating its most respected member by expelling him
from his honorary position at this prestigious research institution. This was one of the only ways
in which the Royal College could exert direct pressure on the AUSNP and leading Soviet
psychiatrists. Snezhnevsky resigned from his position at the Royal College in April 1980, shortly
before his case was to be heard at the College's Court of Electors.471
Gery Low-Beer argued that the Royal College should make the most of this incident by
releasing a public statement welcoming Snezhnevsky's resignation. This, however, did not
happen. Snezhnevsky's resignation from the Royal College was given minimal publicity, something
which some SCPAP members agreed was unfortunate.i" The failure to effectively publicise this
468 For the text of the Declaration of Hawaii see 'World Psychiatric Association: The Declaration of Hawaii,
psychiatric Bulletin, Vol. 2 (1979) pp. 12-13.
469 Minutes of SCPAPmeeting dated 26 July 1978, RCPsych,SCOUPPminutes.
470 Minutes of SCPAPmeeting dated 28 March 1979, RCPsych,SCOUPPminutes.
471 Minutes of SCPAPmeeting dated 16 April 1980, RCPsych,SCOUPPminutes.
472 Minutes of SCPAPmeeting dated 29 October 1980, RCPsych,SCOUPPminutes.
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resignation meant that little pressurewas placed on the Soviet authorities. This could have been a
potentially internationally embarrassing event, and tantamount to an admission from
Snezhnevskythat the accusations of psychiatric abuse from the Royal Collegewere true. The lack
of publicity given to this event is attributed by the SCPAPminutes to some members of the Royal
College's council who did not want to give this case any publicity.473This suggests that even
though the SCPAPhad a large influence over the output of the Royal College, its output was still
controlled by its council. Although the suggestions of the SCPAPwere on the whole accepted and
taken up by the College, this incident suggeststhat this committee was not in complete control of
its output.
The SCPAP'sresponse to the AUSNPresignation was one of reorganisation. It was clear
that the official work conducted by the committee in working against Soviet psychiatric abuse had
come to an end. The AUSNP'swithdrawal from the WPA was a tacit admission by the Soviet
authorities that this abuse had taken place, and without this institutional link there was little that
the RoyalCollege could do to pressurise the Soviet authorities. Without threat of expulsion from
the WPA, the RoyalCollegeno longer had a powerbase with which to put pressure on the AUSNP.
The initial reaction to the AUSNP'sresignation was one of frustration. SCPAPminutes note that
Sidney levine was concerned that little publicity had been given this resignation, and that low-
Beer was worried that the resolutions that were to be presented at the WPA condemning the
Soviet practice would be nullified. It would have been technically impossible to condemn the
actions of an ex-WPA member.474 However, on the whole the reaction to this resignation from
SCPAPmembers was a positive one. The committee agreed that the furore that surrounded the
AUSNPand the WPAwould make it more difficult for Soviet authorities to utilise psychiatric abuse
as a way of controlling dissenters. It also called for renewed relationships with individual
4731bid.
474 Minutes of SCPAPmeeting dated 24 February 1983, RCPsych, SCOUPP minutes.
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psychiatrists in the Soviet Union, who would be professionally affected by the AUSNP's
withdrawal by being scientifically isolated from the international psychiatric comrnunlty.?"
It could be argued that given the efforts of the SCPAPin campaigning for the expulsion of
the AUSNPfrom the WPA, once this had been completed, there was little that the SCPAPcould
officially do. Its direct affiliation to the RoyalCollegemeant that the traditional activism of human
rights groups, such as demonstrations and petitions to the Soviet authorities were both
inappropriate and impossible. Due to this, the 1983 WPA congress in Vienna can be seen to be a
turning point in the work of the SCPAP,something that it recognised in a meeting on 24 May
1983. The minutes of this meeting note that lengthy discussion took place on the remit of the
committee, with members examining how its purpose should be amended. It was agreed that the
scope of the SCPAPshould be extended, and that 'the Russian issue' would 'have to be left to a
certain extent,.476It was also agreed that the committee could not open itself to consider all cases
of human rights abuse, and that all cases that it considered should, in some way, concern
psychiatry. After the 1983 WPA congress, the role of the SCPAPappears to be diluted. SCPAP
minutes from 1983 to 1985 highlight that the committee's work had shifted to focusing on
building relations with other bodies, such as the APA, IAPUPand Amnesty. In accordance with its
new position, it more extensively considered the reports of psychiatric abuse from other
countries such as Japan, South Africa and Uruguay.m The new role of the SCPAPeven took on
discussion of domestic policy, which included the diagnosis of the 'Yorkshire Ripper', Peter
Sutcliffe.478
Even by 1985, the SCPAPwas still questioning its purpose and direction, with Sidney
Levine questioning whether the committee should simply react to reports of abuse that it
475 Ibid.
476 Minutes of SCPAPmeeting dated 24 May 1983, RCPsych, SCOUPPminutes. Section E contains a report of
the discussion of SCPAP's remit.
477 For examples, see Minutes of SCPAPmeeting dated 2 October 1985, RCPsych, SCOUPPminutes; and
Minutes of SCPAPmeeting dated 21 September 1983, RCPsych, SCOUPPminutes.
478 Minutes of SCPAPmeeting dated 11 January 1984, RCPsych, SCOUPPminutes. Peter Sutcliffe was
convicted of the murder of 13 women in 1981, and one of the most infamous British serial killers.
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received or if should be more pragmatic and adopt a 'grander strategy,.479Once the AUSNPhad
left the WPA, the role of the SCPAPin the fight against psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union was
over. It had successfully brought international attention to the Soviet abuses through the WPA,
and as a result the impetus for putting pressure on the Soviet authorities now had to come from
this body.
The role played by human rights groups in both the composition and content of the work
of the SCPAPis striking, particularly given the important role that the committee played in the
RoyalCollege's approach to the Soviet abuse of psychiatry. It is clear that without the direction of
human rights activists, the SCPAPwould have taken a vastly different approach to this problem,
and would have undoubtedly been a markedly different group. It is not an overstatement to note
that human rights activists from groups such as CAPA, the MSCSJand the Working Group did
more than influence the SCPAP,they scripted the output of the committee, and subsequently that
of the RoyalCollege.
479 Minutes of SCPAPmeeting dated 27 February 1985, RCPsych, SCOUPP minutes.
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Chapter 3
Religious Human Rights Groups
Two days before I was arrested, I called Avital and was bitterly disappointed that she had already
left Jerusalem for Geneva. Her supporters assured me they were working in my behalf, but I was
so upset that I neither understood nor appreciated what they were telling me. Little did I know
that an international movement working for my release had already begun, a movement that
ultimately involved tens of thousands of people around the world, including students and
housewives, of course, but also lawyers, scientists, politicians, and many more. It would take
another book just to thank them all.48O
Anatoly Shcharansky, Fear No Evil
The definition of a dissident in the Soviet context was wide reaching. Religious believers
were targeted by the Soviet authorities as political dissenters due to the state promotion of
atheism, which meant that religious belief was actively suppressed.481 Displays of religious belief
in the Soviet Union were very dangerous for individuals. Many suffered directly as a result of their
faith, being demoted in their employment or even losing their jobs altogether. In extreme
circumstances, religious believers were imprisoned in labour camps for their resistance to the
attempts of Soviet authorities to crush their faith.482 Some were even diagnosed with mental
illnesses due to their religious faith, and placed in psikhushki until they renounced their beliefs.483
Separation of religion and state was an important part of state policy from the beginnings
of the Soviet Union, when lenin noted that he felt that religion should be a private affair and of
no concern for the party or the state.484This process of separation of church and state accelerated
under lenin's successors, something that developed into the direct persecution of religion under
Stalin and Khrushchev. Khrushchev's anti religious policy was particularly virulent, with mass
480 Shcharansky,Fear No Evil, p. 420.
481 SeeJ. Von Geldern, 'Conflict with the Church' at Seventeen Moments in Soviet History (Available online
at http://www.soviethistory.org/index.php?page=subject&SubjectID=1917church&Year=1917 accessed16
August 2010).
482 For example, seeShcharansky,Fear No Evil.
483 Van Voren, Cold War In Psychiatry, p. 374.
484 V. lenin, 'Socialism and Religion', Novaya Zhizn, No. 28, 3 December 1905, (Available online at Marxists
Internet Archive - http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1905/dec/03.htm accessed16 August
2010).
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closure of places of worship and attacks on religious bellevers.?" The persecution of religious
believers continued under Brezhnev, predominantly with the rise of the refusenik problem who
were often persecuted on the trumped up charge of knowledge of state secrets. Refuseniks were
frequently persecuted by the Soviet authorities, losing their jobs and being harassed for their
attempts to emigrate.
Religion played a significant part in the dissident movement in the Soviet Union. The
persecution of faith by the Soviet authorities forced religious groups into secret organisations who
formed underground churches to keep their faith alive. Some scholars have argued that religious
dissent had a significant part to play in the collapse of the Soviet Union, with religious belief and
moral conscienceshaping the actions of many dlssenters.t"
In response to this suppression of religious belief, many groups were formed around the
world to petition the Soviet authorities, supply aid and religious materials to believers in the
Soviet Union, and distribute information about the persecuted to the media and governments in
Western nations. Human rights groups had the position to shape not only public awareness of the
plight of religious believers in the Soviet Union, but also the response of governments to their
position.
This chapter will analyse the campaigns of the two most prominent British religious
human rights groups formed in the wake of Soviet persecution in the later twentieth century: the
Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry and the Centre for the Study of Religion and Communism,
also known as Keston College. Both of these groups played an important role in increasing
publicity for the plight of religious believers behind the Iron Curtain, and their campaigns had a
direct influence on the public perception of Soviet dissenters in Britain. It shall take the campaigns
of these groups in turn, illustrating how, despite their outward differences, these two
48S See N. Davis, 'The number of Orthodox Churches before and after the Khrushchev antireligious drive',
Slavic Review, Vol. SO, No.3, (1991) pp. 612-20; J. D. Grossman, 'Khrushchev's Anti-Religious Policy and the
Campaign of 1954', Soviet Studies, Vol. 24, No.3, (1973) pp. 374-86; and A. B. Stone, "'Overcoming Peasant
Backwardness": The Khrushchev Antireligious Campaign and the Rural Soviet Union', The Russian Review,
vol. 67, No.2, (2008" pp. 296-320.
486 See Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia.
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organisations had much in common - something that undoubtedly contributed to the level of
influence that they had on British society.
The Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry
You and your organization have done wonders over the years, & I think (or hope, anyway) that
you know how much I and people like me respect what you've done. I particularly admired it,
when everyone else was falling over themselves to fawn over Mikhail Gorbachev when he came
to Britain, you 35's kept up the pressure almost on your own. That took real guts; & yet now,
some years later, it's quite clear that you were doing exactly the right thing. My hats off to you; it
was courage and foresight like that which brought the old discredited Soviet Union to its grave.
John Simpson, BBCForeign correspondanr'"
The Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry, also known as the 35's, were an unusual group
to take a stand against the authorities of the Soviet Union.488 With the vast majority of their
membership comprised of upper middle classJewish women, it would seem at first glance that
their activities would have had little effect on the Soviet authorities. Yet despite this, some,
including the prominent journalist John Simpson, have noted that their actions played a
significant part in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emigration of thousands of refuseniks
to Israel and other countries around the world. Given the praise heaped on the 35's by prominent
individuals such as Simpson, it is surprising that their role has not been discussed in any depth in
historical scholarship.
The only piece to date that has looked at this group is Daphne Gerlis' work Those
wonderful Women in Black.489 Gerlis, a 35er herself, has produced a history of the organisation
that has particular insight into the way in which its campaigns were run. This piece is richly
coloured with a variety of reminiscences of the groups campaigns, and the relationship built up
between activists and refuseniks. The bulk of information used by Gerlis in the production of this
book came in the form of interviews with leading 35ers, which were unfortunately unrecorded.
487letterfrom JohnSimpsonto the 35'sdated 12September1994,UofSMS254/1/3/9.
488 Asa resultof their nickname,membersof the 35'saresometimesreferredto as35ers.
489 Gerlis,Those Wonderful Women in Black.
184
Given the amount of literature on the persecution of Soviet Jewry, and on the wider
Soviet dissident movement there is clearly a gap in the scholarship surrounding the role of Anglo-
Jewish groups, and their response to the refusenik problem, which was an immensely complex
issuecovering religious, ethnic, and nationalist issues.49o
This chapter will assessthe activities of the 35's in the late twentieth century, and analyse
the effect that they had on the wider British perception on the refuseniks. It will outline the work
of the campaign, showing how it operated on a day to day basis and the manner in which they
lobbied the Soviet authorities using archival material from the 35's collection held at the
University of Southampton. This will build on the narrative foundation set by Gerlis, and offer a
more analytical approach to the activities of the 35's, placing their efforts in the wider context of
British human rights groups in this period. It will also seek to piece together the work of other
authors who have briefly commented on the work of the 35's in different contexts, such as lord
Greville Janner and Howard Spier.491This will readdress the gap in the scholarship regarding the
work of the 35's, bring together the various commentators on the group into a more coherent
piece, and highlight the important role in the construction of the British discourse on refuseniks
and other Soviet dissidents that the 35's played.
The Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry was initially formed after a group of Jewish
housewives in london responded publicly to the perceived lack of support for refuseniks from the
established Jewish bodies in Britain. On 1 May 1971, these housewives attempted to deliver a
petition to the Soviet ambassador in london, and held a hungerstrike on behalf of RaizaPalatnik
an imprisoned refusenik from Odessa.When they contacted the press about their protest, this
490 The plight of the refuseniks can be considered as being an ethnic or nationalist issue rather than a purely
religious issue given the secular nature of many refuseniks. Defining the refuseniks plight in solely religious
or nationalist terms does not fully capture the reasoning for their struggle, which was more complex and
due to a variety of factors. Indeed, the term refusenik should not be taken to give a direct political or
religious stance, but as a more blurred term used to group together Soviet Jews who applied for exit visas.
This thesis will consider groups who campaigned for the refuseniks as religious human rights groups in order
to facilitate comparison to other religious human rights organisations from this period, and also in
recognition of the common religious background of groups such as the Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry
and the refuseniks they supported.
491 See Janner, To Life!, pp. 231- 246; and H. Spier, 'The West European Approach to the Soviet Jewry
Problem' in R. Freedman, (ed.), Soviet Jewry in the 1980s: The Politics of Anti-Semitism and Emigration and
the Dynamics of Resettlement (London, 1989) pp. 97-114.
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group of housewives noted that 'we are a group of thirty-five girls, demonstrating outside the
Soviet Embassyfor the release of a Jewish woman imprisoned because she wants to go to Israel.
She is 35 years of age and we are here for 35 hours.' During one of the numerous calls to The
Daily Telegraph with this message,Doreen Gainsford, one of the founding members of the group,
overheard a man on the news-desk say 'it's those 35's again', and the numbers stuck.492 Soon
after this, the group referred to themselves as the 35's, which became a prominent feature on
their letterhead, public handouts and on demonstration banners.
The 35's are best described as a collection of local campaigns, arranged around the work
of a very active central group based in North London - much like the composition of Amnesty, but
on a smaller scale. The relationship between the central London group and its regional
counterparts was very informal and based predominantly on the spread of information. The
central group offered facts in the form of a regular circular sent to regional groups and other
interested parties, which contained details about the plight of specific refuseniks, noting any
changes in their circumstance and any particular call for letters to be written. This circular
encouraged the writing of letters to individual refuseniks on their birthdays in an attempt to
inform them that their plight was recognised in the West. This was also highlighted on the yearly
calendar produced by the leeds 35's in the early 1980s, which noted the birthdays of all
prominent refuseniks.493 The loose relationship that existed between the central group and its
periphery is perhaps a good indicator of the wider work of the campaign - keen to distribute
information rather than control. There is no indication that the central office of the 35's in London
sought to overrule the actions of a regional group, illustrating the autonomy that regional 35's
had from their central office. Regional groups had the ability to use their own initiative in
instigating campaigns and demonstrations in support of refuseniks.
492 For a good account of the origins of the 35's, see Gerlis, Those Wonderful Women in Black, pp. 26-31. In
this account, Gerlis notes that Gainsford exaggerated the length of the protest from 24 hours in order to
make a better story. See also interview with George and Margaret Rigal, 25 February 2010. Margaret Rigal
has been the co-chairman of the 35's from 1978 to the present, and was directly in charge of the campaigns
links with British MPs.
493 Collection of Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry Calendars from 1981 to 1985 produced by the Leeds
35's, UofS, MS 254/1/3/10.
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Perhaps as a result of this autonomy, many active 35's groups formed throughout the
country. Most notable of these were groups in Liverpool, Leedsand Bournemouth, who were very
active in both demonstrations and petitions. Indeed, Margaret Rigal, co-chairman and
Parliamentary contact of the central 35's group, recalled the need to have active regional 35's
groups as appeals to MPs would carry more weight if they came from a group based in their
constituency rather than a single appeal from a central office in London.494 By the later 1980s the
regional model of the 35's groups had expanded beyond British borders, with prominent groups
formed in Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand and the US.495Like regional groups in the UK,
these campaigns were autonomous from the efforts of the central London group. Although each
of these groups was important in their own right, in order to maintain direction, this piece will
focus primarily on the actions of the central body.
Key to the organisation and running of the central London office was a group of
determined women, who were keen to spread information regarding the persecution of
refuseniks in the Soviet Union. After its formation in May 1971, the 35's were led by Doreen
Gainsford until her emigration to Israel in 1978. After Gainsford's emigration, the group came
under the joint leadership of Margaret Rigal and Rita Eker, who still occupy the co-chairmen
position of the 35's to this day. What is notable about the central organisation of the 35's is the
collection of strong willed characters, who were willing to put a considerable amount of effort
into promoting their cause. Indeed, the central body of women that ran the campaigns are
particularly notable for their strong characters and determination. It would be most appropriate
to describe this central group as a collection of impassioned individuals. Each of these key
individuals was given a specific role in the central office. Doreen Gainsford was the general
administrator of the group till her emigration to Israel; Margaret Rigal was the Parliamentary
contact; Rita Eker was in charge of office administration, and played a substantial part in the
creation of new campaigns and demonstrations; Rosalind Gemal was the Trade Union contact;
494 Interviewwith GeorgeandMargaretRigal,25February2010.
495 Women'sCampaignfor SovietJewryAdmin= llst of internationalcontactsdatedJune1988,UofS,MS
254/1/4/1,
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and there were a variety of other different positions. People were even allocated to reading
newspapers to pick out stories of interest and maintaining books of press cuttings much like the
larger human rights organisations from the time.496 This level of organisation was essential for the
35's to operate as they did and highlights that this was anything but an amateur organisation.
Efficiency was essential for the group given the amount of material that they dealt with,
something that can be seen in the sizeof remaining archival material.
The central offices used by the 35's were donated by charities who no longer required or
could use them. These gifted offices were often left in an appalling condition, and too small for
the requirements of the campaign.497 Indeed, it is impressive that the 35's managed to work as
effectively as they did out of offices that were in such a state of disrepair. Nevertheless, the 35's
could not afford to complain at these gifts and made use of all the space they could for their
materials. So much so that toilets were often used as storage cupboards. However, given the
condition of these offices this use of space backfired when a flooded toilet caused irreparable
damage to materials and photographs of demonstratlons.t" This incident illustrates some of the
basic difficulties that the 35's had in their day-to-day running, which stemmed primarily from a
lack of space and supplies. Other factors that hampered the workings of the group were
repeatedly broken office equipment and poorly maintained photocopiers.
Despite these material difficulties, the 35's worked very well with what they had in their
campaigns. The group developed a sense of notoriety amongst the British press for the way in
which they carried out their public demonstrations. These events were designed specifically to
draw as much attention to the persecution of Soviet Jewry as possible. The leadership of the 35's
noted that when their early campaigns no longer made the front pages of newspapers, they
introduced necessary gimmicks in order to make them more appealing to the media.499
Extravagant demonstrations and protests became a staple of the work of the 35's, appearing to
496 Gerlis, Those Wonderful Women in Black, p. 218 - 222; Admin files of the Women's Campaign for Soviet
Jewry, UofS, MS 254/1/3/1, and MS 254/1/3/2.
497 Interview with George and Margaret Rigal, 25 February 2010.
4981bid.
499 'Story of the 35's', MRC, MSS.387/6/CH/73.
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want to outdo previous attempts at each event. There is a substantial list of demonstrations and
protests that the 35's organised in the appendix of Gerlis' Those Wonderful Women in Black, in
which the activities of individual regional groups aswell as the main london body are described in
great detail.sooHowever, some of these events are worth noting here to illustrate both their
originality and the lengths that 35ers went to highlight the position of refuseniks. These include:
• Holding a 'prisoners banquet' at the Houseof Commons in February 1972
• Handing out roubles to people passingRussia'sNarodny Bank in london whilst dressed as
SantaClausin December 1972
• In February 1974, presenting a Soviet NavalAttache with a lifebelt, illustrating the need to
savethe life of the refusenik Alexander Feldman.
• Arranging a 'prison meal' for Vladimir Bukovsky, the prominent Soviet dissident, shortly
after his exile in 1976 in homage to prisoners of conscience.
• A sponsored parachute jump in July 1986501
The main reasons that the 35's adopted an extravagant approach to their campaigns and
demonstrations was to generate as much attention from the media as possible. Indeed, it is
perhaps telling that the nickname 'the 35's', given to them by members of the press, stuck. The
relationship between the 35's and the press was key to the efforts of the campaign, and gave
them a vehicle with which to spread their messageto a much larger audience. This approach paid
dividends, with many national newspapers reporting on these demonstrations, something that
gave coverage to the plight of refuseniks where it would have otherwise been ignored.
A brief survey of British newspapers in the 1970s and 1980s shows an array of reports of
the 35's demonstrations. These often included photographs of demonstrations and stage
invasions by the 35's. Image 3.1 shows a photograph of a demonstration in london for Anatoly
Shcharansky published in The Times on 24 February, 1978. This was a typical demonstration by
the 35's, using the mourning Britannia as a media friendly way to attract attention to the plight of
Shcharanskyand illustrate that they wanted the British nation to grieve at the Soviet authorities
persecution. Image 3.2 is another example of a report of a demonstration in The Times, showing
the stage invasion at the Coliseum Theatre before a performance by the Georgian State Dance
SOO Gerlis, Those Wonderful Women in Black, p. 218 - 282.
SOl For details of these demonstrations, see Gerlis, Those Wonderful Women in Black, pp. 223-236.
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Company in 1973. As well as these pictures of demonstrations there were also short reports,
often no longer than three paragraphs, giving scant details of what had occurred.502
Image 3.1- '3Sers accompany Britannia who was in mourning over the detention of Anatoly
Shcharansky', The Times, 24 February 1978
Image 3.2 - '35ers on the Stage at the Coliseum Theatre before the Georgian State Dance
Company', The Times,S June 1973
502 For example see, 'Demonstrators greet Soviet tourists', The Times, 6 November 1978 p. 5.; and 'Mothers
protest against Shelepin's visit', The Times, 19 March 1975 p. 3.
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Reporting of the demonstrations of the 35's was not limited to these objective forms of
journalism alone. For example, Image 3.3 shows the sketch by the cartoonist Mac (Stan
McMurtry) which was published in the Daily Mail on 18 May 1984. The depiction of a histrionic
response from the Soviet authorities to the protests shows the clear threat that the efforts of
35ers had at these cultural events. It is interesting that in Mac's cartoon the 35's are clearly the
elephant in the room, illustrating a comical response from the Soviet authorities to the stage
invasions of the 35's, yet there is no explicit reference to the group itself. This could be for several
reasons. Firstly, it may be the case that by 1984, the 35's had become synonymous with this sort
of protest that it was meant to be obvious for the reader to decipher who was being referred to in
this image. This can be considered to be in either a positive or negative manner, with the 35's
being considered as either unnamed heroes or a nuisance. It may also have been the case that
other groups in this period were attributed to these demonstrations at cultural events such as
ballet performances, and that the efforts of the 35's were not directly accredited to the group
themselves, but to the wider community of human rights activists active in Britain at this time.
Either way, by not referring to the 35's directly, Mac has highlighted that these invasions had
become so common place that they would have had a resonance amongst the readership of the
Daily Mail, who would be aware that these demonstrations had occurred, and indeed what they
had been protesting about.
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Image 3.3 - 'Looks as if they're expecting another demo'. Daily Mail. 18 May 1984
Other tabloid newspapers in the 1980s reported on the demonstrations of the 35's,
picking up on their extravagant manner and using them to effect in their articles. The Daily Mirror
reported the 35's demonstration at the visit of Boris Ponomarev, a member of the Soviet
politburo, to the grave of Karl Marx in a light hearted manner. The 35ers had dressed as ghosts,
and declared themselves as 'the ghosts of Karl Marx carrying the spirit of the Helsinki Agreement
that you have murdered by persecuting Soviet Jews'. The author of this article clearly picks up on
the 'publicity-friendly' nature of this demonstration, as the language used in this article carries on
the ghostly theme set out by the 35ers, referring to their 'chilling date' with this dignitary, who
had to be 'spirited away by his aides'. This is continued in the mock up of ghosts 'haunting' the
Soviet official as seen in Image 3.4.503 All of these references highlight not only the humour that
the author appears to have seen in this demonstration, but also the successof the 35's efforts to
make their appeals media friendly. This was perhaps the most effective way of ensuring that their
503 'The Haunting of Red Boris', Daily Mirror, 3 November, 1976, p. 4 - 5.
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messagemade its way into a prominent position in a tabloid paper, where letters and articles on
the complexities of the refusenik problem were likely to be ignored by its readers.
Image 3.4 - The Haunting of Red Boris. Daily Mirror. 3 November 1976
What is perhaps most notable about the reporting of the 35's in the media is how the
group is often referred to as an authority for information, something that stands somewhat in
contrast to its protests and demonstrations. For example, an article in The Times on 29 April 1985
reported the transfer of the refusenik losif Begun to a jail in Moscow, referring to the Women's
Campaign for Soviet Jewry as its sole source of evidence. This position as a reputable source of
information becomes commonplace in articles referring to the 35's in the 1980s.504 By being seen
as a reliable source of information, the 35's occupied an interesting position for a pressure group,
and one that had many benefits. By the late 1980s they were in a position to offer information to
the press in the knowledge that it would be considered for publication. This gave a direct link
between the campaign and journalists, something that the previously media friendly campaigns
had sought to achieve.
504 See 'Refuseniks's jail transfer', The Times, 29 April 1985, p.8; and 'The Waitnik Test', The Times, 28
November 1985, p. 13.
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This authority was boosted by the regular circular produced by the 35's central office
from June 1978 onwards. This bulletin contained an array of up-to-date information on the plight
of refuseniks, including an array of clippings from the media and information about individual
refuseniks. sosThis publication was a way in which the central 35's office distributed the
information that it had collated about refuseniks to a wider audience. Alongside this, the 35's
circular also contained details of the demonstrations and events that regional groups had
conducted. Whilst this bulletin was not as professionally produced as materials on Soviet
dissenters by other groups active in this area, such asAmnesty, the 35's bulletin contained a high
level of information on the position of refuseniks. This material would have undoubtedly been
useful for journalists and other concerned activists interested in the position of Soviet Jewry.
The relationship between the 35's and the British press was not a one way affair.
Members of the 35's played a significant role in passing information on the plight of the refuseniks
to members of the British press. The most prominent example of this occurring is the relationship
between Bernard levin and Michael Sherbourne, a prominent member of the 35's whose role in
supporting the Anglo-Soviet Jewry movement deserves particular attention.
Michael Sherbourne
News flew around Moscow and the West that the KGBwas planning to confine me to a psychiatric
hospital. In a telephone conversation Michael Sherbourne convinced me that "they wouldn't dare
do that," and he informed me that official representatives in England were trying to clarify my
situation. "Ida, don't be afraid," he shouted into the receiver. "Don't be afraid, they won't dare."
Ida Nudel, A Hand in the DarknessSD6
Michael Sherbourne was the main link between the 35's and the refuseniks in the Soviet
Union. The vast majority of the 35's were female, something which is perhaps obvious given the
official name of the group, however there was a small male presence within the activities of the
campaign. Husbandsof 35ers regularly attended demonstrations and offered their support for the
sosA collection of the 35's circular is available from June 1978 through to December 1985 in the papers of
Peter Reddaway, held at the Global Resources Center, Gelman Library, George Washington University,
Washington D.C, USA.
S06 I. Nudel, A Hand in the Darkness: The Autobiography of a Refusenik (New York, 1990) p. 94.
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campaign. There were, however, no men within the leadership of the 35's. This is perhaps due to
the social status of many of the 35's. Many of the husbands of 35ers were in full time
employment and unable to dedicate the amount of time that their wives could to such a
campaign. Indeed, Margaret Rigal noted that if the campaign were to have occurred in the
twenty-first century, the leading 35ers would not have had the time to dedicate to this cause as
they would also be in a professional careers.?"
Sherbourne was in regular telephone contact with a variety of different refuseniks in the
Soviet Union, having learnt Russian from a 'Teach Yourself' book after a bet with a fellow student
that he wouldn't be able to.S08In the 1970s and 1980s he spent upwards of 35 hours a week
telephoning refuseniks, a figure which is even more notable when it is added that he also worked
full time as a teacher.S09 Martin Gilbert neatly describes Sherbourne's efforts in his biography of
Anatoly Shcharansky - 'Sherbourne's Russian was fluent, and his devotion to the refuseniks
total,.SlO Sherbourne's conversations with refuseniks in the late 1960s can be considered as the
start of the Anglo-Jewish response to the refusenik problem. George Rigal, the husband of
Margaret, noted that Sherbourne himself was the entirety of the Soviet Jewry movement in
Britain for a long period.511 Sherbourne's efforts in supporting the refuseniks were supported
financially by Cyril Stein. Stein, the former Chairman of the bookmakers Ladbrokes and Jewish
philanthropist, paid Sherbourne's telephone bill every month, which given the frequency that he
was calling both the Soviet Union and activists in the United States was a substantial amount.512
Stein also offered significant financial support to the 35's, funding their office and aspects of their
• 513campaign,
The ferocity with which Sherbourne went about his support for the refuseniks has led
Gerlis to describe his efforts in the 1960s as a 'one man battle' fought by someone who was never
507 Interview with George and Margaret Rigal, 25 February 2010.
508 Interview with George and Margaret Rigal, 25 February 2010, Interview with Michael Sherbourne, 9 May
2011.
S09 Gerlis, Those Wonderful Women in Black, p. 19; Interview with Michael Sherbourne, 9 May 2011.
510 Gilbert, Shcharansky, p. 39.
511 Interview with George and Margaret Rigal, 25 February 2010.
512 Interview with Michael Sherbourne, 9 May 201l.
513 Gerlis, Those Wonderful Women in Black, p. 39.
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afraid to 'show his head above the parapet,.514 Sherbourne's battles included vociferous attacks
against the seeming inaction from established Jewish bodies in the UK, such as the British Board
of Deputies, to support Soviet Jewry. In an open letter dated 28 June 1977, circulated to Soviet
Jewry campaigners in Britain, Sherbourne vented his frustration at the lack of action to support
the refusenik Anatoly Shcharansky from the Jewish leadership in Britain. He accused the Jewish
leadership of 'cowardice, blindness, ineptitude, complacency' and simply concluded that
'SHCHARANSKY MUST BE SAVED,.m This letter can be seen as a clear and urgent call for action
from the Jewish community in Britain by Sherbourne, who had a strong personal relationship with
Shcharansky, built up in the course of their telephone conversations. A passionate desire to take
active steps to support Soviet Jewry was a trait that Sherbourne shared with the 35's, something
that led to him working closely with them. Sherbourne's admiration for the work of the 35's can
be seen within this open letter in which he notes that 'were it not for the wonderful ladies of the
35's for whom I have the greatest respect, Shcharansky's name would be forgotten in this
country' .516
51. Gerlis, Those Wonderful Women in Black, p. 18.
515 M. Sherbourne, 'THISISNOTAN INFORMATIONSHEET.IT ISAN ACCUSATION'open letter dated
28/06/1977, UofS, MS 254/1/3/9. Block capitals were used in the original document to highlight this section
and have been replicated in this text. The full text of this open letter is given in Appendix 3.
516 Sherbourne, 'THISISNOTAN INFORMATIONSHEET.IT ISAN ACCUSATION'.In the letter itselfthis section
is in block capitals, seemingly to highlight this particular sentence. I have quoted this in lowercase in order
to aid the readability of this piece.
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Image 3.S - Michael Sherbourne at home
The term refusenik itself was coined by Sherbourne in 1971, who translated it from the
Russian otkoznik, after it had been translated into Hebrew for him by the refusenik Gabriel
Shapiro.517 The subsequent international recognition of this term illustrates the importance not
only of Sherbourne's conversations with Soviet Jews, but also of the 35's in spreading this
information to the extent that his definition has now entrenched itself in the discourse on Soviet
dissent. This is in itself indicative of the role played by Sherbourne and the 35's in development of
knowledge regarding the refuseniks in Britain. Although this term is perhaps an obvious and direct
translation from the Russian, it is perhaps testament to the work of the 35's that it stuck in the
public discourse as opposed to other terms such as 'waitnik' or 'refusednik' which had also been
517
http://www.angelfire.com!sc3!soviet jews exodus!English!WhoHelped s!WhoHelpedSherbourne.shtml
(accessed12 April 2010 - article in The Jerusalem Post, 15 March 1990) Otkaznik derives from the Russian
term Otkaz (refusal) hence the literal translation of refusenik.
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used to describe the position of Soviet Jewry that had been refused exit visas. Especially so given
the more accurate definition of the position of Soviet Jewry given by these other terms.
Sherbourne's greatest influence on the wider knowledge of the plight of the refuseniks
was through his conversations with Bernard levin. Sherbourne's link with levin is arguably the
most significant area where the work of the 35's was thrust into the British press. After being told
of the position of the refuseniks by Sherbourne, levin demanded that he contact a refusenik
family using his telephone.518 Levin wanted to know more about what their neighbours in the
Soviet Union thought about their plight. It was at this point that Sherbourne had to explain the
levels of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, and that refuseniks told their neighbours nothing of
their situation through fear of reprisals.s19 levin appears not to have initially understood the
position of the refuseniks, and this enlightenment is arguably illustrated in the venom with which
he wrote his later articles on the persecution occurring within the Soviet Union. He considered
the persecuted as the 'true heroes' in the Soviet Union, and called for British people to take
immediate action to support them. 520
The initially na 'we response from Levin was perhaps born out of his previous lack of
knowledge of the plight of the refuseniks, something which Sherbourne had corrected in a
seemingly revelatory fashion for him. It would not, therefore, be an exaggeration to state that
Levin's articles in The Times on the persecution of refuseniks were due to the efforts of, and
information provided by the 35's. Not only did Sherbourne fundamentally effect the discourse on
the refusenik movement by defining them, his impact on the articles written by levin meant that
his influence was felt on a much larger scale on the British public.
Sherbourne's efforts in telephoning Soviet Jewswere very well received by the refuseniks.
Sherbourne built up strong personal links with many refuseniks, treating them as an extension of
his family. Sherbourne campaigned tirelessly on behalf of Anatoly Shcharansky,and built up a very
518 Interviewwith MichaelSherbourne,9 May2011.
519 Gerlis,Those wonderful Women In Black, p. 20.
520 Foranexampleof thesearticlesseeLevin.B., 'Try a logicalphonecallto Moscow',The Times, 15January
1981,p. 14;andLevin,B.,'Will Britishpsychiatriststake actionsagainstthe torturers of the SovietUnion',
The Times, 3July1975 p. 14.
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strong rapport not only with Anatoly, but also his wife Avital and his close friends and family.
Undoubtedly due to this link, the report of Shcharansky's trial first came to the West through
Sherbourne's conversations with Leonid Shcharansky, Anatoly's brother. Leonid recalled the
details of the trial to Sherbourne shortly after it had occurred, giving as close a transcript of the
events as possible.521After Shcharansky was released from imprisonment and left the Soviet
Union in February 1986, he spent some time with Sherbourne at his house in London. The
photographs of this occasion, as seen in Image 3.6, suggest that this was a very friendly occasion.
Indeed, they more closely resemble photographs of a family event rather than the meeting of a
former prisoner of conscienceand an activist who worked on his behalf.
Image 3.6 - Michael Sherbourne. Anatoly Shcharansky. Muriel Sherbourne and Avital
Shcharansky. london 1986
Sherbourne's personal relations with the refuseniks were also noted in the Soviet Union
itself. In the course of his many telephone conversations with Soviet Jews he built up close
friendships. One of these was with the prominent refusenik Ida Nudel. Sherbourne had sent a
copy of a photograph of himself in the midst of a telephone conversation (see Image 3.5) to Nudel
521 Interview with Michael Sherbourne, 9 May 2011.
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to serve as a memory that there were people in the West concerned with her plight. This
photograph was placed in a prominent position in her home, and can be clearly seen in a
photograph that she sent to Sherbourne as shown in Image 3.7. Nudel's house was later searched
by the KGB, and according to Sherbourne the only item taken was the photograph of himself.522
This suggests that not only were the KGB trying to intimidate refuseniks by attempting to sever
their links with Western activists, but also that they were aware of whom the figure in this
photograph was. Sherbourne's activism had clearly been noted by the KGB, who had attempted
to discredit him in the Soviet press, referring to him as 'the British Lord Sherbourne', and
denouncing him as a fascist.523
Image 3.7 -Ida Nudel at home. (photograph of Michael Sherbourne circled in red)
Alongside the dissemination of information received via Sherbourne, the 35's were
involved in actively pressuring the Soviet authorities to give refuseniks exit visas. This campaigning
focused on the Soviet embassy in London, where 35ers took an array of petitions and letters. The
staff of the Soviet embassy in London, perhaps unsurprisingly, were very cold in their response to
522 Interview with Michael Sherbourne: 9 May 2011.
523 Gerlis, Those Wonderful Women in Black, p. 20 - 21.
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the 35's. In the 1970s a weekly letter was delivered by a 35er to the Soviet embassy in london
which outlined the reports of persecution that had occurred in the Soviet Union that week. The
embassy staff refused to accept these letters, initially locking the door and then the gate on the
street to stop these deliveries. Margaret Rigal recalled one occasion when she was delivering the
letter and by chance came acrossa member of the embassy staff as she approached the embassy:
I stood there and he came along with his key or whatever and I said 'oh how nice, do you think
you could take this letter in for me'. You see it was all charm and smiles and everything else. He
took the letter and he looked at it and he recognised it for what it was and he looked at me and
he told me what I could do and where I should be...lf he could have absolutely slaughtered me he
would have done so. It was real, real hatred.524
The threat of violence, although never actually followed through against the 35's was ever
present in their campaign. John Simpson was correct in noting that it took 'real guts' for the 35's
to stand up to the Soviet authorities.S2S This defiance of threats by the Soviet authorities is most
notable in the recollection of the visits to the Soviet Union by the Rigals.Margaret Rigal recalled
an experience she had in a Moscow airport as shewent through customs with her husband. After
being separated from other passengers in the queue for security clearance, the Rigalswere taken
out of the queue and led to a different area of the airport. Upon being forced to wait by the
Soviet officials, Margaret simply sat down on the counter and started reading her book,
something which greatly angered the officials. 526
Margaret Rigal'ssheer defiance at the actions of the Soviet guards is remarkable given her
circumstances. She was one of the leading figures of a Western group formed to protest the
actions of the Soviet authorities, who was undoubtedly followed by members of the KGB during
her trip, and was arguably at their mercy in the airport. Yet she still had the nerve to protest at
the actions of the security guard, retelling the events almost as a farce. Indeed, portraying this
event in a humorous and almost ludicrous manner shows the resolve of the 35ers. The fact that
this resilience occurred alongside the knowledge that some of her Russian friends had been
imprisoned for 'sixteen days at a time for nothing', with some of them going on to serve much
524 Interviewwith GeorgeandMargaretRigal,25 February2010.
525 letter from JohnSimpsonto the 35's dated 12September1994, UofS,MS254/1/3/9.
526 Interviewwith GeorgeandMargaretRigal,25 February2010.
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longer sentences, makes this resilience stronger still.527 Perhaps what gave the 35's the upper
hand in this situation was that, in their opinion, the Russianauthorities 'weren't very clever' and
more importantly that they kept their own laws.S28This emphasises the point that the 35's
recognised their campaign as an intellectual battle, rather than a physical one, in which as long as
they stuck to the rules they would be unharmed. This is certainly prevalent throughout their
public demonstrations, with a clear emphasis on the spread of information and legality rather
than unlawful disruption of any Soviet cultural activity. The central core of the 35's were unafraid
of threats from the Soviet officials, undoubtedly due to the strong desire to do all they could to
help the refuseniks. DaphneGerlis, herself a member of the 35's, puts this neatly, stating that:
Every 35er stressed that whatever 'risks' they may have taken and whatever inconveniences they
may have encountered, faded into insignificance when compared with the knowledge that the
freedom which they accepted as their birthright, was now being experienced by those for whom
they had worked.529
In this intellectual conflict, not only were the 35's convinced that their efforts would not
lead to physical repercussions but they knew that any hardship they were to endure would pale
into insignificance to the eventual freedom given to others.
Threats to the 35's were not limited to the Soviet authorities. The response of the British
far left was also very negative, who considered the efforts of the 35's as verging on heretical.
Margaret Rigal notes that despite their negative response, she understood the criticisms of the
British Communists, recognising that they had put 'all of their eggs in the Communist basket' and
that they 'were elderly and too old to change'. Indeed, she noted that 'they had done their bit in
their time' by fighting against the British fascists of the 1930s, and were understandably reluctant
to oppose the actions of a group that denounced the ideology they had done so much to
support.530 Rigal's understanding of the resentment from the British Communists is perhaps
telling of her own position. By recognising the previous resistance that the British Communists
5271bid.
5281bid.
529 Gerlis, Those Wonderful Women in Black, p. 181.
530 Interview with George and Margaret Rigal, 25 February 2010.
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offered to the fascist threat earlier in the century, it is possible that she recognised the
importance of upholding principle; a positive attribute that the 35's appear to have adhered to.
The 35's were always very keen to attain the ears of those in positions of power within
the British government. Margaret Rigal offered an interesting analogy of her relationship with
those in the British government, noting:
it takes five years of writing regularly before they really take any interest in you and it's ten years
before they trust you enough to do something, after twenty years they say 'oh hello Margaret'
without knowing who you are or what you are, they know the name but they don't know the
face.m
Margaret Rigal appears to denote herself as 'part of the furniture' in the corridors of
British government, in itself a testament to the frequency with which she was in and around
Westminster. Her recollection is also telling in that it displays the good relationship that she held
with members of Parliament, something that was regularly utilised in appeals. She recalls that
after she took up the position within the 35's as the MPscontact, she could get 'a hundred MPs to
sign anything more or less'.S32This is revealing not only of the relationship that Rigal had with
MPs, but also as to how she utilised this link in the group's campaigns, using the reputation of
politicians to support petitions.
The tenacity of the 35's campaign is clear to see from the groups archive, held at the
University of Southampton. The sheer amount of correspondence between the 35's and individual
MPs is staggering, with regular appeals sent from the 35's en masse to MPs. On the whole,
responses to these appealswere positive, with regular offers to sign a petition or send a letter to
the Soviet ambassador. What is notable about the responses to these appeals is that they are not
isolated to MPs from particular parties or areas of the country, perhaps illustrating that human
rights abuse in the Soviet Union was a cross-party issue. However, appeals were not always met
with offers of assistance from MPs. An example of this came from Robert Adley who declined to
help the 35's in a letter dated 13 July, 1978, stating:
531 Interview with George and Margaret Rigal, 25 February 2010.
s32lbid.
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I am as concerned for the persecuted citizens of the Soviet Union as I am for Palestinians deprived
of the right to live in the land in which they were born. So Imust decline your invitation.m
Rigal's response to this letter was one of restraint, and indeed respect for the position of
an MP, something that she recalls played a substantial part in gaining the support of MPs.m Her
response appears to be an attempt to change the opinion of Adley, putting her call for assistance
in more humanistic terms stating that any increase of freedom for a minority would affect the rest
of mankind.m This shows not only her attempts to persuade dissenting opinion, but also her
persistence and restraint in doing so.
What is interesting about the support from MPs is that it did not translate directly into
Parliamentary speeches on the work of the 35's. The 35's are rarely mentioned in Hansard; the
only reference to the group occurred in the House of Lords on 29 June 1977, when Lord Hylton
asked the Government representative, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, what was being done in response
to the abrupt expulsion of three leading 35ers from Yugoslavla.t" What is apparent, however, is
that there were an array of MPs who regularly raised the plight of the refuseniks in parliament in
the 1970s and 1980s. For example, on 11 May, 1983, Alec Woodall asked the then Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Malcolm Rifkind if on a recent trip to Moscow he
had raised the plight of Vladimir Slepak and Alexander Lerner with the Soviet authorities. In the
same debate, John Blackburn also asked after 'Yosef Begum,S37and 'others of his religion,.s38 The
three refuseniks mentioned here were among those whose plights were prominently promoted
by the 35's.m It is likely, therefore, that these MPs had received information about these
533 Letter to Margaret Rigaldated 13 July 1978, UofS, MS254/1/1/l.
534Interview with George and Margaret Rigal, 25 March 2010.
535Letter to Robert Adley from Margaret Rigaldated 2 August 1978, UofS, MS 254/1/1/l.
536Hansard, Houseof Lords, 29 June 1977, Vol. 384, cc 1212 -1214, available at
http://hansard.millbanksvstems. com/written answersl1977/i un/29lvugoslavia-expu Ision-of-briti sh-
citizens#S5LV0384PO19770629 LWA 6 (Accessed4 August 2010).
537 This appears to be a typing error in Hansard, referring to the refusenik losif Begun.
538Hansard, House of Commons, 11May 1983, Vol. 42, c317W, available at
http://hansard.millbanksvstems.com/written answers/1983/mavI11/soviet-union-human-
rights#S6CV0042PO19830511 CWA 172 (Accessed4 August 2010).
539See 'Releaseof Shcharansky', dated 11 February 1986, UofS, MS 254/1/3/23; Sherbourne 'THISISNOT
AN INFORMATIONSHEET.IT ISAN ACCUSATION'UofS,MS 254/1/3/9; and Draft of Albert Hall Leaflet, UofS,
MS 254/1/3/46.
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individuals from the 35's, and had raised their plight in Parliament without directly referencing
where their information had come from.
In her position as the MPs contact, Margaret Rigal also made connections with many
leading MPs. Notably, the relationship between the 35's and Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime
Minister between 1979 and 1990, was strong. Thatcher was deeply concerned about the human
rights abuses in the Soviet Union, a point she regularly made in her correspondence with the 35's.
Margaret Rigal herself noted that:
Margaret Thatcher was really a very active supporter and she knew more about what was going
on, and the details of the refuseniks than many of our members. She was this extraordinary
mixture of sympathy and not sympathy. And she was sympathetic to the refuseniks that was
something she understood and sympathised with. And she was [a] very nice woman.S40
Rigal's statement on Thatcher is mirrored by correspondence between Rita Eker and
Thatcher. In a letter dated is" March, 1992, Eker puts her thanks for Thatcher's efforts in the
strongest terms:
We have thanked you on so many occasions for the constant and unequalled assistance you have
given us. We really find it impossible to express our appreciation for all that you have done for us.
On behalf of all Soviet Jews (and the Soviet Germans, Armenians and other minorities who built
on our campaign) thank you once more. You, at the head of the Foreign Office, led the struggle
for human rights which in the end opened Soviet gates to freedom. Without you the world would
be a very different place.soll
The good relationship between the 35's and Thatcher was maintained through regular
correspondence between the two throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Both Eker and Rigal regularly
sent Thatcher letters, often congratulating her for a landmark in office or a successful election
result with a bouquet of flowers, or simply to give her a copy of the latest 35's calendar.542 This
was in an attempt to keep the relationship with the Prime Minister as strong as possible so that
information about the persecution of refuseniks could be directly sent to the highest political
office in Britain, and ensuring that it would be recognised.
S40 Interview with George and Margaret Rigal, 2S February 2010.
541 Correspondence with Margaret Thatcher 1973 -1982: letter from Rita Eker to Margaret Thatcher dated
18 March 1992, UofS,MS 254/1/1/31.
542 For examples of these letters see Correspondence with Margaret Thatcher, UofS, MS 254/1/1/29.
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There are several factors that have influenced Thatcher's interest in the 35's. Firstly, it
must be noted that in her position as MP for Finchley, many leading 35ers - including Michael
Sherbourne and Rita Eker - were her constituents. This may well have had an impact on the
petitions that were sent to Parliament by these 35ers, as this would have been the first port of
call for many of these appeals. Secondly, the very fact that it was the Women's Campaign for
Soviet Jewry may well have had an affect on Thatcher. Given her prominent position as the
leading female member of the House of Commons, she may have felt more empathy for this
women's group and for the action that they took in the face of seeming inaction by the Board of
British Deputies, with its predominantly male executive.
Thatcher also benefitted from her good relationship with the 35's. Close links with this
organisation meant that she could get the latest information from them regarding the refuseniks,
something that was undoubtedly useful for the government to have. In a letter to Rita Eker dated
2 August 1982 regarding the worsening position of Anatoly Shcharansky, Thatcher requests that
any information received by the 35's regarding Shcharansky be treated with 'suitable discretion'
and forwarded to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This could be taken to mean that either
the 35's were to distribute this information in a sensible manner, omitting anything that may have
harmed the prospects of his release or that this information was not to be distributed to anyone
but the government. Either way, this placed the 35's in control of the information that they had
received, suggesting a level of trust that the Prime Minister had in the work of the group. What is
clear, however, is that it shows an insistence on being informed of the latest developments on
Shcharanskythat the 35's had, suggesting that Thatcher held their information in high regard. This
statement is underlined in hand by Thatcher, seemingly only to highlight the importance that she
placed on it.54] This is not to suggest that she utilised the 35's simply as a source of information,
but that her good relations with its leading members created a flow of information into the
government regarding the refuseniks, something that the British Embassy in Moscow has
subsequently been accused of failing to effectively do for both Soviet Jewry and the wider
543 Correspondence with Margaret Thatcher 1973 - 1982: Letter from Margaret Thatcher to Rita Eker, dated
2 August 1982, UofS, MS 254/1/1/31.
206
dissident movement in this period.S44 Finally, it was doubtless that Thatcher felt a genuine
sympathy for the plight of the refuseniks and other dissidents in the Soviet Union, and wanted to
help in anyway that she could. It must also be noted that Thatcher had a clear interest in the
protection of human rights, especially in the Soviet Union and other totalitarian states. Her
relationships with human rights groups and prominent individuals involved who supported human
rights, such as the 35's and Vladimir Bukovsky, were strong, which suggests that she placed high
importance to this issue.s4sIndeed Thatcher's admiration and support for human rights
campaigners in this period is made clear throughout her memoirs.S46It is perhaps a combination
of all of these factors that explain why the relationship between the 35's and Thatcher was as
good as it was.
Regardlessof the reasoning behind Thatcher's support for the 35's, it is clear that her
assistance was not only most welcomed by its members, but incredibly useful. For example, a
letter sent to Thatcher from the 35's in December 1984 offered their thanks for her acceptance of
a sack of postcards to be delivered to the Soviet Embassyfrom 10 Downing Street. This letter
notes that the Soviet Embassywould never accept such a delivery from a group such as the 35's,
but that they would 'hesitate to refuse them if they came from Downing Street,.547This not only
gave the 35's the ability, in this instance, to ensure that the Soviet Embassy received their
delivery, but that it came with the apparent endorsement of the British government - a very
powerful affirmation of support for their campaign, and something that would have undoubtedly
raised their profile in the eyes of the Soviet authorities.
The good relationship with authority enjoyed by the 35's extended to the way in which
the police responded to their demonstrations. Margaret Rigal notes the positive response of the
police to the 35's demonstrations, remarking that it broke up their often monotonous days on the
544 Interview with Michael Bourdeaux, 24 February 2010.
545 Boobbyer, 'Vladimir Bukovskii and Soviet Communism', p.46S.
S46 M. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London, 1993) p.452 and p. 813
547 Correspondence with Margaret Thatcher 1983 - 1987, Letter to Margaret Thatcher from Rita Eker and
Margaret Rigal, Dated 13 December 1984, UofS, MS 254/1/1/30.
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beat in London.S48 This response from the police was partly due to the fact that they trusted the
35ers not to be violent or aggressive in their protests. Rigal argues that this response from the
police would not occur in modern london due to the constant threat of violence and terrorism in
the twenty-first century.S49The only occasionwhere the police had to take direct action was when
a group of 35ers had chained themselves to the railings of the Foreign Office in london, a criminal
offence in British law. Interestingly, the police were forced to use wire cutters to break the
handcuffs and release the protestors. Rigalclaims that these wire cutters had not been used since
the handcuffs of the suffragettes had been broken, possibly illustrating a symbolic link between
the two groups.ssoEven in the aftermath of this demonstration, where thirty 35ers were arrested
and eventually brought to court for their actions, Rigal recalled that no charges were brought
except warnings to stay out of trouble for six months. SSl Despite having committed a criminal
offence, their position as upper-middle class Jewish ladies perhaps helped them in this instance,
and secured a light response from the local magistrate. It must be noted that this law breaking
was certainly the exception, rather than the rule of the 35's demonstrations.
What is most notable about the police response to the public demonstrations by the 35's
is the apparent leniency with which they were treated, and the relative freedom that these
demonstrators were given, allowing protests to occur at the visits of Soviet dignitaries. This is
something that was met with great shock by the Soviet dignitaries who visited Britain. George
Rigal recalls the Mayor of Moscow being made visibly shaken by these demonstrations, eventually
cutting his visit to London short.ss2 He noted that some of these Soviet visitors were so taken in by
their own propaganda that they believed that the 35's demonstrations were being carried out
under the order of the British Government.SS3 Had this been the case, this would have only
heightened the impact of the 35's campaigns, which would have been considered more seriously
by the Soviet authorities. Whether this had any impact on the lives of refuseniks is unclear;







however it certainly raised the profile of the 35's amongst the Soviet hierarchy and meant that
their threat was considered seriously.
Given the background of the majority of its members, it is somewhat surprising to
consider the lengths to which the campaigns of the 35's went, and the potential risks that they
took. The extent of these campaigns illustrate the drive these individuals had to support
refuseniks and that they had a genuine determination in their efforts. In a statement entitled 'The
First Ten Years', the 35's noted that they had been formed 'by a group of Jewish housewives who
had become impatient by the lack of support for Soviet Jewry from Anglo-Jewry,.ss4It is clear that
the 35's were a group born out of the inaction of others and a willingness to stand up for the
persecuted refuseniks in the Soviet Union. Why then did this group of predominantly upper-
middle classJewishwomen in london choose to devote huge amounts of time and effort to offer
their support to refuseniks, who, on the whole, they did not initially know? Considering that the
35's were by no means a rigid organisation, it is clear that there is no definitive answer to this
question that would cover the entirety of their membership. However, there a few explanations
for their work that are worth exploring as they reveal several interesting traits about the 35's
themselves.
It may have been that a sense of genuine altruism drove some 35ers to take action to
support refusenik families. Indeed, the personal risks taken by many 35ers and the amount of
financial effort and time put into the work of the campaign needed a senseof selflessnessfrom its
members. However, it would be erroneous to claim that this was the sole reason for the efforts of
the 35's due to the casesthat they supported being predominantly of Jewish faith. The only non-
Jewish dissident that the 35's supported prominently was Andrei Sakharov, who himself was an
active advocate of Jewish freedoms.sssThe shared Jewish background of the 35ers and the
refuseniks is clear to see. It is almost certain that the 35ers felt that they had a duty to stand up
SS4 Women'sCampaignfor SovietJewryAdmin(MargaretRigalandRitaEker'spersonalfiles),Undated
statement:"TheFirstTenYears",UofS,MS254/1/3/2.
m Women'sCampaignfor SovietJewryAdminPublicHandouts'SakharovDay'appeal(OSJune1984) UofS,
MS254/1/3/23.
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against the persecution of the refuseniks, with whom they undoubtedly felt a link due to their
common religious faith. Jewish believers have been subjected to a vast amount of persecution
throughout their history, most notably in the Tsarist pogroms in Russia and the Holocaust
instigated by fascists in Eastern Europe. The 35's may have therefore been dedicating their efforts
to supporting those who were being persecuted for holding the same beliefs as them. As
mentioned above, the 35's outweighed the threats that they were faced with by the sensation of
succeeding in securing the freedom of any Soviet Jews. In order for such a reasoning to continue
their work in the face of any threats from either Soviet officials or members of the British public
they had to have a significant bond with those that they assisted. This bond came in the form of a
shared Jewish faith. Margaret Rigaltalks about this bond, highlighting the necessity of trust:
This is where the Jewshad it compared to anyone else cause the Jewstrusted each other and this
is one of the things that made all the difference. When Michael [Sherbourne] got onto Viktor they
were two people who understood what the other one was talking about. When we were in there
they trusted us and we trusted them. Admittedly you could occasionally get somebody who
wasn't trustworthy but it was very seldom,ss6
This trust was something felt to be beyond a friendship. The links between the 35's and
the refuseniks that they campaigned for, although seemingly an obvious reason for their efforts,
should not be underestimated as a coincidental reason for their efforts. Trust was paramount to
the activities of the 35's. There was more to the efforts of the 35's than just a simple identification
with their Soviet counterparts. There was a genuine trust between the two groups, something
more akin to a familial relationship than to a casual identification with a fellow believer in a
different land. This is clear in the relationship that Michael Sherbourne had with refuseniks such
as Shcharansky and Nudel. When it is considered that many British Jews had descendents who
had emigrated from the territory of the Soviet Union in response to the persecution of the early
twentieth century, this familial link becomes more pronounced. Indeed, the photographic images
SS6lnterview with George and Margaret Rigal, 25 February 2010. Viktor's surname is unknown.
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and recollections of the visits of 35ers to refusenik families in the Soviet Union held in the 35's
archive could easily be mistaken for photographs of family events,"?
Although the relationship of trust between these Jews offers an explanation for the
efforts of the 35's, it does not explain the direction of the group itself, nor why it was committed
to the dissemination of information regarding the refuseniks rather than a more aggressive, or
even militant approach. The reasoning for this perhaps lies in the history of the Anglo-Jewish
community, especially its response to the persecution of Jews during the Holocaust of the 1930s
and 1940s. The efforts of the 35's can be attributed to the attempt to fill the void in public
knowledge about the persecution of refuseniks in the Soviet Union. This was in direct response to
the lack of information circulated in Britain about the Holocaust in the 1930s and 1940s.The need
to educate the British public about the position of Soviet Jewry was doubtless seen by the 35's in
the same light as the need to educate about the events of the Holocaust. Margaret Rigal noted
the distinct lack of education that she had about the 'big politics' surrounding the events of the
Holocaust, and was determined that she wouldn't let her children grow up 'not knowing
anything' .!>S8 When this is considered in relation to the sheer amount of material compiled by the
35's about the persecution of Jews in the Soviet Union, it becomes apparent that there was an
educational aspect to their work. The 35's wanted to educate the wider public about the
persecutions that occurred in the Soviet Union before they became an afterthought or regret that
people wished they had known about. Tied up with this is the potential to prevent another
tragedy comparable to the Holocaust, something which, given the religious ties of the 35's, would
have had a particularly strong resonance. It can be argued that the activity of the 35's was in fact
a post-emptive reaction to the Holocaust, and a pre-emptive attempt to halt further persecution
in the Soviet Union. An example of the link that the 35's felt between the Holocaust and the
persecution of Soviet Jewry can be seen in delivery of Jewish books to the Soviet Union in October
1988. This delivery occurred on the fiftieth anniversary of the Kristallnacht, an event that has
557 See 35's Photographs of meetings with refuseniks, UofS, MS 254/4/1-18.
5S1 Interview with George and Margaret Rigal, 25 February 2010.
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been described as the beginning of the Holocaust.sSg The delivery of Jewish books was in an
attempt to preserve Jewish culture within the Soviet Union, and such a delivery date is clearly
laden with emotive reasoning.
The link between the events of the Holocaust and the persecution of the refuseniks is also
clearly noted in Michael Sherbourne's venomous open letter dated 28 June 1977, in which he
criticised the lack of action from the Jewish leadership in Britain towards the persecution of Soviet
Jewry. Sherbourne discussesthe sentencing of Shcharansky in this letter, noting that the prison
sentence he received was substantially shorter than that of Yuri Orlov. Shcharansky's criminal
offence was being a member of the Helsinki Monitoring Group in Moscow, of which Orlov was its
chairman. Sherbourne argued that:
Clearly Shcharansky is on trial for his life because he is a Jewish leader and meanwhile Jewish
leaders here twiddle their thumbs - they have forgotten DREYFUS- they have forgotten MENDEL
BElLIS- they have forgotten the HOLOCAUST- they have never heard of ENTEBBE.s60
The accusation from Sherbourne is clear. He concluded that Shcharansky was
disproportionally punished because he was a prominent Jewish figure in the Soviet Union. He felt
that ignorance of the persecution of Soviet Jews by the Jewish leadership in Britain was
inexcusable, especially so given the persecution of the figures that he lists. The link between the
persecution of refuseniks and the Holocaust was not only a very powerful manner with which to
highlight the plight of Soviet Jewry, but also a way to rally a strong emotional response from
British Jews.
559 See M. Gilbert, Kristollnocht: Prelude to Destruction (London, 2007).
560 Sherbourne, 'THIS IS NOT AN INFORMATION SHEET. IT ISAN ACCUSATION'. Block capitals and
underlining by Sherbourne, replicated in this quotation to show emphasis. Alfred Dreyfus was a Jewish
officer in the French Army who in 1894 was convicted on dubious evidence of spying for Prussia. This case
exposed widespread anti-Semitism within French society, and led to the official separation of Church and
State. See R. Overy 'Review of The Dreyfus Affair by Piers Paul Read', The New Statesman, 23 January 2012,
available at http:Uwww.newstatesman.com/books/2012/01/dreyfus-affair-france-army (accessed 29 May
2012) Mendel Beilis was a Ukrainian Jew accused ritually murdering a Christian boy in 1911. These charges
were later dismissed, and were clearly fabricated. See H. Levinson, 'A dark lie through the ages', BBC News
Online, 23 January 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/magazine/3420595.stm (accessed 29 May
2012). In July 1976, Israeli soldiers rescued a group of hostages held by pro-Palestinian hijackers at Entebbe
airport in Uganda. For details of this raid, see R. Berg, 'Recollections of Entebbe, 30 years on', BBC News
Online, 2 July 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hilworld/middle east/5101412.stm (accessed 29
May 2012).
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The urgency of the efforts of the 35's perhaps explains the threat that they felt that the
Soviet Jews faced, and the need to prevent a potential genocide. This perhaps explains Margaret
Rigal's particular pride in her recollection of the efforts of the 35's, something that neatly points
to the reasons for the efforts of the 35's and the success that they had:
Everybody that we had been struggling for came out, I don't think anyone was left behind at al1.561
Keston College
East-West relations are bedevilled by sloganising and facile generalisations. Keston College
provides the basis for a more informed dialogue on the subject of religion in Communist lands.
Anyone who pretends to an understanding of the present and future shape of Eastern Europe
must take the contribution of religious belief seriously. Keston is doing invaluable work in
providing the raw material upon which a really informed and scholarly analysis of contemporary
religious trends in Communist countries can be built. The staff are working in a very complex and
difficult area and deserve the greatest encouragement and support from the Churches and bodies
they seek to serve.
Robert Runcie, Archbishop of Canterbury562
Whilst the 35's were notorious for their demonstrations and active form of campaigning,
other groups took a more academic approach to the issue of religious persecution in the Soviet
Union. Keston College563 were the most important group that took this approach, formed in 1969
to research the oppression of religious belief in the Soviet Union and other communist nations.564
Despite the important role that Keston played in the study of religion in the Soviet Union,
there has been little scholarship dedicated to analysing the group itself. Be Our Voice: The Story of
561 Interview with George and Margaret Rigal, 2SFebruary 2010.
562 letter to Rev.Bernard Tidball from Robert Runcie, dated 26 June 1981, Picture file, Keston College
archive, Baylor University, Waco, Texas.
563 Originally called the Centre for the Study of Religion and Communism at its foundation, it was renamed
Keston College after It obtained premise In the village of Keston, in Bromley, Greater london, where it
conducted the vast majority of its work. The group is now officially called Keston Institute.
S64 Keston CollegeCharity Commission report, available at http://www.charity-
fommission.gov.uk/ShQwcharity/RegisterQfCharities/CharityFramework.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber-3
14103&SubsidiaryNumber=Q (Accessed17 June 2010). The actual date of the formation of Keston is
debatable. The first council meeting of the Centre for the Study of Religion and Communism (CSRC),the
forerunner to Keston Collegewas In 1969, its memorandum and articles of association are dated 9 October,
1970 and Keston Collegewas registered as a charity on 8 September, 1971. Given that the CSRCwas the
precursor to Keston, I take Its first council meeting as the beginning of the group, something which
BourdeauKagreeswith, noting 1969 asthe 'official date of our foundation'. Interview with Michael
Bourdeaux, 24 February 2010. In order to maintain readability, this piece will refer to 'Keston' throughout,
rather than the group's name at the specific time in question.
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Michael Baurdeaux and Keston College, by Jenny Robertson, was the first piece that looked at the
history and background of Keston itself.s6s Published in 1984 as part of the Keston series of
booksS66, it is a general account of the work of Keston from 1970 to 1983. It is also the story of
The Revd Canon Dr Michael Bourdeaux, the Anglican Priest who founded Keston College and was
the driving force of the organisation from its establishment. Robertson's piece is very positive
about the work of Keston. Considering that it was published by Keston and written by an active
Keston member, this Is somewhat unsurprising. The fact that it was published by Keston is in itself
of interest, suggesting that this account is how Keston wanted to be seen by the wider public. The
year of publication of this Keston book is also problematic with regards to an objective view of its
history. Bourdeaux was awarded the Templeton Prize in 1984, in recognition of his research into
the persecution of religious belief in the Soviet Union, the same year as the publication of
Robertson's piece.!I67 Given the International prestige that surrounded the award of the
Templeton Prize, it Is likely that the publication of this book at this time was in celebration of the
work of Bourdeaux, something that would have undoubtedly influenced its composition.
Another piece that considers the history of Keston is the article in the Keston News/etter,
'Ringing the Changes, Keston at Forty (1969-2009)' by Michael Bourdeaux which can be seen as a
reflection on the work of Keston by one of its leading members. S68 This piece is useful in its own
right as an internal recollection and assessment of Keston's work, however, like Robertson's work
it inevitably lacks the critical edge needed in an academic analysis of this group. Its brevity is also
an issue; two and half pages of comment on the forty years of Keston's existence is bound to
leave large areas of significance out. Bourdeaux's writings are important for the analysis of his
!l6S J. Robertson, Be Our Voice: The Story of Michael BourdeauK and Keston College (london, 1984).
S66 A major part of Keston's activism was the publication of research on the position of religious belief in the
Soviet Union. This included a variety of periodicals, including Religion in Communist Lands, Frontier, and the
Keston News Service.A prominent part of this was a collection of self published pieces which formed the
Keston Series.A list of this series, alongside other Keston publications is provided in Appendix 4. The central
role of publications continues In Keston's current guise, producing the biannual Keston Newsletter (available
at http://www.kestQn.org.uk/newsletter.php (accessed9 August 2012)) and an regular bulletin on religion
in contemporary Russian(available (In Russian)at bttp:/Iwww.keston.org.uk/russianreview.php (accessed9
August 2012)).
!l67 For more information on the Templeton Prize see bttp:!/www.templetonprize.org/ (accessed6 August
2010)
S68 M. Bourdeaux, 'Ringing the Changes,Keston at Forty (1969-2009)', Keston Newsletter, No. 10, (2009) pp.
1-3.
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role in the work of Keston, and the part that he played throughout, and it is therefore worth
noting that this short piece is very useful for seeing a condensed version of Keston's history
through Bourdeaux's eyes. However, a much longer set of memoirs or an autobiography would
offer a greater insight.
More recently there have been two pieces in Religion in Eastern Europe, which have
looked at the work of Keston. These pieces have focused primarily on the role of Keston in the
Post-Soviet era. Gerd Stricker and Walter Sawatsky's 'Postscript - Keston Institute in Transition'
offer a brief synopsis of the history of Keston, touching on issues of finance and the group's
aims.569 However, this piece is written as a comparison of Keston with the German group Ga/ube
in der 2. Welt - another organisation researching the persecution of religious believers in the
Soviet Union - and very much in the context of Keston's dramatic changes in late 1990s. The fact
that this article is a postscript to an edition of this journal is in itself indicative of the position of
research into the history of Keston.
Davorin Peterlin's analysis of Keston continues in a similar manner to the work of Stricker
and Sawatsky by focusing on the more recent elements of Keston's transition from 2003 to
2006.570 Peterlin's piece focuses on Keston's publication output in this period, although it does
offer a very brief history of the Keston itself. Of this brief history, little over a page in length, half
of the text is focused on Keston's activities in the post-Soviet era.S71Given the work of Keston in
the 1970s and 1980s in researching and publishing material regarding the Soviet persecution of
religion, this brevity cannot be considered as substantial analysis. It must also be noted that
Peterlin was the Director of Keston Institute in the period of his analysis, and this link undoubtedly
influences his assessmentof Keston's history.
S69 G. StrickerandW. Sawatsky,'Postscript- KestonInTransition',Religion in Eastern Europe, Vol.23,No.3,
(June2(03) pp. 1·8.
~70 D. Peterlin,'AnAnalysisOfThePublishingActivityof KestonInstitute InTheContextOf Its LastThree
YearsOfOperationInOxford(2003·2006)', Religion in Eastern Europe, Vol.30, No.l (February,2010) pp. 1-
17.
m Peterlin,'The PublishingActivityof Keston',p. 2-3.
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The historiography of Keston to date can be split into two groups, internal reflections on
the groups work by its members and commentary on the internal divisions within Keston in the
1990s.What is clearly lacking in the scholarship is an analytical piece on Keston's activity in the
1970s and 1980s, written in the wider post-Cold War context. This section will offer a more
thorough examination of Keston's work in the period 1969 to 1985. This will not only fill a gap in
the scholarship surrounding Keston, but it will also allow comparison of Keston's activities to
other human rights in this period covered by this thesis.
From its inception, Keston developed a reputation as being a reliable research body that
produced quality academic research on the position of religion in the Soviet Union. The academic
foundation of this group can be clearly seen in the background of its four founding members:
Michael Bourdeaux, who was noted for his research into the position of religion in the Soviet
Union; the diplomat and writer Sir John lawrence, noted for his links with the BBCand religious
organisations such as the World Council of Churches; Peter Reddaway, the academic and human
rights activist who has been discussedat length in the course of this thesis; and Leonard Schapiro,
Professor of Political Sciencewith Special Reference to RussianStudies at the London School of
Economics, an influential and well respected academic. Eachof these individuals held established
academic credentials, and a passion for the study of the Soviet Union that was arguably
transmitted through Keston's publications. Eachof these individuals was undoubtedly an expert in
their study of the Soviet Union. Their affiliation to the group from its formation was a great bonus
to Keston, who benefitted from an increased academic reputation from these links. Although all
of these individuals were active in Keston's work, mainly through publication of articles in the
variety of Keston periodicals, Bourdeaux undoubtedly was the leading figure and driving force
behind Keston.
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!mag ux peaking alongside Margaret Thatcher at a Keston College
Train d s 1"1 Angllc n pn st, Bourdeaux's initial knowledge of the persecution of religion
in the SOVI Union w s butl up during a year spent as a student in Moscow as part of a British
Council cultural xch ng th t start d in 1959.572 This year in the Soviet Union gave him the
have b n achi v d by c mic rout alone. As he recalls, 'what I learnt about religion and
human rights in Rus i ...c m not through book knowledge primarily but with my own two
feet' .S7 It could b xp rience of witnessing persecution had a much more
dramatic ff et on ourd ux th nne d mic knowledge of this oppression ever could. It is also
essential to not th imp et th t Bourd ux's faith had on his devotion to his work. When he
return d to Moscow in to conduct r search for his first work Opium of the People, he was
told by fri nds of Church th w s d strov d in Moscow under the pretence of the extension of
S72 Int rvl W WI h bru ry 2010.
S7J IbId.
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the Metro system. He visited this church on his first night in Moscow and bumped into three
Ukrainian women who had travelled to Moscow to distribute a second set of documents to
Westerners about the planned closure of the Pochaev Monastery in Ukraine. The first set of
documents sent by these women had previously made their way to Nicholas Zernov, the Spalding
lecturer in Eastern Orthodox culture at the University of Oxford, via a French school teacher.
Bourdeaux had been informed about these documents by Zernov, and part of his research in the
Soviet Union was to check their authenticity.m Upon meeting these women, Bourdeaux was
motioned to follow them to the outskirts of Moscow so as not to be overheard by others who
might inform the authorities of any conversation that took place. Once at the outskirts, they gave
him documentation about the persecution of Christians in Ukraine which he smuggled out of the
Soviet Union. This chance meeting is described by Bourdeaux as both a 'total and utter
coincidence' and 'the way of the hand of God,.575
Bourdeaux's training in the Russianlanguage whilst on National Service in the Army also
contains these personal religious connotations. Although he originally intended to study French
and German, Bourdeaux was posted a week later than expected due to illness and subsequently
missed the entrance exam for his language training. Upon protesting to the commanding officer,
who took pity on Bourdeaux's position, he was placed on a Russianlanguage training scheme.s76
Given Bourdeaux's Anglican faith, he interpreted these events as a religious calling for his
later work in publicising the religious persecution that occurred in the Soviet Union.577 The feeling
of divine intervention felt by Bourdeaux is most clearly noted in Risen Indeed, in which he states:
God's signature is on the small events of this world just as indelibly as on the large. His two direct




576 M. Bourdeau.,Risen Indeed: Lessons in Faith from the USSR (Purley,1987) pp. 1-3.
m SeeInterviewwith MichaelBourdeaux,19May2010andM. Bourdeaux,'Newsfrom the Centre',RCL,
Vol. 1,No.1, (1973)p. 2.
571 Bourdeau.,Risen Indeed, p.l.
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This clearly explains the passion with which Bourdeaux went about his study of the
persecution of religion In the Soviet Union, and his reasoning behind the direction of his life's
work. It is clear that Bourdeaux's activism was in direct relation to his religious beliefs, and that he
felt his work with Kestonwas part of a personal spiritual calling.
Bourdeaux's witnessing of the persecution of religious belief in the Soviet Union led to a
lifetime of work almost entirely devoted to the publication of these abuses. He wrote a variety of
monographs and extended commentaries on the position of religious beliefs in the Soviet Union.
These include Patriarch and Prophets, Religious Ferment in Russia, Opium of the People and Land
of Crosses.S79Given the relative lack of academic focus on the state of religion in the Soviet Union,
these works still form the basis of the historiography of religious persecution by the Soviet
authorities. This Is perhaps a strange legacy of Bourdeaux's writings, and one that needs revision
given the opening of the state archives after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Indeed, Bourdeaux
recognises that it is time for this scholarship to be revised given that it has gone largely
unchallenged, aside from political denunciations, for over forty years.S80
BourdeaulCbecame notable for his public stance recognising the persecution of religious
believers in the Soviet Union from the mid-1960s onwards. His work in the 1960s, before the
creation of Keston, In publicising the plight of religious believers in the Soviet Union was criticised
by various aspects of British society. Indeed, Bourdeaux recalls the 'outcry of horror' at the
publication of Opium of the People In 1965, and the sense of disbelief at his accusations.SSl His
work in studying and publicising the persecution of religious belief in the Soviet Union in this
period led to the formation of Keston in the late 1960s, of which he played the leading role as its
director. BourdeaulCcontinued to occupy a prominent position throughout the 19705 and 1980s,
519 M. BourdeauJt, Patriarch and Prophets (London, 1969); M. Bourdeaux, Religious Ferment in Russia
(london, 1968); M. Bourdeau)(, Opium o/the People (London, 1965); and M. Bourdeaux, Land of Crosses
(Chulmleigh,1979).
~ Interview with Michael Bourdeaux, 24 February 2010.
SlI Ibid.
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and indeed aside from a short period away from active leadership of the group in the late 1990s
and early 2000s, he remains asPresident to date.~2
Another substantial part of Bourdeaux's work for Keston was as the group's figurehead.
Part of this role involved travelling around the world spreading information about Keston and
trying to attain as wide support as possible. Details of Bourdeaux's visits around the world can be
seen in Keston's academic journal Religion in Communist Lands (RCL),with regular reports of his
trips to America, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and the busy lecture tours that he
undertook there. !>II In his tour of America and Canada,for example, Bourdeaux covered 14 towns
in 23 days, where he delivered lectures primarily to Ukrainian communities who 'expressed great
interest In the work of KestonCollege'.su
Given the academic approach that Keston took to its activism, it is perhaps unsurprising
that a substantial part of Its work was in the construction of an archive of primary material on
religious persecution that occurred in communist states. This was primarily formed of samizdat
pieces brought to Kestonand its members by dissidents and concerned individuals. Xenia Dennen,
the current Chairman of Keston and the editor of Religion in Communist Lands - Keston's
academic journal - from 1973 to 1980, keenly stresses the centrality of this archive to Keston's
purpose. In discussingthe publication of material from Keston, she stated:
We do not put out any information unless its based on properly researched [material], its gotta be
based on documentation wherever possible which is why right from the start we started building
up the archive. The archive is an absolute central part of the structure of Keston.s8s
This need for academic rigor has also been echoed by other leading members of Keston,
including Philip Walters, the former Head of Researchand Executive Director. Walters concurred
with Dennen's remarks, noting that Keston positioned itself as 'a thoroughly reliable source of
sal See Keston promotional lea net (received by the author from Xenia Dennen, the current chairman of
Keston, on 21 May 2010), and Keston Newsletter No. 10, (2009) (available online at
http://www.keston,orgukLnew5Ietter.phQ accessed 23 June 2010).
SI) See M. BourdeaulC, 'News from Keston', RCL,Vol. 2, No.3, (1974) p. 28; and M. Bourdeaux, 'News from
Keston', RCI..Vol. 4, No.4, (1976) p. 52.
sa.e M. BourdeaulC, 'News from Keston', RCL,Vol. 4, No.4, (1976) p. 52.
sasInterview with Xenia Dennen, 21 May 2010.
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information backed up by scrupulous research and objective criteria of academic quality',S86 The
ostensible obsession for empirical rigour and corroboration of material compiled in Keston's
archive is perhaps indicative of its wider aims. The integral part of Keston's work was the
establishment, and maintenance of, a resilient academic reputation that would survive attacks on
its impartiality. Without this reputation, the work that Keston was doing in publicising material
and information about religious persecution would have been derided as myth or politically
charged accusations. Establishing a reputation for scholarly neutrality through focusing carefully
on documents was seen as the best defence against accusations of taint or bias, with material
available to defend their position. An example of this can be seen in the attack on Peter
Reddaway's article 'The Georgian Orthodox Church: Corruption and Renewal', by David Lang, a
Professor of Caucasian Studies at the School of Oriental and Asian Studies, University of
London.S81In a letter to The Times, Professor Lang critiqued Reddaway's use of primary sources in
his article on the Georgian Orthodox Church, noting that academics at the School of Oriental and
African Studies at the University of London had not had the opportunity to consult this material,
which was held by Keston.S88 Lang continues, noting several errors in Reddaway's article, and
concluded that he was baffled by the focus on the Georgian Church by the Western press.
Reddaway's responded to these accusations by claiming that Lang had been informally invited to
consult these documents at Keston by Michael Bourdeaux, and reiterated that articles in RCL
noted that photocopies of these documents were available for consultanon.!" Reddaway
continued in this article to stress the array of checks that were carried out on these primary
documents before they were published, something which Lang failed to mention. It is interesting
that in response to this, Lang further critiques a piece of documentary evidence used by
Reddaway, and then seeks to distance himself from Keston, stating that he had no connection to
the group, had not been invited to consult its materials, and had no ability to check or censor its
SB6 Interview with Philip Walters, 19 May 2010.
581P. Reddaway, 'The Georgian Orthodox Church: Corruption and Renewal' RCL,Vol. 3, No. 4-5, (1975), pp.
14-23. Coverageof the debate between Reddaway and Lang,which mainly occurred in The Times can be
found in 'The Georgian Church: A Controversy', RCL,Vol. 3, No.6, (1975) pp. 45-54.
S88 D. Lang, 'Church of Soviet Georgia', The Times, 11 August, 1975, p. 11.
589P.Reddaway, 'Church of Soviet Georgia', The Times, 16 August, 1975, p. 13.
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publlcatlcns.i'" This matter also drew the attention of Lambeth Palace, who later sought to
maintain the reputation of Lang whilst supporting Reddaway's claims and material that it was
based upon.S91Although this particular episode is academic in its focus, the reliance on empirical
sources as Reddaway's primary defence, and the later support of this evidence by Lambeth
Palace,is indicative of the wider guarding of Keston's output. The need to maintain this academic
rigour was especially important in the ideological context of the Cold War, and perhaps explains
why this stance is so ingrained in Keston's leading members to this day.
The material contained within the Keston archive is testament both to the reputation that
Keston built and to the work of its members. Not only does it contain an array of samizdat
material smuggled out of the Soviet Union and sent to Keston, but also an array of press cuttings
from the Soviet press about the persecution of religion. Indeed, the impressive material collected
by Keston has established an essential archive on the persecution of religion in the Soviet Union
for scholars. Bourdeaux considers this archive to be of such importance that he claims that 'when
the church history of the second half of the twentieth century comes to be written, Keston's
archive will reveal the full story to the world'.S92
The bold claim of the central importance of this archive is perhaps not an overstatement
when it is considered that Keston were one of the only organisations in the West that were
collecting material on the persecution of religious believers in the Soviet Union in this period, and
were certainly the most active. The 'full story' of religious belief in the Soviet Union in the later
Twentieth century is likely to be constructed by scholars in the future utilising this collection, and
the Soviet archives themselves, notably the papers of the Council for Religious Affairs and its
predecessors. The Keston archive is undoubtedly an important collection of material regarding
the position of religious belief in the Soviet Union, and something that shaped the activism of the
organisation.
S90 D. lang, 'Church of Soviet Georgia', The Times, 21 August, 1975, p. 13.
591 See C. Longley, 'New evidence in the Georgian church affair', The Times, 15 March, 1976, p. 14.
592 Bourdeaux, 'Ringing the Changes', p. 3.
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In its position as a research body, another integral part of Keston's work was the
publication and distribution not only of translations of samizdat, but also commentaries on the
position of religious belief in communist states. Keston had a wide array of publications in the
1970s and 1980s, building on the work that Bourdeaux had started in the 1960s. These
publications made vast use of the Keston archive, and regularly included large segments of
primary documents, translated from their native language by Keston's staff. Examplesof the types
of works that were produced by Keston include Dick Rogers' Irina, Georgi Vins' autobiography
Three Generations of Suffering, and Rosemary Harris and Xenia Howard-Johnston's Christian
Appeals from Russia.S93The Keston series of books, as listed in full in Appendix 4, shows the
breadth covered by Keston's publications. This list of works clearly shows that Keston's output
was not solely focused on one particular denomination, although it certainly contained a
predominantly Christian focus. Indeed, this Christian focus arguably derives from the Christian
foundations of the group and the faith of its members. The distinct lack of publications on the
position of Islam, Buddhism and Judaism is perhaps a strange omission in Keston's output given
the level of believers of these faiths within the Soviet Union. This omission is even more striking
when claims of the importance of the Keston archive is taken into consideration. It is either the
case that Keston's archive does contain material on these religions, but that no researchers
affiliated with Keston in the 1970s and 1980s wanted to publish on them or that there is no
material in the archive on this area. Either position suggests that the focus of Keston was on the
publication of material related to the Christian faith and the compilation of material on that area,
a position which is at odds with the claim to study all religions. Keston can certainly be seen as an
organisation that was driven primarily by Christian faith, something which is evident in their
publications.
From an academic perspective the most important pieces produced by a Keston member
were the works by Jane Ellis, a Senior Researcher at Keston and Editor of RCL.,on the Russian
593 D. Rogers, Irina (Tring, 1987); G. Vins, Three Generations of Suffering (Reading, 1976); and R. Harris and
X. Howard-Johnston, Christian Appeals from Russia (London, 1969). Howard-Johnston is Xenia Dennen's
maiden name.
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Orthodox Church. Both The Russian Orthodox Church: A Contemporary History and The Russian
Orthodox Church: Triumphafism and Defensiveness are rightly considered as key pieces in the
historiography of religious dissent in the Soviet Union.594It is perhaps to the testament of Ellis'
work that these piecesare also still considered by many academics as the most informative pieces
on the Orthodox dissent in the Soviet Union to date. Had it not been for her untimely death in
1998 it is likely that this high quality of work would have continued, something that many
involved not only with Keston but also with other groups who researched religion in the Soviet
Union in this period have recognised.595
Keston supplemented the publication of books by producing a variety of periodicals,
including the quarterly academic journal Religion in Communist Lands (RCL).This was one of the
first journals to directly focus on the issues of religion in communist countries, and played a
substantial role in increasing its reputation as an academic body. RCl was launched on 27
February 1973 at a press conference on Fleet Street, and was reputed to have been met with
much interest from the secular and religious press aJike.596The first issue had 9,000 copies, with
around a third of these being sent as complimentary copies to a variety of religious groups,
perhaps illustrating a significant area where Keston felt that its support lay and where it sought to
build up more support from.S97 RCLwas declared as the 'focal point for the establishment of fact
and forum for discussion of all aspects of religion in communist countries,.598It was a synthesis of
Keston's work into the format of an academic journal. Indeed, RCl was not only an important way
in which Keston attempted to cement its academic foundations, but also an important journal for
the study of religion in the Soviet Union and other communist states. In the first edition of this
publication, it was recognised that this was the only publication that sought to promote the study
of religion in the Soviet Union and other communist states, and to create 'a greater understanding
594 Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church and J. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalism and
Defensiveness (London, 1996).
595 See 'Death of a Leading Scholar of the Russian Church', East-West Church & Ministry Report, Vol. 6, No.
3, (Summer 1998) available at http://www.eastwestreport.org/articles!ew06304.htm (Accessed 25 June
2010).
596 M. Bourdeaux, 'News from the Centre', RCL,Vol. 1, No.2 (1973) p. 2.
597 Ibid, p. 2.
598 M. Bourdeaux, 'News from the Centre', RCl. Vol. 1, No.1 (1973) p. 2.
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of the religious situation in Eastern Europe,.599It could be argued that Religion, State and Society,
the new name for the journal after the collapse of the Soviet Union, continues to occupy this
unique position despite the widening area of interest as indicated by its title.
RCl is also notable for its attempt not to be a journal focused solely on becoming a record
of persecution, such as other journals produced in this period including the Index on Censorship,
noted for its reporting on freedom of speech issues around the world. RCL sought to 'cover all
aspects of religious life, putting the persecutions and pressures in perspective whilst emphasising
positive features,.600 This is perhaps in stark contrast. to the work of other religious groups
working in this field, such as Richard Wurmbrand's Voice of the Martyrs, who were much more
virulent in their rhetoric, perhaps due to the experiences of Soviet persecution by Wurmbrand
himself.601
A brief consultation of the articles published in RCl, illustrates that they were not entirely
focused on reports of religious repression. Articles were published on the resurgence of the
Russian Orthodox Church and on the development of new churches in communist states.502
However, given the situation of religious belief in the Soviet Union, it was perhaps to be expected
that the vast majority of articles were about the oppression of belief. RCl had its critics for this
overly negative stance, notably The Revd Canon Paul Oestreicher, chairman of the British section
of Amnesty. Xenia Dennen recalled Keston's output being attacked by Oestreicher, who accused
the organisation of being right-wing and anti-Soviet. Dennen recalled that, 'our reply was well
actually we're only giving the facts, this is the truth, if we could be provided with lovely positive
stuff we'd be very happy to publish it,.503When this response is compared to the articles
599M. Bourdeaux, 'News from the Centre', RCL,Vol. 1, No.1 (1973) p. 2 - 3.
600 Ibid, p. 3.
601 SeeR.Wurmbrand, Tortured for Christ (London, 1967) Wurmbrand was a Romanian priest imprisoned
for his religious beliefs. After his exile, he formed the Voice of the Martyrs, a group campaigning for the
human rights of Christian prisoners of conscience. Wurmbrand took a particularly strong anti-Communist
approach to his activism, arguing that Communism and Christianity were deeply incompatible.
602 See,W. Alexeev, 'The RussianOrthodox Church, 1927-1945: Repressionand Revival', RCL,Vol. 7, No.1,
(1979); and P.Gheddo, 'A New Church is Born under Persecution', RCL,Vol. 10, No.2, (1982).
603Interview with Xenia Dennen, 21 May 2010. Oestreicher's relationship with Keston has reconciled in
recent years. In a lecture at the 2010 Keston AGM, Oestreicher noted that he had 'no need to apologise to
Michael [Bourdeaux). I still think there were times when he was wrong. But he was right, absolutely right, in
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published in RCLon the resurgence of faith in areas of the Soviet Union, it is doubtless that this
claim isaccurate.
The most frequent periodical published by Keston in this period was the Keston News
Service (KNS).The KNSwas started on 17 May 1974 with a trial edition that sought to replace the
regular informal press releases that Keston had previously produced. Michael Bourdeaux, who
was the initial editor of the KNS,stated that this service was to 'improve and formalize the output
of up-to-the-minute information' from the college. 604 It is clear that the KNSwas initially set up in
order to streamline the previously informal links that Keston had with the press, and to build
upon the more academic publications from the college. Initially aiming to have 15 copies
published a year, the KNSsoon became a substantial part of Keston's output, with over 200 issues
published in its first decade of publication.
The KNSwas clearly different to the other Keston publications, initially set up to provide
information in the form of short news articles of the latest news of religious life in the Soviet
Union and other communist countries. The very composition of the publication itself feels like a
'rushed' publication, printed on thin yellow paper with the utilitarian font of a typewriter, which
gives the impression that these articles were so 'hot off the press' that there was little time for
professional formatting. To an extent, the rushed feel of the KNSis comparable to the amateur
appearance of the 35's regular bulletin. Both of these publications contained the most up-to-date
material on Soviet dissenters, and the need to distribute this widely clearly took priority over
professional editing and production.
In his editorial in the first edition of the KNS, Bourdeaux echoes this hasty publication
process and insisted that the KNSmust be a 'samizdot experience'.6OSThis is an interesting turn of
phrase as not only does it neatly describe the process of the in-house publication of the KNS,but
also the potential assimilation with the dissidents that Keston reported on. This statement
hissingle-mindedbattle for religiousliberty in the Communistworld'. Forthe full text of this lecture,seeP.
Oestreicher,'Walkinga Tightrope:PeaceandJusticein ChristianColdWarDiplomacy',Keston Newsletter,
No. 13, (2011) pp. 19-21.
604 M. Bourdeaux,'Editorial',KNS,No.1 (Trialnumber),1ih May 1974, p. 2
605 Ibid, p. 2.
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suggeststhat at its foundation, the KNSwas not only as a way of reporting on dissidents, but a
way of Keston becoming active as dissidents themselves. Given the important role that samizdat
played in the Soviet dissident movement, attributing the KNSin such a manner can be seen as a
personal identification with the dissidents themselves.
The KNS'soutput increased dramatically in its first decade of publication. Initial editions
contained one to eight news articles, numbering no more than eight pages. From mid-1978,
however, individual editions of the KNSbecome substantially larger. From number 90, dated 2S
January 1980, onwards this expansion continued with a slight change of format, and with Alyona
Kojevnikov, Keston's Information Officer, replacing Bourdeaux as its editor. This new format
included a selection of commentary articles on religion in totalitarian states, translations of
samizdat documents, and biographical pieces on prominent religious figures in the Soviet Union
and Soviet bloc. This new format was used alternately with the older format of news articles. The
growth of the KNSwas rapid from this point, with single editions in the 1980s regularly containing
over ten articles over fifteen pages. The significant growth in the output of the KNS can be
attributed to a variety of factors. The amount of samizdat that made its way from dissidents in the
Soviet Union to Keston is likely to have increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s as it built up a
reputation as an organisation that would publish this material. Keston was constantly on a
financial tightrope in the 1970s and 1980s and any substantial increase in its output was only due
to an increase in resources. Given that the KNSwas only available to subscribers, Keston's
leadership clearly thought that it was able to expand this area of its publications without it
becoming an unnecessary burden. It must also be noted that this increase in the KNS's output
suggests that it was well received by its subscribers, and that there was a genuine demand for this
information. It is unlikely that Keston, which was stretched both financially and in human
resources, would devote much time or finance to a publication if it was self-indulgent and had a
low readership.
Although the KNSwas Keston's news output it was still heavily influenced by the religious
beliefs of its members. Christmas and Eastereditions of the KNSoften contained cover pageswith
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Christian imagery. For example, the cover of No. 114, dated 22 December 1980 contains a picture
of Mary as shown in Image 3.9, and No. 122, dated 24 April 1981, shows a crucifix with the phrase
'Christ is risen' translated into a variety of languages, as shown in Image 3.10. These images are
particularly striking on the cover of a news service about the situation of religious belief in the
Soviet Union and other communist countries. They are indicative of the religious motivations
behind Keston's work, and clearly show the Christian beliefs of their leading members.
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Image 3.10 - Front Cover of the Keston News Service. No. 122. 24 April 1981
The religious aspects of Keston's work can be seen even more prominently in their later
publication Frontier. Frontier was first published in January 1987 and was an attempt by Keston to
produce a magazine for the mainstream of its supporters. Its glossy production and magazine
style of journalism marks it apart from KNS and RCL, clearly indicating a different type of
audience. What is also notable about Frontier's content is the level of religious imagery used
throughout. These issues regularly contained prayer sections, such as the 'Q Come let us worship'
section in the November - December edition in 1987 as shown in Image 3.11. Another example of
this type of religious content can be seen in the 'Prayer and Praise' section of the July-August
1992 edition of Frontier as seen in Image 3.12. This piece contains 31 targets of prayer, identifying
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areas in the territory of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that they felt needed
assistance. Although these examples occur after the scope of this research, they clearly illustrate
the religious identifications of Keston's staff, something which, given the examples in KNS, existed




Image 3.11- '0 Come. Let Us Worship'. Frontier, November-December 1987
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Image 3.12 - 'Prayer & Praise', Frontier, July-August 1992
The public display of religious persuasion in Keston's publications puts their work into an
interesting position. Given their desire to create an academic reputation for the reliability of their
work, it could be argued that these public displays of faith may have detracted from their
reputation for scholarly neutrality. In this light, it can be noted that Keston's work on the freedom
of religious belief in communist lands was both carried out and seen through lens of Christian
belief. Keston was both a Christian and academic body, with both aspects of its identity having a
significant influence on the other.
Given the amount of effort put in by members of Keston's research team and leadership,
and the amount of pressure they were under in their research, the motivations of the group are
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important to consider. Keston was driven from its inception by the passion of its leading
members. Bourdeaux played a substantial role in this, and it is clear that his religious faith was the
predominant reason for his efforts. Bourdeaux's work in the formation of Keston and his own
publications can be deduced to being driven by what he felt was the 'hand of God' putting him on
this path.606 These religious convictions were shared among the leading members of Keston, who
were predominantly Christian. Indeed, as illustrated in the contents of the KNSand Frontier this
Christian influence is clear. It must be noted that references to Bible passages and Christian
imagery occur frequently throughout a" of Keston's publlcatlons.f" Religion had a clear influence
on both the motivations of Keston, and on its output.
Like many human rights groups in Britain in this period, Keston's finances were an issue
that often impacted on the group's ability to conduct its campaigns. Keston's financial struggles
drew much wanted and unwanted attention to the institute. In the ideological context of the Cold
war there were a multitude of bodies formed by the American and Soviet governments to assist
cultural bodies that would work on their behalf. A notable example of this is the CIA sponsored
Congress for Cultural Freedom, which funded several British literary journals in the 1960s,
including the popular monthly Encounter. Once the financial backing of the Congressfor Cultural
Freedom became publicly known in the 1960s the reputation of the journals it funded greatly
suffered.60S Many staff at these journals swiftly resigned, notably Stephen Spender, the editor of
Encounter, who went on to start the journal Index on Censorship with Michael Scammel in
1972.609 The funding of journals and research bodies in the later half of the twentieth century is a
way to assessany obvious ideological biases that may be contained within publications in the
ideological context of the Cold War. This is an area that was of particular importance for Keston.
606 Interview with Michael Bourdeaux, 24 February 2010.
607 For examples see M. Green, 'Foreword' in M. Bourdeaux and X. Howard-Johnston, Aida of Leningrad
(Oxford, 1972); Bourdeaux, Risen Indeed, pp. 1-10; M. Bourdeaux, 'Preface', in J. Popietusko, A Martyr for
the Truth (London 1985); and '1975 - A Year of Hope', KNS, No. 19, 12 December, 1975, p. 1.
608 For discussion of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and other elements of covert cultural funding by the
CIA in the Cold War see F. S. Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?: The CIA and the Cultural Cold War, (London,
1999).
609 About section of the Index on Censorship website, available: http://www.indexoncensorship.org/About/
(Accessed 2 June 2010). For more on Stephen Spender, see J. Sutherland, Stephen Spender, The Authorised
Biography (London, 2005).
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The desire to maintain its independence as a research institution meant that its leadership were
very careful about where its funding came from. Xenia Dennen noted that,
We always insisted that we should never be controlled or influenced by anyone so our
independence was absolutely central. Soas far as I'm aware we never accepted money from any
dirty source,"?
Accusations of funding from 'dirty sources' were particularly harmful for Keston. The
academic reputation of the organisation, and its publications, may have been in part due to the
neutral position that it took, seeking to present facts rather than an ideological position. Being
accused of being an anti-Soviet organisation in this period had linked connotations of being
funded by the CIA,or one of its umbrella organisations such asthe Congressfor Cultural Freedom.
If this was proven to be the case, the reputation of Keston would have been irreparably damaged,
and it would have been considered as nothing more than another pawn in the Cold War. As a
result of this, Keston refused to receive money from any governments, or government backed
organisation, and made the entirety of its research publicly available. The group also refused to
undertake research projects requested by funding bodies, and only accepted grants for research
for which it had complete control over its direction.
Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of accusations of being funded by 'dirty money' for
Keston were the financial problems that the group faced. The 'News from Keston' section of RCL
regularly called for donations from members throughout the 1970s and 1980s, seeking money
and low interest loans not only to fund a move into larger premises, but also to keep the group
afloat.611 Bourdeaux noted in 1976 that Keston balanced its budget 'on a knife edge,.612Indeed,
financial restraints meant that the publication of RCLwas restricted to only two issues in 1981,
followed by three issuesa year from 1982 to 1987 in order to save costs, and there was a genuine
threat of the group folding. When the accusations of 'dirty' funding are placed in this context,
their sharpnesscan be fully understood by Keston's membership.
610 Interview with Xenia Dennen, 21 May 2010.
611 See 'News from the Centre' and 'News from Keston College' sections in RCLfrom 1973 to 1988.
612 M. Bourdeaux, 'News from Keston College' RCL,Vol. 4, No.1 (1976) p. 51.
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Keston raised the bulk of its finances from individual donations by its members who
donated small amounts from £10 to £50 a year.m As Dennen put it, 'most of our funding was
from private individuals who just were concerned about people in prison,.614It can therefore be
noted that without this widespread support from its concerned membership, Keston would have
been in an even worse state financially. This also offers a small insight into Keston's members who
were not only willing to be paid up members on a yearly basis in the knowledge of the group's
financial problems, but that many of them were willing to contribute extra finances when
required. Although it is impossible to make accurate generalisations about all members of Keston
in this period, it could be suggested that this shows that they were genuinely concerned about the
religious persecution in the Soviet Union beyond a passing interest. The very fact that Keston
survived financially throughout the 1970s and 1980s is arguably due to this concern from its
membership.
Keston became particularly vulnerable to changes in circumstances financially due its
policy not to retain any substantial savings. This was because any money that was raised by the
group was ploughed directly into extending its research programme, primarily by recruiting more
staff in unresearched areas. As a result of this policy, Keston's financial position was repeatedly
dangerous in the 1970s and 1980s. This was seen as a risk worth taking in order for Keston to be
operating at its maximum potential, something which when linked to the perception of a religious
calling of many of its leading members, could be explained as a 'leap offaith'.
Keston's activities were presented to the wider public both through the active publication
of material and through its involvement with media. Many of its researchers were often involved
in television and radio shows as 'talking heads' with regards to human rights abuses and the
position of religious belief in the Soviet Union. Michael Bourdeaux was prominent in this area,
regularly appearing on BBC radio productions with regards to his work on religious freedom in the
Soviet Union. Most notably, Bourdeaux gave the Lent Lecture on BBC Radio 4 on 2 March 1980
613Interview with Michael Bourdeaux, 24 February 2010.
6141nterview with Xenia Dennen, 21 May 2010.
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entitled 'What I have learned from Christians in Russia'.61sThis was a very prominent position for
Bourdeaux to talk about his own experiences, but also in his capacity as Director of Keston
College,which undoubtedly gave the group much publlcltv,
The position of Kestonwas significantly boosted in the first week of October 1983 when it
was featured as 'TheWeek's Good Cause'on BBCRadio4, an event that was seen to have led to a
dramatic increase in turnout at Keston's open day that year.616Being 'The Week's Good Cause'
had the effect of not only being a large appeal for much needed funding for Keston's projects, but
also placed the output of Keston as reputable, something that lent the authority of the BBCto its
research. In the wake of this appeal, Keston's members featured more prominently in the media.
Most notable of these media appearances were the two television programmes on Keston that
aired in January 1984. The first of these focused on the work of Alyona Kojevnikov, the Head of
the Information Department at Keston, exploring the motivations for her work at Keston, and
aired on Channel4 on Saturday 28 January 1984. The second of these programmes focused on the
personal aspect of Keston's work, looking at the individuals involved with the college and its
support groups, which was aired on Channel4 on Sunday29 January 1984.617
Keston publications were often referenced by journalists in their own work on
persecution in the Soviet Union. Bernard Levin's article 'Christian Voices in the Soviet Wilderness'
makes much use of the Keston publication Three Generations of Suffering, which is referenced
prominently.618levin also refers to Keston in his other articles on the dissident movement, and
directly referenced the KNS as his source of information.6l9 Given the prominence of Levin's
articles in The Times in the 1970s and 1980s, having a reference to their work may have enhanced
the reputation of Keston at a national level. Having Keston's publications mentioned in such a
position is also likely to have greatly assisted the publicity of the group. It could also be deduced
615 'For Your Information', KNS, No. 91, 7 February, 1980, p. 5.
616 See 'For Your Information', KNS, No. 183,22 September, 1983, p. 8 and 'The Unusual Event behind the
Annual One', KNS, No. 185, 20 October, 1983, p.l0.
617 See 'Media interest in Keston College Growing', KNS, no. 190,12 January 1984, p. 20.
618 B.levin, 'Christian Voices in the Soviet Wilderness', The Times, 20 February 1976, p, 14. Also see Vins,
Three Generations of Suffering.
619 See B. levin, 'A revolution in the territory of the mind that even Soviet might cannot stop', The Times, 2
August 1977, p. 10.
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that levin's publication and recognition of the sources produced by Keston mean that his articles
became a vehicle through which their findings and opinions became broadcast to a wider
audience. This is in the same manner as the Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry, whose
information was put to a much larger audience than their protests could ever reach through
levin's articles.
From its formation, Keston did not intend to become a human rights organisation,
deciding instead to focus on becoming a research centre to provide information for others.62o
Indeed, Kestonwere legally constrained by their position as a charity, which prevented them from
emulating other more publicly active groups in this period such as the Women's Campaign for
Soviet Jewry and Amnesty international. Keston's charity commission report states their purpose:
To promote the advancement of education in religion and to promote and encourage the study of
and research into religion in communist states of states which have been communist or present
or former totalitarian states.621
This statement legally constricted Keston to become a solely educational and research
body. It is clear, however, that Keston's activities in the 1970s and 1980's went beyond the remit
of their charity registration, and that they were more akin to other active pressure groups than
the first glance would suggest. Indeed, describing Keston as anything other than active would be
erroneous. Xenia Dennen argues that the group could not have been a more active organisation
within the limits of their brief.622
The level of Keston's activism is perhaps not as obvious as other human rights groups
formed in the later twentieth century due the way in which it was carried out. Given their charity
status, Keston were unable to carry out the public demonstrations and protests that others,
notably the 35's, used to inform the wider public about their research and the plight of religious
believers in the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. Keston were forced to carry out their
activism in a different manner, something which marked them apart from other human rights
620 Interview with Xenia Dennen, 21 May 2010.
621 Keston College Charity Commission report.
622 Interview with Xenia Dennen, 21 May 2010.
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groups in this period. An example of this can be seen in the delivery of documents and the spread
of information to the British government. A substantial part of Keston's work involved the
collation of samizdat materials from the Soviet Union and other communist countries. If this
collation of material remained solely as an academic exercise, one could see that Keston was
staying to its brief. However, these materials were often delivered to sections of the British
government when they were considered important enough. This dissemination of material
extended to the highest levels of government, with Bourdeaux personally delivering materials to
the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, at 10 Downing Street. 623 The delivery of this
material can only be described as a form of activism, and one that members of Keston were able
to consider as part of their research. Bourdeaux was also involved in a series of seminars called by
Thatcher at Chequers in late 1983 at which she had assembled an array of experts on different
areas of the Soviet Union.624 Bourdeaux was chosen to attend this meeting as a figure of expertise
on human rights, personally chosen by Thatcher who decided against the recommendation of the
Foreign Secretary and officials at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Bourdeaux attributes
this personal selection to his regular appearances on the BBC Radio 4 Sunday programme, a
broadcast he claims that Thatcher regularly listened to.625 This illustrates the importance of
Bourdeaux's media appearances in this period, and the way in which it allowed Keston to
influence the highest levels of the British government.
Thatcher herself was a keen supporter of the work of Keston. On 2SApril, 1984, she was
the guest of honour at a reception held by Keston in recognition of Bourdeaux being awarded the
Templeton Prize.At this reception, Thatcher noted the high regard in which she held the work of
Keston, stating that she would 'take advantage of the work and personalities of Keston College'
and that 'any Prime Minister would be foolish not to ...any Prime Minister of any background/?"
Thatcher's clear support of the work of Keston, and her insistence that all government leaders
should utilise their material, leant much authority to its work. Thatcher's assertion that
623 Interviewwith MichaelBourdeaux,19 May2010.
624 Thatcher,The Downing Street Years pp.450-452.
625 Interviewwith MichaelBourdeaux,19 May2010.
626 'PrimeMinisterattendsKestonReception',KNS,No.199, 17 May 1984, p. 4.
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governments should utilise the work of Keston was noted in Bourdeaux's speech at the same
reception in which he stated that Sir Harold Wilson had 'sought advice from Keston College on
religious liberty in the Soviet Union', and that Dr David Owen had invited representatives from
Keston to attend a formal consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office before the
Belgrade Review Conference in late 1977.627 These examples illustrate the links that Keston had
with the highest echelons of the British Government in this period, and the chances that they had
to influence policy with regards to the Soviet Union.
Image 3.13 Margaret Thatcher at a Keston College reception held at Church House.
Westminster. 2S April 1984
Keston's activism in the 1970s and 1980s can best be described as passive. It can be seen
that the distribution of information from Keston in the form of their publications and links with
the media gave others the ability to make more active protests about the persecution of religious
627 Ibid, p. 4. Harold Wilson was the British Prime Minister from October 1964 to June 1970, and March
1974 to April 1976. David Owen was the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from
February 1977 to May 1979.
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believers in the Soviet Union. This position can be clearly seen in their work Religious Prisoners in
the USSR: A Study by Keston College (1987). This publication is essentially a list of people
imprisoned in the Soviet Union for their religious beliefs, broken down into different faiths and
denominations. Among the information included for most of these prisoners included their
personal details, information on their arrest, and their address written in latin and Cyrillic
scripts.628 This list is supplemented by a section entitled 'How You Can Help', which gives clear
instructions which are worth quoting in full:
Send short, simple greetings to let them know that you care and are supporting them in prayer.
Do not send long letters unless you first receive a reply. You may write in English, or copy one of
the greetings given below onto your card and add a few words in English if you wish. Please
remember never to make any remark of a remotely political nature, and NEVERmention Keston
College, Aid to RussianChristians, or any similar organisation. This may prove to be harmful as a
believer could be accusedof having connections with a "Western anti-Soviet Organlsatlon.f"
This extract reveals much about Keston's activity in this period. Firstly, it must be noted
that this is clearly a call for supporters of Keston to send letters to persecuted believers in the
Soviet Union. This is notable as Keston's position as an educational charity and financial
restrictions prevented them from taking this direct action. By providing a list of prisoners,
addresses, and instructions on how to send appropriate material, Keston was doing all it could to
be active in this process without sacrificing its position as an academic body which leant it a
heightened reputation. This technique has obvious comparisons with the Amnesty model of letter
writing to prisoners of conscience, and is undoubtedly something that Keston wanted to utilise.
Keston's publications provided information that allowed others to protest on their behalf,
including the addressesof persecuted believers and details about their position, something that
doubtless facilitated the writing of letters to the Soviet authorities. Publishing these details
allowed Keston to encourage direct activism by its supporters, without the organisation becoming
directly involved in the activism, something that would have affected its charitable status and
academic reputation. Although this extract is from a publication produced in 1987, there are clear
628 Kesten College, Religious Prisoners in the USSR:A study by Keston College (london, 1987) pp. 70-149.
629 Ibid, p. 154.
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signs that this direct activism was encouraged in earlier editions of the KNS,with the regular
inclusion of prisoners addresses in the Soviet Union. The process of letter-sending was also
publicised in the KNS,which reported on a Keston display at the Edinburgh International Festival
at which postcards were signed by members of the public and sent to Prisoners of Conscience in
the Soviet Union.63O In fact, in 1982 Bourdeaux called not only for letters to be sent, but also for
those who visited the Soviet Union to meet persecuted believers, taking this activism a step
further.m
It is clear that Keston was much more of an activist group than its academic structure and
output suggested. Through the information it received, and its variety of publications, Keston
sought to encourage others to conduct direct activism on behalf of persecuted religious believers
in the Soviet Union. This allowed the group to maintain its academic reputation that had
developed since its foundation, something that was essential for its publications to be taken
seriously by journalists, politicians, and the wider British public. That its research was taken so
seriously by these individuals, demonstrates not only the respect with which the group was held,
but also the influence that it had on British perceptions of Soviet dissent.
630 'Keston Support Group at Edinburgh Festival', KNS, No. 130, 13 August 1981, p. 15.
631 M. Bourdeaux, 'Some Personal Reflections', KNS, No. 147, 22 April 1983, p.3
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Conclusion
In the ideological conflict of the Cold War, the soft power of human rights activism was a
powerful force. The role of British human rights organisations, and their publication of reports of
Soviet human rights violation, had an impact not only on the public consciousness of Soviet
dissenters in Britain, but also on the outcome of the Cold War itself through their influence on
official bodies, journalists and politicians alike. Snyder and Thomas are right to point out the key
role that human rights played in the later stages of the Cold War. However, it is important to
extend this analysis and look in detail at the activity of these organisations in order to fully
understand the influence that they had.
This thesis has identified the actions of a variety of British human rights groups in three
main areas, illustrating how campaigns led by these organisations had a direct influence both on
the public awareness of Soviet dissenters and on official policy towards the Soviet Union. It has
illustrated that Britain developed expertise in two major areas of Soviet human rights violation -
the political abuse of psychiatry and the persecution of religious belief - and was home to the
headquarters of Amnesty International, an internationally important human rights organisation.
The activism of these groups marked the British response to Soviet dissent as internationally
\ important, something that has been largely overlooked in the literature to date. This thesis has
addressed the gap in the historiography surrounding the activism of these human rights groups,
putting their work at the centre of analysis.This serves to develop the historiography of both the
role of human rights in the Cold War, and given the way in which these groups operated, the
historiography of Soviet dissent itself.
Amnesty International's work on the Soviet Union will be held in the historical record in
relation to its wider campaigns for the forgotten prisoner of conscience. Amnesty is a unique
organisation on both the national and international stage. From its birth in 1961, it has come to
epitomise human rights campaigning. Amnesty shaped the way in which the international
community has come to develop a human rights conscience in the twentieth century. This is
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something that has had profound implications on international relations, especially so in the
context of the ColdWar.
Alongside its wider campaigns for the international respect of human rights, Amnesty's
efforts for Soviet prisoners of conscience, as discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, should be
seen asground breaking and internationally important in their own right. Amnesty's research was
at the forefront of British efforts in publicising casesof human rights violation in the Soviet Union,
collating information on these abuses, and publishing material and comment on these cases.
Without the high level of output and research from this group, the British perception of the Soviet
dissident movement would be vastly different. Amnesty publications not only shaped what
commentators, specialists and the general public knew about these political nonconformists in
the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, but their research has also formed a literature that shapes
contemporary thought on the dissidents. The translation and publication of the Chronicle of
Current Events made one of the most important sources on the position of dissidents in the Soviet
Union readily available to English speakers around the world. This is something that had a
dramatic effect on the public portrayal of dissidents in the 1970s and 1980s, and gave journalists,
academicsand politicians easy accessto primary material written by dissenters. The translation of
this material has also produced a collection of material that is ideal for Englishspeaking students
to use in studying the dissident movement in the Soviet Union. This is something that will
undoubtedly come to influence the way in which generations of scholars will approach this
period, illustrating how Amnesty's work continues to shape public perceptions of these
individuals. The impact of the translation of the Chronicle should not be underestimated.
This thesis has outlined how material produced by Amnesty was used by prominent
journalists such as Bernard levin, who was clearly overwhelmed by the quality and content of
their publications. The dedication of two articles of his column in The Times to comment on the
Amnesty report Prisoners of Conscience in the Soviet Union in 1980 illustrates how such material
influenced him, and undoubtedly others like him. It is clear that these publications had an impact
on the public agenda regarding the Soviet Union in British culture in this period. Amnesty Urgent
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Action reports and news releases also played their part in influencing this public agenda, adding
urgency to calls for support for individual dissidents, often when it was needed most. That it was
able to produce such a vast amount of quality research whilst its Soviet researchers were vastly
overstretched with their work is testament to their commitment to their campaigns.
Of the groups covered by this thesis Amnesty was unique for a variety of differing
reasons. By the early 1970s, it was arguably the only human rights group to have an international
reputation, something it had developed before it seriously embarked on campaigns against Soviet
human rights violation. This reputation was of the utmost importance, aswithout this, Amnesty's
publication of the Chronicle and other samizdat materials would not have had the impact it did.
The successof these publications can be directly linked to having Amnesty's name attached to
them.
Amnesty was also unique in the fact that it had members based in the Soviet Union, most
notably in its Moscow group. Attacks on Amnesty by the Soviet authorities occurred in two main
forms - propaganda and the physical attacks on its members. Whilst all human rights groups in
Britain campaigning against the Soviet treatment of dissenters were subjected to propaganda
attacks, Amnesty was focused on in particular. The direct attacks on members of the organisation
in the Soviet Union only served to heighten the emotions surrounding Amnesty's research. This
served only to increase the resolve with which its researchers functioned, highlighting the crude
nature of the Soviet attacks.
The political abuse of psychiatry is arguably the most horrifying of the ways in which the
Soviet authorities dealt with political dissident in the 1960s and 1970s. The response to this
barbarous treatment of political nonconformists unsurprisingly drew international criticism from
scientists and psychiatrists alike. The use of these methods, and the particularly dubious diagnosis
of sluggishschizophrenia in Soviet psychiatry was counter to all aspects of medical ethics, with the
use of a medical treatment as a form of torture which directly contradicted the Hippocratic oath.
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The role played by human rights organisations alongside these concerned psychiatrists is
particularly interesting, and revealing of the wider role of these groups.
The developing public perception, and response to casesof psychiatric abuse in the Soviet
Union can be neatly tracked through the differing response in Britain to the cases of Petro
Grigorenko, Zhores Medvedev and Vladimir Bukovsky.These three individuals were incarcerated
in psikhushki at varying times, and the response to their cases from the West reveal how
perceptions of dissenters developed from the vague reporting of Grigorenko's casethrough to the
widespread campaigns on behalf of Bukovsky in the mid 1970s. This is most clearly seen in the
response to the Bukovskypapers sent to the West in 1971. The March 1972 letter to The Times by
several prominent British psychiatrists which denounced the imprisonment of Bukovsky was in
stark contrast to the response to Grigorenko's case in the late 1960s. This was a process that
clearly accelerated throughout the 1970s, that culminated in the international pressure, led by
the RoyalCollege,on the AUSNPwhich forced their resignation from the WPA in 1983.
Public consciousnessof the political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union was bolstered
in public culture by the first performances of Tom Stoppard and Andre Previn's Every Good Boy
Deserves Favour in July 1977. That such a prominent playwright and renowned conductor
produced a play with such a central focus on a psikhushka and the forced treatment of a sane
dissident suggestsboth how topical this issuewas in the 1970s. EGBDFhas become renowned as
a classicwork by Stoppard, and enjoyed a successful run at the National Theatre in 2010. EGBDF
built on the impact that Valery Tarsis' Ward 7 had had on some individuals. Despite being less
publicly known, Ward 7 clearly had an impact on the developing public awareness of the Soviet
abuses in Britain.
Analysis of the Medical and Scientific Committee for Soviet Jewry highlights how
important networks were to British human rights groups in this period. This group was clearly set
up initially by the prominent Jewish politician Greville Janner to mobilise support from the
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scientific community in Britain for the refuseniks. However, the organisation quickly shifted its
focus to psychiatric abusedue to the scientific interests of its members.
The Working Group was arguably the most important group active in highlighting the
abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union. This group, formed in response to the Bukovsky papers,
published a regular bulletin on the abuse of psychiatry. Driven largely by the work of Peter
Reddaway and Gery low Beer, the Working Group was academic in its approach to reports of
abuse, collating information, forming opinion on it, and distributing reports far and widely. Its
main source of influence, as noted above, were the links that it had with the Royal College
through the SCPAP.Its influence on this committee shaped the policy of the Royal College
towards the Soviet Union, something that in turn put a huge amount of pressure on the AUSNP
and the Soviet regime. The Working Group's regular bulletin on the position of psychiatry in the
Soviet Union was clearly influential in the SCPAPand other concerned organisations. The Working
Group managed to successfully harness concern for the abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union
from British psychiatrists, using their reputation to further publicise their concerns in the national
and scientific media.
The Working Group's merger with other groups concerned with the political abuse of
psychiatry, including the more activist CAPA,to form IAPUPcontinued the influence of this group
into the late 1980s. IAPUPplayed a key role in the establishment of psychiatric treatment in the
post-Soviet nations throughout the 1990s, and continues to monitor the quality of this treatment
in its current guise asthe Global Initiative on Psychiatry.
Analysis of the Royal College's Special Committee on the Political Abuse of Psychiatry,
which formed in 1978, reveals how influential human rights activists and concerned psychiatrist
were on the policy of the Royal College towards the Soviet Union. The first motion calling for an
official condemnation of the Soviet use of psychiatry in the Royal Collegewas brought by Harold
Merskey and Gery low-Beer, two individuals heavily involved in human rights groups campaigning
for Soviet dissidents. The SCPAPalso had clear links with Amnesty International, with a member
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of Amnesty's staff established as a liaison officer between the two groups. SCPAP'smembership
was dominated by individuals linked to human rights groups, and it would not be an
overstatement to suggest that the overall direction of the group was shaped by these individuals.
This is particularly interesting as the first meeting of the SCPAPset out that the committee was to
have no formal links with other organisations. This highlights the importance of human rights
organisations for the information that they could provide to groups such as the SCPAP,reiterating
the influence that they held over public discourse regarding the dissident movement.
Alongside psychiatric abuse, British human rights groups developed an internationally
renowned expertise on the position of religious belief in the Soviet Union. Several groups formed
in the West to either support religious believers against the state atheism of the Soviet regime
both through financial and material support, and also by petitioning governments and official
bodies on their behalf. Given the emotional links between believers of the same or similar faiths,
this display of support was perhaps unsurprising. What is particularly interesting in the British
context is how these groups adopted vastly different campaigns on behalf of religious believers,
despite being basedon common aims and origins.
The 35's gained many plaudits for their active campaigning style which sought to attain as
much public exposure for the plight of refuseniks as possible. Yet the stage invasions and dramatic
public demonstrations by this group were underpinned by an empirical base,with the collation of
material from the Soviet Union at the centre of their activism. Michael Sherbourne's frequent and
lengthy conversations with refuseniks provided the 35's with regular information on the position
of dissenters in the Soviet Union, something that was clearly utilised in their dealings with the
press and the wider public. Sherbourne's influence on the construction of the British discourse on
these dissidents should not be underestimated. On a literal level, he coined the term refusenik
which has entered the British lexicon as the term used to denote Soviet Jews who had been
refused exit visas. On a more subtle note, the information that he distributed to the 35's and to
other interested parties such as Bernard levin was arguably the main, and most up-to-date
information on the refuseniks. The information attained by Sherbourne, and distributed by the
246
35's in regular bulletins and at demonstrations gave them a reputation for expertise regarding the
plight of the refuseniks. This ensured that although their protests were ostensibly outlandish, the
information that they supplied and protested about was widely recognised as reputable.
Alongside good links with MPs such as Greville Janner, the 35's developed strong
relationships with British politicians, particularly the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. This was
something that was highly valued by the 35's, and this relationship is a clear indication of the
influence that these activists had on the highest levels of the British government. Thatcher's
request to the 35's for information on refuseniks to be passed onto the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office is indicative both of the respect that the Prime Minister had for the
information the 35's collected and of the good relationship that she had with the group. This was
a clear instance of the British government using a human rights group to attain the most up-to-
date information on Soviet dissent.
In contrast to the 35's, Keston College was on face value a much more academic
organisation, something that is explicit in its name. Keston was formed as an organisation to
assessand analyse the position of religious belief in communist lands, and adopted an academic
style to its activism. It concentrated on collecting material from the Soviet Union, mainly in the
form of samizdat, and on the publication of commentary and extended analysis on its research.
Academic rigour was clearly at the centre of this groups work, something that is stressed by all of
its leading figures. This academic approach can be seen in its array of publications, including many
specialists texts on aspects of religious faith in the Soviet Union, and the journal RCLwhich still
holds international respect in its current guise Religion, State and Society. The KNSwas the main
way in which Keston disseminated evidence regarding the persecution of religious believers to a
wide audience. This regular bulletin was utilised by journalists, academics and politicians alike,
and was one of the main sources of information regarding religious belief in the Soviet Union.
The level of publication from Keston on the position of religion in the Soviet Union
increased its own reputation and that of its leader, Michael Bourdeaux. Bourdeaux developed
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from a self confessed 'renegade priest' in the 1960s to the being awarded the Templeton Prize in
1984, a clear indication of how dramatically his reputation changed. This increased reputation
included links with Downing Street, where Bourdeaux developed links with Margaret Thatcher
and advised her on religious persecution in the Soviet Union. His role at a series of seminars at
Chequerson the Soviet Union are a clear indication of the influence that he and Keston had at the
highest levels of government.
On face value, The 35's and Keston could not be more different in their campaigns. Yet
beneath the surface it is clear that these organisations held empiricism at their core, and utilised
their relationships with the British government to further their cause. Both of these organisations
had a significant influence on the way in which the British discourse on the Soviet persecution of
religious faith was constructed through their activism and their relations with politicians of the
highest rank.
Whilst all the groups covered in this thesis varied in their approach to Soviet dissenters,
they all held empirical methods at the very core of their activism. Groups such as Keston, the
Working Group and Amnesty based their campaigns on the collation and dissemination of
information from the Soviet Union. Eventhe more demonstration focused groups such as the 35's
and CAPAwere based heavily on factual information, and the collection of this material from the
Soviet Union. Empirical evidence of the personal circumstances of dissidents dominates the
material produced by these organisations, and clearly played a significant role in the direction
that these groups took. The collection of samizdat materials and other materials from behind the
Iron Curtain dominated the day to day running of these organisations. This information was
translated, analysed and repackaged in the form of journal articles, press releases and other
publications by these groups. It is clear from the analysis of groups in the three main areas of this
thesis that information was key to their campaigns, something that took a prominent place not
only in their output, but also in the way in which these groups functioned.
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The collation and distribution of information on the dissident movement by these
organisations has shaped the way in which English-speakingscholars approach the Soviet human
rights violations of this period. When the scale of work of these groups is taken into account
alongside the influence they had on official organisations, it is of no surprise that the bulk of
English material regarding the dissident movement is derived in some part from these
organisations. This includes the translations of the Chronicle, arguably the key source of
information regarding the dissident movement. Virtually all publications regarding the
persecution of religious believers in the Soviet Union have links to Keston College. Keston's
archive, now housed at Baylor University, Waco, Texas, contains one of the largest collections of
material on religious persecution in the Soviet Union. It is the main repository of information
available on this area in the West, and has been born out of decadesof work.
The central focus on information by these organisations goes some way to highlight why
they played such a prominent role in the construction of the British discourse on Soviet dissenters
in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The flow of information from behind the Iron Curtain to the West was
limited by the censorship of the Soviet regime. Information that did come out via samizdat and
other underground means had a variety of issuesregarding its reliability. Indeed, any information
on the position of political non-conformists in the Soviet Union was liable to an array of biases
rendering it very difficult to use.
British human rights organisations formed a key conduit of information from the Soviet
dissident movement to the British public and the wider international community. They did this in
two major ways. Firstly, on a logistical level these organisations gathered the material from a
variety of sources from behind the Iron Curtain. Given that there was a vast array of material
which came from the behind the Iron Curtain detailing human rights abuse, these groups focused
the import of this material. Keston, for example, was inundated with material passedonto them
by individuals and other organisations. Amnesty also became a focal point for the distribution of
information. This organisation of material allowed samizdat to be collated by groups who could
deal with this information. In some cases,these organisations attained material on the position of
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dissidents directly from the Soviet Union. Michael Sherbourne's telephone conversations with
refuseniks are a good example of this, which in some casesproduced the first details of when a
dissident's position changed. The connections that Peter Reddaway had with the Soviet Union,
mainly through journalists and student visitors, are another way in which the most up-to-date
information on the position of dissidents came to the West. Reddaway once received a copy of
the Chronicle of Current Events less than 24 hours after it had been typed by its editors in
Moscow.m Whilst this is an extreme case, it is clear that through these routes, the latest
information on dissenters could travel past the Iron Curtain. Human rights activists were in the
position to present this information to the British public consciousness through their links to
journalists, politicians and official bodies alike. The development of these channels of information
were essential in the context of the ColdWar for gaining a picture of the situation behind the Iron
Curtain.
Secondly, these organisations acted as a sort of filter, offering reliability to the material
that they had received by publishing it in a variety of forms. In some instances, the reproduction
of samizdat material alone was enough to cut through the high levels of propaganda of the Cold
War. However, without context, this material was unlikely to have been met with interest by the
wider public. Human rights group added a degree of authentication to this information in several
different in forms. In some instances, such as the case of Keston and the Working Group,
scrupulous levels of research and corroboration from a variety of sources added respectability
and reliability to previously dubious sources. Psychiatrists such as Gery low-Beer and Sidney
Bloch, and the Sovietologist Peter Reddaway played a key part in the verification and
authentication of the Bukovsky papers in the early 1970s. No matter how devoted the Working
Group, and other organisations who worked to publicise the political abuse of psychiatry in the
Soviet Union, without this support these papers would have been largely ignored by British
society. Amnesty used their reputation as a prominent and trusted human rights organisation to
underline the reliability of samizdat materials. In particular, the translation and publication of the
632 Interview with Peter Reddaway, 8 September 2011 •
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Chronicle under its own name was crucial in the journal being accepted as a credible source in the
West. Had the Chronicle been produced by another organisation without such an esteemed
reputation, it was likely to have been ignored by the mainstream media.
Thesegroups refined the array of material that they had accessto from the Soviet Union,
both official and unofficial, to produce an account that was as close to the truth aswas possible in
the international context of the day. Whilst British human rights groups played a key role in
attaining information from behind the Iron Curtain, they should not be considered solely as a Cold
War postal service. The most important role that these groups played was in ensuring that this
information was trusted as reliable, something that was of extreme importance in the context of
the ColdWar.
The successof campaigns based on materials from the Soviet Union was based largely on
the reputation of those who supported the campaign. This is where British human rights groups
were very effective, gaining the support of specialists, politicians and celebrities to aid their
position. Many prominent individuals from British society were associated with these groups,
even if only in name. This went some way to improving the standing of these organisations, and
made them more persuasive to the public at large. Human rights organisations gave a sense of
clarity to the murky picture of Soviet human rights violation, an image that had been made
unclear by decadesof Soviet propaganda and pro-Soviet organisations in the West.
The fact that these human rights organisations fulfilled this role of arbiter of this
information put them in an immensely powerful position when the construction of the public
consciousness of Soviet dissidents in Britain is considered. The control that these organisations
had over the flow and reliability of information from the Soviet Union gave them the ability to
shape the public agenda regarding the Soviet Union in Britain.
The positioning of these human rights groups as the bridge between the Soviet Union and
the West gave them a powerful role in how information on the dissidents was 'packaged' and
distributed to the public. This is particularly so when it is noted that journalists, official bodies,
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and in some casesthe British government, held the publications of these groups in particular high
esteem. The decisions of these bodies, and the articles written by journalists regarding the
dissident movement, therefore, were directly influenced by the manner in which these human
rights groups presented their material. Whilst it would be erroneous to say that, for instance, the
policy of the Royal College regarding psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union or the articles of
Bernard levin were directly controlled by the output of human rights groups, it is clear that these
publications had a direct impact on the direction of both of these areas.
These human rights groups undoubted played a substantial part in the way in which the
British public was presented with details about the human rights violations in the Soviet Union.
Not only did these groups ensure that this information was collected from appropriate areas, by
adding reliability and authority to this material they also ensured that it was readily accepted by
the British public at large. Without these groups playing this intermediary role, the position of
dissidents would have remained largely unclear and confused. It could even be argued that had
these groups not played this bridging role between the Soviet Union and the British public, it is
likely that the plight of dissidents would have been largely ignored in the West. These groups
clarified the available information, adding a much needed air of reliability to it, essentially making
it believable by the wider British public. Whilst this might appear a basic role on the surface, this is
something that should not be underestimated in the context of the ideological conflict of the Cold
War
Whilst this thesis has broken down analysis of British human rights groups response to
Soviet dissent into three distinct sections, it is clear that the reality of the situation was more
complex and overlapping. Relationships between organisations and individuals are a factor that
add another dimension to the developing public consciousnessregarding dissenters in this period.
There are individuals who have been discussed in the course of this thesis who, although
contributing in significant ways to one of the three areas discussed, are impossible to isolate to
anyone of these sections.
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The overarching relationships between organisations suggeststhat it is more appropriate
to discuss these separate, and often distinctive groups, as forming part of a wider network, all
working towards similar ends. This is in some senses counterintuitive, as the individual groups
discussed in the course of this thesis appear to have such distinctive approaches to the issue of
Soviet dissent that it would be wrong to compare them as the same entity. One only need
consider the differences in approach, style, and output of Keston College and the Women's
Campaign for Soviet Jewry to see how different these organisations were at face value. Yet
despite this, the relationship between these organisations was very healthy.
One of the reasons that these organisations had such an impact on British public
consciousness towards the dissidents is through their joint efforts. The fact that there were
common relationships between groups may also have affected the spread of information on
dissenters, being shared between groups as well as to the public. It is important in assessingthe
role played by human rights groups in this period to assessboth the wood, the wider context of
these groups, and the trees, the details of their campaigns themselves, together.
This thesis hasfocused primarily on the role played by human rights groups, although it is
clear that in most cases these organisations were dominated and driven by the efforts of
particular individuals. These individuals devoted substantial resources; time, money and perhaps
most importantly emotion to their campaigns. Involvement with these organisations dominated
the lives of several leading campaigners to the extent that their life stories are firmly intertwined
with these groups. The fervour that these individuals held for their campaigns can still be keenly
felt in interviews with these individuals two decades after the Soviet Union collapsed. This thesis
has given many examples of the personal sacrifices of these individuals, showing how their efforts
shaped the composition and position of British human rights groups in this period.
Peter Reddaway undoubtedly played an integral role in the network of British human
rights activists. His direct involvement with the Working Group, Keston College and Amnesty,
alongside personal links with other groups and activists clearly illustrate the development of a
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network of activists, all working along similar lines. Reddaway can be described as a lynchpin of
this network, connecting groups together through a distribution of information and personal
relations. He effectively used his personal connections with dissidents and other individuals to
ensure that a flow of up to date, and, perhaps more importantly, reliable information made its
way to these organisations. That he was held in such high regard by these groups demonstrates
the key role that he played, and the impact that he had on the development of the British
discourse on Soviet dissenters.
That Reddaway was able to maintain this involvement with such as variety of groups is
even more impressive when it is remembered that he held an academic position at the london
School of Economics and Political Sciencesthroughout this period. Although there are clear links
between his academic work and his activism, he was able to manage both of these demanding
areas with apparent ease, highlighting the dedication with which he worked for Soviet dissidents.
His academic position was undoubtedly a great advantage for him, giving him the deserved
reputation of expertise which was utilised in his efforts. Reddaway's life is intertwined with the
campaigns of British human rights groups working for Soviet dissidents, something that
demonstrates how engaged he was in these campaigns, and the personal sacrifices that he had to
make.
Michael Bourdeaux, like Reddaway, is another individual whose life has been totally
shaped by his involvement in his work for Soviet dissenters. Unlike Reddaway, Bourdeaux's
activism occurred virtually exclusively through Keston College, an organisation that is arguably
best seen as a direct extension of his academic, personal and spiritual interests. It is not an
exaggeration to note that Bourdeaux's commitment to Keston, and the personal sacrifices that he
made effectively ensured that the organisation effectively documented the plight of religious
believers in the Soviet Union. Whilst Bourdeaux didn't have the overarching influence on the
network of human rights activists that Reddaway had, it is clear that he had a significant influence
on the public consciousness of Soviet dissenters was strong. His reputation led to personal
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meetings with Margaret Thatcher, which doubtless improved the stature of Keston, and
promoted the plight of Soviet dissidents further.
It is easy to talk of these individuals 'sacrificing' their time and money in their campaigns
for unknown dissenters on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Yet, given the emotion that was
undoubtedly tied up with the efforts of these individuals, this term feels slightly out of place.
Taking the 35's into account, it is clear that the work of this group was built on a strong
relationships with refuseniks that could be described as familial. Michael Sherbourne's lengthy
telephone conversations with refuseniks were based on an altruistic desire to help. These
telephone conversations came to dominate the spare time that Sherbourne had, when he was not
working as a teacher. The desire to help those in need arguably offset the huge impact on his
personal time that these interviews took. Alongside Sherbourne's efforts, the 35's campaigns
were driven by a group of impressively organised and driven women. The extravagant nature of
their protests was something clearly shaped by the leading personalities of the group. Rita Eker
and Margaret Rigal are both strong characters, who were deeply committed to their campaign,
something that might go some way to explain its successes.This personal drive was arguably due
to the recognition that any risk that a 35er faded into insignificance in comparison to the freedom
of refuseniks for whom they campaigned for.
The role of the individual is also clear in the work of Amnesty International, which was
born out of Peter Benenson's personal concern for prisoners of conscience around the world.
Although this organisation is much larger and in some sensesmore bureaucratised than others
covered in this thesis, the influence of individuals can be keenly observed in Amnesty's campaigns
on the Soviet Union. These individuals are, on the whole, all but nameless in the archival material
regarding their campaigns. Despite this, it is clear that Amnesty's Soviet researchers undertook a
huge task in their work, investing personally in the output of the organisation. The demands
placed on researchers such as Bruce laird and Clayton Yeo,who both conducted their research on
the Soviet Union alongside administrative roles in Amnesty's research department, were
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extremely high. That they managed to produced such scholarship in these testing conditions is a
testament to their personal efforts.
One gets a clear sense of frustration from reading Amnesty documents regarding the
Soviet researchers. Not frustration out of the high level of work and demands of their positions,
but a frustration with the inability to do more to help prisoners of conscience behind the Iron
Curtain. This is revealing of the type of individual that worked for Amnesty, both in this period and
arguably to this day. Involvement in such an organisation necessitates a genuine personal concern
for the plight of political prisoners. This emotive concern goes some way to suggest why such an
understaffed and ill-equipped team of researchers managed to produce such a vast amount of
material in such a short period of time. Without the personal drive from these individuals, it is
unlikely that such a quantity of material would have been produced.
All of the human rights groups covered in the course of this thesis are largely driven by
the activism of one individual. Whilst the historiography on human rights in the Cold War has
focused to date largely on the role played by international statesmen, there were another set of
individuals that played a substantial part in the developing position of human rights. The
important role played by these individuals should be noted as a key part of the campaign
movement in Britain to publicise the persecution of dissidents in the Soviet Union. These
individuals all had a committed work ethic combined with a strong motivation to dedicate a vast
amount of personal, emotional and financial resource to their respective campaigns. Had this not
been present, these groups would not have been as influential on public consciousness as they
were. It is interesting to note that the emotional drive of these individuals did not come into
conflict with the empirical method adopted by human rights groups in this period. Indeed, that
such emotionally charged campaigns relied upon empiricism is doubtless linked to the overall
successof these organisations.
Whilst the high level political negotiations are important, in the context of the Cold War,
the role played by these activists was equally important in generating public support for human
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rights. Not only did these activists, and the organisations that they ran, distribute the latest
information on dissenters to a" levels of British society, but they also utilised their positions to
influence the decisions made by official bodies. In most instances, this influence reached the
highest levels of British government.
Given the emerging literature on the role of human rights in the Cold War, it is essential
to consider those in the West that campaigned to protect human rights in the Soviet Union. A" of
these groups challenged the accepted norms regarding the Soviet Union, and experienced
personal hardships that could have ended their campaigns. It is a testament to these determined
individuals that these groups were as successful as they were, and their efforts should rightly be
acknowledged in the historiography of the ColdWar.
There is much scope for further research into the international response to the human
rights violation of Soviet dissenters. This thesis has focused on the period leading up to the
dramatic political changes under Mikhail Gorbachev. The policies of perestroika and glasnost
changed the political composition of the Soviet Union beyond recognition, and played a
substantial part in the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Dissidents came to occupy a dramatically
different position in society, in some casesthey occupied minor positions in government. The role
played by international human rights activists clearly changed in this period, having to respond to
the increasing liberalisation in the political arena. This thesis has highlighted the important role
that human rights groups played in shaping British opinion on the Soviet dissident movement, and
how they influenced official policy towards the Soviet Union, something that undoubtedly
continued until the end of the ColdWar.
The role that Soviet dissidents played in the Cold War is something that wi" undoubtedly
occupy the attention of historians for many years to come. Human rights dominated international
relations in the course of the Cold War, something that impacted on domestic political
developments around the world. This thesis has demonstrated that the concern for human rights
abuse in the Soviet Union mobilised activists in Britain, who impacted on the perception of
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dissidents through their activism and directly influenced public opinion on their plight. Human
rights activists in Britain held substantial influence over both the flow of information regarding
Soviet dissidents, but also over the way in which official organisations responded to their plight. It
is essential to consider the Soviet dissident movement in this light, remembering that their plight
was not limited domestically. The Soviet dissident movement must be considered in an
international context in order to fully understand the impact that they had in this period. Whilst
scholarship on human rights in the Cold War to date has focused predominantly on statesmen
and high-level political interactions, it is clear that there was an undercurrent of human rights
activism in Britain that was influential on these international developments. These human rights
groups played an important role in raising public awareness of Soviet dissidents in Britain, and
their efforts should not be underestimated.
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Appendix 1 - Amnesty International Source Material
This thesis has utilised an array of sources from several different repositories of Amnesty
International's material.
Amnesty reference individual documents using a system of codes from around November
1972 onwards. For example, the 1979 report, The Death Penalty. Amnesty International Report
was give the code ACT 50/003/1979. The first three letters of this code refer to the content of
report. These three letter abbreviations cover the following areas:
• ACT-Action
• AFR-Africa
• AM E- America
• ASA-Asia
• EUR- Europe
• FIN - Finance
• MOE - Middle East
• NR - News Release
• NWS- News
• ORG - Organisation
The series of numbers are unique to the individual document, ending with the year of
publication. Where available, Amnesty materials referenced in this chapter include reference to
this document code in square brackets alongside the archival repository in which it was used for
this research. Documents referenced without this unique document code are denoted [No Ref].
References to Amnesty documentation in this chapter use the following abbreviations:
• IDC - Amnesty Microfiche collection produced by IDC, held at Marylebone Public library.
• IEC- International Executive Committee
• IISG - Internationaallnstituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (International Institute of Social
History, Amsterdam)
• MRC - Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick
• UA - Urgent Action report
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Appendix 2 - Royal College of Psychiatrists Telegram
to APA and AUSNP
The Abuse of Psychiatry on the Basis of the Political Dissent633
Communication from the Council of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, 9th
November 1973
Dr. A. M. Freedman,
American Psychiatric Association
1700 Eighteenth Street, N.W.,
Washington D.C., 200009, U.S.A
Professor A. V. Snezhnevsky
All-Union Society of Psychiatrists,
c/o Institute of Psychiatry of the Academy of
Medical Sciences of the USSR,
Zagorodnye shosse 2,
Moscow M-152.
The Royal College of Psychiatrists is concerned at the reports it has
received about the alleged abuse of psychiatry in the management of individuals who take up a
position of political dissent.
Accusations have been levelled at psychiatrists in various countries and
we appreciate that reports on such matters are liable to some distortion, particularly when they
are transmitted by individuals unfamiliar with psychiatric practice. Nevertheless for humane and
scientific reasons and in order to redeem the good name of psychiatry the world over, we
consider it a matter of urgent necessity that practical steps should be taken in the immediate
future. We would like, therefore, to ask colleagues in learned bodies in a number of countries,
including your own, to join with us in the investigation of individual instances of alleged abuse.
We have in mind an impartial commission of enquiry by a broadly based group of psychiatrists of
high repute, drawn from a number of countries. In the long term task of looking at the wider
ethical problems in this field, we are prepared to co-operate with any action taken by
international organisations.
A similar communication has been sent to the E.E.C. countries,




Royal College of Psychiatrists
633 Copy of Telegram sent to Dr A. Freedman of the APA and Prof. A. Snezhnevsky of the AUNSP, 9
November 1973, RCPsych, SCOUPPSoviet Union.
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Appendix 3 - Open letter from Michael Sherbourne
THIS IS NOT AN INFORMATION SHEET. IT IS AN ACCUSATION634•
What has happened to the campaign in this country on behalf of Shcharansky?
Why is there no screaming and no shouting? OUR LEADERSARE SILENT. Our national council
seems to be in hibernation.
We have a salaried Executive Director who gives the appearance of doing NOTHING.
We have a National Chairman who says only: "Well Shcharansky should not have got mixed up
with the Helsinki Monitoring Group in Moscow. He was a naughty boy. He should not have been
associating with those non-Jews. They are dissidents and we must always remember that we are
not anti-Soviet. Anatoly has been naughty."
What kind of disgraceful dangerous drivel is this from a person in her responsible position? Do our
Jewish leaders really want to see Anatoly Shcharansky put on trial and given a long ten or fifteen
year sentence of imprisonment or even suffer the death sentence?
Our chairman is busy - so there cannot be any meeting of the Executive until September zs"-
SIX MONTHS - yes indeed, six months - since the last meeting. Is there no emergency? Can
Shcharansky wait? Can Professor Lerner wait? Can all the other Refuseniks sit down and wait?
WHAT KIND OF DISGRACEFULATTITUDE ISTHIS?
An innocent man stands in danger of being put on trial for his life and then if he is executed our
leaders will ask us to stand in silence for one minute as they did for Yefim Davidovitch (for whom
they did nothing while he was alive). We shall say Kaddish and we shall mourn - we Jews love to
mourn - but meanwhile our leaders are too busy to put themselves out for him.
Shcharansky's friends in Moscow have asked us to try and form some sort of Tribunal as was
arranged for Dr. Shtern - but we are told that this would take too long to organise - so nothing is
done. Mr. John McDonald a.c. who was asked by Irina Orlova to act as her husband's advocate,
arranged two Press Conferences; the National Council was invited to both. Both invitations were
ignored - i.e. treated with contempt. When asked if she would attend the first, our National
Chairman replied "Good Lord, nol" or words to that effect. The second took the form of a mock
trial with witnesses. Vitali Rubin was brought specially from Jerusalem for this purpose. He gave
evidence as to the truth of the documents dealing with divided families, with the persecution of
Davidovitch and with the harassment of the Jewish families in the Collective Village of lIyinka
because of their desire to emigrate to Israel, constantly being refused by the Soviet authorities.
There are about 2 dozen of them already in Israel but when McDonald asked our Chairman how
he could obtain testimony from them she replied that she knew of none in Israel. Naturally she
didn't bother to enquirell told Vitali how to find them and he brought their testimony on tape. I
was the other Jewish witness and I gave testimony as to the truth of the document detailing large-
scale disconnection of telephones of the Jewish Refuseniks. But the official body representing the
interests of Soviet Jewry was "conspicuous by its absences". It is any wonder that Shcharansky
received hardly a mentions at this mock trial?
634 Copy of open letter fro Michael Sherbourne, dated 28 June 1977, available at UofS MS 254/1/3/9-
Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry Admin.
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Why have we not appointed a lawyer to act on Shcharansky's behalf in this country? In Paris a
leading French advocate has been appointed - Maitre Roland RAPOPORT- why have we not even
looked for a leading British Lawyer to act in liaison with Maitre Rapoport? In France Prof. Laurent
Schwartz has formed a Committee of Mathematicians in Defence of Shcharansky. Why has
something similar not been done here with Mathematicians, Computer Programmers,
Chessplayers?
In Moscow, in his tiny cell or in the forbidding atmosphere of the Interrogation room in the
Lefortovo, Shcharansky has no lawyer. None can be found with both the necessary courage and
the necessary clearance to defend him. The only lawyers offered to him by the Soviet authorities
are prepared - not to proclaim his innocence - but to declare him guilty and plead for a lighter
sentence. They will perhaps get him 12 years instead of 15 or DEATH.
YET SHCHARANSKY IS INNOCENT OF ANY CRIME EXCEPTTHAT OFWANTING TO LIVE IN ISRAEL
AND OF EXPOSINGTHE INHUMANITY OF THE SOVIETSTO THEIR JEWISH MINORITY.
But Heaven forbid that we should be accused of being anti-Soviet, for our leaders say that that is
why Shcharansky is in trouble today. Our leaders and salaried officers in both England and
America say that Shcharansky should not have got mixed up with the Helsinki Monitoring Group
in Moscow. Let us look at the truth:-
Yuri Orlov, a non-Jew, Chairman of the Group, is being charged under Article 190-1"Defamation
of the Soviet State etc." Maximum Penalty - THREE years. Minimum Penalty - a fine of 100
roubles.
Anatoly Shcharansky, a Jew, a member of the Group, representing Jewish interests is being held
under Article 64a (and let us have no more of this nonsense that appeared in "The Bulletin" about
there being a "confused picture"). HIGH TREASON - Maximum Penalty - DEATH. Minimum
Penalty - TEN years.
Clearly Shcharansky is on trial for his life because he is a Jewish leader and meanwhile Jewish
leaders here twiddle their thumbs - they have forgotten DREYFUS- they have forgotten MENDEL
BElLIS - they have forgotten the HOLOCAUST - they have never heard of ENTEBBE.
WE NEED ACTION NOW-TOMORROW MAY BETOO LATE
Shcharansky's friends in Moscow tell us that they fear that the Exit Permits for Azbel and Fein may
presage an early trial. We NEED ACTION NOW. NOW. NOW.
We must even now try to prevent this Show Trial from taking place. Once it does come to court it
will be too late. In Soviet "Justice" a defendant is only brought to trial when he is already declared
guilty. The "trial" is only to give public pronouncement to a verdict already decided in advance.
Shcharansky has not been arrested because of his association with the so-called dissidents. He is
in Lefortovo because he is a leader of those Jews who stand up to be counted as Jews.
Anatoly has been in prison since March 15. I challenge our Jewish Leaders to show that I am
wrong and that they have done anything dramatic or urgent since the London demo of April17
attended by about 6,000 out of nearly half a million Jews in this country.
WERE IT NOT FORTHE WONDERFUL LADIES OF THE 35'S for whom I HAVE THE GREATED
RESPECT,SHCHARANSKY'S NAME WOULD BE FORGOTTEN IN THIS COUNTRY.
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We have an Israeli representative here whose job is to direct and give some inspiration to this
campaign. Yes, we have an Israeli here who maintains a great diplomatic silence and whose
presence in this country and in this campaign goes almost unnoticed in this emergency - apart
from the dead weight of his hand on any positive activity. He probably doesn't realise that there is
an emergency.
Here I must quote from a letter I wrote to Mr. Nehemiah Levanon on 10. May, 1977.
"Dear Nehemiah,
I am writing to make an official complaint about your representative in London, Mr. Shmuel
HATZOR. As you know I have frequently sent to you office Lists of names of Jews in the Soviet
Union who are requesting invitations. However, since I have upset Mr. S. Hatzor personally,
because I responded in kind to his attack on me over the question of co-operation with non-Jews
to try to save Shcharansky, he has refused to accept some articles I sent him viz:
1. A Large envelope addressed to Dr. A. Luntz at Mevaseret Zion, containing amongst other
important papers a LISTOF MORE THAN 150 FAMILIES in the USSRwho are requesting
invitations.
2. An envelope addressed to him personally containing my latest new sheet. Will you please paint
out to Mr. Hatzor that in his official capacity he is not entitled to allow personal pique to enter
into the performance of his duties. His primary, and, I believe, his SOLEfunction here is to help
Jews in the Soviet Union who wish to emigrate to Israel. By Not accepting my news sheet he I not
keeping himself informed. That is his misfortune.
But by refusing to accept the lists of Jews who are asking for invitations from Israel to enable
them to apply for emigration for Aliyah, he is doing incalculable harm both to the campaign as a
while and to those more than 150 families in particular
"Disgraceful" is a word that is hardly adequate to describe his action and attitude. In my opinion
his attitude is CRIMINAL.
Incidentally, Misha Stiglets has confirmed to me that my information and attitude over the
Shcharansky case are correct in his opinion. He has told Hatzor so, and I understand Hatzor has
accepted this. However I have heard not a word from Hatzor in regard to this.
I await your early reply as I intend to publish this letter."
I am now publishing this letter which has neither received reply nor any acknowledgement. I am
not trying to be original. I can only copy the words of a much greater man than I will ever be-
Emile Zola - a Frenchman, a non-Jew, who fought to save the life of a Jew.
J'ACCUSEJ'ACCUSEJ'ACCUSE
He accused the French Government.
I accuse our Jewish Leadership of cowardice, blindness, ineptitude, complacency and I conclude
SHCHARANSKY MUST BESAVED.
Michael Sherbourne, London, 28. 6. 77'
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Appendix 4 - List of Keston College Publications
Keston Books:
1. M. Bourdeaux, Faith on Trial in Russia (London, 1971)
2. M. Bourdeaux, Patriarchs and Prophets: Persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church
Today (London, 1975)
3. G. Vins, Three Generations of Suffering (London, 1976)
4. UNKNOWN
5. M. Bourdeaux and K. Murray, Young Christians in Russia (London, 1976)
6. J. Ellis (Trans.), An Early Soviet Saint: The Life of Father Zachariah (London, 1976)
7. H.Brandenburg, The Meek and the Mighty: The Emergence of the Evangelical Movement
in Russia (London, 1976) [OR M. Bourdeaux, Religious Liberty in the Soviet Union: wee
and USSR:a post-Nairobi documentation (Keston, 1976)]*
8. UNKNOWN
9. M. Bourdeaux, Opium of the People: The Christian Religion in the USSR(2nd ed.)(London,
1977)
10. D. J. Dunn, The Catholic Church and the Soviet Government, 1939 -1949 (Columbia, 1977)
11. Christian Prisoners in the USSR1979 (Keston, 1979)
12. M. Bourdeaux, Land of Crosses: The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Lithuania, 1939-78
(Chulmleigh, 1979)
13. M. Sapiets(Trans.), The Unknown Homeland (London, 1978)
14. UNKNOWN
15. UNKNOWN
16. M. Bourdeaux, Risen Indeed: Lessons in Faithfrom the USSR(Purley, 1983)
17. L. and M. Bourdeaux, Ten Growing Soviet Churches (Bungay, 1987)
18. A. Tomsky, Catholic Poland (Keston, 1982)
19. M. Bourdeaux (ed.), May One Believe in Russia? - Violations of Religious Liberty in the
Soviet Union (London, 1980)
20. P.Walters and J. Balengarth, Light Through the Curtain (Tring, 1985)
21. L. Bourdeaux, Valeri Barinov: The Trumpet Calf (Basingstoke, 1985)
22. J. Ellis, Russian Orthodox Church: A Contemporary History (Beckenham, 1986)
23. J. Robertson, Be Our Voice: The Story of Michael Bourdeaux and Keston Colfege (London,
1984)
24. G. Sikorska, A Martyr for Truth: Jerzy Popielusko (London, 1985)
25. UNKNOWN
26. A. Ogorodnikov, A Desperate Cry (Keston, 1986)
27. UNKNOWN
28. G. Sikorska, Light and Life: Renewal in Poland (London, 1989)
29. P.Walters (ed.) World Christianity: Eastern Europe (MARC, 1988)
30. The Prisoners Lantern: Meditations by a Christian Prisoner in Ethiopia (Keston, 1988)
31. M. Bourdeaux, Gorbachev, Glasnost and the Bible (London, 1990)
32. M. Sapiets, True Witness: The story of Seventh Day Adventists in the Soviet Union (Keston,
1990)
33. R. Davies, After Gorbachev? (Eastbourne, 1991)
*Both The Meek and the Mighty and Religious Liberty in the Soviet Union have been attributed to
Keston Book Number 7
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Others (unnumbered)
• D. Rogers, Irina (Tring, 1987)
• M. Bourdeaux, Aida of Leningrad (Oxford, 1972)
• R. Harris and X. Howard-Johnston, Christian Appeals from Russia (london, 1969)
• A. Sorokowskii (ed.), For my name's sake: selections from the writings of losyp Terelya
(Keston, 1986)
• J. Ton, Marxism: The Faded Dream: A Christian Manifesto (Basingstoke, 1985)
• R.M. Yule, Religion in Communist Countries: A Bibliography of Books in English (Keston,
1979)
• Soviet Christian Prisoner List 1981 (Keston, 1981)
• Soviet Christian Prisoner list 1982 Update (Keston, 1982)
• What Are They Doing At Keston? (Keston, 1982)
Periodicals:
• Religion in Communist Lands 1973 - 1992
• Religion, State and Society 1992 - Present (Control of Journal passed to Taylor and Francis
in 1999)
• Frontier 1987 to 2006
• Kesten Newsletter 2006 to Present
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• Canon Michael Bourdeaux
o 24 February 2010, 12:30pm, Athenaeum Club, Pall Mall, London.
o 19 May 2010, 10.00am, 'Bourdeaux House', Oxford.
• Vladimir Bukovsky
o 18 January 2011, 4.00pm, 'Bukovsky's House', Cambridge.
• Xenia Dennen
o 21 May 2010, 11.00am, 'Dennen Residence' Holborn, London.
• Lord Greville Janner
o 25 May 2010, S.OOpm, Lords Terrace, House of lords, Westminster, London.
• Professor Harold Merskey
o 22 October 2010, 3.00pm, Telephone interview.
• Professor Peter Reddaway
o OSJuly 2010, 10.00am, 'Reddaway's House', Maclean, Virginia, US.
o 08 September 2011, 10.00am, 'Reddaway's House', Maclean, Virginia, US.
• Margaret and George Rigal
o 2S February 2010, 2.00pm, 'Rigal Apartment', St. Johns Wood, London.
• Michael Sherbourne
o 09 May 2011, 11.00am, 'Sherbourne's House', N. Finchley, London.
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o OSJanuary 2011, 2.00pm, Telephone Interview.
• Or Robert Van Voren
o 11 January 2011, 3:00pm, 'CADS bar', Paddington, London.
• Or Philip Walters
o 19 May 2010, 2.30pm, Corpus Christi College SCR,Oxford.
Notes for interviews and transcripts
• All start times are approximate and based on the British time zone, with the exception of
interviews with Peter Reddaway which are based on US Eastern Time.
• If the interview took place at an Interviewees place of residence, full details are not
disclosed. Instead the Interviewees surname and type of house are listed instead, i.e.
'Bourdeaux House'.
• Transcriptions of these Interviews are verbatim, with no notation of intonation or pace of
delivery. Transcripts are unavailable for the interviews with Harold Merskey and Tom
Stoppard, which both took place over the telephone.
• All of these interviews were semi-structured around two main questions:
o How were you involved with British groups campaigning for Soviet dissenters?
o How do you feel your efforts were received?
• Quotations within this piece are made from the transcript of the interview, with pauses
and hesuanons (such as um, erm and ah) removed. Words added to these quotes in order
to maintain continuity and fluency are placed In square brackets.
• Copies of transcripts are available from the author on request.
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